STAFF SUGGESTIONS FOR MEMORANDA TOPICS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R00967A001200010031-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 28, 2005
• Sequence Number: 31
• Publication Date: September 14, 1967
• Content Type: MF

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES
14 September 1967
MEMORANDU4 FOR: ONE BOARD AND STAFF
(Internal ONE Only)
FROM : Chief, Estimates Staff
SUBJECT : Staff Suggestions for Memoranda Topics
1. The suggestions for memoranda which follow are for
discussion at a . meOting of Pond and Staff at 0930 Friday
15 September.
1. IA STAFF
1. The Shape, of Revolutions to Came in Latin America
Social and economic pressures are continuing to grow
in many Latin American countries, but prospects do not seem
bright for rapid change and reform under present political
institutions. The Communist left is neither large nor
strong in most of the countries. What are the forces,
groups and leaders most likely to undertake revolution in
the foreseeable future?
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4.
Latin Americas The Politics of Develoaient
What have been the political conditions most conducive
to economic progress? Are representative governments in
Latin America seriously inhibited in the formulation and
execution of practical economic policies? How severe a
hindrance are the "autonomous" government corporations?
Is it politically feasible to replace or reform them? Can
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military governments sustain the degree of backing from
various interest groups which would seem necessary for faster
rates of econ?xaic growth? Now much have economic problems to
do with the replacement of democratic governments by non-
democratic ones? Is it really much easier for a country to
stick to representative government if it has lots of oil?
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14. Renewed Soviet and Chinese Interest in Africa
An analysis of the ups and (mostly) downs of Soviet
and Chinese programs in black Africa in the past several
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years and of their most recent moves, particularly Soviet
military aid to Nigeria and Chinese involvement in the Tan-
Zam railroad. Are these indicative of new wrinkles on old
policies or of significant new departures?
IV. NE STAFF
15. Some Implications of the Arab Defeat by Israel
The summit ended with a formal split among Arab states.
Meaning of division in revolutionary group for inter-Arab
relations. New strength of conservative regimes. Arab
attitudes toward US.
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17. Southern Arabia
UAR and Saudi agreement. It's chances of success.
Yemen after Egyptian withdrawal. The Saudis, the sbiltk s
end the local rebels in South Arabia. 1N-
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V. FE STAFF
18. Certain Aspects of the Military Situation in South Vietnam
Iwas mulling over
acme ideas for a memo or two on this topic. His ideas doubt-
less will have taken better form now that he has been on the
scene. (Fourth Quarter)
19. Politics in Hanoi
A discussion of who really runs the show and an explora-
tion of any divergent attitudes toward the war. (Fourth
Quarter)
20. Political Stability in Burma
Assess He Win's political hold (and how economics might
affect it) and the problem of insurgency. At the recent meeting
on the Estimates Schedule, the Board seemed interested in
something along this line; we have our doubts that there is
much new and signif icant to say, but are willing to give it
a try. (November)
21. The Military's Involvement in China's Cultural Revolution
A rackup of what we know of the PCPs role and a few
timid speculations. We've already started this and as it's
shaping up it will probably be a for the Board's info" sort
of mmo. (October)
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22. The GRC View of the Mainland Situation
The disarray on the Mainland has exposed a surprisingly
cautious and realistic attitude toward "Return to the Mainland."
Short and sweet. (October)
23. Romania and (Eastern) Europe
This memorandum would seek to describe Romania's
graduated defiance of Moscow and chart its likely future
course. Externally, the main question involves Ranania's
impact on Moscow and other East European regimes and their
known and likely reaction to it. Relevant issues here might
include: Rcmiania's independent policy within CEMA and the
Warsaw Pact; her policies toward the Middle East, the UN,
proposed international Communist conferences, and the like;
efforts made by Moscow, Pankow, Prague, Budapest, and Sufic
to quarantine the Romanian disease; the "Romanian" faction
in Poland; the stimulus provided by Bucharest to Bonn's
eastern policy. Internally, the principal question is whether
the Ceausescu regime will continue to reject, by degrees,
the "socialist" experience of other Communist states and
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permit greater decentralization of the economy and democratization
of public institutions, as is now the case in Yugoslavia.
24. Pros acts for Peaceful Enegement in Euroi)e
On the assumption that the topic is not too general, this
memorandum would attempt to measure the long-term effects of
the continuing expansion of East-West trade, cultural contacts,
high-level visits. The issues of "guallism" in Eastern
Europe, Bonn's eastern policy, prospects for revival of
Communist parties in Western Europe,, the future of NATO and
the Warsaw Pact, the Group of Nine, even the Marxist-Christian
dialogue, are among the subjects which could be grouped under
this rubric.
25. Effects of the Intellectual Revival in Eastern E e
In countries in which intellectuals have traditionally
made the principal thrust for progress, the current intensive
engagement of East European writers and young Party members
in a critical appraisal of Communist political institutions
and Marxist credenda may herald significant pressures against
the regimes themselves. Most of the ferment is in Czechoslo-
vakia, where the dissidents have gained important positions
on both literary journals and in the Higher Party School,
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but there are similar developments in Poland, Hungary,
Romania, and Yugoslavia. There are also prospects for
collaboration between some of these East European mavericks
and their counterparts in the USSR.
26. The Soviet View of China
This memorandum would assess Soviet propaganda state-
ments, intelligence collection requirements, diplomatic and
military moves initiated by Moscow. Beyond that, the memo-
randum would speculate on the probable assessment being made
in the Kremlin on present developments in China and the future
course of Soviet-Chinese relations.
27`. CIPSU Leaders Diverge Over Party's Role
Problem: To examine the Soviet leadership 'a views on
the role of the party in light of the abrogation of Khrushchev'a
1962 party reform. There have been signs over the past year
or so that the Soviet leaders continue to argue over the
party's precise responsibilities in buildirg a Communist society.
Some leaders apparently believe that the party must adhere to
its traditional responsibilities of indoctrination., control,
agitation, etc., while others continue to espouse the
K4rushchevian view that the party must be actively engaged in
the production process, economic management, etc.
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28. Factors of Political Instability in Collective Leadership
Problem: To discuss the likelihood of a return to one-
man leadership as a consequence of factional alignments and
realignments in the top party organs. Although collective
leadership has endured for almost three years, there have
been signs that Brezhnev's authority has been steadily
enhanced as a result of a number of changes in the top
party apparatus. At the same time, there have been indications
that elements within the party and military leadership feel
that the present division of authority in the leadership
impedes the decision making process.
29. The Post_Malinovskiy H
C mnand and Soviet Defense Policy
Problem: To discuss the possible future changes in
Soviet defense policy as a result of the rise to power of a
new generation of Soviet military officers. New blood has
been infused into the high command since Malinovskiy's death,
but little is Down of their positions on such issues as the
Ali! debate, the "flexible response" doctrine, and other major
issues that have far reaching implications for future Soviet
defense policy.
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