SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS AND THE QUESTION OF HOSTILITIES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R00967A001500010006-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 18, 2005
• Sequence Number: 6
• Publication Date: January 19, 1971
• Content Type: MEMO

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11 February 1971
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SUBJECT ONE Memorandum on the Problem of a Sino-Soviet
War
1. Recently, ONE prepared a memorandum, "Sine-Soviet
Relations and the Question of Hostilities," for Admiral
Anderson of the PFIAB. The final version of this paper was
substantially improved over an earlier effort, and we are in
agreement with the principal conclusion expressed in the
last three paragraphs--that the present Soviet leadership
under present circumstances will not take drastic military
action against China, Nevertheless, the tendentious path
taken to reach this conclusion deserves comment.
2. One glaring problem with the paper is its pre-
occupation with the events of the summer of 1969 and its
slighting of subsequent developments. Tensions clearly
reached a peak following the border clashes that year.
Nevertheless, the Soviet decision to press for and stick
with the border talks and to seek a "normalization" of re-
lations, while continuing the military build-up, signaled
an intent to ride out the current difficulties and to hope
for the future. Indeed, their success in facing down the
Chinese in 1969 and bringing about an easing of tensions in
1970, appears to have given the Soviets a greater confidence
in the correctness of this course.
3. In its discussion of the Soviet assessment of the
Chinese threat, the paper seems slanted to overemphasize
Soviet anxiety. Certainly Moscow is apprehensive about the
implications of Chinese nuclear and missile progress. Never-
theless, the thrust of current Soviet thinking seems to
reflect a more realistic assessment of Chinese capabilities
than that presented in the ODE,', paper.
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Militarily, the Chinese are very poorly
trained so the question of military
confrontation is not of primary concern
to the USSR. We have supreme confidence
that the armed forces of the USSR could
handle such a military confrontation
without difficulty.
5. It would be idle to belabor differences with the
discussion in paragraphs 13-16 regarding interpretation of
developments in the summer of 1969. These were amply
stated in the discussion of the draft. It is still dif-
ficult to accept that the Soviets were seriously entertain-
ing the establishment of "buffer states" (which would re-
quire endless defense against an even more revanchist and
hostile China) or were weighing a large ground attack in
order to install a "pro-Soviet" regime in Peking. Further-
more, it is doubtful that a conventional air strike against
Chinese advanced weapons installations would do the job.
Finally, in discussing the indicators of Soviet intentions
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during that period, it should be borne in mind that we never
saw signs of the major military reinforcements needed to
bring Soviet military units along the border up to full
combat strength.
6. Finally, it would be well to add a proviso to the
conclusions, to the effect that a recurrence of serious
border clashes could lead to the suspension of all bets.
In that situation, the Soviets might consider a substantial
punitive raid to impress on the Chinese the folly of their
course. If such a development were to come. to pass, it
would carry with it the possibility of inadvertent escala-
tion. indeed, it might be just such a process of blind
stumbling that would be the most likely scenario for the
outbreak of Sinom-Soviet hostilities.
25
25
Chief, European Divis on, OCI
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