PROPOSED ADDITIONAL ITEMS FOR THE THIRD QUARTER IN THE PROGRAM OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATES (DRAFT FOR BOARD DISCUSSION -- ONE DISTRIBUTION ONLY)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R00967A001400010010-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 19, 2005
• Sequence Number: 10
• Publication Date: March 26, 1970
• Content Type: NOTES

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C E N T R A L I N T E L L I G E N C E A G E N C Y
OFFICE OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES
26 March 1970
SUBJECT: Proposed Additional Items for the Third Quarter
in the Program of National intelligence Estimates
(Draft for Board Discussion -- ONE Distribution Only)
We have now discussed our proposed Program of Estimates
with several members of the NSC Staff. They have made generally
gracious comments, specifically expressing interest in a number
of our Second Quarter entries -- e.g.:
The Horn of Africa (NIE 75/76-70)
Communist China's International Posture (NIE 13-7-70)
The French Role in Black Africa (NIE 22/60/70-70)
Long-Term Economic Prospects in India and Pakistan
(NIE 31/32-70) (In this case, the interest is in
the broader outlook as well as the strictly economic
prospects.)
Burma's Problems and Their Possible Implications
(NIE 51-70)
Chile (NIE 94-70)
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Vary, the NSC Latin Americanist, has mentioned that he
might soon be requesting an SNIE on the Dominican Republic.
Morris,, the NSC Africanist, has sent along several
suggestions, a couple of which seem to us appropriate topics
for Third Quarter NIEs. These are noted below, along with
several new suggestions by our own Board or Staff members.
25X1
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C E N T R A L INTELLIGENCE A G E N C Y
OFFICE OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES
26 March 1970
SUBJECT: Proposed Additional Items for the Third Quarter in
the Program of National Intelligence Estimates
(The present listing carries only the entry
for NIE or NIEs on Soviet strategic weapons
programs, offensive and defensive.)
1. Prospects for Stability and Political July
Development in Post-War Nigeria
(NIE 64.2-70) (In requesting this,
Morris notes the need for an up-to-
date appraisal of the federal-state
balance in Nigeria, the inevitable
intrigues, the role of the Army,
Gowon's chances for survival, etc.)
2. The Outlook, if Any, for the Lebanon July
(NIE 36.4-70) (We propose to do a or
memorandum in May to be titled A Politi- August
cal Guide to the Lebanon in 1970. This
will take a new look at the fedayeen
problem and its likely impact on this
year's presidential election. It would
serve as a good first step for an NIE
which tried to look some distance into
the future, to reexamine the question
of the country's political viability,
and to consider the consequences if it
does come apart.)
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downgrading and
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Cuba: Post Harvest Problems and August
Policies (NIE 85-70) (This is or
presently billed as a memorandum September
subject. Probably there would be
interest in an NIE on Cuba, and this
timing would bring it forth just a
year from the last one. We might
proceed to do the memorandum and
use it as the basic draft for the
Estimate.)
4. The Outlook f the Congo (Kinshasha) August
(NIE 65-70) writes that things or
seem to be a now, but we should have September
a clear appreciation of the strength of
Mobutu's base and the possibilities for
fresh disaster. Another viewer of the
scene, the US Ambassador in the Congo
is pulsating with optimism, and some
of our colleagues at State also appear
convinced that a new land of milk-and-
honey has been found. We would hope
that an NIE could improve perspective,
but we should be prepared for strong
substantive disagreements if we under-
take one.)
5. Greece and the Prospects for the Junta Third Quarter
(NIB 29.1-70) (At the request of DIA (No month specified)
and J-5, we have begun work on an esti-
mative memorandum on this subject. We
think that some months hence there will
be interest in having a formal Estimate --
for which we could use the memo as a
primary input.)
The USSR and the Balkans (NIE 11/12-70) Third Quarter
(For some time, attention has been focused (No month specified)
on Germany and the northern tier of East
European states. This is entirely proper,
and we would not suggest that the focus
be blurred. But there is no reason why
we could not also take a sharper look at
the southern tier, i.e., the Communist
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states in the Balkans. The subject is
important and topical and -- as we hope
our forthcoming memorandum on Romania will
demonstrate -- the subject is also interest-
ing. We have given some thought to an NIB
treating all of Eastern Europe perhaps
trying the approach of our memorandum on
BE: Men of the Seventies. But we judge
we might do a better Jo on that if we
tackled it some considerable time from
now. For the foreseeable future, more-
over, many of the problems in Eastern
Europe will remain, in both the Soviet
and Western views, as particular rather
than area-wide problems. So, not wanting
to do an individual NIE on each Balkan
country, we suggest this regional try.
We append a rough outline to indicate
what would be covered.)
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Outline of Proposed NIB:
I. Introduction
This would explain why we are treating these four
countries -- Romania, Yugoslavia, Albania, and Bulgaria --
together. All, of course, are Balkan Communist states, but
the main point is simply that, in Moscow's view, this is a
highly unsettled area which promises to be troublesome for
some time to come.
II. The Balkan Communist States
This section, handling the countries individually,
would stress the maverick character of each.
A. Romania: Emphasis would be on Romania's deli-
cate internatio al position, its peculiar foreign policies.
A couple of paragraphs on the domestic scene should suffice.
B. Yugoslavia: The emphasis here would be reversed.
Principal attention would be given the internal scene, especially
the growing conflict between reformers and traditionalists and
the prospects for stability after Tito. Foreign policy, relations
with the Soviets, (subjects with which most readers will be quite
familiar) could be discussed in a paragraph or so.
C. Albania: A short descriptive paragraph dealing with
both domestic and international questions would probably be
enough. What is truly interesting now about Albania would be
discussed in a little more length in Section III (below).
D. Bulgaria: Of the four Communist Balkan states,
Bulgaria is the only one still loyal to the USSR. In this
sense, Bulgaria is the true maverick. It will need only very
brief treatment.
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III. Relations betWeen These States
This is a regional paper and relations between the states
in the region are, in fact, one of the more interesting aspects
of the current Balkan scene.
A. The Tacit Alliance: Romania and Yugoslavia. How and
why this has develaped and a look at where it might go.
B. The Isolationist: Albania. There is a complicated
conflict inTirana between ideology (neo-Maoist) and instinct
(survivalist). How this is likely to influence the incipient
movement toward better relations with Yugoslavia and Romania,
and where this movement might lead, should be worth at least
a paragraph, maybe even two.
C. The Loyalist: Bulgaria: Little need be said, but
some mention would be made of the particularly nasty state of
relations with Yugoslavia (in re Macedonia). And there might
be some speculation about how long Sofia is likely to remain
the most faithful of all.Soviet-oriented states in Eastern
Europe. (Part of this fidelity, of course, could be in reac-
tion against contrary trends among its neighbors.)
D. Attitudes Toward the Outside World. Technically
speaking, this subject does not belong under this heading
(III., above), but this is as good a place as any to assess,
chiefly, Romania's and Yugoslavia's warming relations with
Western Europe.
IV. The Soviet View
We know that the Soviets are very unhappy about Romania
and -- despite occasional lip service to the contrary
--
highly displeased with Yugoslavia as well. Some of the back-
ground and reasons for this will be given here, together with
brief statements about Albania and Bulgaria. But major emphasis
in this section will be on what the Soviets might or might not
do about their problems in the Balkans. Included, of course,
will be a discussion of the military option.
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