COLOMBIA: POLITICS UNCHAINED

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R00967A000500030014-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 18
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 31, 2006
• Sequence Number: 14
• Publication Date: November 3, 1972
• Content Type: MEMO

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Confidential
OFFICE OF
NATIONAL ESTIMATES
MEMORANDUM
Colombia: Politics Unchained
Confidential
3 November 1972
Copy No.
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WARNING
This document contains information affecting the national
defense of the United States, within the meaning of Title
18, sections 793 and 794, of the US Code, as amended.
Its transmission or revelation of its contents to or re-
ceipt by an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
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CONFIDENTIAL
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES
3 November 1972
SUBJECT: Colombia: Politics Unchained*
Colombia was regarded as a showcase for the Alliance for
Progress during the early 1960s. It still retains many positive
features by the usual US standards: a commitment to constitu-
tional politics, a pro-US foreign policy, a talent for private
enterprise, a military seemingly content to counter insurgents,
and economic prospects that are better than fair. Mixed with
are
a his ory o fratricidal partisanship;
challenges to the establishment not only from demagogic populism
but from such other self-proclaimed champions of the people as
revolutionary guerrillas and priests; and such typical problems
of developing nations as gross income inequalities and rapid
population growth.
Maneuvering has already begun for the general elections in
1974 -- the first unrestricted contest since political party
leaders agreed on a National Front arrangement 15 years ago.
Prospects for the moderate political forces look better now than
This paper has been discussed with other components within
CIA, but has not been formally coordinated.
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they did when the last estimate was prepared (Colombia, NIE 88-71,
15 April 1971). In particular, the immediate threat from the
anti-establishment ANAPO seems to have collapsed. A new estimate
may prove useful sometime next year. This memorandum provides an
interim assessment of the various political elements operating
for and against peaceful passage to more openly competitive and
uncertain politics.
*******
The National Front 1958-1974 (R.I.P.)
1.
Political rivalry under its two-party system has had
a religious ferocity about it, so that intolerance between Conser-
vatives and Liberals has led the country over and over again into
civil war. The last round of political strife, in the 1950s, cost
hundreds of thousands of lives, a national horror institutionalized
in the language and literature as Za vioZeneia.
2. In 1953 the partisan warfare became so rabid that the
political leaders accepted the military dictatorship of General
Rojas Pinilla as a lesser evil, despite a strong tradition of
civilian rule. By 1957, Rojas' authoritarianism met the combined
resistance of the traditional parties, the Church, and the business
community. The military withdrew support from Rojas and he was
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forced from office. After Rojas' ouster, the armed forces resumed
their accustomed role as unequivocal supporters of the constitu-
tional government.
3. In 1958, Colombia began a unique political experiment,
a 16-year long entente called the National Front. The scheme in-
volved a strict sharing of power between Liberals and Conservatives,
with the presidency alternating between parties every four years,
and with every other public office or body manned jointly on a
50-501basis. The war-weary public accepted this contrivance of
their political craftsmen, hoping the Front would correct the par-
tisan fanaticism that plagued the nation.
4. This system has operated with great difficulty. It has
been frequently crisis-ridden, regularly strained by the con-
tinual splintering of the parties and sometimes paralyzed by the
requirement that important laws need a two-thirds majority. Still,
the bipartisan spirit has survived in better shape than even most
of the architects of the pact expected ten years ago. The agreed
alternation of the presidency and most of the parity requirements
are scheduled to end with the term of incumbent Conservative
President Misael Pastrana in 1974.
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5. The prospect of open politics is a source of great
anxiety in Colombia, for a variety of reasons. Most obviously,
since Conservatives and Liberals still are far from fond of each
other, they are apprehensive about testing whether the National
Front has expunged their fratricidal tendencies. There is also
some concern that the artificiality of politics over the past 15
years has rendered the traditional political groups impotent and
near collapse. This fear was sharpened by a spectacular tilt at
the establishment by former dictator Rojas Pinilla. His ANAPO
party, an undefinable coalition of the anti-establishment, the
discontented, and the politically adventurous, came near to vic-
tory in the 1970 presidential election.
6. On the other hand, some Colombians look eagerly to the
end of what they believe has been a great national stagnancy. They
blame the slow pace of national development on the peculiar poli-
tics of the Front, in that it has reduced the need for political
competition for popular favor. In the Latin American context of
formidable obstacles to development and modernization, Colombia's
record of economic growth has been good, while its achievements in
social reforms have been only fair. The economic growth rate has
been an encouraging 6 to 7 percent per year. But because of the
low starting point (a per capita GNP of less than $400 per year)
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and the rapid expansion of population (more than 3 percent per year),
the economic gains are spread thin. And while increasing numbers
of people benefit from the steady growth of the modern sector of
the economy, the numbers doomed to unrelieved poverty are also
rising. Recent governments have paid increased attention to the
need for improving the economic condition of the poorest classes.
Nonetheless, the dominant theme remains economic growth not social
justice; and, in any case, the popular programs launched so far do
not seriously challenge the special interests of the political and
economic elites.
7. During these final months of transition from the National
Front to something new there will be sharp maneuvering for advan-
tage. A basic question is whether the country any longer has a
two-party system. The Conservative and Liberal "parties" have
become, under the Front, collections of squabbling personalist
factions. The end of the Front is an obvious opportunity to re-
align the political forces. The various jefes are appraising and
weighing possible new combinations; some are toying with the idea of
going it alone. A sense of excitement of being at the threshold
of a new era has gripped the country and has lured all the well-
known political figures, including ex-presidents and sons of
presidents, to the front of the stage.
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8. Much of the tension and insecurity about the future re-
lates to the new mood of the electorate. Although the traditional
parties have a long history and broad popular followings, govern-
ment in Colombia has been the domain of the aristocrats, who call
the shots. The roll of Colombian leaders includes generations of
such illustrious names as Lleras, L6pez, Ospina, Gomez. Popular
alienation became an ominous force in 1970, when Rojas Pinilla's
promise to take power away from these oligarchs proved a potent
electoral approach, leaving him a mere 63,000 (out of 4 million)
shy of victory. And this was not an isolated manifestation of
active popular discontent. Labor has been striking, peasants have
been seizing land, and rural violence, urban terrorism, and uni-
versity disturbances have continued to come in waves. As a result,
the political regulars, the "good families" of Colombia, have be-
come more sensitive to, and perhaps a bit frightened of, the future
electoral appeal of intruders on their scene such as Rojas.
9. The transition period will be confusing and dangerous.
For Colombia to make the passage to a new political phase with a
healthy body politic will require sophisticated leadership and
probably a good deal of luck. If, for example, personal and
philosophical distinctions prove strong enough to keep various
party factions apart and independent, the electorate will have to
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deal with an array of ill-defined tickets and the prospect of an
unprecedented minority president. This is the kind of development
that would be most likely to rekindle all the old grievances,
spark particularist violence, and move Colombia into the ranks
of the problem areas of the hemisphere.
Lining Up for the New Politics
10. Every politician is looking for the magic combination
that will spell victory at the polls in 1974, and many alliances
may be made and broken between now and the final presentation of
an election line-up. Any coalition of factions within or between
parties will require glossing over longstanding differences and
hatreds, but in the end probably the centripetal forces will win
out. We expect some semblance of the familiar two-party national
structure to emerge.
11. In the Liberal camp, which only a few weeks ago seemed
hopelessly split between evenly matched and determined rivals,
movement toward unity has begun. Some of Colombia's best known
politicos are engaged in a contest for all the Liberal chips, and
the one who seems to hold the high cards is ex-president Carlos
Lleras Restrepo (1966-1970). He and Alfonso Lopez Michelson, old
rivals and now partners, lead a faction called "dissident" or
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"progressive". Their differences with the more conventional offi-
cial Liberals led by Julio Cesar Turbay and backed by ex-president
Alberto Lleras Camargo (1958-1962) are both philosophical and per-
sonal. Following several elaborate power plays, from rump con-
ventions to a plebiscite, Carlos Lleras managed to capture the
party leadership at a convention last month. The question is
whether he or anyone else can hold the factions together and-pre-
sent a united front at the elections. A compelling argument for
unity is that together the party factions drew a 46 percent plur-
ality in the departmental and local elections last April.* Carlos
Lleras also draws a parallel with 1946, when a Liberal split
allowed a Conservative presidential victory and created the pre-
lude to the civil strife of the 1950s.
12. A single Liberal candidate would strengthen the cause of
unity on the Conservative side. Now the Conservatives are po-
larized between the followers and opponents of Alvaro Gomez Hurtado.
Gomez is in personality and philosophy a resurrection of his de-
ceased father, Laureano Gomez, the reactionary Conservative
Party vote totals were: Liberals, 1,383,708; Conservatives,
917, 699; ANAPO, 559.,821; Communist and other small groups,
124,000. The Liberal vote was split almost evenly between
slates representing the "officials" and the "dissidents"..
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president (1950-1953) most despised by the Liberals. Neither is
the young Gomez well liked in his own Conservative circles, where
his undisguised effort to dominate the party and lock up its
presidential nomination are bitterly resented, and where his
arch-conservatism is not easily swallowed by his more enlightened
colleagues. Opposition to Gomez has behind it the growing pres-
tige and influence of incumbent President Pastrana, as well as
the support of the party's grand old man, Mariano Ospina (presi-
dent, 1946-1950). If Gomez carries out his threat to run in 1974
regardless of the outcome of the party convention next year, there
may be two Conservative candidates.
13. A puzzler in the political mix is ANAPO, whose roller-
coaster fortunes mocked the conventional wisdom of both 1970 and
1972. ANAPO's strong showing in the 1970 presidential contest un-
nerved the establishment and created a scramble among opportunists
to board the Rojas bandwagon. Then in this year's election, ANAPO's
weak draw of less than a fifth of the vote -- as unexpected as its
good showing in 1970 -- buoyed the traditional parties and set off
a chain of defections from the Rojas camp. ANAPO's loss of follow-
ing has been so large that its chances for recuperation seem poor.
They depend in the first instance on the physical competence of
Rojas, 72 and in delicate health -- or secondarily on the ability
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of his daughter, Mara Eugenia, to take up his mantle if neces-
sary. The odds seem slim that the group could stay together
without General Rojas to bind the disparate membership. Thus
a key issue for the future may be where ANAPO's former consti-
tuency of the disgruntled will end up.
14. There is some talk of prolonging the National Front, an
option leaders in both parties have an interest in keeping open.
Renewal of the Front would close the presidential nomination to
the "wrong" candidate (such as Lopez or Gomez) who would be ana-
thema to large numbers in both parties. Some of the talk is for
purposes of keeping lines open to groups in the opposite camp who
might be coalition partners if the traditional parties fail to
unite. Moreover, the leaders see utility in keeping alive the
notion of bipartisanship, foreseeing a continuing need for legis-
lative cooperation to implement policy. But opposition to con-
tinuing a Front is strenuous: Liberals do not want to share 50-50
with a Conservative minority and Conservatives do not trust the
Liberals to do so. We would expect resort to the Front only in a
last ditch effort to preserve a threatened peace.
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Prospects
15. The course for Colombians will be difficult over the next
few years and we do not discount the possibility that the
style of politics of the past will revive. But we believe the
chances are good that the pragmatic and patriotic character of the
Colombian leadership will in the end overcome baser partisan in-
stincts. We expect the oligarchic (but paternalistically democratic)
clique, which has already demonstrated a certain fortitude in ad-
versity by sticking out 15 years of the uncomfortable Front pact,
will again devise a new arrangement that is both reasonably effec-
tive and generally dominated by the moderate forces.
16. The ANAPO phenomenon sharpened the fear of isolation from
the people among the ruling group, and the first result of the scare
was to draw into instant cooperation all the feuding families con-
stituting the establishment.
__F
The
electoral returns in 1972 show that this effort worked. Thus, in
practical terms, the ANAPO threat clearly helped to resuscitate
Colombia's flagging traditional parties.
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17. Indeed, it also may have served to upgrade the "other
Colombians" in the eyes of the ruling group. Having seen an
alarming number of Colombians seduced by Rojas' promises, the
political regulars are likely to pay more serious attention to
the electorate than in the past. The moneyed sectors seem to
understand somewhat better the necessity to effect change per-
ceptible enough to give most Colombians a sense of having a stake
in things. In general, the Liberal party is considerably more
attuned to the aspirations of the various classes and more com-
fortable with populist programs than the business-inclined Con-
servatives. Either group in power, however, is likely to have a
pretty good feel for what is necessary for survival. Prospects
for the economy are good enough to provide some margin for further
economic and social programs. Certainly, some problems will not
yield even to vigorous attack and eruptions of discontent probably
will mar the scene from time to time, as they have in the past.
But at least for the next few years, we expect that the politicians
will be innovative enough and responsive enough to maintain control
of the political and social pressures for change.
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Confidential
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SUBJECT: Supplemental Distribution of MEMORANDUM: Colombia:
Politics Unchained
STATE: Mr. John Hugh Crimmins, ARA/LA
Ray S. Cline, INR/OD
NSC: Mr. Jorden
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MEMORANDUM FOR: Ray S. Cline
A copy of the attached Memorandum has been
sent to Mr. John Crimmins, ARA-LA.
~. jOIIN14-IUIZENGA
Director
National Estimates
3 November 72
(DATE)
FORM NO.
1 AUG 54
REPLACES FORM 10.101
WHICH MAY BE USED.
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