PAKISTAN: LONGER-TERM OUTLOOK AND ALTERNATIVES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R00967A000800030006-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 25, 2006
• Sequence Number: 6
• Publication Date: February 7, 1969
• Content Type: MEMO

Approved FoQr blease 2007/03/06 : CIA-RDP79R0096 00800 30006-5
Secret
SPECIAL
MEMORANDUM
BOARD OF
NATIONAL ESTIMATES
Pakistan: Longer-Term Outlook and Alternatives
Secret
No. 3-69
7 February 1969
Approved For Release 2007/03/06 : CIA-RDP79R00967A000800030006-5
 25X1 Approved For Release 2007/03/06 : CIA-RDP79R00967A000800030006-5
Approved For Release 2007/03/06 : CIA-RDP79R00967A000800030006-5
 Approved Fooelease 2007/03/06: CIA-RDP79R009W000800030006-5
C E N T R A L I N T E L L I G E N C E A G E N C Y
.7 February 1969
SPECIAL MEMORANDUM NO. 3-69
SUBJECT: Pakistan: Longer-Term Outlook and Alternatives
1. Recent events in Pakistan have shaken conventional
notions about that country. It was generally felt that while
Ayub's popularity had diminished somewhat, and he was actively
disliked by students and intellectuals, he was firmly in the
saddle. As a recent Estimate* put it:
Nonetheless, Ayub remains clearly in control...
Effective repressive measures by the West Pakistani-
controlled security and military services have
stifled dissidence in East Pakistan, and this is
likely to continue. Opposition in the West itself
is feeble and fragmented... In these circumstances,
we believe that Ayub will continue to make, without
effective challenge, the principal decisions now
facing him both in the domestic and foreign field.
NIE 32-68: Pakistan. Internal Developments and Foreign
Outlook," March 1968.
This memorandum was prepared by the Office of National
Estimates. It was discussed with representatives of the
Office of Current Intelligence and of the Clandestine
Services, who are in general agreement with its judgments.
For a more detailed study of the current situation; see
CIA Intelligence Memorandum No. 0612/69 "The Situation
in Pakistan III," 6 February 1969. Secret
GROUP 1
S-E-C-R-E-T Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification
Approved For Release 2007/03/06 : CIA-RDP79R00967A000800030006-5
 Approved Fo lease 2007/03/06 : CIA-RDP79R0096 *600800030006-5
This judgment was shared by Ayub himself, who was clearly
unprepared for the events of the past few months.
2. Beginning in October, and continuing to the present,
Pakistan has been convulsed by riots and demonstrations in
every city in both the East and West. In the past few weeks,
these demonstrations have become massive and more prolonged
than anything previously seen in Pakistan. Recent reporting
from press and diplomatic sources alike has more and more
taken the line that Ayub has suffered a grievous loss of
prestige, an erosion of power, and even that his days are
numbered.
3. The 1968 Estimate stated that "Ayub continues to
have the allegiance and support of his country's predominantly
West Pakistani ruling establishment, including the principal
civil servants, businessmen, and land owners. Above all,
he appears to have the continued support of most officers
of the military, the principal bastion of his regime." We
know of no evidence that any important components of this
establishment have turned against Ayub. Indeed, the police
and army are regularly clubbing and shooting rioters. But,
Approved For Release 2007/03/06 : CIA-RDP79R00967A000800030006-5
 Approved Forr2elease 2007/03/06: CIA-RDP79R0096SM00800030006-5
significantly, many former partisans are beginning to hedge
their bets, display grave doubts, and some prominent figures
have turned against Ayub.*
4+. The protesters are in large part city dwelling
students, lawyers, intellectuals, and the educated unemployed,
though they have on occasion received considerable support
from the general public particularly in East Pakistan. Their
opposition to Ayub is of longstanding, but their current
perseverance and impact are unprecedented. They have shaken
the country and have undoubtedly given a severe shock to the
Field Marshal/President. The traditionally fragmented opposition
political leaders have, for the most part, been followers in
this situation, exploiting rather than directing the wide-
spread activities of the demonstrators. The student demonstrators
have taken up most of the opposition political demands, however.
5. In particular, the students and their allies are
insisting on the abolition of Ayub's creature, the constitutional
-3-
S-E-C-R-E-T
Approved For Release 2007/03/06 : CIA-RDP79R00967A000800030006-5
 Approved Fo, J elease 2007/03/06 : CIA-RDP79R0096iA000800030006-5
system known as "Basic Democracy." Under this scheme, the
voters choose some 120,000 electors or "basic democrats."
These then choose the president (who has overwhelming power),
the parliament, and the state legislatures. The basic democrats
also have considerable authority in local government. In
practice this system has meant the perpetuation of the
establishment's power. First the basic democrats and the
government rig the elections in their favor. Then any oppositionist
or potentially troublesome basic democrat who gets elected
anyway is subjected to heavy pressure to come around. The
result has been rule of, by and for the oligarchy.
6. In addition, the protesters are demanding an end to
corruption and nepotism and to such practices as periodic
jailing of opposition leaders, repressive rule of East Pakistan
by proconsuls from the west wing, and the heavy handed govern-
ment control of the press. Probably more important to the
students than these protests against the way Pakistan has been
governed are certain demands related to their own situation,
demands which no Pakistani government, Ayub's or another,
could meet.
Approved For Release 2007/03/06 : CIA-RDP79R00967A000800030006-5
 Approved Forelease 2007/03/06: CIA-RDP79RO09WA000800030006-5
7. The basic student demands are assurance of a job
upon graduation, and lower academic standards so fewer
students will be weeded out. But, as in so many under-
developed countries, the Pakistani educational system has
expanded at a much more rapid rate than the economy's ability
to absorb the graduates. This is particularly true of the
specialists in law and the liberal arts but increasingly so of
those in technical fields as well. The result has been the
creation of a restive, dissatisfied urban group which is now
exerting very considerable and effective pressures.
8. Faced with this storm of protests and demands,
Ayub has so far made only small conciliatory offers. He
has shown no disposition to surrender or quit. An autocrat,
and a proud one, at the moment he appears determined to ride
out the crisis, expecting that -- along with some modest
concessions --? his array of troops and policemen will
eventually force the protesters to conclude that demonstrating
against him is futile. Will he be able to do so? As we
said above, there are indications that his position is
weakening. A sudden stampede of Ayub's followers, even by
S-E-C-R-E-T
Approved For Release 2007/03/06 : CIA-RDP79R00967A000800030006-5
 Approved Forgelease 2007/03/06 : CIA-RDP79R0096AW00800030006-5
the military, is not out of the question if they feel his
cause is lost. Nor is it impossible that Ayub will himself
come to the conclusion that his finest contribution to
Pakistan's future would be his retirement, either now or
when his term expires in 1970.
9. If Ayub rides out the crisis -- by whatever means --
and remains in power for a time, his position will be less
secure than before. Many basic problems will not have
been resolved and the new antagonisms which have been
created are not likely to abate much. Ayub's many enemies
will continue to oppose him, and will do so with a new
awareness of his vulnerability. Even if things quiet down
for a while, an undercurrent of tension will probably remain
as the president awaits another popular assault on his regime
and his opponents prepare for it. And, sooner or later,
such an event is likely to occur.
- 6 -
S-E-C-R-E-T
Approved For Release 2007/03/06 : CIA-RDP79R00967A000800030006-5
 Approved Fq&,Release 2007/03/06 : CIA-RDP79R00 000800030006-5
10. If Ayub goes, there are a number of possible alter-
native developments about which we can now only speculate.
a. A new strong man might seize power and establish
a more repressive regime. Someone like General Yahya Khan,
the Army chief, could decide that Ayub had lost his grip,
take over the presidency and declare martial law. Ayub did
something like this himself in 1958, but in vastly different
circumstances. A new iron fisted regime might ride out the
crisis for now, but would face the grievances and opposition
-- in intensified form -- now confronting Ayub. Its long-
term survival would be problematical.
b. Ayub might announce his intention to retire
on the expiry of his term in early 1970. Although this
might have an immediate impact it would not in itself re-
solve basic grievances. Under the Constitution, the new
president would be chosen by the basic democrats, and
nearly all opposition leaders have refused to participate
in the indirect elections scheduled for late 1969 and
early 1970, declaring them fraudulent and undemocratic.
His successor would thus not be much more acceptable than
Approved For Release 2007/03/06 : CIA-RDP79R00967A000800030006-5
 Approved Fo lease 2007/03/06 : CIA-RDP79R0096IM00800030006-5
Ayub himself, unless he promised and made good on some sweeping
reforms. He might, however, find it easier to do so.
c. Ayub might resign now. In this case, his tempo-
rary successor would be the Speaker of the National Assembly, a
Bengali politician and leading figure in Ayub's moribund
political party. Constitutionally, the basic democrats elected
in 1965 must choose a new president within 90 days. He would,
of course, face the same difficulties as those in alternative b.
d. In the event of any of the above alternatives,
some constitutional gears might be allowed to slip. A new
president acceptable to a large part of the opposition and
not obnoxious to the old establishment -- Asghar Khan notably
comes to mind -- might be installed by, say military fiat or
selection by a rump group of basic democrats. He would prob-
ably feel constrained to begin the process of restoring direct
democracy and terminating various repressive measures. This
would probably lead to a great easing of tensions in the short-
term, but it would create new problems. Pakistan's previous
experiment with parliamentary democracy was not a happy one.
Parliament and the state legislatures were filled with a
Approved For Release 2007/03/06 : CIA-RDP79R00967A000800030006-5
 Approved Fori;elease 2007/03/06 : CIA-RDP79RO0900800030006-5
host of corruption-ridden parties jockeying with each other,
forming and unforming coalition governments which were weak,
unstable, ineffective, and uninspiring.- There seems to be
little likelihood this would change if the old rules were
restored.
e. A further, and somewhat different contingency
must also be kept in mind. A principal feature of Ayub's
"Decade of Development" has been the dominance and even
exploitation of East Pakistan by the westerners. While
the protesters in the east wing have been, as in the west,
mostly students, they have at times been joined by signif-
icantly large numbers of trade unionists and other elements
of the general public. Were Ayub or a strong minded West
Pakistani successor to continue harsh and repressive mea-
sures, a major Bengali drive for separatism is not out of
the question. There are 20,000 troops -- mostly westerners --
in East Pakistan. But the easterner's traditional passiveness,
inability to organize effectively, and fear of Indian exploi-
tation of such a move have prevented a major uprising to date.
~In early 1958, in a brawl on the floor of the Bengali
legislature, the Speaker was badly beaten and the
Deputy Speaker killed.
Approved For Release 2007/03/06 : CIA-RDP79R00967A000800030006-5
 Approved For.?$elease 2007/03/06 : CIA-RDP79R0096WO0800030006-5
The odds are still against such an uprising. The easterners
are demanding autonomy, not independence, but their attitudes
might change in extreme circumstances.
11. In any event, one of the important causes of Ayubts
time of troubles is most unlikely to be resolved by anyone,
a situation with significant implications for many other
underdeveloped countries. The prospects of the growing number
of university graduates are going to remain bleak. Indeed,
the country already has an angry educated proletariat strong
enough to endanger the future of what had been considered one
of the strongest and most securely established regimes in
the area. The zeal, unity, and perseverance of the protesters
have been enormously enhanced by their grievances against
an oppressive regime. Without such grievances, and inspired
only by their claims as members of the educated proletariat,
they might not provide so formidable a challenge to the govern-
ment, but no regime could be confident that they would not.
ABBOT SMITH
Chairman
Approved For Release 2007/03/06 : CIA-RDP79R00967A000800030006-5
 25X1 Approved For Release 2007/03/06 : CIA-RDP79R00967A000800030006-5
Approved For Release 2007/03/06 : CIA-RDP79R00967A000800030006-5