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Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
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Document Creation Date: 
December 16, 2016
Document Release Date: 
April 29, 2005
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Publication Date: 
March 17, 1964
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PDF icon CIA-RDP79R00967A000900020037-1.pdf66.05 KB
Approved For Releah 2005/05/23: CIA-RDP79R00967A00WOp ' 7-1s -01 17 March 196+ FROM : IA STAFF, D 1. The most disturbing development following the Communist-Socialist Popular Front (FRAP) victory in the 15 March Chilean by-election is the possible disintegration of theft /{. Democratic Front (FD). As for the election itself, FRAP and ift Christian Democratic Party (PDC) both made impressive gains; however, FRAP, by winning, can make the most mileage out of the election by claiming that it was a "plebiscite" for the September presidential election. 2. FD presidential candidate, Julio Duran, has already announced his resignation from the race. This action gives the FD, which is composed of the Radical, Conservative, and Liveral Parties, three alternatives; r 1111 1) It may choose a new candidate (Duran was never an entirely satisfactory candidate), perhaps losing some segments of its member parties. or 2) It may reject Duran's resignation, perhaps~losing some segments of ttsrparties. or 3) It may dissolve and the individual parties align themselves either with the PDC or FRAP. 25X1 Approved For Release 2005/05/23 : CIA-RDP79R00967A000900020037-1 Approved For ReleasL 2005/05/23 : CIA-RDP79R00967A000g00020037-1 S E C R E T Course 1 or 2 would not drastically alter the current presidential odds, favorable to the PDC. Course 3, however, would present an entirely new election outlook. The Conservative and Literal Parties would align themselves with the PDC, and the bulk of their followers would probably follow. The Radical Party would probably either split between the PDC and FRA:P or else take no formal stand at all. In any case, the chances are better than even that the majority of the Radical vote -- perhaps a lajget# majority -- would go to FRAP. Such a development would significantly impppve FRAP's chances, and depending on the size of the Radical support, might result in the election of a Communist-Front 3. It is :pxxxtx practically impossible to make a hard estimate in the current x??E state of flux, but we believe that the FD parties will, at least, etplore fully the possibility of remaining in the race before xt disintegre. ing and seeking an accomodation, which would certainly place them in secondary positions, with xiEk either FRAP or the PDC. S E C R E T Approved For Release 2005/05/23 : CIA-RDP79R00967A000900020037-1