CYPRUS: THREAT OF RENEWED VIOLENCE AND TURKISH INTERVENTION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R00967A000900010017-4
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 8, 2006
• Sequence Number: 17
• Publication Date: January 22, 1964
• Content Type: MEMO

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S-E-C -R-E-T
Director of Iuteiligetce
22 January 1964
Tensions on Cyprus remain high and violence is likely to
erupt again, especially if (as neerns prohabi )the London con-
ference breaks down. Renewed violence would put strong pressures
on Turkey to intervene militarily. Before doing so, the Turks
would probably seek Western -- especially US -- protection for the
Turkish Cypriots, but the request would be urgent and the deadline
very short.
MORUCIDIF
GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
S -E-C-R-E T downgrading and
declassification
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V*AO 14W
1. The present meeting in London to seek a solution to
the Cyprus problem has provided only a momentary respite.
None of the parties concerned entered the negotiations with any
real expectation that the conference would succeed. The
British have been unable to elaborate any solution of their own.
They still hope that by keeping both sides talking tempers
might cool sufficiently for compromises to develop. However,
progress to date has been minimal and the positions of the
Greek and Turkish communities remain as far apart as ever. In-
deed,the conference may well fail.
2. Tension on Cyprus remains high. The Turkish and Greek
communities in the urban centers remain physically separated
with almost no contact. Incidents continue, and the presence of
British troops is vital to the maintenance of even the present
tenuous cease-fire. The control the Cypriot communal leaders
exercise over their followers is questionable. President Makerios
has once again unleashed forces that he cannot control. The
Greek community is split into num* ?vti?e paramilitary o na3 nations
with differing aims and orientations ranging from the Crypto-
Communist to the far right. As a result of the heavy losses
suffered by the Turkish Cypriot in the recent fighting, Vice
President Kuchuk is seriously concerned about the safety and
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S.E-C-R-E-T
lives of his people. Thus neither side has much room for com-
promise. Both communities are seeking to import additional
arms and readying defenses in preparation for the outbreak of fight-
ing they consider likely. Meanwhile,weak governments in both
Athens and Ankara are unable to exercise effective restraint.
3. The only hopeful signs are the fact that the apparent
readiness of Turkey to intervene (as shown by the Turkish jet
passes over Nicosia on Christmas day) has dampened somewhat the
Greek Cypriot inclination to renew fighting, and that the British,
who have brought in about 2,500 men since December 1963 to
augment their normal base personnel, are now determined and able
to control small riots. In the event of widespread disorders,
however, they plan to withdraw their troops to the Sovereign
Base Areas, and in any case are not willing to ko:ep these
additional troops on Cyprus for more than a few months.
4. All things considered, the chances of a breakdown of
law and order are considerable a:add, in such an event, the first
victims will be the Turkish Cypriots. Under such circumstances,
pressure by the Turkish military for unilateral intervention
would become almost irresistible. We do not believe Turkey would
immediately invade Cyprus, but rather might first appeal for
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joint intervention by all the Guarantor Powers (Greece, Turkey,
and the UK). They would also appeal to NATO, and particularly
to the US, for assistance. Any delay on the part of the Western
powers in taking whatever action was necessary to halt the fight-
ing would be likely to cause the Turks to move military forces
into Cyprus unilaterally. The 39th division in Iskenderun remains
on alert for this purpose and, given Turkish air superiority in
the Cyprus area, a Turkish invasion could not be stopped by
either Cypriot or Greek forces.
5. Unilateral Turkish intervention would place Greek political
and military leaders under overwhelming pressure to take military
action despite their awareness of the dangers Involved. We
believe that Greek moves would, at least initially, consist
of attempting to reinforce the Greek army contingent on Cyprus.
However, by this time passions in both Greece and Turkey would be
be aroused to the point that further escalation would be
difficult to prevent. The Greek Cypriots, moreover, would be
likely to seek Soviet diplomatic intervention, which would almost
certainly be forthcoming.
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6. Even if renewed violence breaks out on Cyprus, there
would be no immediate likelihood of deliberate attacks on US
installations or personnel by either side. However, there would
be a considerable chance of accidental dampge, and the powerful
Cypriot Comrnanist Party might try to destroy or compromise US
installations. Mureover, Greek Cypriots might hold the US
responsible for failure to prevent a Turkish invasion, which
could lead to attacks on US facilities.
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