TRANSMITTAL OF MEMORANDUM ON 'SECURITY CONDITIONS IN MALAYSIA AND INDONESIA'

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R00967A001200010020-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 1, 2006
• Sequence Number: 20
• Publication Date: October 25, 1967
• Content Type: MF

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C E N T R A L I N T E L L I G E N C E A G E N C Y
25 October 1967
MEMORANDUM FOR THE UNITED STATES IWELLIGENCE BOARD
SUBJECT: Transmittal of Memorandum on "Security Conditions
in Malaysia and Indonesia"
1. Having been alerted by the Secret Service to the
possibility that Vice President Humphrey will visit Malaysia
and Indonesia, we have prepared the attached memorandum on
security conditions in those countries.
2. This memorandum is being sent to the same addressees
as that on "Security Conditions in Saigon" dated 18 October. It
represents CIA views only.
MERMAN KENT
Director
National Estimates
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Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification
I/CDF Pages
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C E N T R A L I N T E L L I G E N C E A G E N C Y
24+ October 1967
MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR
SUBJECT: Security Conditions in Malaysia and Indonesia
Vice President Humphrey is scheduled to visit Malaysia and
Indonesia following his attendance at the 31 October inauguration
of General Thieu in Saigon. In accordance with past practice,
we have prepared a brief memorandum to supplement regular reporting
on security conditions relating to his trip.
GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
S-E-C-R-E-T declassification
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C E N T R A L I N T E L L I G E N C E A G E N C Y
24 October 1967
SUBJECT: Security Conditions in Malaysia and Indonesia
1. Malaysia. The principal security threat in Malaysia
is likely to come from the small but vocal leftwing opposition
which strongly opposes US policy in Vietnam. The activists
within this opposition are predominantly ethnic Chinese youths
who adhere to the militant doctrines of Mao's "Red Guard"
movement.
2, In Kuala Lumpur and elsewhere in peninsular Malaysia,
these pro-Communist activists have adopted "mass action"
tactics -- demonstrations, riots, strikes, and isolated acts of
violence and hooliganism -- designed to advertise their cause,
provoke the government and the police, and create an impression
of Malaysia as a politically unstable police state. It is likely
that these extremists will use the occasion of the Vice President's
visit to further these same objectives as well as to show their
hostility to the US. Demonstrations are likely and may involve
clashes with police and security personnel and actions against
US or Malaysian Government installations.
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grading and declassification
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3. Security during the visit will be the responsibility
of the Royal Malaysian Police (RMP), a generally efficient and
experienced force. Some of its units are well-equipped and
trained for riot control and have an excellent capability for
swift response to fast-breaking situations. Intelligence functions
of the RMP are concentrated in its Special Branch and are highly
developed. The 11 will cooperate closely with US officials.
If given advance notice, the police are in a position to detain
leftist leaders and other extremists who might be expected to
cause trouble during the Vice President's visit. While the RMP
may not be able to exercise full control over all demonstrations,
we believe it will be able to insure the personal safety of the
Vice President.
4. Indonesia. In Djakarta, selected units of the Indonesian
Army will probably have the major security responsibility during
the Vice President's visit; the local police forces are relatively
weak and ineffective, and to some degree politically unreliable in
the eyes of the Suharto regime. The an W has frequently demonstrated
its ability to cope with large-scale demonstrations, though in the
relatively permissive atmosphere of the past two years, it has not
always been able to predict their size and scope. In this instance,
however, the military will be particularly alert and unlikely to be
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caught unaware. For their part, any potential demonstrators
will be cautious for fear of subsequent reprisal by the military.
The power of the generals is such that any group of dissidents,
for example, opponents of the US position in Vietnam, would not
demonstrate without securing prior approval. Such approval,
while it might be forthcoming, would severely limit the anti-US
activity in scope and duration.
5. Indonesians and their government tend to be ambivalent
about the war in Vietnam. While there is considerable opposition
to communism and particularly the Chinese Communists, there is
much sympathy for North Vietnam as a small Asian state in a
fight with a powerful Western nation. The Suharto government,
moreover, is attempting to establish itself as a potential
mediator in the war and tries to avoid close identification with
US Vietnam policy. It is also concerned lest the Russians and
other East Europeans judge Indonesia as too pro-West and cut off
shipments of military supplies. For these reasons, Suharto may
permit small-scale demonstrations opposing US policy in Vietnam.
These will, as noted above, be carefully controlled; Suharto is
even more concerned to avoid Jeopardizing expected US economic
assistance. We do not believe, therefore, that any incident is
likely to occur in Djakarta which will jeopardize the safety of
the Vice President.
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6, Thuugh the Indonesian Army is capable of maintaining
good security for the Vice President anywhere in the country,
its problems would be compounded in certain cities of Central and
East Java (e.g., Surabaja). In these districts, pro-Sukarno,
anti-US, and even pro-Communist sentiment remains strong; the
Vice President would probably be received with substantial local
hostility.
FOR THE BOARD OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES: 25X1
Acting Director
National Estimates
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