1967'S ESTIMATIVE RECORD: FIVE YEARS LATER

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R00967A001500040012-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 20
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 29, 2005
• Sequence Number: 12
• Publication Date: August 10, 1972
• Content Type: LIST

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SUBJECT: 1967's Estimative Record: Five Years Later
I
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I.
INTRODUCTION .....................................
3
II.
TOPICS OF GREATEST INTEREST ......................
5
A.
Vietnam.. .... ............................
6
B.
Soviet Military Forces ...... ..........
7
C.
The USSR and Its Confrontation with the US...
14
D.
The Arab-Israeli Crisis ......................
16
III. OTHER IMPORTANT TOPICS ........................... 18
A.
China ........................................
18
B.
Korea.. .................................
20
C.
Latin America. ................................
22
D.
Yugoslavia ...................................
23
E.
Africa... ...................................
24
F.
South Asia ...................................
25
IV. REFL
ECTIONS ON THE RECORD ........................ 26
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1. A retrospective assessment should avoid being either a
whitewash or an exercise in masochism. Of necessity, it must
concentrate on the more important issues and papers, since
encyclopedic coverage would only weary the reader. (In 1967
ONE turned out 67 NIEs and SNIEs and over 80 estimative memoranda.)
The attached discussion focusses primarily on the score or so
of estimates which seem to be the most important and on a few
of the memoranda which dealt with major issues of 1967.
2. Each of the estimates discussed herein contains a goodly
number of estimative sentences. Some are easy or obvious estimates,
for which we should take no credit. Some estimative judgments are
contained in conditional clauses, e.g., if relations remain cool,
then certain developments are likely to occur. There is an
implicit estimate in the "if" clause, and if we were off on this
one, the following judgments are of little value whether they
turn out to be true or not. Many of our estimative sentences,
and indeed whole estimates, are based on contingencies. If the
contingency never came about, or has not yet occurred, we have
no way of knowing whether we were right or wrong. One of our
estimates in 1967,SNIE 20-67, Foreign Reactions to Certain US
Courses of Action Regarding US Forces in Europe., discusses
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three specific cases of unilateral US withdrawal from Europe:
in actual fact, none were employed, hence the validity of the
estimate cannot be evaluated. NIE 75/76-67, The Horn of Africa,
contains an estimate of the likely repercussions of the death of
Haile Selassie. Since the Emperor is still alive, this part of
the estimate is in a kind of limbo.
3. Theoretically the best estimate is the one which is
wrong, i.e., the warning in the estimate comes through so per-
suasively that policy makers, upon reading the estimate, take
measures to prevent or minimize the danger. In this case the
dire events do not happen and the estimate, though "wrong",
turns out to be a triumph for the estimator. But, this is a
rare case, indeed.
4. Most estimates contain a number of fairly important
estimative judgments, and some lesser ones. If all of the
minor estimates in a paper are right, but a major one is
clearly wrong, then the paper as a whole probably rates a
bad mark. One of the major difficulties in reviewing old
estimates is that so many of the judgments were partly right
and partly wrong. Another problem is that many of the
estimative phases were couched in terms which are hard to
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judge in retrospect. If, for example, we estimated that the
political stability of an undeveloped country looked fairly
good, but that much depended upon continued rule of a strong
prime minister, how should we judge our assessment, if, in fact,
the ruler was overturned and the country fell into political
confusion? If an estimate forecast the deployment of a major
Soviet weapon system by a given date, but it actually was
deployed a year earlier or a year later, is the estimate wrong?
How wrong?
5. In assessing particular estimates in the following
sections, we have struggled with these and other problems in
a fashion which cannot help being subjective. As a general
rule we have excluded what appear to be the lesser judgments of
estimative papers as well as those judgments which are not
readily susceptible to evaluation. This still leaves a large
number of estimative statements, and on the basis of these,
we have compiled our review.
II. TOPICS OF GREATEST INTEREST
6. Vietnam, the USSR's military strength, and the USSR's
position in the world were clearly of great intelligence and
policy interest in 1967. A crisis of nearly equal import between
Israel and its Arab neighbors broke out in May and -- involving
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as it did both this country and the USSR -- occupied senior
policymaking levels of government.
A. Vietnam
7. 1967 was a year in which the main intelligence issues
of the Vietnamese conflict were addressed at length in a number
of NIEs. The issues were: communist capabilities for fighting
the war in South Vietnam; the significance of Cambodia to the
communist effort; and, communist responses to certain hypothetical
escalatory actions.
8. Capabilities were discussed mainly in SNIE 14.3-67, which
provided work for many hands in the Community through the year
and was finally published in November. It was the second big
"capabilities" estimate on the Vietnamese war and covered the
subject in great detail, with lengthy arguments during coordination
on most significant issues. The paper came down heavily on a
judgment that communist military strength in South Vietnam was
on the decline -- and indeed it was -- but a brief epilogue on
strategic options spoiled things by picturing Hanoi as resigned
to a "protracted war" of attrition against Allied forces; two
months later the Tet '68 offensive occurred.
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9. The Cambodian role in the war was covered in SNIE 57-67
(January) and SNIE 57/1-67 (December). The Sihanoukville supply
issue did not surface in all its vigor until 1968, but these
earlier estimates were also characterized by spirited coordination
sessions. Both papers emerged, however, with a clearly conservative
view of Cambodia's role -- present and potential -- as a funnel for
arms to VC/NVA forces in South Vietnam; indeed, there was little
evidence to support a contrary view. Nonetheless, in retrospect,
one might question the reasoning in the January NIB that "it seems
unlikely that they (the Vietnamese communists) would rely in any
major way on such an uncertain and indirect source (as the Sihanouk-
ville route)." This cast of mind regarding the Sihanoukville route
tended to persist through 1968.
10. The third category of papers on Vietnam falls into the
"what if" type. In retrospect NIEs of this year -- unlike many
of the previous year or two -- were relatively relaxed about
Soviet and Chinese reactions to US moves to escalate the conflict.
Thus, SNIE 11-11-67, while concluding that US escalation of the
war "might" seriously affect a number of bilateral dealings
between the USSR and the USA, also stated: "we think it unlikely"
that the Soviets would want to provoke a real crisis with the US.
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B. Soviet Military Forces
11. NIBs produced in 1967 on Soviet military forces were
very general and gave relatively few detailed judgments compared
to present-day estimates. NIE 11-14-67, Soviet General Purpose
Forces, for instance, was a document of 28 pages which provided
only a broad-brush treatment of Warsaw Pact general purpose forces.
In contrast, NIE 11-14-71, Warsaw Pact Forces for Operations in
Eurasia, was 215 pages long and discussed these forces and their
capabilities in great detail.
12. In order to evaluate these NIEs, it is useful to categorize
the judgments found in them. Broad general judgments about capa-
bilities and future courses of action have generally held up well;
such judgments, while important, are based on an appreciation of
a broad range of considerations, not easily subject to change
through the appearance of specific new data. Judgments about
specific capabilities existing in 1967 have also stood the test
of time; they usually had hard evidence to support them, but
sometimes did not. Predictions of specific future capabilities
and force levels are a more chancy business; estimates have
sometimes been right on the mark, but sometimes wide of it. NIEs
have often been low on numbers for important force projections,
but accorded the Soviets a more rapid growth in weapons technology
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than actually took place. (See paragraphs 17 E 19.) The para-
graphs that follow assess a representative group of specific
examples of these general statements -- in the areas of air
defense, the Soviet navy, the SA-5, ICEM deployment, and MIRVs --
without trying to cover all major judgments.
13. Judgment on an Existing Operational Capability: NIE 11-3-67
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14. Judgment on Mission and an Existing Capability. In 1967
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16. Judgments on General Future Developments. NIE 11-14-67
concluded "The Soviets are well on their way toward developing a
large modern Navy as an instrument for the projection of national
power-The Soviets are developing forces which, over the longer
term, will significantly improve their ability to support their
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political interests in other parts of the world, but we doubt that
they intend to develop a capability to engage in distant limited
warfare with a major power," Soviet ship construction, command
and control developments, training, and exercises have in the
past five years rapidly increased the size and flexibility of the
Soviet Navy. A greater number of ships have operated further from
home, demonstrating a powerful presence in many sea areas of the
world. But the Soviets have not in this time constructed the
afloat air or logistic forces to permit them to support distant
operations against opposition.
17. Judgments on Specific Future Developments. NIE 11-8-67,
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18. Many specific forecasts of introduction of new weapon
systems were close to the mark, as developments then underway
worked out in a normal fashion. But in some cases the Soviets
met unexpected problems, and predictions were a year or two off.
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19. In other cases we accorded Soviets much too great a
capability to introduce important new weapons. NIE 11-8-67 estimated
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20. Any evaluation of NIEs about the Soviet strategic
military forces must take into account the phenomenon of action
and reaction. While Soviet weapons developments have their own
technical and bureaucratic imperatives as do ours, it is also
true that policy decisions concerning deployment of these
weapons must consider changes in the US strategic military
posture as well. Likewise, while it is difficult to explain
why a specific US force-oriented decision took place, an
appreciation of projected changes in the USSR often enters in.
For instance, the estimate that the Soviets could deploy hard
target MIRVs by as early as 1972 was used to justify the US
decision to deploy As at ICEM complexes. And this decision,
in turn, was likely a consideration bringing the Soviets to
agree to limitations on ABMs. Such interplay cannot, of course,
by specifically documented, as these decisions on both sides
are arrived at out of a complex of considerations. But.there
certainly must have been instances when a judgment in an NIE
accurately reflected Soviet intentions at the time, but sub-
sequent US policy decisions -- influenced in part by estimates
of what the Soviets would do -- caused the Soviets to reappraise
the situation and to alter their course, thereby causing the
estimate to appear faulty.
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C. The USSR and Its Confrontation with the US
21. A central issue in 1967 as in other years, it tends to
be covered in a number of NIEs as the US and USSR compete in
different parts of the world. The Soviet response to possible
US escalation in Vietnam has been addressed in Section A. And
Soviet actions and policies in the Mediterranean and Middle East
will provide the transition at the end of this section to the
Arab-Israeli crisis.
22. NIE 11-7-67, Soviet Foreign Policy, (September 1967)
was the principal estimative paper on the USSR for the year.
It covered:(a) The Post-Khrushchev record; (b) Foreign Policy
and the Leadership; and (c) Current Issues of Policy. The
discussions under these headings emphasized Soviet setbacks,
problems, and caution, and it could be said that they did so
to a fault. Certainly the paper failed to anticipate the more
vigorous Soviet foreign policy evident during the past couple
of years. But the emphasis appears appropriate for 1967 and
the judgments were generally sound for 1968 and 1969. And the
NIE did anticipate the survival of the collective leadership,
expect continued problems for the Soviets in Eastern Europe,
suggest a forward Soviet detente policy in Western Europe,
emphasize Moscow's likely desire to keep channels to Washington
open, warn of continued trouble with China, and so on.
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23. The heavy Soviet presence in the Middle East and
eastern Mediterranean is nowadays a fact of international life,
accepted even by those powers most anxious to limit or contest
it. Its beginnings date back to 1955 and 1956, when, as NIE 11-4-56
put it, "A concurrence of developments ... combined to provide the
USSR an opportunity to inject its influence forcefully into the
Middle East." Subsequent NIEs took much the same estimative
path, warning of strong Soviet ambitions in the area, noting the
opportunities available to the USSR, and cautioning that there
are constraints on Soviet behavior.
24. The general judgments of NIE 11-6-67, Soviet Strategy
and Intentions in the Mediterranean Basin, have passed the test
of time. For example: "...Soviet policy is likely to find numerous
opportunities in the Mediterranean and its adjacent areas in the
years ahead", and "...local conflicts might occur in which the
Soviets would wish to support their clients at some fairly high
level of risk short of actual intervention". The estimate also
correctly judged that the USSR would not run high risks of an
East-West conflict for the sake of the Arab cause. SNIE 11-13-67
of 20 July assessed what the Russians were up to in rearming the
Arabs states. It correctly noted the likelihood of "a further
influx of Soviet advisors,...(and) and increased Soviet military
presence in Arab ports and military facilities."
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25. SNIE 11-9-68 of 18 January accurately totted up the
account, noting that USSR faced "both new problems and new
opportunities" that the Arabs were more dependent on it, that
resumption of hostilities would produce a dangerous and un-
predictable situation, and that Soviet and Egyptian policies
on many important issues would remain congruent. It also
advised that Arab ports and airbases could be used and might
even be run in part by Soviet advisory personnel. The estimate
also said, "The Soviets will probably continue efforts to make
the Mediterranean a less favorable environment for US naval
forces....". They have.
D. The Arab-Israeli Crisis
26. We published an estimate (NIE 30-67) on 13 April which
addressed the possibility that a basic change might be occurring
in the Arab-Israeli crisis. We noted that "Rivalries and disputes
among the Arabs... create some danger of precipitating crises from
which large-scale Arab-Israeli hostilities could develop," and
that "The Israelis... would resort to force on a large-scale only
if they felt their security endangered." Very true, but the
estimate hardly conveyed to the reader that such a crisis would
appear within two months. Moreover, the estimate concluded with
the pronouncement: "In any event, the threat of great power
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intervention has had a sobering effect upon proposals to resolve
the problem by military force, and the chances are good that it
will continue to do so". The crisis that led to the war, however,
proceeded from a series of miscalculations by the Soviets, Arabs
and Israelis, in effect a circumstance unforeseen by the estimate.
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III. OTHER IMPORTANT TOPICS
A. China
29. The review of events connected with the Cultural
Revolution looks very solid in retrospect. The judgment that
China's domestic situation would remain tense and inherently
unstable so long as Mao remained in control seems justified
by last year's purge of Lin Piao and company. Estimates on the
succession have yet to be tested. But the scenario in NIE 13-7-67
would not be greatly altered if written today; although the purge
of Lin Piao obviously changes the lineup.
The
main conclusion on internal prospects was that despite the
divisive impact of the Cultural Revolution and the remote chance
of a coup against Mao, the basic thrust was toward preservation
of national unity -- a judgment not particularly startling now,
but considered fairly bold at the time.
The phrase is not from an ONE document.
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