SOVIET REACTIONS TO A US DECISION TO DEPLOY ABM DEFENSES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R00967A001000070003-1
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 15
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 1, 2006
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: December 10, 1966
• Content Type: MEMO

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CE TRAL IU * LLXGB C AGENCY
A RCN TO D Y
he .3cvi; now
decision
r d
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Excluded fm l automatf
downgrading and
declassification
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In general those 3ovicts who urge bigge
only at
would speak, with louder ir
.opted a similar px x. A de
3-4. In ow' recent astimtes we
eater pertinence in this respect if, as we
Y: the USSR is now deploying a 4-i A system
defenses at
that, regardless
of Alit decieio , the Soviet predilection for strategic defense
and the aeive threat they see in the strategic attack forces
would probably canoe the i 3f to extend AM defences re widely
during the next 10 years. We have allowed, however? for the
possibility that the Soviets might decide t;iat sufficient A
deployment for the general defense of the US S11 vas too costly.
coats for the 4oecow system alone gill be the
nt of at least .13 billion (excluding R&D costs) over the
peerentl y required to deploy it, from 1962 to about
1970. Soviet vi l xi :ess to spend such a sun is consistent with,.
he high priority which has long been as
T-O-T' $-E G<
,tegi defense
no question that
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cbellegge
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would
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aud coat t e v o
IT. The
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ri to
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he ` ov1e ecanow.
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systems post to us, and thereby to escape from the deterrence
of their present and growing threat. Either program would convey
to the Soviets that we were not content to remain in a condition
of mutual deterrence but were striving instead to gain a clear
power advantage.
A second major Judgment then follows. Faced with this
situation, the primary Soviet concern would be to retain what
we call an assured destruction capability, that is, the power
to impose vast and unacceptable injury on this country regardless
of the circumstances in which nuclear war might begin. The
Soviets would therefore deploy ICBM's of such types and numbers
as to insure retention of such a capability. In the end, after
enormous costs to them and to us, the condition of mutual de-
terrence would be likely to obtain as before.
Finally, the political implications for Soviet society
and for Soviet-American relations of such an intensification of
the arms race seem to me to be of significant importance. The
strains imposed by such an effort would at the very least re-
tard what movement we have thought might be developing toward
T O P S E C R E T
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