TURKEY: A REGIME IN TROUBLE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R00967A001400030009-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 20
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 29, 2006
• Sequence Number: 9
• Publication Date: June 4, 1971
• Content Type: MF

25X1
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C E N T R A L I N T E L L I G E N C E A G E N C Y
OFFICE OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES
'4 June 1971
MEMORANDUM FOR THE CONSULTANTS
SUBJECT: Turkey: A Regime in Trouble
1. Turkey is passing through a time of turmoil. The
freely elected government of Suleyman Demirel, which found it
increasingly difficult to maintain law and order, was forced
out in March 1971 by an ultimatum from the senior generals.
It was replaced by a largely non-representative government
formed with only token participation from the major political
parties by Nihat Erim, an experienced and generally respected
politician. Martial law has been clamped on Turkey's largest
cities and some other parts of the country. In this situation,
the mood of confidence that Turkey was moving effectively
toward its goal of becoming a powerful, modern state accepted
as an important member of the world community has been rudely
shaken. Indeed, these events raise the question of whether
the present Turkish regime has sufficient flexibility to meet
the mounting challenges it faces.
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A. Parliamentary Paralysis
2. Turkey's dramatic difficulties reflect deep problems
in society. In the political realm, the very future of the
democratic system is at stake. The parliamentary process has
encountered growing challenges in recent years. Supposing the
centralization of power in a one-house parliament to have been
responsible for the excesses of the Menderes decade of the 1950s,
the framers of the 1961 Constitution elaborated an extensive set
of checks and balances. Further, in accord with this philosophy,
the new electoral law introduced proportional representation
which effectively limited the size of the ruling party's majority
and assured splinter parties representation. Even more important
in this context was the explicit constitutional confirmation of
the military establishment's right to address political issues.
3. As intended, these constraints curtailed the government's
freedom of action. During his tenure as Prime Minister from
1965 to 1971, Demirel, who was by nature a conciliator rather
than a leader, was reluctant to use his parliamentary majority
to enact controversial legislation opposed by the Republican
Peoples Party (RPP) which presumed to speak for the bulk of the
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educated elite. Demirol's freedom of action was further
constricted by the parliamentary revolt within his own
party after the 1969 elections which left him a hairline
majority in the lower house. Thus for a year before the top
generals finally forced him to resign in March 1971, the
government had limped along, showing its muscle only by acts,
such as the devaluation of August 1970, which did not depend
directly on parliamentary approval. This style of rule fed
dissatisfaction with present constitutional arrangements and
stimulated yearning for more decisive government, encouraging
some politicians to question the validity of the democratic
process for Turkey.
4. Against this background, the mounting frustration
of educated elements, most of whom still favor the elitist,
reformist, semi-authoritarian approach inherited from the
Ataturk era, assumed new significance. The important segment of
the Turkish power structure traditionally grouped around the
RPP has never seen their party win a freely contested election.
While the RPP leaders still profess confidence that the masses
will come to support their reformist approach, some former party
members have already abandoned hope in the electoral process and
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have been urging another military takeover.' The 86-year old
Inonu, prestigious hero of the establishment of the Turkish
Republic, categorically opposes such military intervention.
But the failure of the RPP that he leads to improve its
position at the polls has weakened the thrust of his argument.
5. In Turkey, the military establishment traditionally
identifies with the reformist elite. The military career has
offered rural elements the educational opportunities they needed
to achieve status in society. And having shared power with the
reformist elite for some 30 years prior to 1950, the top ranks
of the officer corps, at least, appear generally to share the
authoritarian, statist outlook inherited from Ataturk. No
simple label adequately describes their approach. But they
take seriously their role as protectors of the regime, not only
from external enemies but also from disruptive domestic elements,
particularly any who call for an assault on the system. The
generals want an orderly society in which public service is set
as the highest good, with its rewards in wealth and power, Private
Some of the founders of Devrim, a periodical promoting a
military takeover, were former members of the RPP. Devrim
was closed sine the by the martial law authorities zn May UM
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enterprise and the production of individual capital through
trade or industry rank at the bottom of their value system.
6. Yet while the officer corps has been notably unhappy
with the deterioration of public order, the taint of peculation
by civilian politicians, and the failure to enact significant
social reforms, the senior generals are aware of the drawbacks
in ruling Turkey through the armed forces and may even recognize
their own limitations of experience with the problems of civil
rule. Hence, though the generals did concert to oust Demirel
to seek more forceful leadership to deal with Turkey's pressing
needs, they have shown themselves genuinely reluctant to take
power directly.
B. Urban Terrorism
7. The proximate cause of the installation of the Erim
government was the rise of politically motivated violence toward
the end of 1970. Much as crimes of violence are common in
Turkey, the commission of such ordinary crimes as bank robbery,
murder, kidnapping, and arson for political ends had been
virtually unknown. In the past there had been occasions of
broad resistance to governmental pressures, but popular move-
ments and demonstrations had aimed to prevent perversion of the
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legally constituted political process, not to destroy the
system. Moreover, though the police had at times been dis-
credited for partisan application of the law, the armed forces
enjoyed a wide reputation for impartiality that commanded
respect throughout Turkish society. Thus the rise of an
"urban guerrilla" movement, inspired by the exploits of
Che Guevara, Regis Debray and others which defied the army,
loomed as a totally new and disturbing phenomenon.
8. We cannot yet draw a clear profile of the tiny band of
urban terrorists. But from the scattered evidence available,
it is apparent that they are products of the failings of the
Turkish educational system. Education has been the hallmark of
the elite in Turkey, the pathway to status and power. Since
the Republic, Turkish regimes have regarded the school as an
essential agency for social reform and the ultimate means to
consolidate gains achieved in the first instance by government
fiat. In this context, adulation of the student as the guardian
of reform has whetted the desire and expectation of those in
universities to play a major part in ordering Turkey's destiny.
Especially since the 1960 military takeover -- which came in the
wake of university demonstrations -- students in Turkey have
exaggerated their importance and power in society.
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9. The rise of the radical student movement was a
distinguishing mark of the 1960s. Student organizations
first demanded reform of the antiquated university system,
but soon branched out to demand wholesale changes in Turkey's
domestic and foreign policy. Cries for educational reform
initially met warm response outside university circles --
even Demirel acknowledged the justice of complaints against
examination procedures, overcrowding of classes, and harsh
student living conditions. But student demands for basic
social reform aroused antipathy in some influential segments
of the elite, including the Justice Party (JP), Turkey's largest
political organization.
10. Student discontent drew impetus from a number of
sources. On the one hand, the 1960s were a time of rapidly
expanding higher education. Several new universities opened
during this period, turning out vastly increased numbers of
graduates. But although Turkey's economy was expanding by an
average of about seven percent a year after the mid-1960s,
there was a dearth of jobs offering suitable status and rewards
to the rapidly swelling ranks of recent graduates. Traditional
prejudices against private enterprise still prevailed widely
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among the student population. Yet the government bureau-
cracy, customarily the employer of preference for university
graduates, was unable to absorb these growing numbers of
educated elements. While the dimensions of this problem
have not become as critical as in some other underdeveloped
countries, nevertheless, the difficulty in finding employment
of acceptable status has provided a fertile field for dissidence.
11. Since 1960 as well the universities have been the scene
of wide-ranging ideological debate. Particularly after the
Cpyrus crisis of mid-196 showed that US and Turkish interests
were not entirely congruent, some of the younger professors
especially began to sow suspicion of Western capitalism. It
became stylish in Turkish universities to explain Turkey's
backwardness as the result of Western, and particularly US,
economic imperialism. From this it was only a short step to
believing that the US was effectively intervening in Turkish
affairs to keep "progressive" elements from power. Under the
infleunce of these views, some of the more activist students
turned to explore the "classics of Marxism-Leninism" and then
branched out to Maoism and the revolutionary approach of the
Cubans, North Vietnamese, and the Arab guerrillas. Thanks to the
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permissive atmosphere of the 1960a in Turkey, translations
and commentary on these subjects were for the first time
readily available in quantity. And the universities, with
their autonomy and relative immunity from ordinary police
regulations, became a haven for a small number of radical
protestors.
12. No doubt the revolutionary student movement was
influenced to some degree by factors outside Turkey. The
example of the French students in challenging de Gaulle in mid-
1968 clearly encouraged their Turkish counterparts to pursue
an activist course. Turkish students have followed closely
events in American universities. We have no hard evidence on
the role of Soviet or other foreign missions in stimulating
student disorder, though Soviet officials have had contact with
Turkish student radicals. The well-known clandestine Bizim Radyo
continually criticized government efforts to control student
dissidence; no act of terrorism has yet been condemned by Moscow.
A few Turkish students have also apparently traveled to Communist
China. Nonetheless, the indications of direct Soviet, Chinese
Communist, Cuban or other involvement in the Turkish radical
student movement are so peripheral that there seems little
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ground for accepting the "Communist" label now hung on these
radicals by the Ankara regime. In essence the Turkish student
activists appear to be a home-grown product.
13. By the late 1960s a hard core of student activists
was drawn increasingly to violence to express its extremist
point of view. But these tactics rapidly eroded the sympathy
the earlier demands for university reform had engendered among
the Turkish elite. The officer corps, which may be receptive to
the argument that Turkey needs more or less radical social reform,
obviously feels itself directly challenged by the urban terrorists.
Indeed, the need to crush this movement to its roots is being
raised as an argument for more direct and longer military
intervention in the political process. Although there is some
evidence that elements in the RPP and others of a like persuasion
are concerned over the wide sweep of repression launched by the
government against all those even "remotely related" with
stimulating the terrorists, there is clearly general revulsion
against tactics such as the kidnapping-murder of the Israeli
Consul General. And from the rising tide of informers against
the urban guerrilla movement, it seems apparent that there are
few elements in Turkish society that now support this movement.
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14. Although the Turkish government attributes the urban
guerrilla movement to a tiny coterie of leftists, the Ankara
regime has rounded up numerous professors, writers, and jour-
nalists who might in some way have inspired lawlessness. The
authorities have banned nearly 100 books, newspapers, and
periodicals -- from do-it-yourself instructions on guerrilla
war to the strategy of anti-imperialist war in Turkey. Among
those singled out for prosecution by the martial law command
have been the leaders of Turkey's only socialist party, the
Turkish Labor Party (TLP). Turkish security officials have
long considered the TLP a Communist-front organization -- though
the evidence for this charge appears far from conclusive -- and
the party's support for radical student movements provides a
convenient pretext for retaliation. Indeed, the martial law
commanders have now effectively silenced the left in Turkey,
depriving it of all legitimate outlets for its strident views.
C. Kurdish Separatism
15. A perennial problem highlighted by the martial law
regime has been that of Kurdish separatism. The Kurds, who
form a heavy majority in almost all the provinces of south-
eastern Turkey, number perhaps 3-4 million of the some 35 million
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people in the country as a whole. The areas they inhabit are
the least developed and least modernized section of Turkey,
lagging far behind the western regions in standard of living,
in industrialization, in emancipation from traditional mores and
social structure, or in any other accouterments of modernity.
Development expenditures by the central government also have
been less in these regions than elsewhere in Turkey; and the
economic backwardness of the area has enhanced the differences
between the Kurds and the Turkish majority.
16. Ankara governments have generally adopted a firm policy
toward evidences of Kurdish aspirations for autonomy. Suspected
Kurdish nationalist agitators have regularly been hailed into
court and sentenced to lengthy jail terms. Yet at least on the
cultural level, Kurdish poets and writers have continued to
agitate for autonomy. Though precise statistics are unavailable,
it also seems that Kurds have been disproportionately drawn into
.the radical student movement to express their rebellion. The
martial law authorities claim to have uncovered evidence of
concrete plotting among Kurds in eastern Turkey to break off
to form an independent state in conjunction with Mullah Mustafa
Barzani in northern Iraq; Ankara has announced the discovery
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of sufficient weapons cached to arm more than a regiment with
rifles, machine guns, and submachine guns.
17. It is difficult to evaluate this evidence of active
Kurdish separatism. The Kurds, split as they are into rival,
competing tribal agglomerations, have never displayed a cohesive
front to the outside world, even during their rebellions during
the 1920s and 1930s. Much as some groups in Turkey may admire
Barzani, others certainly nourish long-standing grievances
against him. Thus it seems unlikely that there was any plan
for a general rising by the Turkish Kurds to unite with their
Iraqi confreres. Arms smuggling is endemic among the Kurds,
who traditionally have carried guns; the weapons uncovered by
the security forces may have been largely intended for sale to
Iraqi Kurds. In any event
the lightly armed Kurds could
hardly hope to confront the well-armed and determined Turkish
army.
II. PROSPECTS
18. Nihat Erim does not view his regime as an interim
expedient to carry out limited reforms and retire gracefully
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as soon as possible. He is ambitious and undoubtedly sees
this his opportunity to build a sufficient power base to
remain in contention for the position of top leadership in
Turkey for some time to come. Thus, unless pushed out by
the military establishment, #rim will probably try to serve
out the full parliamentary term ending in October 1973. By
that point he might hope to have neutralized the left wing
of the RPP, his old party, so that he could at least return
to the fold with a strong claim on the leadership of the party.
19. The problem of restructuring parliament to avoid the
paralysis of the past and to exclude "undesirable" elements
will be hard to solve. The reformist elite, typified by Erim,
wishes to amend the election law and, if necessary, the consti-
tution to limit the franchise in some way to insure that the
RPP can win elections. There is no obvious change that would
offer assurance of achieving this end. For example, it is
doubtful that even a radical measure restricting the franchise
to those who are literate or have at least primary education
would have the effect of reducing the relative majority of JP
votes, as some of the most backward areas have provided a
significant proportion of RPP votes in the past. Naturally,
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any blatantly partisan move would fracture the coalition
support Erim's government now enjoys.
20. Yet until this conundrum is cracked, the military
establishment will probably refuse to back very far out of
its present position of checking the government's every move.
If the conspicuous role now played by the generals continues
for a prolonged period, the concept of the military establish-
ment sharing power openly with the civilians may become entrenched.
In this event, democratic practices in Turkey would be tenuous at
best. The resulting strains and frustrations could lead to
renewed military upheavals and to outright abandonment of even
a facade of democratic pz'ocedure.
21. This poses a cruel dilemma for the JP. Demirel and
his colleagues are probably prepared to wait until the 1973
elections before making another bid for power. If elections
are not scheduled by the normal 1973 date, the JP will undoubtedly
grow restive and be tempted to withdraw cooperation from the
regime. There is little that the JP can do, however, to press
effectively for elections, as any resistance would probably
strengthen the determination of the military to keep its
commanding role. In fact, were the JP to withdraw its support
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from the Erim government, it would create a political crisis
which could bring civilian rule to an end.
22. The urban guerrilla movement is probably a transient
phenomenon. The military is willing to use all necessary
force to crush it. Moreover, its reservoirs of sympathy have
dried up outside of a few tiny committed extremists on the left.
Erim is likely to make good on his promise to bring the univer-
sities to heel by curtailing their immunities, especially to
normal police procedures. These changes would make it extremely
difficult for the terrorist movement to revive, even if martial
law is relaxed. Any effort to organize guerrilla activity in
rural areas would be even more difficult to sustain.
23. In any event, the scope of political debate is likely
to be restricted for some time to come. The TLP might even
be abolished. Already for practical purposes it has ceased
to operate. Constitutional amendments may even be proposed to
prevent formation of parties close to the extremes of left
and right. The assumption of many on the extreme left that
a military regime would eventually favor their cause does
not seem likely to come true. Thus far, the officers have taken
the lead in encouraging repression of the left. And particularly
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in the revulsion generated by the activities of the urban
terrorists, it seems highly unlikely that the military will
ever look to such elements for guidance or inspiration.
24. Nonetheless, repression is not apt to make the
university scene more than superficially quiet. The strains
that spawned the movement of political violence are not sus-
ceptible to easy solution. It will be difficult to adapt
the present university system to produce graduates that fit
existing social needs. Nor is it likely that any early
consensus will be reached on the role of the university graduate
in society. Hence, if freedom of expression is restored, the
universities are likely again to become a focal point of
discontent with the regime.
III. IMPLICATIONS FOR THE UNITED STATES
25. For the moment, the US is benefiting from the
restrictions on the expression of leftist views in Turkey.
These elements consider the US their declared enemy; even
before martial law was imposed, some critics of the US were
promoting the line that the military move to dump Demirel
had been directed by Washington. Now these voices are
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necessarily stilled, and the US is being lambasted only
in organs from outside Turkey, such as the clandestine
Bizim Radyo. And, indeed, the excesses of the terrorists
may have generated some sympathy for the US.
26. But the US is apt to experience increasing dif-
ficulties in working with the Erim regime. The elitist
approach is compounded of nationalist sensitivity. Erim's
program and the pronouncements of Cabinet figures indicate
that the new regime may be more rigorous in pressing Turkey's
own interests at the expense of those of her allies. American
private investment may be particularly affected: the Erim
government is committed to take over certain mining and mineral
ventures and to tightening terms of others. The repatriation
of foreign exchange is also likely to be made increasingly
difficult. In short, Turkey is likely to become a considerably
less welcoming place for American private investment.
27. There will also be an impact on government-to.-
government relations. Turkey and the US have been engaged in
negotiating subsidiary implementing agreements for activities
and facilities operated under the Defense Cooperation Agreement
(DCA) of July 1969. These implementing accords were to be
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completed by July 1970; thus far none has been concluded.
The essential sticking point has been the insistence of
the Turkish military establishment on regaining the con-
cessions made by the civilian authorities in the DCA. The
soldiers are adamant in their desire to gain explicit authority
to control the details of US operations in Turkey. With the
general rise of military assertiveness in Turkey, therefore,
the prospects of the Erim government being able to induce the
soldiers to back down seems small.
28. Rising nationalist sensitivity also impinges on the
opium question -- a matter of increasing importance to the
US. The Demirel government talked sweetly about first elimi-
nating, then merely restricting, opium production. It also
cooperated with US narcotics officials. But
a high priority to solving this problem.
29 . Erim recognizes the "humanitarian" obligation to
stop opium production in Turkey. But he wishes to avoid
giving the appearance of acting under US pressure. Thus his
government is pressing Washington to give him a breathing spell
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and to work through multilateral, rather than bilateral,
channels on this issue. It is difficult to p--edict whether
or not Erim will prove a more effective collaborator with the
US on opium matters than his predecessor. Those in his
government do not have ties to the illicit producers, nor
does his government depend on the political support of poppy
growing regions. On the other hand, he has been deeply pre-
occupied with other matters more pressing to the survival of
the regime. The question of opium -- which is not a social problem
in Turkey -- can scarcely compete in Erim's eyes with many of
the other demands on his time. Hence, even if Erim does
take a more effective stand against the diversion of opium
into illicit channels, he is not likely to move either as
speedily or as completely as the US would wish.
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