'NEW CHALLENGES TO THAILAND'?

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R00967A001500020002-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 21
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 27, 2012
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: February 25, 1972
• Content Type: LIST

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C E N T R A L I N T E L L I G E N C E A G E N C Y
OFFICE OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES
25 February 1972
MEMORANDUM
SUBJECT: New Challenges to Thailand?
There is increased concern regarding the security
of Thailand. The domestic insurgency has grown more
troublesome. In Laos, North Vietnamese and Pathet Lao
forces have been making substantial territorial gains.
And since early January, condemnation by the communists
of Thai involvement in the Indochinese war has reached
unusually high levels of vituperation. All this at a
time when American resolve to continue the military
struggle in Southeast Asia has seemed to diminish --
at least in Asian eyes.
After a discussion of the growing threat, this
memorandum assesses communist attitudes and probable
actions toward Thailand, and -- starting in paragraph
23 -- the prospect for any change in Thailand's view of
the war and its alliance with the United States.
This memorandum has been coordinated within
appropriate offices of CIA.
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The Threat to Thailand Grows
1. The Thai insurgency appears to become more of
a problem each year: the estimated number of insurgents
has tended to rise -- along with the number of recorded
"incidents" and casualties -- and the areas of insecurity
have tended to increase in extent. This year, as the
various regional insurgencies enter their more active
dry-season phase, does not appear to be an exception.
In the northern and north-central provinces in particular,
insurgent forces continue to strengthen their position,
though they remain confined to remote and sparsely
settled zones.
2. There may be as many as 2,500 to 3,000 armed
insurgents in these northerly areas -- largely Meo tribesmen
led by Thai and Sino-Thai communists; and while their
numbers are not growing at a dramatic rate, their capa-
bilities are more highly regarded than before. Their
weaponry, for example, now seems to include AK-47 rifles
and modern carbines, rocket-propelled grenades, and im-
proved antipersonnel and antitank mines, as well as
limited numbers of light mortars and light machine guns.
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Insurgent training and tactical organization may also be
improving; because of their stiff resistance, recent
government efforts to eliminate important base areas have
been largely unsuccessful. Indeed, in many districts
near the Lao border, government troops are presently on
the defensive. There is evidence, too, of a developing
network of communist support bases in this border zone,
not far from Pak Beng, terminal of the Chinese-built road
to the Mekong.
3. Elsewhere in Thailand, the situation seems much
less serious. In the northeast, the 1,500 or so insur-
gents have felt compelled in recent years to avoid direct
confrontation with government forces, and are focusing
instead on improving the quality of their organization
and the security of the existing village support base.
In the other regions, the insurgencies are troublesome,
but anti-government activity is small-scale and sporadic
-- largely terrorism. The well-organized communist activity
along the Malay border still seems to be targetted mainly
against Kuala Lumpur.
4. In Laos, the threat to Thai interests and,
potentially,Thai territory has increased. The communists
are on the offensive as in the past three dry seasons,
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but this time NVA/PL forces moved to threaten Vang Pao's
base complex at Long Tieng as early as December. But
while the communists claimed the fall of Long Tieng over
a month ago, this objective continues to elude them. In
southern Laos, communist troops have gained almost com-
plete control of the strategic Bolovens Plateau; and in
this and other sectors, allied forces now seem to have
their backs to the Mekong. There is not much doubt that,
with relatively small additions to their ranks, the com-
munists could move to threaten Savannakhet, Pakse, and the
other major river towns.
5. The more threatening tone of recent communist
propaganda attacks on the Thai government is another cause
of concern. Hanoi and its Pathet Lao clients have been
most outspoken. Hanoi has warned editorially of "punish-
ment" for the Thai leadership, and at three successive
Paris meetings has made a point of condemning Thai
involvement in Laos and the presence of US air bases in
Thailand. The Pathet Lao and Prince Souvannavong (in a
letter to Souvanna Phouma) have given heavy play to the
theme of Thai intervention and promised "annihilation"
of Thai forces in Laos. Chinese media (NCNA) have cele-
brated "the defeat and extermination of Thai mercenaries"
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in Laos, and have quoted Albanian attacks on`Thailand
as '.'a springboard for US aggression" in Southeast Asia.
Sihanouk has followed along with denunciations of alleged
Thai plans to invade Cambodia.
The Changed Communist View of Thailand
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8. The air war in Indochina also appears to be
taking on an increasingly Thai flavor. Relatively few
US aircraft are now based in South Vietnam; the burden of
the air effort in Indochina is divided between US carriers
and the bases in Thailand. Moreover, B-52 attacks in the
region are now mounted almost exclusively from the Thai
base
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9. Recent developments in Bangkok itself may have
contributed to communist animosities. The November "coup"
was, in important part, an effort by the top Thai generals
-- General Praphat in particular -- to clear the decks for
a more unified policy line on the war, on relations with
Peking, and on Thailand's regional role generally. The
generals had been disturbed by press and political carping
about Thailand's "overcommitment" to the US, and were
critical even of Foreign Minister Thanat's occasional
efforts to open a dialogue with Peking. The "coup" may
have confirmed communist suspicions that Thailand was
firmly in the hands of the hardliners and likely to proceed
even further down the line of involvement in the war.
10. As the communists observe these trends, they
doubtless perceive some aspects of "Vietnamization" that
might have been unclear to them even a year or two ago.
that US military withdrawal from
South Vietnam did not necessarily imply withdrawal from
Thailand which, if the war continued, would probably
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become the linchpin of a continuing US military presence
on the Southeast Asian mainland.
11. For Hanoi, all this must be frustrating --
a greater possibility of a lengthy military stalemate
in Laos and even more difficulty in bringing Souvanna
to terms; in Cambodia, potentially a similar hindrance
to North Vietnamese ambitions. For Peking, there is no
immediate concern, but it too has interests in the future
of Laos and Cambodia, and of Thailand as well. More
important, perhaps, Chinese expectations of a rapid US
military drawdown in Thailand may have been disappointed.
For both communist powers, assuming that they are thinking
about Thailand along these lines, there is the question of
how to respond -- other than rhetorically.
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13. NVA/PL forces, in our view, are presently
incapable of posing any immediate threat to Vientiane,
much less taking it. Stalled in their effort to take
Long Tieng, the odds are against the communists taking
this complex or eliminating Vang Pao's defending forces
in the next few weeks. Even if successful in both these
efforts by late March or April, Hanoi would have rela-
tively little time to extend its gains so as to threaten
the Vientiane region directly this season. Moreover,
The impact of all this on the overall Thai-US
relationship could not be gaged so clearly by
the communists.
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with the spring rains and consequent difficulties in
resupply over vulnerable routes from North Vietnam --
and under allied pressure -- Hanoi would probably with-
draw from any exposed outposts in the Long Tieng sector.
In sum, the threat to Thailand from communist forces in
northern Laos will probably not be greatly intensified
during 1972 even if some defeats are sustained over the
next few months.
14. Aside from its presently limited military capa-
bilities in northern Laos, Hanoi may also be restrained
by an unwillingness to press the war against Souvanna
to a political showdown at this time. Hanoi has given
no sign that it has abandoned hope of utilizing the
Geneva/Zurich accords to secure the neutralization of Laos
and a legitimate role for its Pathet Lao clients in a
reconstituted Lao coalition. To advance boldly into the
Vientiane plain carries the danger of dislodging Souvanna
in favor of rightist military leaders who
would probably elect to continue the
war to the end; and Hanoi knows this. With its priorities
clearly in South Vietnam, there would seem to be little
reason for Hanoi to assume this additional military burden.
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The move might also antagonize Peking which apparently
continues to favor holding the door open to Souvanna and
a negotiated settlement in Laos.
15. As noted earlier, the communists have substan-
tial capability for further advance in southern Laos. But
in this arena, Hanoi is clearly concerned mainly to safe-
guard its corridors to South Vietnam and Cambodia. While
attacks on -- or seizures of -- the Lao valley towns would
be important psychological victories, they would not neces-
sarily drive Vientiane out of the war and would be costly
to the communists in manpower and materiel.
16. A second potential communist lever on Thai
behavior is the domestic insurgency. Indeed, it seems
clear that the active phase of the Thai insurgency was
initiated by Peking and Hanoi in 1965 (in northeastern
Thailand) mainly to warn Bangkok against involvement
in US military operations in Indochina. There was little
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expectation that the frail, Peking-dominated, Thai com-
munist movement could quickly develop into a viable threat
to Bangkok's authority on the model of communist guerrillas
in South Vietnam, or even Laos.
17. The communist "warning" to Thailand has failed
over a seven-year-period to do the job; and it is our view
that Peking and Hanoi are still at least several years
away from any significant dividend on their insurgency
investment. There are many reasons. For one thing, the
present military leadership of Thailand -- and almost any
foreseeable leadership -- is not disposed to believe
that Peking (or Hanoi) would cease supporting the insur-
gencies simply as part of some bargain for Thai "neutrality"
in the war. Moreover, anti-communism and suspicion of
communist intentions run strong in the conservative military
elite that has run Thailand for forty years. And while the
occasional public and private feelers to China from Bangkok
invariably refer to negotiation of the insurgency issue,
in our view this is not being done with any real expecta-
tion of favorable communist response.
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18. In any event, until recently at least, most
Thai leaders have not been particularly impressed with the
threat posed by the domestic insurgency, The government
has consistently viewed it with less concern than have
its American advisers and, in general, has undertaken
aggressive countermeasures only in response to US prodding.
This attitude may have resulted in part from the rela-
tively rapid suppression of the more active phase of the
northeastern insurgency in 1966 and 1967. It certainly
rests heavily on traditional Thai disdain for the high-
land tribesmen who comprise the bulk of the communist
directed combat force in the northern and north-central
provinces. Viewed more broadly, this relatively relaxed
attitude is also a function of Bangkok's belief that the
insurgency is almost wholly a foreign import -- its leader-
ship and objectives alien to Thailand -- hence unlikely
to attract or hold the allegiance of many ethnic Thai.
Experience does indicate that, in Thailand, trained and
loyal insurgent manpower simply cannot be expanded rapidly
on the basis of local recruitment.
19. This brings us to the issue of what Peking or
Hanoi might do to pump up the Thai insurgency. One concern
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has been the possibility of experienced Chinese or North
Vietnamese personnel entering Thailand in numbers suffi-
cient to galvanize the movement into more effective action
at some early date. We think this an unlikely prospect,
though a few political cadre or technical specialists
might well slip over the border from time to time for a
season of campaigning or some special mission -- e.g.,
a rocket attack on a US air base in the northeast.
20. Supporting this point of view is the fact that
no substantial number of Chinese nationals (as distinct
from Sino-Thai, the ethnic Chinese resident in Thailand)
or Vietnamese nationals (or for that matter Vietnamese
resident in Thailand -- there are some 30,000-40,000 in
the northeast) has been reliably identified in any Thai
insurgent force. Secondly, at least for Peking, such action
would be out of phase with observed policy in the Burmese,
Lao, and Cambodian insurgencies, as well as with established
Maoist doctrine on revolutionary self-reliance. Hanoi,
however, has often integrated its forces with those of its
Lao and Cambodian clients. It might act this way in Thai-
land, though in view of Peking's established position as
mentor of the Thai Communist Party, Hanoi might see little
advantage in any additional sacrifice of its already de-
pleted military manpower pool.
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21. There is a stronger case to be made for the
possibility of wholesale infiltration of Pathet Lao forces
into adjacent areas of Thailand. PL personnel include Meo
and other tribal elements, and "Thai-Lao" -- the lowland
peoples of the middle Mekong region. The highland tribes
are spread across China's southern rimlands from Burma
to North Vietnam; in a sense, they know no boundaries,, and
it would not be difficult for Meo insurgents from Laos to
operate in the Thai highland environment. Nor do the
"Thai-Lao" on opposite shores of the middle Mekong differ
greatly in appearance, language, and customs. The real
issue, of course, would be the availability of any sub-
stantial number of PL for duty in Thailand at this stage
of the intensive communist effort in Laos itself.
22. On the basis of the foregoing, we would conclude
that the range of actions open to the communists in any
short-term effort to intimidate Thailand is quite limited.
An obvious conclusion is that Thailand does have a
Legitimate concern regarding external subversion
once the war in Laos is ended; in the Thai view,
communist control of Laos would open the floodgates
to subversion by such "foreign" elements.
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Winning the war in northern Laos would be most effective
but seems unlikely to occur in 1972. Any dramatic upsurge
in insurgency in Thailand itself appears beyond communist
capabilities for a few years, possibly longer.
Thailand and the US Alliance
23. Peking and Hanoi are well aware of their limited
leverage over Bangkok in the short term, though they may
feel justified in a certain measure of confidence regarding
the longer term prospects. Peking, as noted earlier, can
afford to take the longer view. Its basic objectives in
Thailand are the removal of US bases and securing Bangkok's
acknowledgement of China's primacy among the powers in
Southeast Asia. Current tidal movements in Asia favor
achievement of these goals. Hanoi may have no positive
program regarding Thailand other than to discourage any
resurgent Thai ambitions in Laos or Cambodia. The out-
come of the Indochinese war is likely to decide that issue;
but the war outlook, particularly in Laos, seems generally
unfavorable to longer range Thai interests.
24. Faced with such problems, it might seem sur-
prising that the Thai generals have become so heavily
committed against the communist side. Perhaps their
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current policy is a result of diplomatic inertia, a hold-
over from the more promising fifties when the Thai saw
considerable advantage in cultivating a close relationship
with the US. More likely, it is still based on cool cal-
culations of Thai national interests -- as viewed by the
military elite, whose continued direction of the nation
seems assured even though shifts might occur in the top
echelon.
25. The generals' view of the world is not im-
mutable; they have grown conscious of Thailand's excessive
dependence on a single patron and, since the 1968/69 shift
in US Asian policy, have initiated a cautious search for
options. But they have found few meaningful alternatives
to. their close alliance with the US. The war, especially
their preoccupation with the security of the Mekong
frontiers, prevents any Thai approach. to the Hanoi regime.
The "neutrality" which seems to intrigue the Malaysians
would also become viable only in the context of a broad
Indochina settlement. There is no appetite for seeking
security in China's orbit; the Thai leadership fears the
impact on the domestic scene of the radical ideas that
might be spread, particularly among Thai youth and the
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local Chinese community. Thus, despite growing anxiety
over ambiguities in US policy, Thailand still views the
alliance as offering the most security; and it is willing
to continue to do its part to maintain US interest in
the relationship. And, so far at least, Thailand sees
US aid to them continuing and US military posture in
Indochina still firm despite the withdrawals from South
Vietnam.
26. This is not to say that the Thai will not per-
sist in the search for alternatives. But key elements in
the equation -- the outcome of the war and the course of
Sino-American relations -- are beyond Bangkok's ability
to control. At this juncture, the generals are certainly
asking themselves whether they are helping or hurting
Thai chances for a modus vivendi with the communists by
assisting the US effort in Indochina. If the war goes
well for the allies, Thai leaders can take satisfaction
in their decision to stay the course; Peking and Hanoi
can be dealt with in a relatively relaxed manner. If the
war goes badly, adjustments would come sooner and be much
less favorable to Thailand, moreso because of its in-
creasingly prominent role in the battle.
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MEMORANDUM FOR: L-l
This is the paper you requested for Under
Secretary Irwin. I would give it additional distribution
if you approve.
Director
National Estimates
Attachment:
Memorandum, dated 25 Feb 72
"New Challenges to Thailand?"
25 Feb 72
(DATE)
10-101
FORM
MAY FORM
54 1 0 1 WHICH REPLACES
AUG NO.
I USED.
BE
MEMORANDUM FOR: Mi Villlam Sullivan
Deputy Assistant Secretary for
East Asian and Pacific Affairs
This piece on Thailand responds to
certain questions raised by Under Secretary
Irwi n in a recent conversation with Mr. Helms.
A copy has also gone to Ray Cline.
JOHN HUIZENGA
Director
National Estimates
28 February 1972
(DATE)
10-101
MAY FORM
FORM NO. 101 WHICH REPLACES
BE
1 AUG 54 USED.
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MEMORANDUM FOR: Ms. Ray Cline, Director
Bureau of Intelligence and
Research
This paper was done in response to certain
questions on Thailand raised by Under Secretary
Irwin in conversation with the DCI. Bill Sullivan
also has a copy.
JOHN HUIZENGA
Director
National Estimates
28 February 1972
(DATE)
FORM NO. 'oI REPLACES FORM 10.101
1 AUG 54 WHICH MAY BE USED.
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