NOTE TO THE DIRECTOR FROM ABBOT SMITH

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R00967A001200020022-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 27, 2005
• Sequence Number: 22
• Publication Date: June 7, 1967
• Content Type: NOTES

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1. We have reviewed yesterday's paper in the light of your
comments, the "Breezy Estimate" on yellow sheets that you sent us,
Ambassador Bohlen's cable, remarks of Ambassador Thompson in a
meeting at State, consultations with IflR, and other consultations.
The attached revised memorandum does not change our previous views
in any important respect.
2. The resignation of Nasser (announced while we were doing
this version) makes estimates difficult.
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9 June 1967
SUBJECT: Current Soviet Attitudes and Intentions in the
Middle East
NOTE; It should be emphasized that this memorandum deals
primarily with the immediate and short-term Soviet reactions
to the current situation. Further, at the moment of writing,
it is still quite unclear who is in control in Cairo, and
the outcome of this situation will obviously affect Soviet
policies.
1. We do not believe that the Soviets planned or initiated
the Middle Eastern crisis. The Israeli-Arab war and, more
specifically, the defeat of the UAR in that war, were develop-
ments which the USSR did not desire, initially did not foresee
and, later, could not forestall. But it is clear that the
Soviets were actively involved in the crisis from mid-May on.
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3. We believe that Nasser's decision to blockade the
Gulf of Aqaba (announced on 23 May) was made without Soviet
counsel and that the Soviets received little or no advance
warning of it.
Moscow had no
foreknowledge of the move; the Soviets displayed some uncertainty
as to how best to handle the issue; and they carefully avoided
any subsequent sanctioning of Nasser's move to close the Gulf
(though they did say that the entrance to the Gulf was in
Egyptian territorial waters, as they had 10 years before). But
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our belief that the Soviets did not approve of the Gulf closure
rests partly on our judgment that the Soviets were well aware
that this one move could provoke an Arab-Israeli war.
4. Clearly they miscalculated the course of events. Nasser
moved faster and further than they anticipated. The Israelis
did go to war and inflicted on the Arabs a defeat far more rapid
and complete than the USSR could have expected.
5. Soviet policy since the outbreak of the war has rested
essentially, we think, on several considerations; the USSR's
concern to avoid direct involvement in the war and to escape
the risk of a direct confrontation with the US; its desire to
preserve as many of the gains of the prewar crisis (both Soviet
and Arab) as possible through diplomatic and propaganda means;
its devout wish to avoid the stigma which would attach to Moscow
if the Arabs suffered a complete defeat and the Soviets did little
or nothing to prevent it; and, presumably, its hope that -- through
it all -- they could preserve a viable relationship with their
principal client in the Middle East, Nasser.
6. On the whole, the Soviets have behaved within the kind
of guidelines suggested by the considerations listed above. They
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have maintained their propaganda attack against Israel; they have
continued publicly to support the Arab cause; and after hostilities
broke out they quickly made direct contact with the US to proclaim
their interest in peace and, implicitly, to reassure President
Johnson that they plan no confrontation with the US over this
issue.
7. Federenko's agreement in the UN to a ceasefire without
the conditions demanded by the Arabs presumably reflected Soviet
fear that, unless the fighting was soon halted, the Arabs would
suffer a disastrous defeat. But this same action cost the USSR
something within the Arab world. The partial Soviet abandonment
of the Arabs at the UN will have to many the appearance of at
least a partial sell-out.
8. Moscow has probably decided that its task now is to
pick up as many pieces in the Middle East as it can, and has
probably already estimated that its chances to recoup from recent
setbacks are fairly good, especially over the long term. The
Soviets still have impressive advantages in the area, the
principal ones being the high tide of anti-US and anti-Israeli
feeling, and the Arab belief that the USSR is the only major
power likely to provide support for them in the foreseeable
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future. The Soviets probably believe that the US has suffered
more severe and lasting political losses in the Arab world than
they have.
9. The Soviets are probably hurting enough to take a new
look at their attitudes and policies toward the Middle East.
But they are probably not hurting enough to abandon their normal
caution in international affairs and to seek compensation for
their losses by lashing out against the US elsewhere in the world.
There are no places where dramatic Soviet gains could be scored
without risking a confrontation with the US or, at the very least,
substantial damage to existing Soviet policies.
10. We do not foresee a period of active Soviet cooperation
with the US in the Middle East. Soviet willingness to act in at
least partial concert with the US on the question of an immediate
and unconditional ceasefire was born of the needs of the moment
and did not, we think, reflect long-term considerations (other
than the standard Soviet desire to avoid direct confrontation
with the US). Basic US and Soviet goals in the Middle East --
including, for example, the USSR's wish to increase its presence
in the area and the US desire to prevent this -- have not been
altered by the current crisis.
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11. Indeed, it seems likely to us that, once the fighting
has stopped, the US and the USSR will find themselves in dispute
over a variety of issues associated with an armistice. An
immediate question will be how far and under what terms the
Israelis withdraw from the area they have occupied. Without
attempting to examine here the complexities attending this problem
we note only that the Soviets will be in a position to regain some
favor with the Arabs by supporting the Arab position in the matter.
They will continue to denounce the Israelis as aggressors (as they
have already done), and will condemn almost any policy the US may
adopt as one either of defending aggression or of hesitancy and
insincerity in restoring the rights of its victims.
FOR THE BOARD OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES:
ABBOT SMITH
Acting Chairman
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