TRENDS IN THE WORLD SITUATION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R00967A000900020014-6
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 46
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 29, 2005
• Sequence Number: 14
• Publication Date: June 8, 1964
• Content Type: MEMO

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II* THE EVOLVING ROLE AND RELATIONS OF MILITARY
POWER ? a ? ? ? ? ? . ? ? ? ? . . ? ? ? o o ? 3
III, PROBLEMS OF THE COMMUNIST WORLD a a ? ? ? o ? 10
IV, EMERGING TENDENCIES WITHIN THE ADVANCED
NON-COMMUNIST STATES. ? ?.? a ? ? a . ? a v ? 16
V. PROBLEMS AND TRENDS IN UNDERDEVELOPED AREAS ? 25
Latin America ? ? . . . . . a ? . ? . ? . . a 26
Africa, ? ? ? . ? a ? ? ? a . a ? . ? ? w a a 29
The Near East q ? ? ? - ? ? . ? . ? ? ? ? o a 31
Southeast Asia. . ? . . ? ? ? ? ? ? a ? ? o ? 35
VI. SOME IMPLICATIONS OF THE NEW RELATIONS OF
POWER ? . ? . a ? ? ? . ? . ? ? ? ? ? . r ? ? 38
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8 June 1964
1. The decade of the 1950's witnessed fundamental changes in
the structure of world power. The development of Soviet long-range
missile capabilities, the Soviet bid for world leadership, the
rise of Communist China, the creation of new nations, rapid
economic development in the advanced nations of the West, and the
birth of the space age -- all altered the outlook for many of the
world's peoples. By the end of that decade, in contrast to its
beginning, the US no longer enjoyed military invulnerability,
unchallengeable world power, or unique economic superiority. It
was clear that the world was entering upon a new era. Not only
was there a new political and military relation between the major
powers, but new leaders were arriving upon the scene, political and
social instability had become epidemic in the southern two-thirds
of the world, and schisms and heresies were appearing within the
Communist camp itself.
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2. The first years of the decade of the 1960's have witnessed
the further development of many of the trends in world affairs which
appeared during the 1950's as well as the emergence of several new
ones. The bipolarity of world politics has further declined, the
turmoil in the underdeveloped areas has intensified, questions
concerning the operation of military deterrents remain, and judgments
regarding the risks involved in international initiatives still
perplex policy makers. Among the new tendencies are mounting
economic difficulties in the Communist states, the increasing
effort of the Soviet leaders to inject a new atmosphere into US-
Soviet relations, and the readiness of the current European leaders
to undertake broader political experiments at home and to explore
new programs and policies abroad. Moreover, the new style brought
by President Kennedy to the conduct of foreign relations, the
erection of the Berlin Wall, the Cuban crisis of October 1962, the
death of President Kennedy, and tho succession of Lyndon Johnson were
all major international events which have had a profound effect
upon international relationships.
3. In the paragraphs which follow these various developments
are discussed under five main headings: (a) the evolving role and
relations of military power; (b) problems of the Communist world;
(c) emerging tendencies within the advanced non-Commmmist states;
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(d) problems and trends in underdeveloped areas; and (e) the out-
look for US interests and for a reduction of international tensions.
XI. THE EVOLVING ROLE AND RELATIONS OF MILITARY POWER
4+. The military situation in the world today, as it has
been for the past several years, is essentially one in which both
the US and the USSR can inflict enormous damage upon the other. The
US possesses greater striking power than the USSR and could wreak
much greater damage in the USSR than the latter could in the US.
Nevertheless, whatever the precise balance of military power might
be, a general nuclear war -- whether brought about by design, accident,
or miscalculation -- would kill many millions of people, destroy
the capital accumulation of many decades, render large sections of
the earth uninhabitable, and destroy the power of most of the
modern nations of the world.
5. The crucial current questions concerning strategic military
power are not the size, armament, and operational capabilities of
opposing military forces, but the manner in which the US and Soviet
leaders now view these forces in relation to their own objectives and
to the will of their opponents. In this age of mobile striking
forces and hardened missile sites, it does not appear possible to
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build a military force capable of destroying an enemy's capabilities
and simultaneously protecting oneself from unacceptable damage.
Even extremely large numbers of high-cost weapons would provide
no assurance of victory or even survival. Thus, if there is any
valid and rational concept today upon which to develop and measure
a strategic military force, it is that of deterrence.
6. But one cannot find any rule for determining that a
stated level of forces will deter and that another will not.
Deterrence is a mental state, and it depends to a preponderant
degree not upon a precise level of forces but upon a variety of
other factors such as how the party to be deterred estimates the
military forces arrayed against him and the balance of military
power, how desperately he wants to achieve a given objective, how
he estimates the determination and will power of his opponent, how
he estimates the chances of a political confrontation leading to
hostilities, and how he estimates the chances of hostilities leading
to a general conflict. While it is most unlikely, for example, that
the Soviet leaders will choose to carry out actions which they know
to carry a high risk of general war, such knowledge is not easy to
come by. On most issues which have arisen or appear likely to
arise, a good deal of uncertainty has been and is likely to be involved.
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7. The Cuban missile crisis of 1962 has helped to emphasize
the consequences of taking action when uncertain of -- or under
misapprehensions regarding -- the consequences of such action. The
Soviets probably undertook this initiative either in the expectation
that the US would accept it or in the belief that the US reaction
could not be so accurately predicted as to preclude making the
effort. In the international atmosphere of early 1962, when the
Cuban move was planned, the Soviet leaders were still riding high,
and the US probably appeared to them to be uncertain and cautious.
The US had chosen not to run the political risks necessary to save
the Bay of Pigs expedition, the US had accepted the erection of the
Berlin Wall with little more than verbal pyrotechnics, and the US
had accepted the neutralist solution in Laos. US formal statements
regarding Cuba conveyed an air of studied uncertainty. In military
planning, despite substantially increased programs of missile deploy-
ment, the US was advocating a greater conventional capability and
a counterinsurgency program. Thus, it probably appeared to the
Soviets that the diplomatic and military stance of the US was that
of a power seeking to avoid confrontation and fearful of its con-
sequences, and perhaps therefore a power which could be subjected
to a series of setbacks without high risks of forceful resistance.
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8. The rapidity and magnitude of US mobilization after the
missile installations were identified, and the firmness and
sureness with which President Kennedy dealt with both Khrushchev
and Castro, no doubt surprised both; the misconceptions of the
Soviets were dissolved and the missiles, bombers, and military
forces withdrawn. Thus, the Cuban missile crisis helped to reduce
the uncertainties or misapprehensions under which the Soviets had
operated. The effect is likely to persist for some time, and the
unmistakable effort of President Johnson to demonstrate the continuity
of US policy will contribute to its persistence. But some uncertainty
will always exist; it is in the nature of arms and politics in this
era. Each situation is to some degree a special one. Other crises
can arise in which the dimensions of interest and determination on
each side will be different, and these differences may permit uncer-
tainties and misapprehensions to play a critical role in policy deter-
mination.
9. The Cuban affair following upon the failure of other Soviet
foreign policy initiatives of the past few years must have caused
the Soviet leaders to become somewhat disillusioned about the utility
of the strategic military power which they had striven so hard to
acquire. To be sure, possession of this power contributed greatly
to Soviet prestige and established the USSR in a position of strength
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far above that of any other nation except the US. But the Soviets
almost certainly believed that an intercontinental striking capability
plus an arsenal of high-yield nuclear weapons would bring tangible
benefits, preferably in the solution of such problems as that of
Berlin on favorable terms. They must have expected to achieve at
least a better bargaining position and a greater capacity to frighten
or to blackmail smaller powers into acceding to Soviet wishes. This
has not occurred; moreover, the US in response increased the tempo
and size of its own arms program, thus confronting the USSR with the
need to pursue still more costly programs if it was not to fall
further behind. Thus while strategic military power has become
substantial on both sides, it has not been particularly useful in
the achievement of objectives beyond that of maintaining the
strategic balance itself.
10. The acquisition of substantial strategic power by both
sides has not only depreciated the value of strategic power in the
achievement of particular objectives; it has also come to circumscribe
the use of other instruments of military power. It has
become increasingly difficult for either of the great powers to
project its military pcver in conventional form, into other areas
of the world or into disputes which may arise. Any movement of military
power into a new area -- and particularly Into an area geographically
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proximate to the other -- tends to be regarded as one which threatens
to upset the world balance of power or to alter the political align-
ment in the area concerned.
11. This situation -- namely, the appearance of new inhibitions
upon the freedom of action of the great powers both with respect to
brandishing their strategic capabilities and projecting their con-
ventional ones -- has caused the secondary and minor powers to view
their own military capabilities in a more sanguine fashion. Some of
them, believing that this provided them an opportunity for developing
greater stature and influence in their own regions, have sought to
acquire modern arms from the great powers; others have developed
their own. Egypt and Indonesia, for example, have very substantially
improved their capabilities through the acquisition of Soviet arms.
France embarked upon a nuclear weapons program in the apparent
belief that in this way it could improve its base for playing a
more independent role in world affairs.
12. Weapons acquisition and development programs of this type
have in fact enabled some of their possessors to play a somewhat
more active role in their regions or in world affairs. It has made
them more secure at home and has made them forces to be reckoned
with by the peacemakers. Nevertheless, these programs probably have
not and probably will not fulfill all the hopes which have been
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placed in them. A nuclear capability in the hands of other than the
two great powers is a nuisance and a potential trouble maker, but
it is not much of a factor in the world balance of military power or
indeed in the respect accorded to its possessors. On the regional
level, those possessing significant military capabilities tend to
deter each other or to be deterred by the possibility of great power
or UN intervntion should open hostilities occur. Leaders of these
smaller powers are beginning to recognize these limitations upon
their actions, and tend to limit military activities outside their
own lands to such expedients as the shipment of arms, the diupctch
of instructors, or the training and use of guerrillas.
13. This does not mean that military power in the hands of the
great powers or of the lesser ones has become or is becoming a matter
of minor importance in international politics. The Soviet leaders
may have become somewhat disillusioned about the value of their
strategic power in the resolution of disputes; the great powers may
have found it very difficult to project even their conventional
forces into situations around the world where they have an interest;
the lesser powers may not realize all the benefits they expect from
the acquisition of greater capabilities. But possession of military
power remains a major, though perhaps not a predominant, factor in
determin?ng a nation's role on the world stage. In the case of the
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two great powers, the possession of substantial capabilities is
indispensable to their security and to the maintenance of their
positions of leadership. What is happening is that the use of
military power is increasingly being inhibited because of its growing
magnitude and because of the risk that any undertaking involving
the active use of force may involve extremely high stakes. This
situation may not obtain Indefinitely; the Soviets, for example, would
almost certainly seek to derive full advantage from any scientific
or technological breakthrough in weaponry which they might achieve.
Nevertheless, for the present, the military situation in the world --
plus the problems which the Communist world is experiencing today --
suggests that the likelihood of a military confrontation between
the great powers has been somewhat reduced.
III. PROBLEMS OF THE COMMUNIST WORLD
iii. The obvious problems within the Communist world today are
also spectacular ones: the open quarrel and exchange of polemics
between the two great Communist powers; the magnitude of the economic
failure in China -- so great that it led to thousands of people push-
ing against the gates of Hong Kong; the spectacle of the USSR, after
the boastful claims and plans of a few years ago, coming to the
West hat in hand to buy wheat and to ask for long-term credits. These
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phenomena are not passing difficulties, nor are they merely the
consequences of misfortune. The source is deeper, and the problem
will not soon go away. It lies fundamentally in the nature of
communism itself, how it should be defined, how its objectives should
be translated into reality, whether it can be made to work.
15. What communism is and what policies should be followed
to bring it about have always been subjects of debate within the
European revolutionary movement. There have always been dissidents
claiming descent from Mri.rx, and in Russia itself there were a variety
of groups and doctrines which persisted after the Bolshevik seizure
of power and were only gradually overwhelmed. Yet even the dissenters
sought unity; they believed that true communism was not susceptible
to a variety of interpretations. In Stalin's time Communist unity
existed, partly because of Stalin's measures to enforce conformity
and partly because there was no alternative center of authority.
Durixg the last twenty years this singular situation has ended. The
expansion of communism brought a diffusion of political power and a
concomitant dissipation of doctrinal authority. Moscow's influence
remains substantial, but its authority has greatly diminished. First
Yugoslavia and then China exhibited the phenomenon of heresy allied
to national power, and Moscow was unable to compel obedience.
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16. The process of debate and redefinition going on today is
distinguishing one national Communist party from another and one
regime fron another; it is creating diverse currents of opinion
within the various parties and regimes; above all, it has openly
split the Communist movement into two warring camps and created
within each of these camps satellite groups which distinguish them-
selves to some degree from its leadership. All the causes of this in addition to the expansion of communism and the historical termina-
tion of Moscow's unique position as the only Communist capital --
cannot be discussed here. One major factor is certainly the diversity
in the world itself. Despite its claim to universal truth, Communist
doctrine simply can not apply equally to all national circumstances;
some individual parties and leaders have found it necessary to adjust
their doctrines in order to make their system work where they have
won power or to prevent the party's decay as a political force where
they were seeking power. Another factor of great importance is
nationalism, which orthodox Communists have always considered an
outmoded evil associated with the capitalist system. Yet, in
attempting to create Communist societies, the Communist leaders them-
selves have come increasingly to conform their doctrinal positions and
their policies to the historic national policies of their states.
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17. The absence of a center to enforce orthodoxy has produced,
not only doctrines which in the previous era would have been
heretical, but the prostitution of doctrine to parochial concerns.
The Sino-Soviet schism, the association of Albania with China, the
ambivalence of North Vietnam, the independence of Yugoslavia, the
growing divergence of the Eastern European states from the Soviet
model, the tendency of Western European parties to criticize Moscow
and to develop their awn political programs, the competing influence
of Castroism in Latin America -- all reflect peculiar national or
regional interests. In some cases these phenomena may be excused
as tactical variations, but often they have been elcvated.to the
level of doctrinal differences. We can confidently expect that
this situation will continue and that communism in the future will
come to possess still less doctrinal uniformity than it now has. In-
deed, the national and doctrinal antagonisms which exist may
occasionally lead to armed conflict; the Communist world may come
to be as diverse and undisciplined as the non-Communist world.
18. An even more serious and certainly more immediate problem
thrui that of disunity is the problem of making the Communist economic
system work. A Communist system may be very effective for bringing
a backward society quickly up to date in terms of infrastructure
and basic industry, but it is evidently not very good for achieving
adequate agricultural production; many aspects of agricultural
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production require the attention and devotion which collective
organization does not inspire. Moreover, as Communist societies be-
come increasingly large and complex -- in short, when they become
developed -- the central planning and organizational methods which
worked during the period of initial economic development tend to break
down. These two problems have plagued the Soviet system for some years
and have survived all the expedients improvised to deal with them.
19. In more specific terms, Soviet growth rates have declined
in the 1960's. The investment rate has fallen, defense costs have
risen, and agricultural output has failed to keep pace with growing
demand. Livestock has been prematurely slaughtered, the Soviet
leaders are buying grain in the West, and a large-scale program
designed to quadruple fertilizer production has been initiated. In
order to finance the external purchases involved, the Soviets have
drawn down their gold reserves and are seeking foreign credits.
None of this means that the Soviet economy is about to collapse;
these are symptoms of disease, but there are no indications that
the disease will prove fatal.
20. The problems of Communist China are infinitely worse.
The Chinese have recovered somewhat from the disasters of 1960, 1961,
and 1962, but the prospects remain poor. The population is
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immense and bound to grow without check for many years to come;
arable land is short and weather unreliable; economic experiments
based upon ideological predilections and revolutionary compulsions
have complicated what were already intractable difficulties. The
Chinece are devoting increased attention to agrioultu^e, but it is
doubtful that per capita consu; tion can be significantly increased
for many years to come. Industrial development is greatly handi-
capped by failures in agriculture and by the absence of large-
scale outside aid. The economy is not on the verge of collapse, but
it is becoming increasingly apparent that Communist China, as now ruled,
will at best make only slow progress. At worst, starvation, disease,
and political disaffection could bring about a violent upheaval.
21. While the grave economic problems which China faces may
in time destroy the regime as we know it, they are not all to be
attributed to the policies which the Communist regime has adopted.
Any regime would have staggered under the enormous problems of popula-
tion and food supply.. By contrast, the economic problems which the
USSR confronts are tractable, but it is still uncertain that the USSR
can solve them without fundamental changes in its ideological outlook.
A fertilizer program will increase agricultural production, but it
will not make the collective farmer a happy and a constructive
worker. Continued detailed central planning will keep the economy
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going, but it will not keep it going very efficiently. There have
been some indications that the Communist leaders in the USSR may
be gradually coming to realize that they must make some adjustments.
The practices of Yugoslavia have been noted and perhaps taken to
heart; greater contact with the West and with Western scholars may
convince them that more flexible methods of planning and control
will give greater prod-action and stimulate greater initiative. Mean-
while, Soviet economic problems have contributed to some greater
prudence in Soviet policy and particularly to the current Soviet
efforts to create a more friendly atmosphere in US-Soviet relations.
IV. EMERGING TENDENCIES WITHIN THE ADVANCED NON-COMMUNIST STATES
22. The disunity, indiscipline, and decline in ideology which
have developed within the Communist world have been matched by a
similar development in the West. The Atlantic alliance has suffered
a further lessening in its unity of purpose, the UK has been rather
rudely disinvited to participate in the European Economic Community,
and US influence in Europe has been reduced. At the same time, within
the various Western European states, conservatives have become more
liberal and radicals less revolutionary. Along with a decline in
the intensity of domestic politics, there has developed a greater
readiness to experiment with economic questions and to pursue foreign
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policies based upon national interest rather than upon those of
the Atlantic community as a whole. These changes derive in part
from the reconstruction and growing strength of the European
economies; they also reflect the personal characteristics of the
new leaders who are arriving on the European scene.
23. Even before the decade of the sixties began, France began
a major crisis of regime. General de Gaulle now thoroughly dominate
the French scene, the old political parties have decayed, the French
colonial system has been largely liquidated, and the French govern-
mental system has been remodeled. It is still not possible to
determine whether Gaullism as a political force will remain an
essential element in the political system, but de Gaulle's impact
upon France, together with the fundamental changes in French life
and attitude which have occurred in the past few years, make a
full return to the old ways most unlikely.
24+. Within the last year significant changes in German and
Italian politics have occurred. The Adenauer era has ended under
conditions which augur well for the future. Erhard has taken
over with firm hand, and though the country faces parliamentary
elections next year, there is a stronger national consensus and
less domestic bitterness than under his predecessor. In Italy, a
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new political experiment has been undertaken by the leaders of the
Christian Democratic party in forming a coalition with the Italian
Socialist party, which in turn has broken its political ties with the
Italian Communist party.
25. These changes -- the readiness of France to accept a
national leader, the strengthened national consensus in West Germany,
and the successful creation of a Socialist-Catholic coalition in
Italy -- reflect what appears to be a new desire not to get bogged
down in ideological debate, a recognition that revolution might
destroy more than it accomplished, and a willingness to accept
society's institutions as a basis for going ahead with progress and
reform. This is not to say that there is a general acceptance of
things as they are, but there appears to be a growing tendency
among leftists and younger leaders to shun wholesale revolution and
to move at a prudent pace.
26. One cause of this new cautious attitude toward revolu-
tionary change has been a realization that it was not necessary to
nationalize industry and finance in order to achieve the objectives
of socialism, and that much the same ends could be achieved through
welfare programs and through proper use of the mechanisms of modern
fiscal and monetary systems. Perhaps more important is the fact
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that the economies of Western Europe have continued to expand at a
fairly rapid rate and that new economic arrangements were being
forged and institutionalized -- to the benefit of nearly all Western
Europeans -- through the Common Market. The Common Market has now
reached the point where it is determining many aspects of the economies
of its members; moreover, the process is already so advanced that
it is almost irreversible. The only questions are those of who
shall benefit by the readjustments which are being made.
27. Another factor which has contributed to the declining
appeal of revolutinary doctrines is the change which has occurred
within the Roman Catholic Church since the accession of John XXIII.
His response to gestures from the Communist states (gestures
prompted largely by a Communist recognition that the Catholic
populations of Eastern Europe were not giving up the Church and
by a consequent desire to develop some kind of modus vivendi),
his willingness to accept an "opening to the left" in Italian
politics, his apparent willingness to accord the national episcopates
greater freedom, and his encouragement of ecumenism -- all these
have contributed to a reduction in confessional tensions and a decline
in anti-clericalism as a political force. Above all, they have
given the Roman Catholic Church a new image, one of liberalism and
progressivism, and thus reduced the appeal of the prophets of
revolution.
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28. This generally more tolerant and more flexible approach
of Europeans to political, international, economic, and religious
questions has had a number of significant consequences. The move-
ment toward European political unity of the type widely discussed
fifteen years ago has been slowed; many of those who were previously
drawn to the idea now see better chances of progress within the
national context. Such movement toward political unity as appears
from time to time now seems to be directed more toward onntrolling
the Brussels bureaucracy or toward providing another forum for the
assertion of national interest than toward the creation of true
central institutions.
29. The new European attitudes have also given a somewhat
greater respectability to the Communist states of Eastern Europe
and to the Marxist parties of the West. In West Germany, for
example, it became possible to accept negotiations with the East
Germans over the issuance of Christmas passes to East Berlin and to
hope that this might be a step toward resolution of the Berlin pro-
blem. In Italy, it became possible for Catholics to vote for Marxist
parties and to enter a government with Marxian Socialists. It has
become possible to consider long-term credits to the USSR and the
Eastern European countries. In general, it has stirred new hopes
that an East-West accommodation can somehow be developed which will
enable Europe as a whole to live in peace and prosperity.
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30. One major consequence of changes in the leadership and
attitudes of the Western Europeans is the changed role of the US
in European affairs. De Gaulle's foreign policy is clearly designed
to reduce that role and to enhance that of France. He sees himself
as an historic figure who will not only restore France to its
rightful place in world councils but use that position to resolve
some of the world's problems. De Gaulle's objectives are not shared
by his neighbors, but they have increasingly come to share some of
his precepts -- particularly his opposition to standing still while
the USSR and the US determine the fate of Europe and his preachments
that Europe can and must develop its own power and solve its own
problems. Nevertheless, not de Gaulle and still less his neighbors
are ready to hazard their own security by destroying NATO or so
weakening it that it loses its deterrent value. All the European
members of NATO but France still regard the predominant US position
in the alliance as an indispensable element of their security. This
does not mean that they will always accede to US wishes or make con-
cessions to help the US solve its problems. US proposals, such as
that for the multilateral force, are examined with care and even
skepticism. On the other hand, US trade and balance-of-payments
problems are understood, and there has been some effort to ease
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31. Finally, the differences between the US view of the world
situation and that of the Europeans have become even more striking
than in the past. Most Europeans have always viewed the Communist
threat in a somewhat different way; it has always seemed to them
that the US overestimated the danger of military attack and under-
estimated the Soviet reluctance to become militarily engaged.
They have always believed that it was the threat of force combined
with domestic subversion and diplomatic maneuver which was the
preferred Soviet strategy in Europe. Thus, most of them have tended
to look upon the Atlantic alliance and the presence of US forces in
Europe less as a defensive arrangement and more as a deterrent to
threats, coups, or a collapse of will. They have believed, and
continue to believe, that the principal problem of the alliance is
to strengthen its deterrent effect by providing a greater measure
of European control over its military forces and particularly over
its nuclear strategic arm.
32. In more recent years, as the US has become increasingly
engaged in disputes and undertakings all over the world, they have
felt that the deterrent effect of the alliance has been somewhat
dissipated. They view disputes between the US and the USSR outside
Europe as peripheral to the vital interest of both the US and
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Europe. They do not want the US to be defeated or humbled outside
Europe, but neither do they wish the US to create, or to allow
itself to be confronted with, issues of a critical character out-
side Europe. They are inclined to believe that the US makes
too much of Latin American, African, and Far Eastern problems,
that it overdramatizes them and makes them more significant than
they really are, and that steps should be taken to minimize, to
quiet, or to neutralize them. France in particular, but the UK
and the others to some degree also, would prefer to calm the
situation in the Far East by dealing with China, North Vietnam,
and North Korea, would prefer to treat the new leaders in the under-
developed areas with less obvious sympathy and more severity,
and would prefer the US to take a more cavalier attitude toward
Latin American revolutionary developments.
33. The only large and developed non-Communist nation outside
Europe and North America is Japan. It stands in splendid isola-
tion in the northwest Pacific, carrying on the bulk of its
trade with the West, still distrusted by its non-Communist Far
Eastern neighbors, and still distrusting and distrusted by its
two great neighbors, Communist China and the USSR. Japan has
shown amazing political stability and vigorous economic growth.
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Democratic political institutions seem to be taking root, leftist
political factions have been growing at only a moderate pace,
and rightist extremism is still small and ineffectual. Never-
theless, Japan has still not found a national soul to replace
that cast out with the defeat of 1945. Old cultural concepts and
practices are rapidly being discarded, but there is no consensus
on new ones. The nation almost certainly will one day confront
the question whether it will continue to be a cooperative client
of the US with a Western culture or whether it will become an
Asian power with a new national culture and forging a different
kind of relationship with its Far Eastern neighbors. It is still
too early to determine which course it will follow.
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V. PROBLEMS AND TRENDS IN UNDERDEVELOPED AREAS
34. While the powerful and developed nations of the northern
third of the world have been coping with the problems of military
power and moving with both greater prudence and flexibility toward
political and economic change, revolution and disorder in the
southern two-thirds of the world have been intensifying. In four
major areas, Latin America, Africa, the Near East, and Southeast
Asia, indigenous political forces -- in some cases with the assist-
ance and encouragement of other powers -- were overthrowing governments,
forming political alignments, and impinging to a degree hitherto
unknown upon the concerns and even vital interests of their more
powerful northern neighbors.
35. There remains a large common denominator among the countries
of the underdeveloped world despite the cultural and historical
diversity which exists. Nearly all these nations are beset by
problems arising from rapid population growth, lack of development
capital, rising popular expectations, internal political strife
and competing ideological pressures, lack of administrative and
technical competence, and an inadequate sense of national identity.
Many have adopted strongly socialist methods; some have held to
constitutional methods with only the greatest difficulty and
others have abandoned them; some have thrown out bloody dictators
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and some have acquired them. Most profess some form of neutralism;
only a few have chosen to ally themselves with one or other of the
major powers. Despite these general similarities, it has become
increasingly apparent that each of the major areas of the under-
developed world has developed political forces and tendencies more
or less peculiar to its particular problems, geographical location,
and political history.
Latin America
36. The pace of social and economic change in Latin America
has greatly quickened during the pact few years. In some countries,
industrialization and the more rapid pace and broadening base of
economic activity in general have enlarged both the middle class
and the urban proletariat. Rapid population growth and migration
to the cities have created large slums and large numbers of restless
and disaffected people. In those countries still largely under-
developed and governed by the traditional ruling classes, pressures
are developing for modernizing society. Nearly everywhere in
Latin America there is a high degree of political instability;
the combination of strong pressure for change from growing numbers
of dissatisfied people, revolutionary plotting, and the very
difficult economic problems which most countries confront have
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kept the political pot boiling and will continue to do so for
many years to come.
37. In most countries where this high instability exists,
the causes and the political forces involved are almost exclusively
indigenous. The Communist parties of Latin America are for the
most part under Moscow-oriented leaders, incapable of overthrowing
or exercising strong influence in any regime, and largely unsuccessful
in acquiring a mass following. The Castroist groups which have
come into existence have greater appeal to the growing mass of
poverty-stricken and frustrated urban and rural workers. The
promise of quick suceess through force and terror has proven more
attractive than the more rational plans and more deliberate pace
which the Communists have adopted. While Castroist-type movements
have been aided and encouraged by the Castro regime, for the most
part their activities and their doctrines arise from their own
passions and from the example of Cuba.
38. The political elements which pose the most serious threat
to existing regimes -- whether they are traditionalist or progressive
in character -- are not those who call themselves Communists or
Castroists, but leftist-nationalist groups who blame their own
and their nation's troy : al s upon what they believe to be an
alliance of foreign --especially US -- capitalists with local
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land-owners, military leaders, and political adventurers. These
forces represent, for example, the Peronist tradition in Argentina
and the Brizola group in Brazil; their political program is strongly
anti-US and leftist in ideology and demagogic in method. They
attack progressive and traditionalist regimes alike and they are
not reluctant to accept Communist and Castroist support.
39. In a few places there are encouraging signs of more
responsible forces for change developing. Some countries have
genuinely accepted the Alliance for Progress concept and are
pushing toward its goals. In some countries groups and individuals
striving for change have joined in the Christian Democratic movement
and are acquiring significant political influence. President
Betancourt of Venezuela not only survived a long and intense
terroristic attack from Communist and Castroists, but succeeded in
his goal of a peaceful transition to a freely-elected successor.
4+0. Nevertheless, the Latin American scene as a whole will
probably continue to be marked by civil disturbance, plotting and
counterplotting, political warfare, and terrorism. Some of the
leftist-nationalist forces may succeed in acquiring power. Those
revolutionaries who take Castro As their model, inspiration, or
guide will exploit whatever opportunities are open to them, either
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within the leftist-nationalist movement or among the dissatisfied
and frustrated masses. In some cases, military leaders of a more
traditionalist character will seek to head off leftist-nationalist
and Castroist groups by establishing military regimes; the conse-
quence of this may be to drive the moderate revolutionaries into
the radical camp. In any event, the presence in the Western
Hemisphere of a Communist state backed by the USSR will continue
greatly to jeopardize US interests throughout the continent and
to complicate the problems of US diplomacy.
Africa
41. The situation in Africa is at least as unstable as that
in Latin America, but considerably less suffused with a disposition
toward revolutionary change. The African states are by and large
less developed. There are fewer educated people and fewer technicianst
the middle class is small; the urban proletariat, though growing
rapidly, is less class-conscious and less aware of its power.
Revolutionary groups on the classic model are small or non-existent,
and there are few Communists. Plotting and violence occurr, but
they are not usually directed against the existing social and
political system; their aim is usually simply to replace those
enjoying the privileges of office by others who would like those
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privileges themselves. Often the atmosphere of political developments
is that of the comic opera rather than that of social crisis.
42. There are many problems in Africa which will cause serious
difficulties. Nearly everywhere there is governmental weakness,
ineffectiveness, corruption. Economic growth is slow, and many
economies are virtually stagnant. The countries of northern
Africa are over-populated in terms of available resources; the
race problem will cause great troubles in southern Africa; nearly
everywhere development capital is scarce and qualified people are
few; expectations are rising and unlikely to be fulfilled; many
cities are full of semi-literate unemployed people who are still
unaroused and complacent. There have been assassinations and
assassination attempts, a few governments have been changed, some
leaders are in danger of overthrow, and some have clamped down on
the opposition to protect themselves. Many situations such as those
in Algeria, the Congo, and the Horn of Africa are very fragile.
Nkrumah is an unstable man who has created and will create consider-
able instability in West Africa. Even nations led by mature and able
leaders, such as Nigeria and Senegal, have deep divisions. Devel-
opments of the type which recently occured in East Africa will be
probably repeated there and elsewhere; "reliable" regimes left
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behind by the departed colonial power will be thrown out, and the
succession will be a source of conflict between leftists and moderate
nationalists.
43. Some of the new states in Africa may continue to be
relatively stable and may even grow in strength. But in most of
the continent the picture appears much more clouded than it did a
year or two ago. There are likely to be many more eruptions of
violence and perhaps some changes of a major character. By and
large, the drift seems to be toward political and social chaos.
Although revolutionary forces of a serious and dangerous character
remain largely undeveloped or unmobilized, the milieu is one in
which these forces may become suddenly generated and difficult to
control. The area is certainly becoming increasingly vulnerable
to meddling from the outside.
The Near East
44. Arab nationalism is still seeking a form and definition
acceptable to all. It has become increasingly apparent that no one
of its competing doctrines or models is likely to win an early or
decisive victory. Nasser remains secure in his own country and
seems to be making progress in reforming and developing it, and
he remains an important symbol of the Arab revolution. Yet no
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other Arab country appears likely to accept him as its leader or
Egypt as its model. While, by contrast, the Baathist movement is
inter-Arab and not based upon single-nation dominance, it lacks
the strong popular base upon which to construct a new Arab political
union. Nevertheless, the idea of an "Arab Nation" persists, and
the belief in a wholesale reconstruction of Arab society continues
to dominate the political thinking of intellectuals and middle-class
Arabs everywhere. The monarchies in Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and
Libya are making in varying degrees some efforts to modernize,
but even in the most energetic of these, namely Jordan, the monarchy
itself could be swept away by the forces it is releasing and en-
couraging.
45. It will be a long time before the political turmoil among
the Arabs subsides. The various political currents and the various
national interests are likely to remain in conflict for some years
to come. While the monarchies and the sheikdoms, so long as they
persist, are likely to remain fairly accommodating to Western
interests, especially Western oil interests, there is likely to
be a continuing and steady pressure to bring the Western powers
into a more supplicant posture. At the same time, the Arabs are
not likely to move to terminate oil contracts or so to hinder oil
company operations as to cause the companies to withdraw or curtail
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exploitation; they know they need the oil revenues and are beginning
to appreciate the importance of the companies in the marketing of
oil. Also, despite their unwillingness to make peace with Israel,
they continue to recognize the danger of forceful action against
Israel. They respect Israeli military power, and some at least
realize that the West would prevent them from destroying Israel
even if they could. Thus, while turmoil will continue as the Arabs
quarrel among themselves and apply pressure on the West, the chances
are good that this turmoil will not spill over into conflicts
likely to be seriously damaging or critical for Western interests.
46. In two of the non-Arab states of the region an interesting
political experiment is underway. The royal regimes of Iran and
Afghanistan have become, at their rulers' initiatives, instruments
of revolution. The more dramatic case is that of Iran, where the
Shah has turned against both the upper and middle classes, made
common cause with the peasants, and begun a large-scale land and
political reform. His effort seems to have flagged in recent
months, but there is no sign of his turning back. Indeed, the
Shah is so committed that he can turn back only with considerable
risk; if he fails or falters, his regime may go down with his
program. In Afghanistan, the royal initiative has been less dramatic
and more deliberate. Steps toward more rapid modernization and
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toward political reform are being taken cautiously, and there are a
number of difficulties to be surmounted. As the pace of change
accelerates so will the pressures for its continuance; it is still
too early to determine whether the King will have the courage to
go ahead when the going gets harder.
4T. Developments affecting India which have occurred during
the past few years are an interesting example of the manner in
which changes in the Ccmm2niat world have led to a major change in
the structure of world power. The Chinese attack upon India in 1962,
although to some degree a response to Indian provocations, was
nevertheless opposed by the USSR and inconsistent with Soviet
policy toward India. The Indian leaders, despite their protestations
of neutralism, turned to the US and UK for military assistance.
This obliged the USSR to extend additional military aid to India
to protect its stake, and this further aggravated Chinese-Soviet
relations. US aid to India in turn upset the Pakistanis, who
feared the consequences of Indian rearmament. The Pakistanis then
proceeded to improve their relations with China at the expense of
their hitherto cordial relations with the US. Thus, while the
formal relations among the powers involved have undergone but
little change, in fact the structure of power, and especially the
international posture of India, has fundamentally changed.
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Southeast Asia
4+8. Of all the underdeveloped areas of the world, that in
which the major world powers are now most critically engaged is
Southeast Asia -- an immense area extending from the Indian
subcontinent to Melanesia. The two major problems in the area,
the future of Indo-China and of the great island areas to the south,
involve China, the USSR, Britain, the US, France, and Australia.
The problems of this area have loomed large in world affairs since
the end of World War II; they are now reaching critical proportions.
The major change of the past few years has been the growing
inability of the great powers to control the situation. Local
leaders and local political movements have become increasingly
powerful -- in large part as a result of the receipt of military
material from foreign sources -- and less disposed to follow
the dictate or advice of others.
49. The guerrilla war in South Vietnam is in its fifth year
and no end appears in sight. The Viet Cong in the south, dependent
largely upon their own resources but under the direction and control
of the Communist regime in the north, are pressing their offensive
more vigorously than ever. The political mistakes of the Diem regime
inhibited the effective prosecution of the war, which is really more
of a political contest than a military operation, and led to the
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regime's destruction. The counter-guerrilla effort continues
to flounder, partly because of the inherent difficulty of the
problem and partly because Diem's successors have not yet demonstrated
the leadership and the inspiration necessary. There remains serious
doubt that victory can be won, and the situation remains very fragile.
If large-scale US support continues and if further political deterio-
ration within South Vietnam is prevented, at least a prolonged stale-
mate can be attained. There is also a chance that political evolution
within the country and developments upon the world scene could lead
to some kind of negotiated settlement based upon neutralization.
50. Larger stakes are involved in the contest between
Indonesia and Malaysia. The ostensible issue is the future of
the territories of northern Borneo, but Sukarno and his Indonesian
supporters appear to have more fundamental objectives in mind.
Among other things, they fear Malaysia and particularly the greater
energy and efficiency of the Chinese in Singapore and North Borneo,
who they believe will come to dominate the new state. Believing
as they do that Indonesia is the greatest nation in the area and
feeling a new strength from the acquisition of Soviet arms and the
successful termination of the West New Guinea Affair, they also
believe that they cannot tolerate a rival state which could become
a magnet to the diverse peoples of Indonesia itself. Above all,
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they hope to make Indonesia a great world power.4ble to negotiate
in equality with China, the USSR, and the US -- after having
destroyed Malaysia and having brought the Philippines and the main-
land states under Indonesian hegemony. The struggle will not be
easy for Indonesia. Its economic problems will be intensified,
and the interested Anglo-Saxon powers will try to prevent Malaysia
and the Philippines from falling in behind Indonesian designs.
But Malaysia, too, will have its problems. There is serious doubt
that it can attain its main purpose, namely, to create a state
controlled by Malays which will utilize the energies and ingenuity
of the Chinese without allowing them to dominate. The outcome
seems likely to remain uncertain for yerrs to come.
51. French initiatives in Far Eastern politics have added
a new factor to an already unclear picture of great power influence.
British influence in Malaysia and the still strong US position on
the mainland are a brake upon both Indonesian aspirations in the
south and Chinese designs in the north. The USSR, while it has
not entirely given up its efforts to retain some influence in Laos
and North Vietnam, has evidently decided that its position is too
weak to enable it to strive for decisive influence on the mainland;
in any case Indo-China is not a good place for the Soviets to
challenge Communist China. They have sought instead to gain
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influence in Indonesia, in part to block the Chinese, but even so
they probably regard their Indonesian policy as a low cost venture
for a potentially high profit rather than as a matter of vital
concern. The French recognition of China, in the context of its
continuing position in Hanoi and its quiet activities in Laos,
Cambodia, and South Vietnam, may not involve an intention to take
further diplomatic steps in the near future, but it does set up
conditions under which de Gaulle, if he chooses, can move gradually
toward the creation of new equilibrium in the Far East and partic-
ularly in Southeast Asia.
VI. SOME IMPLICATIONS OF THE NEW RELATIONS OF POWER
52. The preceding paragraphs clearly indicate that the
structure of world power -- which had already undergone profound
changes during the 1950's -- is again undergoing major modifica-
tions. The fact that the two great powers have found it diffi-
cult to bring their very substantial military power to bear in
order to achieve their objectives, or to project this power into
parts of the world where they have an interest, has had important
consequences. It has deterred the major powers from undertakings
which might call their military capabilities into action. This in
turn has enhanced the role of discussion, diplomacy, and negotiation
at the great power level. At the same time, the natural centrifugal
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forces within the major power blocs have been released and the rising
national and cultural forces outside the two major power centers
have been accelerated. These forces within the two power blocs were
probably bound to emerge in time, but the changing relation of
military power has helped to free them.
53. Such phenomena as the gathering strength of India,
the continuing vision of Arab nationalism, the increasing importance
of African and Latin American developments in world affairs, the
growing proclivity of emerging nations such as Indonesia to plow
an independent course, all these represent a strong secular
trend which is probably irreversible and which in itself has de-
preciated the role and influence of the great powers. As a con-
sequence of these phenomena and of the progressive disintegration
of the two power blocs, a pluralistic world order is rapidly coming
into being. World power is proliferating, divergencies are emerging,
and diversity has been encouraged.
54+. It would be easy to go too far in appraising the
results of these changes in the structure of world power. The
strategic situation in the world does not make general nuclear
war impossible, but it makes it a highly irrational method of re-
solving international disputes. The fact that the Communist world
has become undisciplined will not force it to abandon communism
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or to renounce its objectives, but it makes progress more difficult
and inhibitions more compulsive. Discord within the West is not
destroying NATO or undermining the predominant role of the US in
the non-Communist world, but it is forcing the Western nations to
recognize the underlying diversity of their concerns. The rise
of independent nationalisms and centers of power outside the North
Atlantic basin does not foreshadow a great decline in Western
influence, but it does greatly reduce the chances that Western
political concepts will gain wide acceptance.
55. The Soviet leaders themselves appear to have come to a
new appreciation of the world situation.. In the months following
the Cuban crisis Khrushchev was apparently under some attack at home
and apparently won his battle. The battle was probably not so much
over his personal position as it was over the domestic, intrabloc,
and foreign policies the USSR should follow. The result was a
decision to hold the line on defense expenditures, a determination
to stand fast against Chinese and Chinese-inspired attack upon
Soviet policies, and a decision to seek better relations with the
West in general and the US in particular. While this stance may
persist for some time to come, particularly since it derives from
a recognition of factors which are unlikely to change in the short
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term, it does not in itself signal a broader withdrawal of the
USSR from its basically hostile attitude toward the West or from
its revolutionary goals.
56. Even as the Soviet leaders were conforming their policies
to the changing atmosphere and power relations of the world, Western
leaders were doing likewise. President Kennedy's style and approach,
and particularly his capacity to combine firmness with restraint,
both encouraged the Soviets to seek a new kind of relationship with
the US and made clear the limits of American patience and hopes.
General de Gaulle, now pre-eminent in Europe and driven by a sense
of historic mission, has moved with boldness and stubbornness not
only to reconstruct France, but Europe as well. De Gaulle's policies
and manner are widely deplored in the West, particularly because of
their effect upon the Atlantic alliance and because of their patently
nationalist motivation. But de Gaulle is probably also convinced
that his policies are right, and that, in the present world context,
they will lead to a new and preferable world equilibrium.
57. Despite these changes in the world situation and in
the manner in which the world's leaders look upon it, the danger
of a general nuclear war with all its horrible consequences will
continue to be the overriding problem of our time. This danger
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will continue to arise, as in the past, not from a deliberate
attempt to destroy a competitor, but from undertakings and
occurrences of a more limited character. The problem of calculating
the risks involved in such undertakings and occurrences will remain
a major concern of policy-makers.
58. In any event, the problems which will increasingly
preoccupy policy-makers will be those which arise from the diversity
of interests which has developed and the proliferation of power which
has occurred. Events similar to those which recently occurred in
East Africa and Panama will flare up in the many places which
continue to be unstable. Often an event occurring through accident
or irrational action will trigger political developments throughout
an entire area and provide opportunities for political adventures
or revolutionaries who otherwise would have remained obscure and
ineffectual. Aside from alarms and excursions of this nature,
tensions are likely to flare up from time to time over the many
continuing problems of international politics -- Berlin, Cuba,
Vietnam, of al. Some may produce open military confrontations
between the great powers despite the strong interest of both sides
in not permitting such confrontations to develop.
59. Indeed, despite any disinclination to get involved
in crises or any interest in a detente which may exist, the
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situation in most of the underdeveloped world is so disorderly that
many situations are likely to develop from which the great powers
will have difficulty remaining aloof or which they will have
difficulty controlling if they do get involved. Individuals and
groups calling themselves Castroists or Communists might stage
revolutionary attempts or initiate guerrilla movements, not on the
orders of Moscow; Peiping, or Havana, but in the hope of gaining
their support. Similarly, individuals and groups may organize or
execute plots simply to gain US support. In some cases, of course,
the instigation will have come from the outside, and in many cases
support will be forthcoming. Once outside powers do become involved,
whether by accident or design, crises can develop which will engage
their prestige to a degree incommensurate with the intrinsic or
strategic value of the area itself.
60. One consequence of this disorder and of the inhibitions
upon open involvement is likely to be an increase in clandestine
activities designed to influence the course of events in a desired
direction or to block similar activities by other powers. In
many places the situation may be so soft, the issues so undefined,
and the parties so difficult to identify that outside powers
will be unable to develop an acceptable rationale for intervention.
Thus, many situations will be resolved by local leaders or groups
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sponsored and supported covertly from the outside. This will be
an attractive course of action, not only because of the inhibi-
tions upon open intervention, but because it will often cost so
little in money and effort if an investment is made early enough
to be effective.
61. It is possible in the present context of Soviet policy
-- particularly to the extent that this policy derives from the
USSR's appreciation of the military situation and from its own
difficulties at home and within the Communist world -- that some
movement toward the settlement of some international issues will
occur. But the obstacles to a general detente are very great, not
only because of the key character of such problems as Berlin, but
because of the new tensions and problems which will arise
from the disorderly character of so much of the world. Thus, the
US will probably be confronted with many serious challenges to its
interests in many parts of the world and will have to live with
the paradox that --while it disposes greater power than any
nation ever had -- it is greatly inhibited in the use of that
power to advance or to protect its interests.
62. Over the longer run, the chances are good that the
gradual changes taking place in the USSR will diminish its
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hostility to the West and the vigor of its revolutionary effort
outside the Communist world. In particular, the climate of opinion
within the USSR, the greater intellectual freedom permitted, the
sensitivity of the regime to intellectual opinion and popular pre-
occupations with peace and a better life, the greater weight accorded
to national interests and conventional modes of international
conduct -- all these have already contributed to the decline of
Soviet aggressiveness and to a realistic appreciation of the
nature of the modern world. This process of change may be slowed
from time to time, or even halted, but it is probably irreversible.
But whether it proceeds or halts, the evolution which has taken
place, together with the changes which have occurred within the
Communist camp and in the world at large, suggest that for the
next several years at least the world may be replete with strife
and disorder but not on the verge of nuclear disaster.
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