SOUTHEAST ASIA IN THE SEVENTIES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R00967A001400030013-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 23, 2006
• Sequence Number: 13
• Publication Date: June 2, 1971
• Content Type: MF

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C E N T R A L I N T E L L I.G E N C E A G E N C Y
2 June 1971
MEMORANDUM FOR Tal CONSULTANTS*
SUBJECT: Southeast Asia in the Seventies
NOTE
May I ask that before scanning this memo, the reader per-
form the same rite as the author? That hawk, dove, or owl, you
cleanse your soul of bias, submerge personal commitment to this
or that paper or policy or party, and face the task with as much
objectivity as can be mustered on such short notice? The cause
is a good one: To try and find a way through the thicket of the
Indochinese war and predict the shape of Southeast Asia in the
seventies.
See the recently published NIEs on South Vietnam and
Thailand, and the recent Staff Note on Laos, which are
on the table.
GROUP I
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification
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1. The war is, after all, the prime fact of life in the
region at this time. We have tried in past estimates and
memoranda to wish away the problem, to make assumptions or to
offer contingency situations as the framework for whatever post-
Vietnam judgments seemed warranted -- e.g., the Thailand NIE.
When prediction of straight-line trends could not be avoided
(and interagency coordination was required) -- e.g., the South
Vietnamese NIE -- we hedged rather shamelessly. But let's not
overdo the breast-beating; the present concern is how best to
proceed in presenting our views of the prospect in Indochina.
And the fork in the road seems to offer two fairly well-defined
paths: one marked (serious) negotiation and the other continu-
ing warfare.
2. Before presenting our view of the likely prospect in
Indochina under each course, here are the stars we in the Agency
steer by these days:
a. The 1968-69 US commitment to withdraw from a
combat role in South Vietnam and the 1969-70
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congressional strictures against assuming such
a role in Laos, Cambodia, and Thailand mean that
indigenous non-communist forces will have to cope
with Hanoi pretty much on their own after about
mid-1972.
b. US airpower has not so far been a "decisive"
factor in the war; it is being substantially
reduced in quantity, hence will have even less
chance of being decisive in the future.
C. Indigenous friendly forces will not be capable
over the longer term of coping with Hanoi's
forces in any of the Indochinese states. Lao
and Khmer forces are already incapable and un-
likely to improve significantly. ARM forces
are capable of coping with some enlargement of
NVA/VC forces in some parts of South Vietnam --
mainly in populated areas of the south -- but
only marginally capable of doing so elsewhere.
ARM capabilities will not improve greatly;
instead, they will probably deteriorate as US
air (especially helicopter), armor, and artillery
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support is severely reduced. ARM will be in-
capable in the 1971-72 dry season of closing down
the Ho Chi Minh Trail in Laos to any great extent,
and incapable of preventing solidification of the
communist hold on northeastern Cambodia. ARVN
will be hard put in 1971-72 to challenge re-
establishment of communist border sanctuaries
north of Saigon. A series of obvious ARM defeats
along the frontiers or in the northern areas of
the country could quickly unravel the political
situation in Saigon.
d. Vientiane and Phnom Penh, perceiving the above and
mindful of recent developments in US-China rela-
tions, are not eager to extend themselves mili-
tarily and will be increasingly willing to
"compromise" with the communists. Thailand
seeks "security"; military victory is perceived
as only one of several ways to achieve it.
e. Hanoi, while not "10-feet tall", is more deter-
mined than its opposite numbers in Southeast
Asia. It has sufficient manpower to challenge
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any combination of indigenous allied forces
(except in the unlikely event of a total Thai
commitment to the war); and it can deliver these
men and supplies in needed quantities, to most
of the fighting fronts in 1971-72 and to all of
them thereafter. It could, at relatively low
cost, occupy Vientiane and Phnom Penh in the
winter of 1971-72. It could shake ARM control
of much of northern South Vietnam over 1972 and
probably in parts of southern South Vietnam
thereafter, Its military edge will grow over
the years. Its political infrastructure in
South Vietnam still stands; it may grow weaker
in short run, but prospects for reducing it
to easily manageable proportions are poor.
f. The Paris talks, certainly in their present
context, are going nowhere. Hanoi sees little
reason, so long as "Vietnamization" proceeds,
to make any agreement with the US other than one
that ratifies as US withdrawal from South Vietnam
on terms providing the communists with a clear
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shot at power in Saigon. Hanoi 'will be (marginally)
restrained for the next year orlso from abandoning
Paris and from undertaking really massive troop
deployments southward by the continuing threat of
renewed, all-out US bombing of the North; it will
be progressively less restrained as major US air
units move out of Southeast Asia.
g. Peking probably holds the view that the general
drift in the Indochina situation is in its favor.
In any case, China holds the high cards in South-
east Asia; US power is on the decline in the region
while China is there. The Sovi t factor is negli-
gible in real terms, except as Ianoi (and some US
officials) see it as a counterweight to Peking.
The war is depleting indigenous
east Asia -- including that of
while China remains unscathed.
strength in South-
orth Vietnam --
Chinas influence
in the region is growing, not only because of the
effect on the region of the deb.litating and in-
conclusive struggle, but because US policy moves
vis-a-vis China are enhancing Peking's status in
the eyes of Southeast Asian governments.
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3. Assuming that none of the above is too difficult for
the reader to accept, what does it mean? We think it supports
the view that the US bargaining position in Southeast Asia grows
steadily weaker. But it is not necessary to our estimates of
Southeast Asia's future that you accept this view. We will, in
any case, proceed down both the roads mentioned earlier --
(serious) negotiation and continued warfare.
4. Continued Warfare. If the war goes; on into 1973 and
beyond, it is virtually certain that our Laos at best will have
been reduced to a rump state, enclaves around
Mekong towns, defended mainly by Thai troops.
course, be other contested lowland areas, but
a very few major
There will, of
in such areas
the communists will have the initiative. ThejSouvanna regime,
in its current anti-communist mode, may well survive into 1973;
but if so it will be mainly because Hanoi continues to see
political advantage in bending Vientiane to its purposes in the
inevitable negotiated settlement rather than breaking it forever
by some precipitate military move. Hanoi would also prefer to
avoid the casualties likely to accompany any major communist
ground effort against the big Mekong towns. Finally, Hanoi's
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main objectives are still in South Vietnam; conquest of Laos
adds no critical dimension to this effort.
5. In Cambodia, the military-political situation will be
only slightly better than in Laos. At best, AtVN forces will be
able to hold major towns in the southeast, including the capital.
But roads and rivers will be increasingly unreliable as supply
arteries; US aircraft will probably bear the main burden of
supply, flying directly to Cambodia's remaining airstrips. Thai
units will bear increasing defense burdens in securing the few
towns of western Cambodia. Cambodian forces will be largely
i
content with static defensive roles in support' of ARVN and/or
Thai units; they will be hard put even to cope
with growing
Hanoi-supported, Khmer communist elements. T&the extent that
South Vietnam and Thailand are reluctant or unable to provide
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continuing troop assistance, the situation will become even
bleaker. All these adverse trends will be reflected in growing
political instability in Phnom Penh; the best bet is for a com-
plete military takeover of the government within a year or so.
6. In South Vietnam, the post-1972 picture is of a regime
losing its grip on the frontiers and highlands
beset politically and economically. There wil
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and increasingly
be strong overtones
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of the serious national morale situation of the early 1960s. The
regime's writ will still extend over most of the populace but will
become much more tenuous as communist military efforts bear im-
portant fruit.
7. Thailand, after a few more years of war, will have a
more serious (though hardly critical) insurgency on its soil,
and a shakier domestic political situation in the face of allied
setbacks in Indochina and continuing US withdrawals from the
entire region -- including Thailand itself. More and mc:'e,
Bangkok will be casting its diplomatic net in the direction of
Peking.
8. Elsewhere in Southeast Asia, the continuation of the
war will have less impact. Burma will remain Burma. In Malaysia,
Singapore, and Indonesia, gratification that the US had not "sold
out" to Hanoi would be balanced by concern at the persistent
deterioration of prospects for the survival of non-communist
regimes in "neutral" Laos and Cambodian Few would expect adverse
trends in South Vietnam to be reversed. In all three countries,
and in the Philippines as well, there would be a preoccupation
with problems of domestic stability, but considerable attention
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to efforts to draw China into some sort of useful regional
power balance with the US, the Russians, and the Japanese,
9. In sum, if the war goes on, and if the military situation
(as we believe) goes against the allied side in 1971-72 and 1972-
73, the shape of Southeast Asia as we move toward mid-decade is
likely to be one of weakening military, political, and economic
structures in Indochina and Thailand, though trends elsewhere are
likely to remain generally unaffected. In these other countries,
our main concerns are unrelated to the war, and more a function
of intractable economic problems -- particularly in Bu ma and
the Philippines.
10. Negotiations. The main value of any serious negotiation
on Indochina would be to preserve whatever chance is available
for Cambodia to retain its independence; and for Thailand to
disengage without major domestic political damage. A Laos settle-
ment can only ratify communist military predominance there; and
any negotiation over South Vietnam must, by definition, accord
a strong voice to the communists in Saigon's affairs.
U. Thus, it is quite likely that the best the US could hope
for as a negotiated solution would be one which terminated the
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US presence in Indochina, gave Hanoi a leg up in South Vietnam,
left Hanoi pretty much in charge in Laos, and permitted for the
moment a divided Cambodia. Thailand, with the US commitment
(against major overt attack) intact, would be working out its
own accommodation with Peking and Hanoi. US influence would de-
cline in Bangkok though it would remain greater than that of
Peking for years to come.
12. Elsewhere in the area, this kind of solution would be
seen as preordained by the increasingly adverse balance-of-forces
in the area. The concern of other Southeast Asian regimes would
tend to focus on Thailand, and to a much smaller degree on Cam-
bodia. If Bangkok seemed able to live with the deal, the ripples
elsewhere would not be very substantial. If not, pressures for
accommodation with Peking would tend to rise.
13. Obviously, in any negotiation of the Geneva type --
and, indeed, this appears to be the only alternative to the
deterioration spelled by continued warfare -- much will depend
on Peking's attitudes and objectives. Perhaps more than at any
time since 1962 it is possible to speak of Chinese, as distinct
from North Vietnamese, objectives in Indochina. In our view,
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the turn of events in Cambodia in 1970, the post-1968 Chinese
roadbuilding in northern. Laos, the 1971 allied incursion into
southern Laos, the Sino-Soviet skirmishes of 1969, and develop-
ments accompanying all of these have enhanced China's interest
and stake in the inevitable Indochina settlement.
14. In South Vietnam, Peking wants the US to acknowledge
defeat, to lose "face" and so to contribute correspondingly to
Chinese pretensions to the predominant power role in Southeast
Asia. In Laos, there is interest in securing a frontier, gaining
an advanced position from which to pressure Bangkok, and removing
the Soviets as a significant political factor; in Cambodia, a
possibility of acceptance by the Khmers in a guardian role vis-
a-vie the feared Vietnamase, and another opportunity to wipe out
a Soviet diplomatic bridgehead. Finally, Peking desires the
removal of the US military presence from Thailand and steps by
Bangkok toward a more balanced posture vis-a-vis the powers.
15. An optimist, at this stage of the game, would hope
that preservation of ostensibly neutral, left-leaning buffers
in Laos and Cambodia would satisfy Peking's aim in Indochina
and that Peking would find such arrangements sufficiently useful
to argue Hanoi into acceptance of such terms. It may be so. And
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it is not unreasonable to suppose that US military disengagement
from Thailand would solve that problem for Peking, at least for
the immediate future. But it is a bit far-fetched to expect the
Chinese to aid and abet any solution in South Vietnam that the
US might term a compromise. In sum, Peking may see deals to be
made at a new Geneva, but real flexibility could characterize
only their views on Thailand and Cambodia.
15. Conclusions. Having gone through the foregoing exer-
cise, it may be possible, after all, to ignore our so-called fork
in the road. And to state that, almost regardless of developments
in the war, the straight-line estimate for Southeast Asia in the
seventies can be seen with reasonable clarity. Barring some
allied military miracle or a profound change of heart in Hanoi,
the outlook is for a communist-dominated Indochina and a Thailand
increasingly on its own to deal with this new and adverse situation.
Elsewhere, we foresee an increased propensity to cease viewing
security as a function of western military commitments and more
as a function of local strengths -- political and economic sta-
bility -- and balance-of-power arrangements abroad.
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