CHANGING INFLUENCES ON CUBAN FOREIGN POLICY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R00967A001600010002-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 21
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 7, 2006
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: January 9, 1973
• Content Type: MF

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES
9 January 1973
MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. David Mark, State (INR)
for Estimates, DIA
SUBJECT
Boards
and Estimates Division, NSA
Changing Influences on Cuban
Foreign Policy
The attached memorandum is an attempt to assess the various
influences on Castro's foreign policy options vis-a-vis the USSR,
Latin America, and the US. We are giving it limited distribution
as a working paper for the upcoming Cuban estimate. Draft terms
of reference on the estimate will be distributed shortly.
SPECIAL DISTRIBUTION
Colonel T. L. Morgan, USA (ACSI)
Captain Jerome Henderson, USN
Colonel F. J. Mackey, USAF (AF/INA)
National Estimates
Director
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES
CHANGING INFLUENCES ON CUBAN FOREIGN POLICY
Despite Castro's manifest interest in the current efforts
to complete an anti-hijacking agreement, there is no indication
that he is interested in working towards a broader normalization
of relations between Cuba and the US -- except on his own terms.
There are influences at work in Castro's relations with the USSR
and with Latin America, however, which appear likely to speed the
growth of Cuban intercourse with non-communist countries over the
next couple of years, and to affect, at least indirectly, the
character of Cuba's relations with the US.
This memorandum assesses Castro's policy failures in econ-
omic development and in export of violent .rPvoZution which have
served to increase his dependence on the USSR and to reduce his
credibility as a force for shaping the course of events in Latin
America. Moscow's apparent interest in encouraging Cuba toward
more extensive ties with the West and Latin America's growing
efforts to "pull" Cuba back into the hemisphere community are
then considered. The paper ends (paragraphs 25 through 28) with
a brief discussion of the implications for the US of the break-
down of Cuba's isolation.'
This paper has been discussed with other components within CIA,
but has not been formally coordinated.
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1. We see no evidence that Castro is in the process of alter-
ing his terms for a broad normalization of relations between
Washington and Havana, in spite of his public support for comple-
tion of an anti-hijacking agreement. In mid-December Castro stated
that an essential condition would be US abandonment of the policy of
sanctions against Cuba;* on earlier occasions he has cited two other
conditions: US evacuation of Guantanamo Naval Base and the ending
of "subversion" against Cuba. These requirements aside, Castro
apparently remains convinced that the US government is basically
hostile to him, and he is thus deeply suspicious of US intentions
toward his regime. His reaction to any overtures from Washington
would probably be governed at least as much by atmospherics -- by
whether or not the overtures seemed to indicate US willingness to
accept his government's legitimacy -- as by the practical advan-
tages Cuba might gain from a positive response.
2. Castro's uncompromising posture does not appear to rule
out possibilities for accommodation on minor issues. Particularly
if the US and Cuba reach some agreement on hijacking, Castro might
In 1964 the Organization of American States (OAS), upon Venezuela's
initiatives, passed a resolution recommending that OAS members
terminate all diplomatic and commercial relations with the Castro
government. Only Mexico did not comply with the resolution. US
restrictive Legislation dates from the early 1960s.
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begin to feel more confident about seeking other kinds of trade-
offs; e.g., Cuban easing of eligibility requirements for the de-
parture of refugees via the air lift in exchange for some further
easing of US restrictions on travel to Cuba. But this kind of
piecemeal bargaining will probably not have much effect on Castro's
willingness to negotiate with the US on the larger issues associated
with Cuba's revolutionary course over the past decade: Castro's
close ties with the USSR and his promotion of revolution elsewhere
in Latin America.
3. Yet in both these spheres Castro has been able to exert
less and less independent influence in recent years, and the ini-
tiative for change has come to lie more and more with Moscow and
the countries of Latin America. These developments reflect, in
good measure, Castro's failures both at home and abroad.
The Stagnant Revolution
4. By any historical standard, the political and social
changes Castro has brought about in Cuba have been truly revolu-
tionary. The once dominant upper and middle classes have been
destroyed or banished along with all traces of US economic and
political influence. The country's economic resources have been
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redistributed on a massive scale; and greatly expanded health,
educational, and housing programs have measurably improved the
status and condition of the poor. Among the latter in particular,
despite the regime's totalitarian mold, a sense of revolution per-
sists -- a still evolving mix of nationalism, resentment of past
US domination, and pride in the social improvements achieved. And
despite many admitted failures in his 14 years of single-handed rule,
Castro continues to dominate. Part communist, part nationalist,
part eaudiZZo3 he remains the Zider maximo and the controlling force
behind it all.
5. But the Cuban revolution now appears stagnant and side-
tracked, largely because of miscalculation and mismanagement in the
economic sector. The early rush toward rapid industrialization and
agricultural diversification was ill-conceived and found the govern-
ment's managerial and technical resources inadequate to the task.
By 1964 the economy had slowed to a halt. The swing of the pendu-
lum back to a sugar monoculture, culminating in near total mobili-
zation of the country's labor force to try for a 10-million ton
sugar harvest in 1969-1970, proved similarly ill-fated. The harvest
fell short by more than a million tons. Partly because of the
excesses .of :the .19.70 .effort but also because of severe drought,
production fell sharply to less than 6 million tons in 1971 and to
only about 4 million tons in 1972.
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6. The..net result of Castro's policies has been stagnation.
of production since 1961. Because of the poor sugar harvests, per
capita GNP during both 1971 and 1972 was well below-the level of
1961 and of the late 1950s. The economy continues to be plagued
by disorganization, mismanagement, low productivity, and worker
absenteeism, Although there appears to have been recent improve-
ment in the availability of certain consumer goods (used mostly as
incentives to spur production), severe shortages persist and strin-
gent rationing has become a way of life.
7. Castro's economic failure at home is matched by his failure
to establish himself as the leader of revolution abroad. Cuban
attempts to overthrow governments in Latin America through guer-
rilla operations have been at best ill-conceived and at worst
quixotic. In countries where at one time or another the Cuban hand
has been evident -- notably in Bolivia, Colombia, Guatemala, and
Venezuela -- Castro's agents and allies almost invariably under-
estimated the ability of the local security forces to retaliate and
displayed an abysmal lack of understanding of the local political
terrain. Rather than creating a new revolutionary dynamic, the
Cubans usually ended by merely exacerbating existing divisions
among local communist and other revolutionary groups. Though some
guerrilla groups still are capable of causing sporadic disorders,
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in no case do they possess sufficient strength to posera serious threat
to the established order. The Cuban thesis of violent revolution has
thus become discredited or irrelevant, or both, among Latin Americans
who once thought it might represent the wave of the future.
8. The consequence of Castro's dual failure to make his revo-
lution succeed at home or to export it abroad has been to increase his
dependence on Soviet support and to reduce his credibility as a shaper
of events in the hemisphere. At this point at least three inter-
related sets of foreign actors are of growing importance in shaping
the character and range of his options. There are, first, the pres-
sures on Castro arising from his Soviet ties. Moscow is anxious to
safeguard its considerable political, economic, and ideological stake
in Cuba, but seeks to balance this against its stake in "normalizing"
relations with the US and in expanding its influence in Latin America
generally. Then there are the shifting views of Latin American
countries on the issue of Cuba's isolation in the hemisphere in the
context of changing US-Latin American relations. Finally, there is
the ability of the US to continue or relax pressures on Castro
directly or via other governments and international agencies. While
Castro may see some room for maneuver in Latin America, his policy
stance vis-a-vis the Soviet and US Goliaths is defensive and reactive.
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The View from Havana
9. Castro is undoubtedly uncomfortable with his increased
dependence on the USSR as the source of the essential resources,
particularly oil, needed to keep the Cuban economy afloat.* He
must also have qualms about the well-entrenched Soviet presence on
the island, especially the close Soviet scrutiny of his economic
planning. He probably views Moscow's use of Cuba to support Soviet
naval vessels and aircraft with mixed feelings: a sign of Cuba's
importance to the USSR and perhaps a deterrent to the US, but at
the same time aninfringement on Cuba's sovereignty, especially
in the eyes of other Latin Americans. Yet economic necessity and
his own ideological commitments appear to have left him with no
currently acceptable alternative to dependence on the USSR. He
probably sees the US as ideologically too hostile and geographically
too close for Cuba to find safety in a position of nonalignment.
During 1969-1.971,.. Sbvidt economic: credits, to,-,Cuba zaveraded nearly
$400 million annua/ly. During 1972, Soviet credits exceeded
$500 million, equal in value to more than one-third of total
imports. Through 1971, Cuba received about $3 billion in de-
velopment and balance-of-payments assistance from the USSR.
Cuba also benefits from guaranteed Soviet purchases of sugar
at prices usually above the world market level. The actual
volume of Soviet purchases each year appears to be adjusted to
balance the USSR's needs for domestic consumption against Cuba's
opportunities to increase its sugar sales in Western markets and
thus reduce its need for Soviet assistance.
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10. Castro deeply resents Washington's continued attempts to
enforce the hemispheric policy of economic and diplomatic sanctions.
The resentment springs more from a feeling of national humiliation
than from real economic deprivation. The effectiveness of the
sanctions has been steadily weakened over the years by the substi-
tution of machinery of communist origin for US machinery in the
vital agricultural sector, and by gradually expanding commercial
ties between Cuba and Western Europe, Canada, and Japan. Ending
sanctions would enable Castro to obtain certain industrial spare
parts at a lower cost. It would probably also increase Cuba's access
to Western sources of trade and credits, but only marginally because
of Cuba's limited ability to expand exports. It would not relieve
the country's basic economic malaise, though it would provide a
small measure of relief from Cuba's heavy dependence on the USSR.
The gains for Cuba, therefore, would be primarily political and
psychological: With the ending of sanctions, Castro could claim
an important victory over "US imperialism".
11. If the US were to signal a willingness to remove sanctions
and undertake other steps to normalize relations, Castro would want
to be sure that the quid pro quo expected of him did not compromise
his anti-imperialist revolutionary credentials. He would not be
interested in a trade-off which involved compensation for nationalized
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US businesses on the island. Even if the US should offer to rein-
state the Cuban sugar quota or to extend other substantial forms
of aid, he would want to make clear that acceptance did not imply
abandonment of his political and economic ties to the USSR or re-
strict him in reacting to opportunities to further his objectives
in Latin America and the Third World.
12. Castro may see some problems arising over the longer term
from his narrow margin for maneuver vis-a-vis the US and the USSR.
During his visit to Moscow in June 1972, in exchange for continued
Soviet aid at the high level of recent years, he gave formal (though
qualified) support to the Soviet approach to detente with the West.
Having thus committed himself, he may now be wondering whether
Moscow and Washington in future moves toward East-West normalization
might consider arrangements involving Cuba.
13. Castro would bitterly resent any-appearance that Moscow
and Washington were making a deal over his head. Moscow, aware of
this, would probably feel obliged to consult him before completing
any agreement affecting Cuba. In these circumstances, Castro would
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insist on a US concession of visible benefit to Cuba, e.g., US
evacuation of Guantanamo.*
The Moscow Connection
14. Moscow probably feels that its Cuban investment, though
costly and at times troublesome, is at least secure. With Castro
fairly well locked into the Soviet sphere -- the most recent link
was formalized at mid-year when Cuba joined the Soviet-bloc Couihcil
for Economic Mutual Assistance (CEMA) -- and with their own presence
on the island well-established, the Soviets would probably like to
see formal Western recognition of the status quo. Confident of
Castro's basic anti-US orientation and of his continuing economic
dependence on the USSR, the Soviets probably now feel that an ex-
pansion of relations with the West would not jeopardize Cuba's mani-
fold links to Moscow or the well-established socialist structure of
Castro's regime. Although increased ties with non-communist countm-es
would not much reduce Cuba's economic dependence on the USSR, the
Soviets would hope that over the longer term a greater influx of
Moscow may in fact be trying unofficially to determine whether
there would be interest in a deal along these lines. The Soviet
Ambassador in Havana recently suggested to a US newsman that the
USSR might be willing to reduce its presence in Cuba in exchange
for the eventual abandonment of Guantanamo by the US.
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Western credits, aid, and technology would hold down the cost to
them of underwriting the Cuban economy.
15. The Soviets continue to assess their stake in Cuba in the
context of their larger, long-range strategy in Latin America as a
whole. They view growing nationalist trends and declining US in-
fluence as opening opportunities to enhance their own image and in-
fluence in the region. They apparently feel that a widening of
Cuba's range of contacts at this time will not endanger and at times
will facilitate the advancement of their own objectives in Latin
America.
16. Finally, Moscow may well believe that it has more to gain
than lose by encouraging Castro and the US to temper their adversary
relationship. It may hope thereby to reduce the chance that Cuba
might again become a major issue between the US and the USSR. They
may also view such a development as a means to advance their goal of
maintaining a naval presence in the Caribbean area without upsetting
their improving relations with the US.
17. Moving to reduce Cuba's isolation would carry some risks
for Moscow. The Soviets might fear that increased Western influence
would make it more difficult for them to guide Castro's economic
policies. The process of opening up Cuba to the-West would have to
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be fairly well controlled to prevent either a serious weakening of
ties with Moscow or a restoration of major US influence. In the
context of their larger hemispheric objectives, the Soviets would
be concerned that once Cuba was accepted into the Latin American
community Castro might again, as he has in the past, challenge
Soviet orthodoxy in order to advance his own parochial interests.
They might also fear a rash act by Castro which could provoke new
tensions between the US and Cuba and adversely affect their own
game plan with Washington.
18. Despite these uncertainties, however, Moscow is probably
more confident in regard to Cuba than it was a year or two ago. It
is likely to calculate that Castro's range of options has now been
sufficiently narrowed and that its own capability to guide develop-
ments in Havana is well enough established to minimize the risk
that Castro will move in directions that would jeopardize basic
Soviet interests.
The Latin American "PuZZ"
19. Over the past year or so, Latin American leaders have
begun to question seriously the wisdom of continuing Cuba's iso-
lation in the hemisphere. They attribute the economic failures
of the Castro regime, quite rightly, more to Castro's bungling and
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mismanagement than to the success of sanctions. Most Latin American
leaders see diminishing reasons for maintaining the policy in Latin
America in the face of growing Cuban trade with Western European
countries, Canada, and Japan. Some have expressed concern that
Washington might make a sudden turnaround on Cuban:policy.without
advance consultation, thereby leaving them in an embarrassing posi-
tion vis-a-vis local ardent nationalists. Moreover, though Brazil
and some other governments continue to maintain generally hostile
attitudes toward the Cuban government, most no longer feel en-
dangered by Castro's futile attempts to foment violent revolution
in the region.
20. The more benign attitude in part reflects the passing of
the Cold War belief that the countries of the hemisphere must stand
together against communism. The feeling that the superpowers can
now be counted on to move toward peaceful solutions of outstanding
problems has had the result of turning many Latin Americans away
from world problems which do not directly affect their interests.
If they are unpersuaded by US warnings of a continuing Cuban threat,
they are also not greatly disturbed by the Soviet presence in Cuba.
21. The erosion of Latin American support for the policy of
isolating Cuba has also been influenced by the growth of nationalism
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in the hemisphere. Nationalist revolutionary aspirations and the
determination to assert foreign policies manifestly independent of
US influence moved Chile (in late 1970) and Peru (in mid-1972) to
reopen diplomatic relations with Cuba. Most recently, nationalist
pretensions and a new emphasis on regional ties have led four
Caribbean Commonwealth countries -- Guyana, Trinidad and Tobago,
Jamaica, and Barbados -- to establish relations. Other countries
-- including Panama, Ecuador and Venezuela -- have shown interest
in moving in the same direction.
2.2,. Castro's growing acceptability in the hemisphere seems to
be prompted, in good part, by the feeling that, whatever else he
may be, he shares with other Latin American leaders most of the
problems and frustrations of the developing countries in the hemi-
sphere and in the Third World generally. This growing sense of a
common identification (in contrast to declining Cold War or Pan-
American loyalties) can be partly attributed to mounting Latin Ameri-
can impatience over the failure to achieve substantial progress in
economic development (with one or two notable exceptions) and to a
feeling that the US and the other rich industrial nations have
written them off economically. Increasingly, Latin American leaders
feel that if they are to move ahead they will have to rely on their
own solutions. These attitudes are reinforced by, and in turn
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provide impetus to, anti-US nationalist trends. To the extent
Castro is identified with these attitudes, his anti-US posture has
become more widely accepted and respectable. Indeed, many Latin
American leaders feel a certain sympathy with Castro's claim to be
a martyr to US economic interests.
23. Castro has already adjusted his tactics to take advan-
tage of the changing regional climate. He has retained a capa-
bility for supporting guerrilla activities. But he has become
generally more cautious and selective about extending that support.
In practice, except for training of would-be revolutionaries within
Cuba, Castro's aid is now restricted for the most part to those
insurgent groups which have shown an ability to survive on their
own and to engage in attacks against conservative regimes, e.g.,
in Guatemala. Meanwhile, as his ideology has broadened to include
support for established "revolutionary governments" like those in
Chile and Peru, Castro's approach to the region has become more
realistic.
24. On the non-governmental level, Castro's emphasis has
shifted from support of guerrillas to traditional methods of po-
litical intelligence and covert action. In this area, Castro is
working more closely with orthodox communist parties, while
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continuing his efforts to influence other political groups and
labor and student organizations toward revolutionary activities.
Diplomatic missions like that in Chile are useful to him in this
regard. But Latin American governments are aware of Castro's chang-
ing tactics, and these efforts are not likely to pose a serious
threat. By and large, Castro-supported groups will continue to be
countered by established governments or absorbed by indigenous
nationalist and revolutionary movements. Castro is likely to see
a need to be judicious in his support of subversive as well as guer-
rilla activities in order to maintain his new acceptability in the
region and to facilitate a further growth of normal relations with
established governments.
25. In the light of all of the above considerations, a
growing number of Latin American countries can be expected over
the next couple of years to defect from the US-backed policy of
isolation. This will pose certain problems for the US. To the
extent the US actively resists the "pull" of Cuba back into the
Latin American community, Castro will be viewed as a victim:of
US intransigence and vindictiveness, and there will be a risk
that each new defection from the sanctions policy will be looked
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upon as a defeat for the US. Alternatively, if the US takes
the lead in abandoning the policy, there will be the risk of
friction with Brazil and other anti-Castro governments in the
region. Most Latin American governments would probably prefer
a third alternative somewhere between these two extremes; i.e.,
they would want the US to consult with them about its attitude
on sanctions and then stand aside as each country determines on
its own whether and when to reestablish relations with Cuba.
26. As the reentry process reaches completion, Castro's
"martyr" image will tend to dissipate. He will continue to attack
and criticize the US and he might influence some of the smaller
nations in the region toward anti-US positions on some issues.
But it is unlikely that he will be accepted as a hemisphere
leader by most Latin American governments. Cuba's small size,
Castro's domestic economic failures, and his manifest. dependence
on the USSR will limit his ability to influence regional councils
which also represent the interests of larger countries like
Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Mexico, and Venezuela. Moreover,
since Cuba and most Latin American countries have little to offer
each other economically, Castro will benefit little from new trad-
ing opportunities in the region.
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27. The larger external forces we have described as the
major determinants of Castro's options will probably continue
to shape Cuba's role in the region and on the world scene. To
the extent Castro identifies with Latin American and Third World
interests, he will reinforce general nationalist trends which
will continue to present difficulties for the U.S. But as Castro
deals more regularly with and begins to accommodate to a variety
of nationalist governments, he can be expected to become more
pragmatic in his foreign policy moves. Since Cuba will continue
to be dependent for some time on substantial external assistance,
he may come to see advantages in dealing in a business like way
with the US, as with other Western industrialized nations, on the
basis of development needs, not merely ideological confrontation.
One effect of this would be to reduce somewhat the extent of his
dependence on the USSR.
28. Insofar as the Soviets continue to pursue a policy of
"normalizing" relations with the US, they are likely to place
their own limits on Castro's anti-US impulses and on their use
of Cuba to embarrass the US. Indeed, Moscow may seek to promote
the "normalizing" of US-Cuban relations by pressures on Castro or
by agreements with the US which work to reduce tensions between
Havana and Washington. Though Castro and the Soviets will continue
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to share the objective of reducing US influence in Latin America,
the Soviets will want to be sure that Castro's activities in the
region do not spoil their own growing respectability there. And
the very factors which have produced the nationalist and indepen-
dent approach of Latin American governments which is working to
draw Cuba back into the community and to reduce US influence in
the region will also work to circumscribe the influence of both
Moscow and Havana.
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