NOTE TO AMBASSADOR LUCIUS BATTLE FROM ABBOT SMITH

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R00967A000800010005-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 17
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 30, 2006
• Sequence Number: 5
• Publication Date: May 23, 1968
• Content Type: NOTES

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Ambassador Lucius Battle
You may be interested in this estimative
paper on Iraq.
ABBOT EMITS
Director
National Estimates
23 May 1968
Identical memo & Att fwd to:
Mr. Rodger Davies, Dep. Asst Secy, NE,, State
Mr. l[arold Saunders, NSC
Mr. cMarry H. Schwartz, Dep. Ass't Secy NESA, MEOSC/ISA
Mr. Maurice J. Williams, AA/NESA, AID
Mr. John C. Campbell, Policy Planning Council, State
Mr. George Carroll (VP Office) 121 East Bldg, 2.30 E St
Other distribution of Attachment only:
Allan Evans (State)
DIA)
(NSA)
Col. W. W. Cover (ACSI)
Capt. R. W. F. Werthmuller (On)
AFNIN
11-6 F
MORI/CDF pages 2-17
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Secret
SPECIAL
MEMORANDUM
BOARD OF
NATIONAL ESTIMATES
IRAQ: The Stagnant Revolution
Secret
22 May 1968
No. 11-68
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WARNING
This document contains information affecting the national
defense of the United States, within the meaning of Title
1.8, sections 793 and 794, of the US Code, as amended.
Its transmission or revelation of its contents to or re-
ceipt by an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
cx~~ur i
CX Lf DFD FROM AD POMAnc
DQ N(.NADING AND
L E I AASIFIC CSCIN
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22 May 1968
SPECIAL MEMORANDUM NO. 11-68
SUBJECT: Iraq: The Stagnant Revolution*
Ten years have elapsed since the revolution in Iraq, but
the government continues to be ineffective and fumbling. The
regime is dominated by the military, and military backing gives
it a firm grip on power, but it has no real basis of popular
support. Kurdish dissidence still smolders in northern Iraq,
since the government is unable to stamp it out and unwilling to
settle with it. The emergence of political leadership capable
of giving direction to the country is unlikely.
Iraq has traditional interests and claims in the Persian
Gulf, and the impending British withdrawal may bring Baghdad
to pay more attention to the Gulf region. But it is likely to
react to developments there rather than to take initiatives.
This memorandum was prepared by the Office of National
Estimates. It was discussed with representatives of the
Office of Current Intelligence, the Office of Economic
Research, and the Clandestine Services, who are in general
agreement with its judgments.
GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
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1. Ten years have elapsed since the revolution in Iraq
ousted the monarchy, destroyed the power of the land-holding
class, and drastically reduced ties to the US and the UK.
Domestic political, social, and economic affairs have since
pre-occupied the country. Indeed, under Qasim Iraq was
isolationist. In the five years since his overthrow, however,
Iraq's various governments have been involved in broad Arab
interests, though Baghdad has not been an exporter of revolution
as have Cairo and Damascus. Though its seaborne trade and more
than a third of its oil exports pass through the Gulf, Iraq's
major foreign policy concerns are with the Arab states Vest
of it and with the Arab-Israeli question. Its relations with
Iran focus on Kurdistan and Kuuzistan, Except for the now
dormant claim to Kuwait, governments in Baghdad have paid
relatively little attention to the Persian Gulf. But the
impending British withdrawal is likely to stimulate Iraq's
interest in that region.
Domestic Affairs
2. The military establishment has dominated Iraqi govern-
ments since the 1958 revolution, except for eight months in 1963,
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when the pan-Arab Socialist Baath Party held power. Although the
Iraqi officer corps is chiefly drawn from the Sunni Arab element
of the population,* the Iraqi military establishment is far from
united; factions within it support a variety of political ideo-
logies and parties. The army does not have the capacity to run
the government entirely by itself. Moreover, there is a wide-
spread feeling in Iraq that civilians should have a share in
governing. In these circumstances, the army must pay some heed
to public opinion; it has worked out arrangements whereby various
political elements have some share in government.
3. Formal political organizations in Iraq are few; the sole
legal party is the government-sponsored Iraqi Arab Socialist Union.
The pre-revolutionary political parties have disappeared, and most
individuals prominent in the public life of that period are no
longer active. The bulk of Iraqi politicians are split roughly
into a group of doctrinaire radicals and a somewhat larger group
of men of a moderate and pragmatic outlook. The Baath Party still
Of Iraq's eight million people, half are Shia Arabs living in
the area south of Baghdad. Sunni Arabs and Kurds each account
for about a fifth of the population, with several other minority
groups comprising the rest.
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functions, but is divided, and neither its radical pro-Syrian
faction nor its more conventional members enjoy much support.
4. Communist influence in Iraq is limited. The Iraqi
Communist Party has recovered somewhat from the injuries which
the Baath regime inflicted on it. It is split into three factions
by leadership quarrels and by pro-Moscow and pro-Peking attitudes.
While the Communists could emerge as a significant force in a
chaotic situation, they are unlikely to be more than a nuisance
at least as long as the present type of government prevails. The
Soviets themselves, despite the substantial military and economic
aid they have provided to Iraq, appear to have little influence
on the Iraqi regime's policy decisions.
5. The Iraqi political radicals, typified by National Oil
Company head Jadir and Prime Minister Yahya, want to emulate
the Egyptian approach to domestic affairs. They have concentrated
on imposing controls on the economy and are eager to get Iraqi
control of oil production. They also seek a highly centralized
political system, with all political activity limited to regime
sponsored and directed organizations. The moderates, whose
impeccable credentials as nationalists and Iraqi patriots protect
them against charges of foreign influence or self-interest, want
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a freer economy and a measure of choice in political matters.
They also feel that heavy involvement in intra-Arab affairs
operates against Iraq's best interests. They do not admire
Nasser, but they are careful to keep on good terms with him,
for they believe that an Iraqi regime strongly opposed to
Nasser cannot long survive.
6. The present Iraqi government is, in theory, a tran-
sitional one and is committed to write a new constitution and
hold free elections. In fact, such developments are probably
many years away. It is headed by President Abd al-Rahman Arif,
who was chosen as the least controversial man available to
succeed his dead brother, Abd al-Salam, in 1966. The President
has shown some sympathy for the moderate point of view but he
is not a strong figure. Of the various individuals who have
been Prime Minister, the most important are probably General
Tahir Yahya and Abd al-Rahman Bazzaz. Yahya, the present
incumbent, has generally been the leading spokesman for the
extremists, Bazzaz for the moderates. The extremists have
dominated the Iraqi regime since the overthrow of the Baath
in 1963, except for the year from mid-1965 to mid-1966 when
Bazzaz was Prime Minister. The balance of forces is such that
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no group feels powerful enough to take decisive steps; the result
is a situation in which many important political and economic
matters are simply ignored.
7. The civilian extremists are allied with like-minded
fellows in the senior levels of the military establishment and
are willing to let the army have its may in acquiring military
equipment and in taking a strong line with the Kurds. This
military-civilian combination has proved strong enough to ensure
that Iraq does not take positions in inter-Arab affairs seriously
at variance with those of Egypt. Domestically, the extremists
face opposition. The moderate faction's opposition has deterred
them, for example, from trying to re-institute the cumbersome
centralized banking, industrial, and commercial organization
which they constructed in 196+ and which the moderate government
of Bazzaz dismantled during its year in office. Nor have the
extremists lately tried very hard to put life into the Iraqi
Arab Socialist Union. Bazzaz and other moderate politicians
are publicly urging a return to a more representative form of
government, which by implication would be a non-military one.
Student demonstrations centering on Baghdad University during
February appear to have supported the moderates, although our
information on this is imprecise.
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8, These conditions of unstable equilibrium seem likely to
prevail for some time. The radical civilian-military combination
will probably continue successfully to resist pressures for more
representative government; Arab-Israeli tensions provide them
with a handy excuse for maintaining a "patriotic, united" govern-
ment. The factional tug of war will probably result in cabinet
changes from time to time. There is a possibility of an effort
to change the present government by violence. Some part of the
army would of necessity be involved in such an attempt -- perhaps
a group allied with a pan-Arab organization, e.g., the Baath or
the Arab Nationalists Movement, perhaps by some officer who sees
himself as the country's savior. Any coup group would face the
same problems of governance that the present regime does and
would probably be no more successful in overcoming them. While
such a government might be more radical than the present one,
deterioration of political affairs to a Syria-like situation
is improbable.
9. Over a period of years -- probably a decade or more --
there is a fair chance that moderate political forces will re-
assert themselves in Iraq. The demise of Nasser would deprive
the radical cause of much of its appeal; the moderates would be
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much less concerned about Cairo's political influence in Baghdad.
The existing Iraqi sentiment for government in some measure
responsive and responsible to the public is likely to grow,
especially among the professional, business and intellectual
classes which are politically important. At best, however, the
growth of moderate political forces will be slow and subject to
setbacks. It could be especially harmed should there be a series
of efforts at governmental change by coup.
its eighth year. Several years of fighting between Kurdish
tribesmen, led by Mustafa Barzani, and government forces have
left effective control of northern Iraq, except for principal
towns and main roads, in the hands of the Kurds. They continue
to receive aid from Iran and from Israel. The bulk of the Iraqi
army is in the North watching the Kurds, but it remains unable
to subdue them in the event of new fighting. Despite this
incapacity, sentiment in the army strongly opposes concessions
and favors imposing a harsh settlement on the Kurds. Nonetheless,
a large amount of commerce moves between government controlled
and Kurdish controlled areas.
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11. There have been only sporadic shooting incidents since
the Bazzaz government effected a cease-fire in 1966 and agreed
to assist in rehabilitating the North and to allow the Kurds a
measure of local government. The government in Baghdad is
supporting a faction of Kurds opposed to Barzani's leadership,
in order to weaken the chief Kurdish leader, both in the event
of new fighting and to limit his capacity to press the govern-
ment to carry out the provisions of the 1966 agreement. The
government is unlikely to concede to the Kurds legal control
of the North. Neither it nor Barzani wants new hostilities,
and continued stalemate is the most likely course. But there
are possibilities for miscalculation. Should serious fighting
break out, however, Baghdad would probably feel compelled to
withdraw most of the troops it has stationed in Jordan.
Oil and the Economy
12. 1967 was a bad year for oil revenues, which are the
principal source of Iraq's government income. In January and
February, Syria closed the Iraq Petroleum Company (IPC) pipe-
line to the Mediterranean; at the time of the Arab-Israeli war
in June, Iraq itself suspended oil shipments to the US, UK, and
West Germany. As a result, Iraq's oil revenue dropped from
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nearly $)400 million in 1966 to about $360 million in 1967.*
Future revenue from IPC is unlikely to be much above $450
million annually. Even so, these revenues are sufficient
to finance the Iraqi government's operations; overall
economic performance is likely to reflect the stagnation
in the political arena, though serious economic difficulties
are not likely.
13. Since 1961, when the Iraqi government seized the
non-producing portions of IPC's concession area (99.6 percent
of the total), IPC has spent virtually no money on capital
improvements. IPC raised production by 300,000 barrels a
day in 1963 shortly after Qasim was overthrown; production
increases since have been small, since the fields are pro-
ducing close to capacity. Baghdad worked out a draft agree-
ment with IPC in 1965, but did not ratify it because of
extremist opposition to dealing with "imperialist" oil concerns.
Although the IFC terms and offers from French and other Western
firms were lucrative, nationalist pride led Iraq in April 1968
to announce that the Iraqi National Oil Company would produce
The latter figure includes an advance of $22 million from
IPC in 1967, which must be repaid in 1968 and 1969.
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and market the oil from the most prolific area seized from IPC,
North Rumalia. Iraq may be able to have 100,000 barrels a day
for sale by 1971, but potential buyers are likely to offer
bilateral trade agreements rather than the hard currency Iraq
wants.
Foreign Relations
14. Iraq takes a generally neutralist stand in its
foreign policy, and is associated with Egypt on many area
issues. It rushed troops to aid Jordan in June 1967. These
forces remain and are active in supporting fedayeen operations
against Israel. Much of this support is probably due to the
initiative of local commanders; the Iraqi government is
verbally bellicose on Israel, but it is fairly well disposed
toward Jordan and its policy, in matters dealing with Israel,
is a prudent one of following the Egyptian lead.
15. Iraq's relations with Iran are correct, but flawed
by mutual suspicion. The Shah aids Barzani's Kurdish dissidents
in Iraq because he believes that such help keeps Iraq weak and
thus less able to help his enemy, Nasser. The Shah is also
concerned that Iraq might seek to stir up trouble among the
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Arabs of Khuzistan, where the southern part of the Iraq-Iran
border divides Arab tribes. In fact, Iraqi meddling in this
district has been on a very minor scale, and it is unlikely
that Baghdad would see much advantage in stirring up trouble
here.
16. Foremost of Iraq's interests in the Persian Gulf
is its claim to Kuwait. This was first put forth in the
1930s, surfaced briefly during the short Iraqi-Jordanian
union in 1958, and dramatically asserted by Qasim in 1961.
It presently is dormant, but most Iraqis believe that Kuwait
belongs to Iraq. The claim rests on a temporary submission
of the Shaikhs of Kuwait in the last century to the Ottoman
Pasha of Basra. Kuwait has bought diplomatic recognition
from Iraq by generous loans which it does not expect to be
repaid. The countries are now surveying the border between
them; actual demarcation would add to Kuwait's feeling of
legitimacy. Iraq would probably seize Kuwait if it thought
it could do so with impunity. But as long as other area
states, e.g., Saudi Arabia, Iran, and even Egypt remain
opposed to such action, the Iraqis are not likely to under-
take it. This is the more true as long as a substantial
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part of the Iraqi army is occupied in Jordan and most of the
rest faces the Kurds in northern Iraq.
17. With the impending departure of the British from
the Persian Gulf, the Iraqis will probably feel compelled to
demonstrate that they have a legitmate role there. In the
field of clandestine and subversive activities, Iraq has
given some support in the past to the Omani and Dhofari
rebel movements in the Sultanate of Muscat and Oman. It has
also assisted nationalist anti-regime elements in Bahrain.
These activities have not involved large numbers of people,
nor have they been pursued with much vigor. The British
were for a time concerned that Iraq might seek to promote
its claims to Kuwait by subversive means, but there is no
evidence that Iraq has attempted seriously to carry out
such action.
18. Over the next several years, Iraq's internal pre-
occupations -- Kurds, oil, and the domestic power struggle --
will absorb a great deal of its energies. Iraq will probably
continue to provide some assistance to anti-regime movements
in the smaller Gulf states, mostly on its own initiative, but
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occasionally in collaboration with the Egyptians. If such
movements gather momentum, particularly as the time of British
withdrawal draws nearer, Iraq would be likely to increase such
assistance. The level of such assistance would depend on such
factors as accessibility of the movement and its political
coloration. (The present Baghdad government would not give
much help to a Baathist group, for example.) In general, we
do not believe that the Iraqis will initiate much anti-regime
activity in the Gulf over the next few years, but that they
would respond to calls for aid, probably by providing sig-
nificant amounts of arms and training.
ABBOT SMITH
Chairman
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