SOME PROBLEMS IN THE COORDINATION OF MEMORANDA

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Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
CIA-RDP79R00967A001200010018-9
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RIPPUB
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S
Document Page Count: 
4
Document Creation Date: 
December 16, 2016
Document Release Date: 
June 27, 2005
Sequence Number: 
18
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
October 27, 1967
Content Type: 
MF
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t Approved For Release 2005/07/13 : CIA-RDP79R00967A491200010018-9/ ?itt, SECFIET 27 October 1.967 MEMORANDUM FOR: Din FLOM: CAS SUBJECT: Some Problems in the Coordinstion of Memoranda 1. It has been the practice for Some time to attath to intelli- gence memoranda prepared for circulation outside the Agency a footnote indicating 'whether they bare been prepared entirely within CIA, indica- ting the Agency element principally reoponsible? and naming those other elements that participated or gave their concurrence. The origin of this practice was a request from Genera Mvontell Taylor that ho not be given papers without clear indication of their origin. In practice, the sourcing footnote hes provided e. means of assuring and certifying coordination of memoranda within the Agency. 2. Py common consent responsibility for coordination of memoranda has been left to the people engaged in their preparation. In CNB re- sponsibility for giving concurrence *bon consulted has been left to the Staff Chiefs, vbv have the authority to delegate that responeibility to 'Alton members. Notification is given in writing to the Cla's office of all concurrences requested and of the action taken, but nothing further is required unless there is &problem that cannot be resolved at the ? working level. Other offices follow similar procedures. It has been the general practice to coordinate and ask concurrence only of those AeWINT elements whose consent is recorded as pertinent to the matter at hand. CE, for example? does not as =NT antaummao on a memorandum on a political or economic subject, nor does it son that of OCZ or OE R on e subject deemed largely military. Other offices pUblishvithout consulting OUR when they write on matters or 0 current or technioal nature, for example, on which it le considered tbet ONSin view are not pertinent* 3. In general those procedures have worked very vell. They depend for their effectiveness on the excretes at geoid judgment by the toECriET Approved For Release 2005/07/13 : CIA-RbP7 .4.1 riauatit Laitis kid 0010018-9 Approved For Release 2005/07/13 : CIA-RDP79R00967A09,1200010018-9 tEGM prelysts with respect to the interests, resources, and claims to be consulted of the many elements in the AaanCY /Monad in preparing finished intelligence. It also depenas on the manner in which thaY interpret and represent the viess at their cm offices in giving or withholding concurrence in memoranda prepared by others. 4. The present system depends on the emumption that analysts, checked by their aupervisore and officio chiefs, have the authority to decide which of the various Agency components should be consulted and which not, In the past when armsomnda have been given external eircu- lation without OMB concurrence and when UM has believed that it should have been consulted, the matter has been broui to the attention of the Office chief concerned. The diecuselons which followed have demonm strated that they have a mutual interest in seeing that the system works. Problems usually arise When an mallet is pressed for time and hopes to avoid or shortcut consultation which he fears will delay publication or chew his 12C21101`1112dMis His supervisor or Office chief is usually more concerned than he about maintaining good relations with other Agency components. 5. There are, however, more difficult problems than that of seeing that consultation actually takes place. First, there is the problem of whet to do in the case of ? clear divergence of vieva on a matter of judgment. It is essential, of *nurse, that thajigeney speak to the outside world with a single voice. There ie a general willineness to tolerate treatments of subjects that would not be the preference of the party asked to give concurrence, so long as basic judgments are in agreement. Most analysts are willing to go quite far in accommodating other exponents of the Agency in araer to get *paper that con be put out with all proper concurrences. 2 do not know of a paper which loss been withheld from publication became of thowithholdingleoncurrence. There was one case, of course, in 'bleb found itself unable to subscribe to the formulation or the problem end the methodology employed. Because this was a paper written in response to a special request, it was agreed that in this case Oars name could simply be left out of the sourcing footnote. In a cone of substantive difference such a solution would be unlikely to satisfy. I suggest that each ease should be de- cided an its merits and that in nOnt instances ? ealution will be found by working the alternative arguments into the text or appendix* a footnote in which they are spelled out. -2 SECRET Approved For Release 2005/07/13 : CIA-RDP79R00967A001200010018-9 ILLEGIB Approved For Release 2005/07/13: CIA-RDP79R00967A001200010018-9 .i1CRET 4 6. Another kind of prObles allies ever the (pestles at what offices shou3A be consulted m sew given paper, In *oat cases the cholas is obvious. In sone it can be *ten difficult ard delicate eurtter. I de not believe there is any rule of thumb, nor to I be. have that a rule can be formulated,boveverfcamplicated, that will cover all cases. Each component at the Agency has an devious claim to be consulted on a ymer that cover. a field in which it has special cemetence and responsibility. oar o rights ars perhaps mere diffi- cult to define than those of $oy other Aeenfee emepecent. It can claim the right to be consulted on any broad and *portent matter on which estimates are and.. it 'there do you draw the line between these and subjecte that are essential.ly specific, current, or techuicelt re Win the only practical rule is for the analysts, =pier the direction of their supervisory* to be bold retponsible to the claims of other Offices and. comments of the Ageney. Saab miniedietent noted should lead to dialectal= and, hopefully* correetive?seetion. It should be leapt in mind that there hoe in practice been very few cases where one component hes felt that it bud a valid =implant feminist another. T. There remains one area in 'bleb 02131 has a clear and easily eateblished claim to being 403sulted end listened to. I refer to momoranda which deal with (tette:Mee node In National Intelligence 'estimates* or which WV due to be treated in forthcoming Rift. Your treatment of this whole bums in your lessorandem to the Director 011 of the Office of Strategic Dosexrch (rtt. CEA Itmeorsudtms an the dated 10 October 1967) sets forth Ws position on this natter. I believe it should be scut to ell compcnents of the Agelm that produce finithed intelligence. B. 2 have discused the subject or this memorandum with a variety of people whose judgment I value and have found neral agree =ant with the outline of the present vat= ay set forth above sea lath the principles that crealeexte ehould be held 7.'17,00014? for declaim who should be caked for cencurrence end seeing that it is done, mad that the astern is best policed by berries aggrieved parties take their case to the superiors of the analyst with those decieimes they dis- agree. Co proposal for e in the system is being considered by. the =11. It is to footnote 1110=oranda published for circulatien cataide the Agency simply with the statement that they teme be= prepared entirely within the Jkgeacy, or in collaboretica with BOW SECRE1.1 Approved For Release 2005/07/13: CIA-RuP79R00967A001200010018-9 Approved For Release 2005/07/13 : CIA-RDP79R00967A001200010018-9 SECRET other agency When that is the ease. Ohio would deprive the outside reader of nothings insuoneh as be is unlikely to know one CIA ensimnent the abhor. It vem334 hove the advantage of avoiding the altuetioa 7-? in which an ONE Special ligonorazdom ea, 0111 coneurrence could be reed an a modification ar en estimate made in cam =I or 83134 Thome copies of the memorandum circulated vithin the Itgenevs homers road carry a slip indicating the office at prepenticas other offices participating and offices conetubring. Mlle would permit the Present Wit, se of policing the concurrence system to =Mane u at present.) I recommend that vi support the =I in this provo5s/4, SECRET Approved For Release 2005/07/13 : CIA-RDP79R00967A001200010018-9 t