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December 16, 2016
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July 19, 2005
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March 26, 1970
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Approved For Ruse 2005/08/03 : CIA-RDP79R00967AO 00010010-5 S-E-C-R-E-T C E N T R A L I N T E L L I G E N C E A G E N C Y OFFICE OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES 26 March 1970 SUBJECT: Proposed Additional Items for the Third Quarter in the Program of National intelligence Estimates (Draft for Board Discussion -- ONE Distribution Only) We have now discussed our proposed Program of Estimates with several members of the NSC Staff. They have made generally gracious comments, specifically expressing interest in a number of our Second Quarter entries -- e.g.: The Horn of Africa (NIE 75/76-70) Communist China's International Posture (NIE 13-7-70) The French Role in Black Africa (NIE 22/60/70-70) Long-Term Economic Prospects in India and Pakistan (NIE 31/32-70) (In this case, the interest is in the broader outlook as well as the strictly economic prospects.) Burma's Problems and Their Possible Implications (NIE 51-70) Chile (NIE 94-70) GROUP 1 S-E-C-R-E-T Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification Approved For Release 2005/08/03 : CIA-RDP79R00967AO01400010010-5 Approved For Releae 2005/08/03 CIA-RDP79R00967AO0 AR0010010-5 S-E-C-R-E-T Vary, the NSC Latin Americanist, has mentioned that he might soon be requesting an SNIE on the Dominican Republic. Morris,, the NSC Africanist, has sent along several suggestions, a couple of which seem to us appropriate topics for Third Quarter NIEs. These are noted below, along with several new suggestions by our own Board or Staff members. 25X1 Approved For Release 2005/08/03 : CIA-RDP79R00967AO01400010010-5 Approved For Rele a 2005/08/03 : CIA-RDP79R00967A00S! 0010010-5 C E N T R A L INTELLIGENCE A G E N C Y OFFICE OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES 26 March 1970 SUBJECT: Proposed Additional Items for the Third Quarter in the Program of National Intelligence Estimates (The present listing carries only the entry for NIE or NIEs on Soviet strategic weapons programs, offensive and defensive.) 1. Prospects for Stability and Political July Development in Post-War Nigeria (NIE 64.2-70) (In requesting this, Morris notes the need for an up-to- date appraisal of the federal-state balance in Nigeria, the inevitable intrigues, the role of the Army, Gowon's chances for survival, etc.) 2. The Outlook, if Any, for the Lebanon July (NIE 36.4-70) (We propose to do a or memorandum in May to be titled A Politi- August cal Guide to the Lebanon in 1970. This will take a new look at the fedayeen problem and its likely impact on this year's presidential election. It would serve as a good first step for an NIE which tried to look some distance into the future, to reexamine the question of the country's political viability, and to consider the consequences if it does come apart.) GROUP 1 S-E-C-R-E-T Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification Approved For Release 2005/08/03 : CIA-RDP79R00967AO01400010010-5 Approved For Releap 2005/08/03: CIA-RDP79R00967A00UP0010010-5 S-E-C-R-E-T Cuba: Post Harvest Problems and August Policies (NIE 85-70) (This is or presently billed as a memorandum September subject. Probably there would be interest in an NIE on Cuba, and this timing would bring it forth just a year from the last one. We might proceed to do the memorandum and use it as the basic draft for the Estimate.) 4. The Outlook f the Congo (Kinshasha) August (NIE 65-70) writes that things or seem to be a now, but we should have September a clear appreciation of the strength of Mobutu's base and the possibilities for fresh disaster. Another viewer of the scene, the US Ambassador in the Congo is pulsating with optimism, and some of our colleagues at State also appear convinced that a new land of milk-and- honey has been found. We would hope that an NIE could improve perspective, but we should be prepared for strong substantive disagreements if we under- take one.) 5. Greece and the Prospects for the Junta Third Quarter (NIB 29.1-70) (At the request of DIA (No month specified) and J-5, we have begun work on an esti- mative memorandum on this subject. We think that some months hence there will be interest in having a formal Estimate -- for which we could use the memo as a primary input.) The USSR and the Balkans (NIE 11/12-70) Third Quarter (For some time, attention has been focused (No month specified) on Germany and the northern tier of East European states. This is entirely proper, and we would not suggest that the focus be blurred. But there is no reason why we could not also take a sharper look at the southern tier, i.e., the Communist Approved For Release 2005/08/03 : CIA-RDP79R00967AO01400010010-5 Approved For Release 2005/08/03 : CIA-RDP79R00967AO01400010010-5 S-E-C-R-E-T states in the Balkans. The subject is important and topical and -- as we hope our forthcoming memorandum on Romania will demonstrate -- the subject is also interest- ing. We have given some thought to an NIB treating all of Eastern Europe perhaps trying the approach of our memorandum on BE: Men of the Seventies. But we judge we might do a better Jo on that if we tackled it some considerable time from now. For the foreseeable future, more- over, many of the problems in Eastern Europe will remain, in both the Soviet and Western views, as particular rather than area-wide problems. So, not wanting to do an individual NIE on each Balkan country, we suggest this regional try. We append a rough outline to indicate what would be covered.) Approved For Release 2005/08/03 : CIA-RDP79R00967AO01400010010-5 Approved For Release 2005/08/03 : CIA-RDP79R00967A001400010010-5 Outline of Proposed NIB: I. Introduction This would explain why we are treating these four countries -- Romania, Yugoslavia, Albania, and Bulgaria -- together. All, of course, are Balkan Communist states, but the main point is simply that, in Moscow's view, this is a highly unsettled area which promises to be troublesome for some time to come. II. The Balkan Communist States This section, handling the countries individually, would stress the maverick character of each. A. Romania: Emphasis would be on Romania's deli- cate internatio al position, its peculiar foreign policies. A couple of paragraphs on the domestic scene should suffice. B. Yugoslavia: The emphasis here would be reversed. Principal attention would be given the internal scene, especially the growing conflict between reformers and traditionalists and the prospects for stability after Tito. Foreign policy, relations with the Soviets, (subjects with which most readers will be quite familiar) could be discussed in a paragraph or so. C. Albania: A short descriptive paragraph dealing with both domestic and international questions would probably be enough. What is truly interesting now about Albania would be discussed in a little more length in Section III (below). D. Bulgaria: Of the four Communist Balkan states, Bulgaria is the only one still loyal to the USSR. In this sense, Bulgaria is the true maverick. It will need only very brief treatment. GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic S-E-C-R-E-T downgrading and declassification Approved For Release 2005/08/03 : CIA-RDP79R00967AO01400010010-5 Approved For Rel6aee 2005/08/03 : CIA-RDP79R00967A00W0010010-5 S-E-C-R-E-T III. Relations betWeen These States This is a regional paper and relations between the states in the region are, in fact, one of the more interesting aspects of the current Balkan scene. A. The Tacit Alliance: Romania and Yugoslavia. How and why this has develaped and a look at where it might go. B. The Isolationist: Albania. There is a complicated conflict inTirana between ideology (neo-Maoist) and instinct (survivalist). How this is likely to influence the incipient movement toward better relations with Yugoslavia and Romania, and where this movement might lead, should be worth at least a paragraph, maybe even two. C. The Loyalist: Bulgaria: Little need be said, but some mention would be made of the particularly nasty state of relations with Yugoslavia (in re Macedonia). And there might be some speculation about how long Sofia is likely to remain the most faithful of all.Soviet-oriented states in Eastern Europe. (Part of this fidelity, of course, could be in reac- tion against contrary trends among its neighbors.) D. Attitudes Toward the Outside World. Technically speaking, this subject does not belong under this heading (III., above), but this is as good a place as any to assess, chiefly, Romania's and Yugoslavia's warming relations with Western Europe. IV. The Soviet View We know that the Soviets are very unhappy about Romania and -- despite occasional lip service to the contrary -- highly displeased with Yugoslavia as well. Some of the back- ground and reasons for this will be given here, together with brief statements about Albania and Bulgaria. But major emphasis in this section will be on what the Soviets might or might not do about their problems in the Balkans. Included, of course, will be a discussion of the military option. Approved For Release 2005/08/03 : CIA-RDP79R00967A001400010010-5