THE CRISIS IN SOVIET-CZECHOSLOVAK RELATIONS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
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• Release Decision: RIPPUB
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• Document Page Count: 16
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 30, 2006
• Sequence Number: 6
• Publication Date: May 10, 1968
• Content Type: MEMO

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Secret
No Foreign Dissem
SPECIAL
MEMORANDUM
BOARD OF
NATIONAL ESTIMATES
The Crisis in Soviet-Czechoslovak Relations
?1O ..1/CDF Pages 1 thru 1 -
Secret
10 May 1968
No. 10-68
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Alk,
WARNING
this document contains information affecting the national
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Its transmission or revelation of its contents to or re-
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C E N T R A L I N T E L L I G E N C E A G E N C Y
OFFICE OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES
10 May 1968
SPECIAL MEMORANDUM NO. iO-68
SUBJECT: The Crisis in Soviet-Czechoslovak Relations
SUMMARY
During the last week or so Soviet concern over developments
in Czechoslovakia has clearly been increasing at a rapid rate.
We believe that the Soviets have issued a serious warning to Prague
to arrest its wayward course, and that., if this proves ineffective.,
Moscow intends to use additional sanctions. The best judgmewt that
can be made at this stage is that the Soviets will probably stop
short of military intervention. But the stakes for the Soviet
leaders are high,, and such a move can no longer be excluded.
This memorandum was produced solely by CIA, It was prepared by
the Office of National Estimates and coordinated with the Office
of Current Intelligence,
GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
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1. The Soviet leadership, after several months of fretting,
fuming, and temporizing, seems now to have decided that heavy
pressures will be needed to push the alarmingly wayward Czechs
back into line. Signs of this from Moscow, Prague, and elsewhere
have begun to accumulate at a startling rate, In the last day or
two there has been evidence of some Soviet troop movements in
Poland and East Germany toward Czechoslovak frontiers. Chances
of at least an open political clash of some sort between the two
countries, or of an open clash between contending forces within
Czechoslovakia, or of both, thus seem to be increasing, and
rapidly so.
The Moscow Meetings
2. Precisely what took place during Alexander Dubcek's
hurried trip to Moscow last weekend remains a mystery.
0
0
description of the meetings as "rough", however, seems
plausible. The Soviet leaders, who were inclined initially to
view post-Novotny political developments in Czechoslovakia as
"revisionist", are said to see them now -- as did Ulbricht from
the very beginning -- as "counterrevolutionary." (A similar change
in Soviet terminology took place in October 1956 vis-a-vis Hungary.)
The subsequent quick convocation in Moscow of the four Eastern
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European leaders who presumably share Soviet concern -- Ulbricht,
Gomulka, Kadar, and Zhivkov -- tends to substantiate the notion
that the Soviets talked tough to the Czechs. These leaders were
probably informed of what Brezhnev told Dubcek, what Dubcek had
to say for himself, and what the Soviets planned to do about
Czechoslovakia if Dubcek were not in a concessionary mood or if,
regardless of Dubcek's mood, Czechoslovakia continued to move
away from both Communism and the USSR.
3. Several other developments since Dubcek's visit to
Moscow also suggest that the Soviets arrived at some hard decision
last weekend. Dubeek himself, on his return to Prague!, was
reticent but did confess to the press that the Soviets were
anxious about the Czech situation, an admission subsequently
quoted, and thus confirmed, by Pravda. Dubcek also revealed
that economic proposals advanced by the Czechs -- probably asking
for more equitable trade relations and for a hard-currency loan --
would only be "studied" by the Soviets. Finally, Dubcek took
account of the USSR's growing inclination to brandish the Warsaw
Pact by asserting that (presumably contrary to Moscow suspicions)
Prague was still a loyal and participating Pact member.
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4+. Dubcek had hardly finished speaking before Tass issued
a stern and, in effect, official demand that the Czech press,
including the party press, end its campaign to implicate the USSR
in the death of Jan Masaryk (a demand which has since been ex-
plicitly and vehemently rejected by at least one Prague paper).
Next, Tass was promptly gone one better by Tribuna Ludu, voice
of the Polish party, which on 8 May came out and frankly declared
itself in favor of the forcible silencing by the leadership in
Prague of those responsible for the "alien, anti-socialist trend"
in Czechoslovakia. Chances are that Tribuna Ludu was speaking
for Moscow. If so, the Soviets have now warned in effect that
the Czech party will have to assert itself and regain control
of the press and, indeed, of the country as a whole, or else
face some very serious consequences.
5. The Soviet leaders are clearly concerned that events
may be getting out of hand in Czechoslovakia and, from their
perspective, they may be right. Even though they are probably
not persuaded that a capitalist restoration is imminent, they can
only be bewildered, pained, and frightened by the outpourings of an
unfettered press, the public clamor for a revival of Czech
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democracy, and the opening up of sensitive issues buried long ago
by Soviet stooges in Prague. More important perhaps, they
can only be alarmed by the spectacle of a Communist Party in
the hands of people unable or even unwilling to do anything
about all this. They must also be well aware that the future of
those Czechoslovak Communists most likely to try to reimpose pro-
Soviet orthodoxy is now in grave doubt; pressures for the con-
vocation of a Czechoslovak Party Congress in the near term seem
to have become almost irresistable, and such a Congress would
almost certainly remove Novotny holdovers from positions of
authority. Small wonder, then, that the Soviets may have issued
an ultimatum to Dubcek in Moscow. But even if they did, three
big questions remain: (1) How did Dubeek respond? (2) What
threats did the Soviets make? and (3) What measures are the
Soviets actually prepared to use against Czechoslovakia?
The Dubcek Dilemma
6. Alexander Dubcek is very much the man in the middle.
Appeasing the Soviets risks serious domestic repercussions;
appeasing the home folks risks serious Soviet countermeasures.
Perhaps he can somehow maneuver between extremes -- a tactic he
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has practiced with some success within the Czech party -- and
avoid a final choice. A display of Soviet impatience might even
help Dubcek if he is of a mind to persuade the liberals to calm
down, which he probably is. Statements by him since the Moscow
meeting, and even by the leading liberal, Smrkovsky, seem to
point in this direction. Ultimately, however, Dubcek might be
forced to choose: to follow, perhaps, the dictates of his con-
science and his patriotism, the route taken by Imre Nagy; or to
go the way of expediency and "socialist internationalism", the
path descended by Janos Kadar.
7. Brezhnev is said recently to have praised Dubcek but to
have expressed his fear that Dubeek would be unable to main-
tain effective control. This appraisal may be fairly close to
the mark. For a Communist, Dubcek's views are probably relatively
enlightened, but from a Soviet point of view his instincts may
still seem essentially sound. That is to say, Dubcek surely has
no desire to turn Czechoslovakia over to non-Communists and
certainly wants to be on friendly terms with Moscow. But even
if Soviet threats or Soviet deeds convince Dubcek, they might
only infuriate the Czech liberals, whose ability to remove Dubcek
from office cannot be wholly discounted.
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Soviet Options
8. The Soviets could move against Czechoslovakia in
roughly four areas: politically, through open polemics and
propaganda, international conferences, diplomatic pressures,
etc.; economically, through slowdowns and interruptions of
deliveries (of, for example, such vitally important commodities
as wheat and oil) or even a total break in economic relations;
clandestinely, principally through pro-Soviet or conservative
elements in the Czech party; and militarily, through pressures --
e.g. Warsaw Pact and Soviet troop movements -- or through
direct intervention, probably in response to a trumped-up or
even genuine Czech invitation.
9. Even before Dubeek took off for his meetings in Moscow
there were signs that the Soviets were cranking up to move in a
number of the areas listed above. Polemics, for example, had
already begun. The Soviet press had started to issue warnings,
some of them only indirectly critical and cast in ideological
terms -- defending, among other things, the dictatorship of the
proletariat as the highest form of democracy -- others fairly
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direct, admonitory, and even explicitly critical of the positions
of liberals in the Czech party. For its part, the Czech press
in addition to raising the question of Soviet involvement in
the Masaryk affair and in the Slansky trial -- had begun to
sound the alarm over Soviet attitudes and intentions, inter alia
scoring the Soviets for "measuring new phenomena with an old
yardstick" and raising again the spectre of "imperialist" sub-
version.
10. The state of Soviet-Czechoslovak economic relations
is more confused. Rumors that the Soviets have already played
games with wheat deliveries and hard-currency loans have yet to
be fully confirmed or denied; both sides may be putting out
tendentious statements on these matters. Soviet reluctance to
rescue the hard-pressed Czech economy is, however, fairly obvious
and easily understandable.
11. Indications that the Soviets have been tempted to
resort to clandestine efforts to re-establish influence over the
Czech party are as yet very indirect, consisting chiefly of
signs that Moscow remains in touch with Czech conservatives,
including Novotny, and guesses that anti-Dubcek pamphlets now
appearing in Prague and in Czech factories were at least in
part Soviet-inspired.
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12. It is in the military area that the portents are most
ominous. Soviet concern over the Czech attitude toward the
Warsaw Pact is a matter of public record. The question of
joint maneuvers in Czechoslovakia has been raised and answered,
equivocally. Dubeek said after his Moscow visit that such
maneuvers would of course be held; the Czech Defense Minister
agreed but indicated that they would be command post exercises
not involving the presence of any substantial number of Soviet
troops. In addition to such open commentary,
that Marshal Yakubovsky, commander of Pact forces who stopped
in Prague during a recent swing through Eastern Europe, asked
the Czechs to allow the stationing on Czech soil of Soviet or
perhaps other Pact forces.
emb d
It is in principle the same kind of idea the ov1
a few years ago when they suggested that elements of the
so-called northern tier forces (i.e. those from Poland,
Czechoslovakia, and East Germany) be stationed on one
another's territory. (The proposal was turned down at the
time, apparently in part because Warsaw found the notion of
German troops returning to Poland simply too abhorrent.)
The point is that the Soviets have flirted with this kind
of scheme for some time. Resurrecting it now, as a means
to intimidate the Czechs, is not too startling a thought.
Using Yakubovsky, a blunt, even crude soldier to convey
the message, through a fellow soldier and Hero of the Soviet
Union,, President Svoboda, though perhaps a clumsy way of
doing things, makes a certain amount of sense too.
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F- that General Yepishev, the top
Soviet political officer, told the CPSU Central Committee in
late April that Soviet forces are ready to intervene in Czech-
oslovakia if "faithful" Cor unists there asked for help.
Soviet Politics
13. A variety of reports that Czech developments are
responsible for growing political difficulties in Moscow seem
entirely plausible. Unsuccessful Soviet efforts to keep Novotny
in power, presumably masterminded by Brezhnev with the active
concurrence of Kosygin and Podgorny,, open the Triumvirate to
charges of bumbling or worse. The equivocal results of the
Dresden conference in March and the subsequent hands-off policies
of the leadership, together with the continued progress of the
Czech liberalization movement, also expose the Triumvirate to
charges of having underrated the dangers of Czech "revisionism"
after Novotny was tossed out. In other words, from the per-
spective of party and military stalwarts in Moscow who are
especially alarmed about what might happen in Czechoslovakia
and who, in any case, might be delighted to have a pretext for
criticizing the policies of the Triumvirate, the top leadership
may look both bad and vulnerable.
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14. There is not very much precedent to go on here, but
two incidents from the past may be worth mentioning.. The last
international crisis the USSR went through, the June War,
occasioned strong and open criticism of the top leadership in
the Central Committee. (This was the Yegorychev affair.) And
when, in the fall of 1956, the Soviets faced the sudden prospect
of losing major client states in Eastern Europe, the problem
led to considerable controversy within the leadership, and the
Soviet military seemed at the time especially anxious to clamp
down hard -- Marshal Zhukov wanted to "crush" the Poles "like
flies".
Conclusion
15. There are compelling reasons for the Soviets to want
to try to arrest or reverse the trend of events in Czechoslovakia.
To Brezhnev and company, the risks of inaction may be twofold:
loss of position at home and loss of Czechoslovakia -- and
eventually others -- abroad. To be sure, if this is indeed the
Soviet mood of the moment, there are also good reasons why
Moscow would hope to be able to avoid drastic measures. Political
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action and threats of something more severe would thus appear
to be the best bet. But to make such action and threats credible,
to impress Dubcek and the Czechs with the dangers of continued
heresy and the strength of Soviet purpose, Moscow may have
decided that bold moves are in order _- presumably on a rising
scale -- and that ultimately even military intervention may be
necessary.
16. In this connection, we repeat the conclusion of one
of our previous memoranda:
The question of the continuation of Communist rule ...
may be the key one in Moscow. Conceivably, the Soviet
leaders could come to feel that the Bloc, qua Bloc, was
not all that vital. As, in fact, they have learned to live
with a truly independent socialist Yugoslavia, so too
they could bring themselves to try to get along with an
equally independent socialist Czechoslovakia. But the
collapse of Communist control in any of the Bloc countries
would damage the USSR's prestige, embarrass its ideology,
and threaten its vital interests (including even the security
of its frontiers). It could lead to chaos and counter-
revolution, tempt similar developments in other Bloc states
(e.g. most ominously for the Soviets in East Germany), and
even invite Western involvement. The stakes would thus seem
extraordinarily high and the hazards of inaction extremely
grave. Unless, as seems most unlikely, the Soviets con-
cluded that their moves would be actively and forcibly
ONE Special Memorandum No. 6-68, "The USSR and Eastern
Europe",21 March 1968, SECRET.
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opposed by the West,, they would probably believe that the
disadvantages of intervention - by no means inconsiderable --
would simply have to be suffered. This certainly was their
conclusion in 1956 and though they now have more to lose
than they did then,, its message seems apropos even today.
FOR THE BOARD OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES:.
..13_
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MEMORANDUM rUR: The Direct
ire are a few of us ciao think the
last ice of the Sumary MW be too
reassuring -- am* reassuring perbaps
than the paper itself. But I believe this
is about as near as ve can cam to an
estimate today.
I an not sending this outside the
Agency this afternoon.
AXKFZ SKM
Directors El
YAW 101
(DATE)
FORM NO. lol REPLACES FORM 10.101
I AUG 54 WHICH MAY BE USED.
MEMORANDUM FOR: The Honorable Charles Boh.mm
this meaara d attempts to place in
perspective the current spate of reports
and rtartor$ concerning Soviet intervention
in Cisechoelovakisa.
AV BM '$KI"J! K
Director
iiatioeel Est mates
For other recipients with this
buckslip, see other side
10 my 108
(DATE)
FORM NO. REPLACES FORM 10-101
I AUG 54 'O' WHICH MAY BE USED.
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