THE WAR AND THIEU'S POLITICAL POSITION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R00967A001500030005-8
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 17
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 9, 2006
• Sequence Number: 5
• Publication Date: June 23, 1972
• Content Type: MEMO

? Approved F#&Release 200P
ltEA-RDP79R009WA001500030005-8
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES
23 June 1972
MEMORANDUM
SUBJECT: The War and Thieu's Political Position
This memorandum discusses Thieu's political prospects
over the next four or five months. It focusses on possible
changes in the situation on the battlefield, including re-
lated military, political, and psychological developments
in both Vietnams; and it explores the political implica-
tions of ARVN defeat, ARVN victory, and a military stale-
mate. There is no attempt to develop scenarios linked to
alternative US military/political postures. The memo assumes
the continuation -- at one level or another -- of the US
"blockade" and the bombing of the North, and continued
unwillingness in Moscow or Peking to apply the kind of
pressure on Hanoi that might compel the North Vietnamese
to quit the field in the South.
GROUP 1
hcludod from auIomoNc
downgrading and
dodaulgcatlon
Approved For Release 2006/gR R RDP79R00967A001500030005-8
 Approved Fj.Release 206 TIA-RDP79R00907AO01500030005-8
;Zements of Thieu's Political Strength
1. Through the various formulations of the communist
proposals for a settlement of the war, one condition has
remained constant -- the removal of Nguyen Van Thieu and
his political apparatus. Hanoi's asserti.in that Thieu stands
between South Vietnam and peace has not struck a noticeably
responsive chord in South Vietnam, however, and Thieu's
political position has remained remarkably solid over the
past few years. Most of what remains of Thieu's domestic
opposition has been in obvious disarray, incapable of offering
a serious challenge to his control. Non-communist opposition
groups have lacked the unity and leadership to present an
effective coalition of anti-Thieuf.orces, while communist
capacities for effective political action against the central
government have been relatively slight since the 1968
Tet offensive.
2. The An Quang Buddhists have remained an exception
to the general political impotence of opposition groups in
South Vietnam, mainly because of their impressive political
organization in the northern provinces of South Vietnam.
SECRET
Approved For Release 2006/03/17 : CIA-RDP79R00967AO01500030005-8
 Approved F&r.Release 20$Ff TIA-RDP79R00 9A001500030005-8
An Quang alone, of course, has never had the political
muscle to overturn the government in Saigon, but it has had
the capacity to stimulate serious civil disorder, as in
1966. Church leadership has generally avoided this kind of
disruption in recent years, however, and has sought to
strengthen its influence by working within the political
system rather than taking to the streets. An Quang leaders
have little love for Thieu, but generally have come to look
upon him as more acceptable than the unpredictable Ky or
the ineffectual Minh (though local bonzes and laymen did
support Minh's abortive presidential candidacy).
3. Obviously, Thieu's power has not been based on
his broad popular or political appeal; it rests heavily on
his control of the governmental bureaucracy - - most impor-
tantly -- on the continuing support of the senior military
establishment. Thieu has always shown great skill at sur-
viving the shifting fortunes of military politics; since
his election in 1967, he has maneuvered officers loyal to
him into most of the senior commands while isolating those
associated with Nguyen Cao Ky, his predecessor. Indeed,
SECRET
Approved For Release 2006/03/17 : CIA-RDP79R00967A001500030005-8
 Approved F i Release 20 / r '.'IA-RDP79ROOs 7A001500030005-8
there does not now seem to be any senior ARVN officer who
could generate enough support among his colleagues to
challenge Thieu's leadership.
4. Other factors have reinforced Thieu's position.
The most significant has been the firm backing of the US
Government, whose well-known opposition to further coups in
South Vietnam has been decisive in dissuading would-be
plotters. The military's physical and psychological depen-
dence on American military assistance has made them ex-
tremely sensitive to this kind of pressure from Washington.
There is also a genuine awareness among the generals --
and among most politically conscious Vietnamese as well --
of the advantages of political stability over the merry-
go-round of coups and civil disorders that characterized
the 1963-1966 period.
Politics and the Changing Military situation
5. In the final analysis, Thieu's political survival
is (and always has been) linked with South Vietnam's pros-
pects on the battlefield. The current enemy offensive has
had an unsettling effect on the political situation in
SECRET
Approved For Release 2006/03/17 : CIA-RDP79R00967A001500030005-8
 Approved FeivRelease 20F ' IA-RDP79ROO9 A001500030005-8
Saigon. When the loss of Quang Tri hit home, public confi-
dence in the government and its forces was quite obviously
shaken. Criticism of Thieu's leadership -- though muted --
began to percolate, not only among his political opponents
but among some senior elements of the military as well.
General Minh's supporters initiated. a good deal of the
grumbling in the background. And in late April, Senator
Vu Van Mau, leader of the opposition Buddhist bloc in the
Senate, introduced a resolution demanding that Hanoi with-
draw its troops from the South, mainly to cover a parallel
request that Thieu institute sweeping reforms. Some senior
officers, including members of the Joint General Staff, have
become more vocal in ctiticizing Thieu's policy of selecting
commanders for their personal loyalty rather than pro-
fessional competence.
6. The solidity of American support has also been
called into question. As on the occasion of earlier military
setbacks, there are rumors in South Vietnam of connivance
between Washington, and Hanoi ... or Peking... or Moscow,
helped along by the Vietanmese tendency to believe in con-
spiracies. There is also much open discussion of alleged
great-power understandings to end the war, even at the
SECRET
Approved For Release 2006/03/17 : CIA-RDP79R00967AO01500030005-8
 Approved FQARelease 20bkkg EIA-RDP79R009e'PAO01500030005-8
expense of South Vietnamese interests. Such speculations
reflect. the search for scapegoats for ARVN setbacks since
early April; they are also in part: a spinoff from the dis-
closure of the secret US-North Vietnamese talks in Paris and
the US Presidential visits to Peking and Moscow. But the
preva.l.enc-e of such attitudes points up the basic sense of
insecurity that has always weakened the resolve and capa-
bilities of the South Vietnamese in. their confrontation with
Hanoi. The expanded US air and naval effort against the
North in recent months has been reassuring to the South
Vietnamese, but it is obvious that the strength of Thieu's
political. position will remain highly sensitive to the
course of the current military campaign, which may well
extend into the fall, months.
7. Defeat or Victory: The "Ea y" Estimates. If ARVN
can stop the current North Vietnamese thrust on all major
fronts, and proceed at some early date to edge Hanoi's
divisions back toward their frontier redoubts, Thi.eu's
political position would be greatly strengthened. He
could not easily b e dislodged by his opponents in Saigon.
SECRET
Approved For Release 2006/03/17 : CIA-RDP79R00967AO01500030005-8
 Approved FQRelease 20I.'EIA-RDP79R007A001500030005-8
8. Thieu's political problems would not be over,
however. While he would be ina strong position to cope with
elements opposed to his continuation in office, he could not
count on ARVN successes eliminating all domestic sentiment
for his political scalp. Even with the imminent communist
threat removed -- the Saigon political scene is likely to be
churning with peace talk, most of it involving Thieu's re-
moval from the scene. The US presidential campaign alone
would be sufficient to set this rumor mill in motion. But
it will also be fed by persistent war-weariness among
Southerners (and a. widespread assumption that Hanoi shared
the feeling).
9. Not that An Qvang or other civilian politicians
would want to hand the country over to the communists; on the
contrary, the feeling might prevail that having set Hanoi
back rather decisively -- albeit with US help -- South
Vietnam had for the first time achieved a solid bargaining
position for the inevitable political negotiation with Hanoi.
And Thieu himself, as an obvious barrier to any settlement,
might seem more expendable than before in their eyes. In such
circumstances, however, Thieu could undoubtedly count on
the support of his generals, who could not easily be persua-
ded to abandon a winning hand, unless they came to believe
that the US itself was ready to shift away from Thieu.
SECRET
Approved For Release 2006/03/17 : CIA-RDP79R00967AO01500030005-8
 Approved For Releame 2006/03/1 $ i"8& 79R00967A004600030005-8
10. At the other end of the military spectrum -- if
ARVN simply collapses in the field in the face of a renewed
onslaught, Thieu's leadership position would collapse with
it. The public mood in the South would quickly turn to a
search for any form of accommodation that offered a chance
of personal survival. Those in the government and the army
with the means would undoubtedly try to leave the country.
Further American support of the war would appear futile to
most South Vietnamese; and they would anticipate heavy
pressures in the US for any kind of a settlement with Hanoi
that seemed to guarantee the release of US prisoners. With
ARVN in disarray and the people disheartened, Thieu would be
exceedingly vulnerable to any move by a political grouping
in Saigon that represented itself as ready, willing, and
able to negotiate an end to the fighting.
11. Even short of this sort of total collapse, ARVN's
will to continue the fight could be shaken decisively by
some major military setback, even if ARVN itself were left
largely intact and still in control of most of the country
and its people. The loss of Hue, in particular, would be a
tremendous shock, not so much because of its military value
(Danang has more), but because it would signify the failure
of the best fighting units in the South -- ARVN's First
SECRET
Approved For Release 2006/03/17 : CIA-RDP79R00967AO01500030005-8
 Approved For Releae2006/03/17.g.JP-P&%R00967A0015p030005-8
Division and the Marines, as well as Ranger and Airborne
elements -- in addition to the loss of Vietnam's "imperial"
city. Such a defeat could have an unravelling effect on the
cohesion and will of the rest of the ARVN. The rank and file
of the army would be increasingly vulnerable to communist pro-
paganda and proselytizing efforts, which have already had an
impact on the relatively exposed People's Self Defense Forces
-- the local militia. The regular troops, so far at least,
have been largely unreceptive to communist offers of
leniency to those who defect or desert. But if ARVN's elite
forces go down in defeat at Hue, defection and desertion
might quickly develop widespread appeal among troops else-
where in South Vietnam. In any case, Thieu's leadership
position would become almost untenable.
12. Prolonged Stalemate. Political forecasting becomes
more difficult in situations where neither side succeeds in
gaining a decisive battlefield position in the months ahead.
Yet this now appears as a likely outcome of the current mili-
tary campaign.
13. If ARVN is able to hold essentially its present
positions against Hanoi's forces but shows little promise by
this fall of restoring the situation to its status of last
SECRET
Approved For Release 2006/03/17 : CIA-RDP79R00967AO01500030005-8
 Approved For Releaee~ 2006/03/17 S.ElQT9R00967A001Q0030005-8
March, there is likely to be considerable pessimism in South
Vietnam over longer-term prospects. A substantial North
Vietnamese Army will have secured major lodgements in South
Vietnam, increasing the chance of another round of heavy
fighting next year in the same critical areas. Thieu's
position, in this situation, will be determined by the same
factors that have been operable since 1967 -- the attitudes
of top ARVN leaders -- which as before will hinge largely on
assurances of continuing American support and the course of
events on the battlefield.
14. In a situation of military stalemate, with the
communists still in a threatening position, South Vietnamese
politics would no doubt continue to be restrained, notwith-
standing persistent criticism of Thieu's leadership. None of
the major opposition groups have shown signs of adopting a
pacifist posture; just the opposite, An Quang, for example,
has continued to express the view that compromise with
Hanoi is impossible. And Catholic groups, though upset by
Thieu's recent bid for unlimited powers, are not inclined to
support major concessions to the communist side. Various
political blocs, normally at each other's throat, are attemp-
ting to work together to provide refugee relief and generally
to present a united front to the communists.
SECRET
Approved For Release 2006/03/17 : CIA-RDP79R00967AO01500030005-8
 Approved For Relearn 2006/03/1 i?l 9R00967A001 0030005-8
15. However, Thieu shows no serious inclination to
seize the opportunity offered by the current wave of anti-
communist patriotism to bring opposition figures into the
government and create at least the impression of greater
political unity in the South. There was speculation earlier
that members of the An Quang-associated bloc would be offered
some larger political role, but Thieu quickly withdrew into
his customary aloofness from the civilian politicians and
from the ad hoc groups trying to generate public esprit. He
has been unresponsive as well to efforts of non-political
figures, in Hue for example, to organize the populace in
support of the war effort. Although Thieu has met frequently
with some legislators, his essentially abrupt attitude to-
ward them has led to trouble with the Senate over legislation
for emergency powers, and no doubt will continue to evoke the
criticism that Thieu cannot "unite" the nation and does not
truly represent the South Vietnamese people.
16. The support of the military remains the sine qua
non of any move to replace him. For all their dislike and
distrust of Thieu, none of the political factions seem cap-
able or willing to move to bring him down. And so long as
ARVN seems able to stand up to the North Vietnamese on the
SECRET
Approved For Release 2006/03/17 : CIA-RDP79R00967AO01500030005-8
 Approved For Relea a 2006/03/17 ~ T9R00967A00fW0030005-8
ground, there is little chance of any senior commander opt-
ing for other than the hard anti-communist line identified
with Thieu. The determination of the generals to resist a
compromise settlement will certainly be influenced by their
view of conditions in North Vietnam, however. If they come
to believe that the US "blockade" and air strikes are in
fact substantially curtailing foreign military assistance
to North Vietnam, they will probably anticipate an end to
large-scale territorial warfare and a return to "protracted"
warfare on the patterns of 1970-1971, and hence see little
reason to abandon Thieu. On the other hand, should these US
measures be abandoned soon or prove ineffective, and the
South Vietnamese military thought they faced another round of
massive artillery and armor assaults in 1973, their attitudes
would be less sanguine, their support of Thieu less certain.
17. Nonetheless, the generals are not going to abandon
Thieu unless they feel that Washington looks upon him as a
liability in its negotiations with Hanoi. Most military
leaders, like virtually all South Vietnamese, feel that the
war must eventually be settled by the powers, with South
Vietnam's fate basically in the hands of the US. Thus,
they will certainly remain very sensitive to any hint that
SECRET
Approved For Release 2006/03/17 : CIA-RDP79R00967A001500030005-8
 Approved For Releasw2006/03/17 SElQYA&'F9R00967AO01.WO30005-8
American support for Thieu is wavering, and very receptive
to rumors of secret arrangements between the US and the com-
munist side. As noted earlier, the US presidential campaign,
of itself, is certain to arouse South Vietnamese fears of a
major shift in US policy in Indochina. And then there is the
prospect of a continuing US drawdown through the summer of
its remaining troop complement in the South.
18. In a stalemated situation, Hanoi is sure to con-
tinue its persistent effort to exploit Thieu's image as an
uncompromising hawk and, on the other hand, to arouse South
Vietnamese fears of abandonment by the US. The communists
are already trying to make contact with senior ARVN officers
and notable political and religious figures. Big Minh has
admitted approaches from communists, and An Quang leader
Thich Tri Quang recently refused a proposal to meet with
communist officials near Saigon. While such approaches have
apparently been unsuccessful in the past, the argument for
accommodation would grow stronger if there were prospects of
further massive assaults, and if the chances for continuing
American assistance seemed to grow more questionable.
SECRET
Approved For Release 2006/03/17 : CIA-RDP79R00967AO01500030005-8
 Approved For RelQase 2006/03AVQMkFREP79R00967AOM600030005-8
19. Indeed, if ARVN seemed to be bogged down, unable
to regain the initiative, and if American patience and
support appeared to be wearing thin, Thieu himself might
feel pressed to try for an accommodation with Hanoi. He
has occasionally shown willingness to consider political
compromises and he is not unrealistic. Hanoi's attitude
would be controlling in this situation, however, and Hanoi
has remained adamant on Thieu's removal, though refusing to
indicate with any degree of clarity who among the southern
elite might be acceptable in a coalition government.
20, Hanoi's rigid posture clearly works against an
early end to the war, even one not necessarily unfavorable
to communist political objectives. One can only assume
that Hanoi requires: (1) the "face" that would attend
achievement of its more ambitious demands; and/or (2) the
absolute certainty to be derived from a clean sweep of all
experienced non-communist leaders in the South. North
Vietnam's apparent insistence that not only Thieu, but the
entire establishment that now runs South Vietnam must go,
does not hold out much hope to the South Vietnamese that
any other notable figure now on the Saigon. political scene
SECRET
Approved For Release 2006/03/17 : CIA-RDP79R00967A001500030005-8
 Approved For Ruse 2006/03AIFMP79R00967AO f500030005-8
would be any more acceptable to the North Vietnamese. The
South Vietnamese politicians seem to have little choice but
to go on as they are, as long as the army is willing to
fight, hoping that international pressures will somehow
force restraints on Hanoi's actions and demands.
21. Were Hanoi to modify its stand, however, and
somehow to indicate a way in which the GVN -- without Thieu
-- could arrange a settlement (rather than a capitulation),
domestic pressures for his resignation would grow rapidly,
particularly if the US showed interest in the offer. Minh
remains the most obvious figure to lead a new combination in
Saigon. Although his leadership abilities are dubious, he
still commands respect among the Buddhists, among native
Vietnamese of the Delta, and in the military; and he has
indicated a willingness to permit the Viet Cong "a politi-
cal role" in South Vietnam, in contrast to Thieu's negative
response on the subject. Unless Saigon's military prospects
looked dismal, however, ARVN leadership would accept Minh
only at Washington's insistence -- though he would be more
tolerable to them than any of the civilian politicians on
the scene. He would certainly be more tolerable to Hanoi
than any of his fellow ARVN generals.
SECRET
Approved For Release 2006/03/17 : CIA-RDP79R00967AO01500030005-8
 Approved For Relee 2006/03/1 fFF'w79R00967A0046U0030005-8
22. in sum, if ARVN acquits itself reasonably well
over the next several months, President Thieu will retain
the domestic political assets that have buttressed his
leadership position in Saigon for the past several years,
most particularly the support of the top military. But
ARVN performance, however solid, cannot provide him with
immunity to persistent opposition harassment, even on basic
issues. The past 90 days, though costly to Hanoi, have
demonstrated the limitations of the ARVN force (and the
virtual indispensability of US air support to its opera-
tions), and the fragility of the government position in the
countryside. In addition, the increased military demands on
the US -- coupled with anticipation of the American presiden-
tial campaign -- has intensified concerns in Saigon of a
settlement reached over South Vietnamese heads.
23. Such liabilities are balanced to some degree by
the firm US posture vis-a-vis the North at this time; and
might be further offset if it should become clear that US
tactics will succeed in greatly reducing North Vietnamese
capabilities to initiate large-scale attacks next year.
SECRET
Approved For Release 2006/03/17 : CIA-RDP79R00967AO01500030005-8
 Approved For Rele 2006/03/17-B1Q 9R00967A001i00030005-8
Nonetheless, even the staunchest anti-communist elements
in the south are war-weary and see little prospect that
GVN forces, even with heavy US air support, can compel the
communists to cease military activity in the South at any
time soon. In such a milieu, Thieu's position could be-
come increasingly vulnerable.
SECRET
Approved For Release 2006/03/17 : CIA-RDP79R00967AO01500030005-8