A ROUGH FUTURE FOR MOROCCO'S KING HASSAN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R00967A001500040009-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 10
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 31, 2006
• Sequence Number: 9
• Publication Date: August 25, 1972
• Content Type: MEMO

Approved For Release 2007/03/06 : CSKt00967A001500040009-3
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
MEMORANDUM
SUBJECT: A Rough Future for Morocco's King Hassan
25 August 1972
In time, Moroccans are likely to become restive at the continuing
deterioration of their situation in comparison to that of their neighbors.
The loyalty of the armed forces to the monarchy also is likely slowly to
decline. But Hassan's hold on power looks to be good for some years.
With a deft combination of force and favor, he probably can suppress or
buy off potential dissidents for at least several years to come. Over
the longer run, Hassan's ability to retain his throne is open to serious
question. Even today, a carefully hatched plot along Libyan lines can-
not be ruled out. (NIE 60-70, 12 March 1970)
Hassan is solidly in charge of Morocco and is likely to remain so
for a considerable period. But the Moroccan regime faces a number of
very serious problems which collectively could prove its undoing in the
more distant future. Hassan has little dispositon for slogging away at
uncongenial tasks of resource allocation, spending, and planning. The
royal family's financial dealings are a growing topic of domestic criti-
cism. The malaise among the politically aware is showing up in student
strikes. The King has great resources of power, skill, political legiti-
macy, and religious prestige to rely ono But he cannot expect to run
Morocco as his medieval forebears did for the indefinite future without
a blowup. (ONE Staff Memorandum, 28 April 1971)
This memorandum was prepared by the Office of National
Estimates and discussed with other components
of the CIA, who are in general agreement with
its judgments.
SECRET
Approved For Release 2007/03/06 : CIA-RDP79R00967AO01500040009-3
 Approved For Release 2007/03/06: Cla 0967AO01500040009-3
King Hassan survived a spectacular and nearly successful coup
attempt in July 1971. While Hassan quickly reestablished control
and executed the alleged ringleaders after summary trial, the uprising
at Skhirat palace clearly shook the regime and exposed the vulnera-
bility of narrowly-based royal rule. Although an explosion does not
appear likely in the immediate future, continuing discontent poses a
long-term threat to the regime. To avoid eventual forceful overthrow,
Hassan must be willing to change the system far more fundamentally
than he has so far been willing to do. General Oufkir has emerged
as unquestionably the most important personage in the country after
King Hassan. There are numerous reports that he is having second
thoughts about the long-term survival of the royal house. (ONE
Memorandum, 28 February 1972)
King Hassan II, who was nearby overthrown in a military up-
rising in July 1971, has learned little from his narrow escape.
This virtually assures that other challenges to the King will take
place, but Hassan is in a strong position and could carry on for many
years. The military establishment is both the chief prop of and
potential threat to the crown. Thus fair, General Oufkir, who has
firm control of the armed forces, has shown no inclination to move
against the King. He would be tempted to step in, however, if Hassan
seemed to be fumbling badly in handling the problems of government.
The odds in favor of a move by lower ranking officers, who seem more
concerned with the need for basic change in society are likely to
grow over time. (NIE 61-72, 15 June 1972)
1, On 16 August 1972, General Oufkir was directly implicated
in an attempt to shoot down King Hassan"s airplane. Oufkir himself
is dead and the King has assumed direct control of the armed forces.
Approved For Release 2007/03/06 : AR00967A001500040009-3
 Approved For Release 2007/03/06 CSE(MEW00967AO01500040009-3
The King has survived not because of any "strong position" but because
of some atrociously bad gunnery by the Moroccan Air Force and ap-
parently some quick thinking on his own part. The highly negative
comments in the papers cited above -- on the King's handling of civilian
political forces, the strains in Moroccan society, the country's
economic problems and prospects, and the loyalty of the armed forces --
are as true as ever and the latest attempt on the King's life casts
new doubt on the durability of the monarchy.
2. It is noteworthy that both the July 1971 attempt to over-
throw the King and the more recent effort were carried out by small
groups of military officers -- primarily Berbers, a group he has
favored. Available evidence indicates that the would-be regicides
aimed at eliminating Hassan and getting rid of the corrupt and waste-
ful entourage that surrounds him. The eventual demise of the monarchy
itself apparently was intended, Relatively few officers were directly
involved in each attempt. Among others who may have had advance
knowledge of the attempt, none appears to hEoe been sufficiently loyal
to the monarch to report the plans to the authorities.
3. Thus, the loyalty of the Moroccan military establishment
is now even more questionable than before, There are no doubt
many officers who remain loyal to the King, but he cannot be sure
Approved For Release 2007/03/06: Ca%P79Rb0967AO01500040009-3
 Approved For Release 2007/03/06 : CIA-RDP79R00967AO01500040009-3
SECRET
who they are. He has reacted to the disloyalty of a few by giving
a scathing talk to several dozen senior officers in which he impugned
their integrity. Furthermore, the denunciation was broadcast to the
entire population. He has taken over the running of the military
establishment on grounds that he cannot trust any of his military
subordinates; in these circumstances, the military has little reason
to trust him. Since he has long since eschewed any confidence in
civilian political forces, he now has no loyal cadre of people on
whom he can depend.
4. There is also the question of what affect this second
coup attempt will have on Hassan himself. He has shown an admirable
capacity to escape from a hail of bullets, take charge of the situation,
and restore order. He has also, over the years, demonstrated great
ability at political manipulation -- balancing this political party,
that clique, or this person off against one another. But he has
devoted a large part of his time to the pursuit of pleasure. If he
now refuses to trust any subordinate with the day-to-day business
of running the government, the efficiency of the Moroccan bureaucracy,
none too high to begin with, is likely to decline. Such effort and
energy as he is willing to devote to the task of governing is likely
to be absorbed by intrigue, political manipulation, overseeing
competing security services, and the like.
SECRET
Approved For Release 2007/03/06 : CIA-RDP79R00967AO01500040009-3
 Approved For Release 2007/03/06: CIT-9a967A001500040009-3
5. He will have little time to spare for Morocco's social and
economic problems, which have had only small attention from him in
the past. And there remain formidable sources of political difficulty.
Unemployment and poverty are endemic and growing in Morocco; the major
cities with their large numbers of impoverished slum dwellers and
frustrated students and intellectuals are fertile breeding grounds
for dissent.
6. Civilian opposition leaders may believe that the King has
been seriously weakened by recent events and that mass dissent would
now be a more effective weapon against royal rule than it was in the
1960s. A variety of urban-focussed ills -- student and labor strikes,
demonstrations, public disorders -- could well add to the regime's
difficulties in the months ahead. And the loyalty of the forces
needed to control such manifestations is questionable.
7. The two recent attempts on his life have significant ele-
ments in common. They were carried out by individuals with special
perquisities and privileges, coming from groups who have been especially
favored by the King. And the King's survival does not appear to have
inspired any outpourings of popular support for his person or for the
monarchy. If he cannot buy loyalty nor count upon his role as religious
Approved For Release 2007/03/06 :`( fA`-f& 7TR00967AO01500040009-3
 Approved For Release 2007/03/06 :9<-00967AO01500040009-3
as well as temporal leader for popular support, his only hope seems
to lie in reforming his own approach. The coup attempt of 1971 didn't
teach him anything. The attempt of 1972 may, but we doubt it strongly.
His initial response has been to blame virtually everyone else in
Morocco for creating conditions that permitted blows at the throne.
The outlook for his regime, therefore, can only be described as
deteriorating.
8. Some monarchs -- Husayn and the Shah come to mind --
have faced similarly parlous situations and survived. But they had
assets, such as a body of loyal subordinates, a disposition to
work at the business of governing and a willingness to make the
throne an agent of change. As far as we can judge, Hassan no
longer has the support of important groups in the country. More-
over, he is a dilettante, and is convinced of his own righteousness.
9. The question of when -- not if -- the next attempt on
Hassan's life will be made is unanswerable. A group may seize the
first available opportunity, even in the next few weeks, to try to
eliminate him. Or, plans could be laid to mature over a period of
months or even years. There is no assurance that any particular
SECRET
Approved For Release 2007/03/06 : CIA-RDP79R00967AO01500040009-3
 Approved For Release 2007/03/06 : CIA-RDP79R00967AO01500040009-3
SECRET
plot would be successful; too much depends on luck and individual
marksmanship. In short, further blows at the King are certain; there
is no way of knowing when or where they will come. And, since Hassan
has isolated himself from most significant sources of support in the
country, the odds are increased that one or another attempt against
him will succeed.
SECRET
Approved For Release 2007/03/06 : CIA-RDP79R00967AO01500040009-3
 25X1 Approved For Release 2007/03/06 : CIA-RDP79R00967AO01500040009-3
Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt
Approved For Release 2007/03/06 : CIA-RDP79R00967AO01500040009-3
 Approved For Release 2007103/06 : CIA-RDP79R00967AP01500040009-3
MEMORANDUM FOR: Ray S. Cline
Copies of the attached Memorandum have
been sent to Assistant Secretary David Newsom
and Country Director, North Africa, James Blake.
J UIZENGA
Director
National Estimates
25 August 1972
(DATE)
FORM
BEM US10-101
AUGN 54 101 WHICH RELACES
ED.
MEMORANDUM FOR: DCI
This is an early reading on the prospects for
King Hassan in the wake of the assassination attempt
against him. The excerpts from earlier issuances
which lead off the piece show that nobody should be
surprised by these events, and in fact we now estimate
that the odds on his survival are poor.
Jp7 GA
Director
National Estimates
25 August 1972
(DATE)
10*101
FORM ND, 101 WHICH C MAYF BE M USED.
I AUG 54
Approved For Release 2007/03/06 : CIA-RDP79R00967AO01500040009-3
 25X1 Approved For Release 2007/03/06 : CIA-RDP79R00967AO01500040009-3
Approved For Release 2007/03/06 : CIA-RDP79R00967AO01500040009-3