GIS COMMENT ON SOVIET MILITARY FORCE LEVELS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R00967A000800040005-5
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 25, 2005
• Sequence Number: 5
• Publication Date: March 29, 1960
• Content Type: REPORT

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Approved For Release 2005/04/13: CIA-RDP79R00967AOQ 800040005-5
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C E N T R A L INN T E L L I G E N C E A G E N C Y
OFFICE OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES
29 March 1960
SUBJECT: GIS Comment on Soviet Military Force Levels
It is being assumed that the Soviet Union is indeed carrying out a
reduction in its military forces roughly to the extent indicated by
rushchev. This entails no military risk since, on the one hand,
the Soviet government may take into consideration that the West will
not attack and, on the other, even the then much reduced Soviet
forces woult be strong enough to guarantee the internal stability as
well as the defense of the external frontiers of the Soviet sphere
of influence.
The reduction in strength will maifly affect the army, all the more
since its units could be replenished or reactivated the fastest if
need be.
The reduction in strength of 1.2 million men will presumably be made
as follows:
Army
19000,000 men (83 percent)
Air Force
100,000 men (8.5 percent)
Navy
100,000 men (8,5 percent)
In Detail (Figures in accordance with your memo of 24 February 1960):
Based on the assumption that the figure given by Khrushchev of
3,623,000 men under arms is correct and that the security troops
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are not included in this figure, the following estimate which
offers a breakdown according to arms and branches of service, is
submitted (figures in parantheses give the reduction in strength):
(1) Army 2,093,000 (1,000,000)
(2) A.A.A. units, including bomb line rockets 200,000 (Zero)
(3) A.A.A. early warning and fighter control 90,000 (20,000)
(!) Strategic missiles 30,000 (Zero)
(5) Tactical air force 280,000 (35,000)
(6) Air force transport 30,000 ( 5,000)
(7) Long-rnnpe air force 90,000 (20,000)
(8) A.A.A. fighter planes 210,000 (20,000)
(9) Naval air force 100,000 (Zero)
(10) Floating units and bases 30,000 (50,000)
(11) Naval infantry, if it exists 10,000 (15,000)
(12) Coast artillery 60,000 (25,000)
(13) Naval land forces 50,000 (10,000)
(14) Defense ministry 10,000 (Zero)
Personnel reduction in flying units concerns mainly ground personnel.
Ratio between front-line troops and supporting units approximately
2 to 1 above divisional level.
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Approved For Release 2005/04/13 : CIA-RDP79R00967A000800040005-5
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On 3:
Breakdown according to assignment:
Army Field
2,103,000
(1,000,000)
Air Defense
500,000
( 40,000)
Long Range Attack
120,000
( 20,000)
Tactical Aviation
280,000
( 31,000)
Nav31 Ministerial
590,000
( 100,000)
Transport Aviation
30,000
( 5,000) (additional)
On 4:
Security troops 350,000,
of these 175,000 border troops and
135,000 troops of the interior.
AAE MOnt.
I. Army
1. Combat units
Army units can, if necessary, be replenished or reactivated
the fastest by means of calling up the trained reserves, as long as
there are large reserves of materiel, There exists virtually an
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unlimited supply of trained reserves. The reorganized mobilization
system m,kes possible the mobilization of the first wave within an
extremely short period. After the reduction, the Army would
presumably be composed of special units, a number of effective
divisions regarded a "fire department" in a manner of speaking --
which would be stationed in the approaches to and strategically
important areas of the USSR --, and a larger number of cadre units.
Doubtless one must also expect th