OKTOBERFEST AT THE UN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R00967A001400030002-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 15, 2005
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: November 2, 1971
• Content Type: MEMO

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CENTRAL I N T E L L I G E N C E A G E N C Y
2 November 1971
(ONE Distribution Only)
These are some random thoughts, inspired by the stirring
events at the UN last week. There is no particular purpose to
the piece, except to elicit comments and stimulate thought.
No further distribution is planned.
Ling-Mel, es Staff
GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
S-E-C-R-E-T declassification
25X1
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C E N T R A L I N T E L L I G E N C E A G E N C Y
OFFICE OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES
2 November 1971
SUBJECT: Oktoberfest at the UN
1. Last week's voting at the UN provided a high degree of
emotional satisfaction to the winners, some sulking and re-
criminations by the losers, and confusion generally about
what it all means. In future years political science students
will probably find this a choice topic for senior term papers.
I wish them luck. From the point of view of this office there
is little point in trying to fathom why this particular ill-fated
policy was adopted, what larger purposes it served, or what would
have been achieved had it succeeded. I think there is some value,
though, in considering foreign responses to the US initiative,
and likely reactions to the US setback, if that is what it is.
2. Certain facts are clear enough. For the US the glass
building on the East River is no longer a confortable club of
GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
S-E-C-R-E-T declassification
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largely like-minded or supple members. Indeed, it has not been
that for a long time. In the decade from the mid-fifties to the
mid-sixties decolonization produced scores of new members.
Many of these viewed the UN as a forum for obscure, parochial
issues, or as a corral for their own hobbyhorses. Sterile cold
war themes sometimes gave way to the more flamboyant rhetoric
of the non-aligned group. The non-aligned bloc was an irritant
to the US, but not inevitably hostile. Moreover, as the non-
aligned group expanded in number, its principal aims were diluted,
and it failed to emerge as a collective identity.
3. In the days of expanding membership US influence held
up fairly well. The US, drawing on its long record as a foe
of colonialism, attracted the admiration, and even the gratitude
of new national leaders in Africa and Asia. Even little-known
chiefs of state from remote lands treasured a hand-shake from
President Kennedy, and a chance to speak to the UN General
Assembly. US bilateral economic and other aid helped to assure
favorable votes in the UN. Latin Americans and NATO allies
tended to follow US leadership, often because it coincided with
their own interests. All of this served to perpetuate the illusion
that the UN was an institution working in tandem with the US.
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4. Those days are gone forever. For a variety of reasons
it has become increasingly difficult for the US to get favorable
responses from the UN on contentious matters. For one thing,
it is simply more arduous now to canvas 130-odd members than a
couple of score before 1950. Also the lessening of cold war
tensions, the emergence of highly emotional regional distractions
(Arabs vs Israel, black Africans vs white southern Africans,
India vs Pakistan), and the growing frustration of the world's
poorer countries with the US and its wealthy friends have all
contributed to the decline of US influence in the UN. US involve-
ment in Vietnam has estranged a goodly number of former friends.
In addition, the US no longer maintains the wide scope of foreign
aid programs which once helped shore up diplomatic support.
More recently, the import surcharge and the floating of the dollar
have aroused widespread resentment. There is increasing un-
certainty about US intentions, and less fear of US diplomatic
and military power.
5. In these circumstances, it is surprising that US diplo-
matic efforts produced as many as 55 votes last week for our
losing cause, the Chinese Representation resolution. Indeed, it
took a massive diplomatic onslaught, a combination of arm-twisting,
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cajolery, and special pleading to do it. Among the 55 supporters
were Japan, Indonesia, Australia, and the four largest Latin
American states. Twenty-three of the states on our side have
populations under three million, nine of them under a million.
Only Luxembourg, Greece and Portugal of the NATO states joined
the US.
6. The timing and the atmosphere were unfortunate for the
US. With Henry Kissinger in Peking at the time of the vote, some
UN members doubted that the US was sincere in defending the right
of Nationalist China to a seat. Others dropped off, not wanting
to be on what they saw as a losing side. Also the presence of
most of America's closest allies on the other side of the issue
confused many. Some were still smarting from recent unhappy
encounters with the US (Peru, Ecuador) or felt that a vote
against the US was a measure of asserting national independence
(perhaps Guyana, Uganda, Kenya, and Trinidad).
7. Yet, in many respects this is hardly a fair measure of
US support in the world, and the pitiful line-up at the great UN
Oktoberfest should not be considered as a new listing of clients.
Actually, many of the 55 states associated themselves with the US
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only with great reluctance. Japan, in particular, is reeling from
the humiliation of yet another international blow. The dancing
and jubilation, led by Tanzania, in the aisles of the General
Assembly, did reflect a rejoicing that the mighty US had gotten
its comeuppance. And in news media in many of the Third World
countries in the following days the UN affair was treated as a
vote of no confidence in US leadership.
8. In time the US setback will be forgotten. It was not
really a major event, rather a symptom of changes going on
in the world, or perhaps the end of a long period in which
the US fairly easily dominated international events. T'hore
are serious considerations of foreign policy looming ahead in
the 1970's of a somewhat different order from those of the past.
The coming decade will see a proliferation of major conferences,
in which the affairs of the recent past will be disposed of and
new issues addressed. In 1972 alone scheduled conventions
include: SALT, UNCTAD, monetary readjustments, world environment,
Law of the Sea, and probably one on population control. There
are also problems for the US in formulating and ajusting to new
relations with China, the USSR, Japan, and the expanded EEC.
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9. We do not, for example, have any very clear idea of how
China is going to behave in major world councils. The emergence
of China as a participant will probably have a considerable
effect on Third World countries. There will certainly be many
more exchanges of diplomatic representation with Peking, flocks
of aid-seekers winging their way to China, and probably consi-
derable susceptibility by Third World countries to blandishments
of the Chinese.
10. The US for its part, faces a great challenge, and per-
haps a great opportunity. Many of the old constraints on US
policy are being stripped away. We don't have to fawn over un-
pleasant foreign regimes, if their votes a:,e not important to
us. We do have to give serious thought to those foreign countries
important enough to do some damage to US interests. The probable
early wind-down of US involvement in Vietnam will remove a big
obstacle in our relations with many Third World states. This,
and other actions which appear to some of our client states as a
kind of neo-isolationism, will cause considerable concern in some
capitals. Yet, over time, the US may come to feel that it does
not need to support a number of repressive authoritarian regimes.
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US relationships with Third World states are likely to be based
less on patron-client lines than on economic and perhaps
cultural exchanges.
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