CHILE: AN OLD FEAR REVIVED

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R00967A000900020037-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 29, 2005
• Sequence Number: 37
• Publication Date: March 17, 1964
• Content Type: MEMO

Approved For Releah 2005/05/23: CIA-RDP79R00967A00WOp ' 7-1s -01
17 March 196+
FROM : IA STAFF,
D
1. The most disturbing development following the
Communist-Socialist Popular Front (FRAP) victory in the 15 March
Chilean by-election is the possible disintegration of theft
/{.
Democratic Front (FD). As for the election itself, FRAP and
ift Christian Democratic Party (PDC) both made impressive gains;
however, FRAP, by winning, can make the most mileage out of the
election by claiming that it was a "plebiscite" for the September
presidential election.
2. FD presidential candidate, Julio Duran, has already
announced his resignation from the race. This action gives the
FD, which is composed of the Radical, Conservative, and Liveral
Parties, three alternatives;
r
1111 1) It may choose a new candidate (Duran was never an
entirely satisfactory candidate), perhaps losing some
segments of its member parties.
or
2) It may reject Duran's resignation, perhaps~losing some
segments of ttsrparties.
or
3) It may dissolve and the individual parties align
themselves either with the PDC or FRAP.
25X1
Approved For Release 2005/05/23 : CIA-RDP79R00967A000900020037-1
 Approved For ReleasL 2005/05/23 : CIA-RDP79R00967A000g00020037-1
S E C R E T
Course 1 or 2 would not drastically alter the current presidential
odds, favorable to the PDC. Course 3, however, would present an
entirely new election outlook. The Conservative and Literal
Parties would align themselves with the PDC, and the bulk of
their followers would probably follow. The Radical Party would
probably either split between the PDC and FRA:P or else take no
formal stand at all. In any case, the chances are better than
even that the majority of the Radical vote -- perhaps a lajget#
majority -- would go to FRAP. Such a development would significantly
impppve FRAP's chances, and depending on the size of the Radical
support, might result in the election of a Communist-Front
3. It is :pxxxtx practically impossible to make a hard estimate in
the current x??E state of flux, but we believe that the FD
parties will, at least, etplore fully the possibility of remaining
in the race before xt disintegre. ing and seeking an
accomodation, which would certainly place them in secondary
positions, with xiEk either FRAP or the PDC.
S E C R E T
Approved For Release 2005/05/23 : CIA-RDP79R00967A000900020037-1