THE EFFECTS OF CHANGING US POLICY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R00967A001200030024-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 30, 2006
• Sequence Number: 24
• Publication Date: September 25, 1968
• Content Type: MF

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C E N T R A L I N T E L L I G E N C E A G E N C Y
OFFICE OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES
25 September 1968
SUBJECT: The Effects of Changing US Policy
The attached memorandum poses questions which should
arouse a considerable amount of discussion by the Board. I
would hope we could meet on it some day soon.
GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
S-E-C-R-E-T downgrading and
declassification
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25 September 1968
SUBJECT: The Effects of Changing US Policy
It is common to find in our estimates the words "much will
depend on the attitude or actions of the US" or sentiments to
that effect. In many cases this is not pursued further and there
is more or less a tacit assumption that the basic lines of US
policy are not going to change much. For example, though the
recent draft of a paper on Southeast Asia after Vietnam had one
or more paragraphs on the importance of US policy, they were
stuck in at the end of the discussions of the various contingencies
and the main discussions presumed a continuance of a US presence
in Southeast Asia including military commitment in Thailand,etc.
While it is not our job to speculate on changes in US policy, it
is our job to estimate on the policies and actions of other
countries. Those policies and actions are in many cases in-
fluenced if not determined by their appreciation of prospective
US policies and actions. Thus we cannot escape.
GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
S-E-C-R-E-T downgrading and
declassification
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To make my point, let me outline what might be country X's
estimate of the ",:?rospects for US policy in the next rive
If I exaggerate, it is to raise the issues.
The Estimate: The 1968 elections will almost certainly
consolidate a major change which has been going on in US foreign
policy. Since the immediate post-war years, foreign affairs
have been a major concern of successive US administrations,
vide: the Marshall Plan, the intervention in Greece, NATO, SEATO,
ANZUS, Korea, the Japan defense treaty, the Berlin airlift, the
Alliance for Progress, massive world-wide foreign aid,etc., etc.
This preoccupation has been changing in the past few years.
Foreign aid has been progressively reduced until the 1968 ap-
propriation is so low that a responsible newspaper has suggested
that the appropriation bill be vetoed as being worse than no
program at all. The American diplomatic and economic presence
abroad has been drastically cut. While balance of payments
difficulties have been cited as the cause, it is clear that the
value of foreign representation has been downgraded. The dollar
savings from the drastic cut in foreign representation are in-
significant in the whole US financial picture -- a comparable
amount cut from any one of several military accounts would barely
be noticed. Politically, the US feels that cuts in official
civilian personnel overseas are more acceptable than reductions
in the number of and facilities for dependents of the US military.
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The US is going through a crisis of believing that it has
spent billions on foreigners and neglected domestic problems.
And to make matters worse, it feels that its foreign friends
and allies are not supporting it in its policies in Viet Nam,
Cuba or the Middle East. The Japanese trade with China and
North Viet Nam, the British and Canadians with Cuba, the French
have virtually deserted Israel. These two factors reinforce each
other; the recipients of US aid are ungrateful.
The Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia has shocked the US
and revived some of the emotions of the Cold War. At a minimum,
any moves towards detente with the USSR will be looked upon with
a cold eye. Situations in which it can plausibly be maintained
that Communists are threatening areas of close interest to the
US, such as Latin America, will arouse more response than would
have been the case a year or so ago. This is not to say that the
US will have a renewed interest in the Alliance for Progress, but
that anti-communism will be a more important criterion for US
support of regimes than their dedication to modernization and
reform.
Perhaps the most important element in the picture is Viet Nam.
There is widespread and passionate opposition in the US to the
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American involvement in Viet Nam. Without paying attention to
the tolerance shown student demonstrators who wave Viet Cong
flags, it is clear that an overwhelming majority in the US
wants to liquidate the American commitment to the GVN. The
differences are about how to do it, not what should be the
objective. The strength of the feeling about Viet Nam will not
soon dissipate and will militate against any new deep involvements
in areas which seem remote from direct US interests.
Domestically, a number of objectives appear to be emerging.
The need and desire to do something quickly and effectively about
disorders and crime, which is the substance of the talk about
"law and order," appears to be swinging from a concern about the
causes (coupled with a fair degree of tolerance for the mani-
festations) to a defense against the manifestations, including
a tougher attitude towards disturbers of the peace, strengthening
the police, the purchase of weapons by the citizenry and such.
This change in emphasis will correspond to a generally defensive
frame of mind and will extend itself to the military field, i.e.,
expenditures for defensive weapons, including the ABM.
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Defensiveness will also increase in the economic field,
leading to a greater success by those seeking protection from
foreign competition (steel, textiles, lumber). A desire to
reduce governmental expenses and disillusion with the results of
foreign expenditures will cause a further resistance to spending
money overseas for development of backward countries, i.e., a
further reduction of aid.
In short, the prospect is for a much more inward-looking
US, in which those concerned with foreign affairs will be on
the defensive, particularly against the Congress. There will
be an increase in actions which appear to offer immediate defense
of US domestic interests, a great reluctance to spend money abroad
and a desire to withdraw to the extent possible from involvement
in foreign matters. End of estimate.
The making of such an estimate will profoundly affect the
allies of the US or those who have relied on the US, and its
antagonists. Already Europeans have renewed doubts about the
effectiveness of the American alliance (vide: the revival of
talk about an European defense community). NATO looked to the
US for a lead in reacting to the invasion of Czechoslovakia; the
US checked the bet. Recipients of substantial American aid will
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cast about for about for alternative sources. Those who have
relied on US defense commitments will feel a greater urge to
make other, supplementary arrangements and those that can will
be even more inclined to go for the manufacture of nuclear weapons
(Israel, India, later japan). The alternative of accommodating
to the USSR will be considered.
The Germans in particular will have increasing doubts of the
US as a guarantor of their security. They will not expect the
troops already withdrawn from Europe ever to return and will
expect further reductions. They will not count on a strong
reaction on the part of the US, or of other NATO countries which
rely on the US nuclear umbrella, to new encroachments on Berlin
by the East Germans or the USSR. In that case, they will explore
the fields of other West European guarantees and arrangements,
nuclear weapons, and accommodation with the GDR and the USSR,
i.e., recognition of the division of Germany.
The Soviets will understand that they have a greater freedom
of action. Their leaders are tough and determined to maintain
at least their present position in Europe, the Middle East and
the sub-continent and will expect a declining US willingness to
challenge them in those areas. Having, through their invasion
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of Czechoslovakia, lost a large part of their credibility when
talking about peaceful coexistence and detente, they are likely
to press for what they see as advantages in any area of interest
to them. While the Soviets will probably believe that they do
not have a completely free hand and will be uncertain of the
point at which the US would react, they will believe that the
scope of safe action is enlarged. All the while, they will keep
up some gestures towards the US. They will feel free to discuss
all manner of bilateral agreements, being confident that the US
Senate would be unlikely to ratify any agreement which would be
interpreted as requiring confidence in Soviet bona fides, (e.g.,
arms limitation). The advantage to the Soviets would be that
US-USSR negotiations could easily alienate the allies of the US
who would be encouraged in their suspicions that the super powers
were negotiating matters of world importance over their heads.
In Asia, confidence on the part of the friends of the US in
its constancy and future reliability will falter. Japan will
consider its alternatives in case it is left on its own. The
smaller countries of Asia will be tempted to trim their sails
to a changed power situation and modify their policies against
the contingency of US withdrawal from the Asian mainland. The
Chinese will not feel it necessary to be too agressive or ex-
pansionist at present, confident that they will soon be the
undisputed great power in the area, to which the lesser states
will have to accommodate.
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There will be little or no incentive for the North Vietnamese
to compromise. Confident of their ability to stick it out for
the next few months, they know that they will be faced by a new
US administration, which will be relieved of the necessity of
justifying the policies of previous administrations and ready
and anxious to pull out, with no intention of returning. They
can be quite sure that even the talk about a great economic
program for the area will die down in the face of a US Congress
which was reluctant to appropriate funds for the Asian Development
Bank. Hence, although all US candidates for president speak of
persisting to a just settlement, Hanoi probably will be confident
that it can get a better deal from any new administration than it
can get from LBJ.
It would be nonsense to infer that US power and influence
in the world will become unimportant. But the impact of the US
is to a considerable degree a function of US will, intentions,
and policy. If, as I believe, considerable changes are already
underway, I think it behooves us to take greater account of these
changes in estimating likely policies and actions in other
countries. It may be much later than we think.
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