THE ARAB WORLD AFTER NASSER

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R00967A001400030027-5
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 24, 2006
• Sequence Number: 27
• Publication Date: February 17, 1971
• Content Type: MEMO

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C E N T R A L I N T E L L I G E N C E A G E N C Y
OFFICE OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES
17 February 1971
MEMORANDUM (Draft for Board Consideration -- CIA Distribution)
SUBJECT: The Arab World After Nasser
Nasser's Role in the Arab World
1. Gamal Abd-al-Nasser was the most powerful leader the
Arab world has seen since Muhammad Ali, the Albanian founder
of modern Egypt over 150 years ago. Nasser brought about a
radically changed relationship between the Arabs and the
Western Powers and he came to be the greatest exponent of
Arab nationalism. He was an unsettling influence in many
ways -- he made the first Arab arms agreement with the Soviet
Union, for long he actively promoted subversion of conservative
Arab regimes, and he fought to eject Western influence. He
was able to bring together the disparate leaders of the Arab
world, mute their quarrels, and at times create an impression
of common purpose.
GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification
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S-E-C-R-E-T
2. On the face of it, the demise of so powerful and
charismatic a leader would appear to mean widespread and
fundamental change in the Arab world. And the months since
Nasser's death have indeed seen changes in inter-Arab relations.
But these differences have been subtle, negative rather than
positive. This is so because Nasser's ability to influence
events in the Arab world had declined substantially in recent
years as a result of the humiliating Egyptian defeat at the
hands of Israel in 1967. The other Arab leaders recognized that
Egypt, as the largest Arab state, would remain important in the
confrontation with Israel, but virtually all felt free to refuse
to follow Nasser's policy direction. In a sense, then, the
biggest "post-Nasser" changes had taken place prior to his death.
3. Moreover, the circumstances which had obtained for
several years before Nasser's death continue to condition
the Arab world's actions. Since 1967, Nasser's options in
the Arab world had been severely limited by the Israeli
occupation of Sinai, by Egypt's need for Arab subsidies and
for massive Soviet military support, and by a requirement to
present at least a facade of unity in the face of Israel. His
Egyptian successors have the same needs and, moreover, feel
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compelled to appear to be following in the master's foot-
steps. Certainly one of the most important foreign affairs
legacies which Nasser left to them and to other Arab leaders
was his acceptance of and involvement in a process of a
negotiated settlement with Israel. Arab leaders would be hard
put even to engage in indirect negotiations with Israel today
if Nasser's last words had been the once familiar slogan that
"warfare is the only solution".
4. In the paragraphs which follow, we survey the state
of inter-Arab relations, with particular reference to develop-
ments since Nasser's absence.
The New Situation
5, The tripartite "federation" between Egypt, Libya
and Sudan -- to which Asad's new Syrian regime has proclaimed
its adherence -- is an expression of the old Arab yearning
for unity. Its most enthusiastic member is Libya's zealous
Qaddafi, who seems to feel that he must carry on Nasser's
mission to unify Araby. Egypt, both under Nasser and
Anwar Sadat, has taken a much more cautious attitude, emphasizing
the need for unity by slow stages. Cairo, while seeing both
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financial and some political advantages in the federation,
remembers the ill-fated union with Syria from 1958 to 1961.
In addition, a traditional Egyptian reluctance to become
deeply involved in affairs outside of Egypt may take on more
importance in the future. Historically, Egypt's interests
have lain more to the south, in the Sudan and the Nile River's
headwaters. It was Nasser's own aspirations, rather than
popular pressures, which sparked his country's active and deep
pan-Arab involvement.
6. Sudan's revolutionary leader, Numairy, has been more
a follower than a leader in striving for unity. His real
interest seems to be in a close relationship with Egypt,
with a view toward warding off intrigue in Khartoum by Cairo.
He also hopes to gain support from Egypt against Sudanese (or
external) elements opposed to him. At the same time, he does
not want to antagonize the many Sudanese who view Cairo with
suspicion. Libya's Qaddafi seems to view the federation as a
bulwark against Israel and a vehicle for a social revolution
which will bring the downfall of the moderate Arab kingdoms --
Jordan and Saudi Arabia. Like the Sudan, Libya has many
people who fear Egyptian domination and the influx of Egyptians
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into Libya has already created considerable resentment. The
violence of Qaddafi's attacks on King Hussein for suppressing
the fedayeen have been an embarrassment to Cairo, which feels
it necessary to present a common front with Hussein toward
Israel.
7. While the possibility for cooperation among Egypt,
Libya and Sudan in some fields seems fairly good, it is doubt-
ful that any meaningful federation will transpire. At most,
the members will develop, mutual beneficial arrangements in
such areas as communications, trade, and education.
8. The new government in Syria has associated itself
with the Egyptian-Sudanese-Libyan grouping. Prime Minister
al-Asad, having ousted virtually the entire leadership of the
Baath Party, turned for support to a number of pro-Egyptian
politicians. His move to join the three African states was,
in some measure, a payment for the support of these men.
Al-Asad may also feel that collaboration with pro-Nasser
elements in Syria is less risky with Nasser dead. Syria
continues, however, to conduct most of its inter-Arab
relations without much regard for Cairo's views. While some
of its policies happen to be in harmony with Egypt's --
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e.g., antagonism to Iraq; others are not -- e.g., its very
tolerant attitude toward Jordan's efforts to wipe out the
fedayeen.
.9. One significant change in the climate of the Arab
world as a result of Nasser's death has been the almost
complete ignoring of Cairo's attitudes on a number of issues.
Arab leaders no longer look over their shoulders in the di-
rection of Cairo before adopting a policy. This phenomenon is
most apparent in Lebanon, the country traditionally most
sensitive to Egypt's influence. Contrary to past practice
Lebanese leaders no longer make the pilgrimage to seek Cairo's
blessing. Neither President Frangie, nor former pro-Nasser
Prime Minister Salam, has felt this necessary, a radical de-
parture from the past. Likewise, other Arab political leaders
have not felt constrained by Cairo's views on various subjects
and have taken actions that would have been unthinkable in
the past. This has spread even to the Arab press and radio.
Cairo, for its part, realizing the diminution of its influence
has not recently attempted to influence policies in the Arab
world nearly as much as it had been doing since the mid-1950s.
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10. Jordan has both gained and lost from Nasser's death.
His departure removed the person who had directly contributed
to political turmoil on many occasions in the past and who
could exert a kind of veto on Jordanian policy when it suited
him. But Nasser also could, and did, help Hussein when his
interests so dictated, most prominently in the Arab-Israeli
confrontation and most particularly after 1967 when they were
in the same boat in many respects. On the other hand, the
current showdown between the Jordanian regime and the fedayeen
exemplifies Jordan's gain, In Nasser's day, Arab leaders would
have met in Cairo and come up with an "understanding" between
the fedayeen and Jordanians, which Cairo would have supported
by political and propaganda pressure. Today, Amman feels at
liberty to virtually ignore the views of Egypt and Egypt's
supporters as it goes about destroying the fedayeen.
11. Iraq's relations with Egypt have been poor more often
than they have been good since World War II and Nasser's
death has not changed this pattern. Iraq's Baathist regime
is antagonistic toward most of its Arab neighbors as well
as with Iran. As for Iraq's relations with Syria, the new
Baathist regime in Damascus is no better for Baghdad than its
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predecessor, and Iraqi-Syrian relations may get worse as a result
of Syria's snuggling up to Cairo in the "federation". Iraqi-
backed subversion in the Persian Gulf sheikhdoms continues and
no doubt will increase as the time for the British withdrawal
nears. As time goes on the Iraqis will do their best to give
their Gulf aspirations the aura of an Arab-Iranian struggle
for influence or control. Egypt is a refuge for Iraqi political
refugees, and a propaganda battle has raged between Cairo and
Baghdad since mid-1970. Yet neither country's principal interests
or spheres of activity coincide; Iraq can pursue its quarrels
with Iran, renew its civil war with the Kurds, and meddle
in the Gulf with little regard for what Cairo says on these
issues.
12. Much the same is true of Saudi Arabia. Nasser's
death removed King Feisal's main antagonist. Feisal's
opposition to Nasser was more an effort to thwart what he
viewed as Cairo's threat to conservative regimes than a contest
for leadership of the Arabs. But, Feisal does take seriously
his role of combatting radical forces in the Arabian Peninsula.
He will support traditional rulers in the Gulf against, for
example, Iraqi subversive efforts. He will almost certainly
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continue for some time to support the mixed bag of ousted
tribal leaders, former Sultans, and Adeni politicians in efforts
to overthrow the radical regime in South Yemen.
13. Egyptian influence in the two Yemens is low and
unlikely to revive very soon. In the Peoples Democratic
Republic of Yemen (PDRY) -- formerly Aden and its hinterlands,
the radical regime continues to undergo periodic purges, each
succeeding clique losing a bit more of Aden's grasp on the
provinces. The prospects are likely for increasing near-
anarchy, with the primitive tribal and local forces asserting
limited independence of or actively fighting the central govern-
ment. In Yemen proper, the government continues in power to a
very considerable extent as a consequence of Saudi subsidies and
political support. San'a is involved in the efforts to topple
the regime in South Yemen. It would like to have a friendly
regime there and eventually to unite both into "national"
Yemen, but such a development appears remote at best.
14. In the Maghreb (Morocco, Tunisia, and Algeria),
Nasser's death has had little impact. While he was a popular
hero to the masses, these countries' leaders -- each for their
own reasons -- regarded him as a threat to their positions.
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Indeed, Boumediene saw him as an impediment to Maghreb harmony.
Qaddafi's enthusiasm for Nasser did much to thwart a closer
Algerian-Libyan relationship. It now seems likely that this
situation will not change much, since Qaddafi's new-found
enthusiasm for the "federation" and his aspirations to be
Nasser's successor as a pan-Arab leader will disincline him to
orient Libya's policy westward to any significant degree. How-
ever, in areas where there is a community of interest, such as
oil policy, limited cooperation is likely.
15. For all its militant, anti-Western postures, Egypt
under Nasser was particularly cautious about risking its hard
currency income. It not only encouraged American oil companies
to come to Egypt, but Nasser used his personal ascendancy over
Qaddafi to counsel restraint in Libyan oil dealings. It seems
likely that the Libyan regime will be less willing to take such
advice from Cairo's present leaders -- if they give it -- and
more apt to take precipitate action against oil companies
than in the past.
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16. In sum, Nasser's demise has removed the kingpin
from the movement for pan-Arab unity. No leader or party can
claim to function for the entire Arab polity. Baathism now has
at least four mutations; the Syrian and Iraqi regimes, and the
remnants that each of these Baathist regimes have ousted in
the past few years. Each of these -- ousters and ousted --
claims to be the true Baath leadership. Each of them is con-
testing for the allegiance of Baathist followers in the other
Arab countries, where the branches of the Baath Party are mostly
clandestine. In nearly all of these states the Baathists are
opposed not only by the ruling regimes, but by rival radical
groupings, such as the Marxist-oriented Arab Nationalist
Movement, local revolutionary groups, and the local communist
parties. While the future of several of the conservative Arab
regimes bordering the Persian Gulf seems limited and the
prospects for some sort of radicalism look likely, present
revolutionary movements seem more likely to fragment than to
amalgamate.
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