A STUDY OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATES ON THE USSR 1950-1957

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R00971A000300050001-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 138
• Document Creation Date: November 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 27, 2000
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: January 1, 1957
• Content Type: STUDY

Approved For Release 200QJ06/07 : CIA-RDP79R00971A00030005V-8
Ts#141757
A STUDY O'
NATIONAL INTELLI NCE ESTIMATES
ON THE USSR
1950-1957
ITC: TS S C .,
t :: -- 19 9 7i
);I, I _: J_4-11 REV LWER: ku-$- i
Approved For Release 2000/06/07 : CIA-RDP79R00971A000300050001-8
 Approved For Release 2000/06/07: CIA-RDP79R00971A000300050001-8
Available
Approved For Release 2000/06/07 : CIA-RDP79R00971A000300050001-8
 Approved For Release 00106107 CIA-RDP79ROO971A000300001-8
rT S ':!;P T
I. I?TRODJCTION . . . . . . ? ? ? h
II. Gi J.L tAI SUiIVEY , . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . .. . . 6
The Soviet Estimates in General ? ? . . . . . . . . . ? 6
The "Annual" Soviet Estimate. . . . . . . . . . . 7
The Papers on "Capaihlities to. 'attack the US" . . . . . . 16
Other Papers . . . . . ? . .. ? . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
General Validity of the E stiiui tes . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
Some Further General Observtti.ons on the Soviet Esti- tes 25
III. T:1E INTERNAL POLITIC ,,L SITU ..T:r(;1~1 i TDIE USSR &ND T}I ; BLOC ? 31
The USSR . ? ? ? . r r r ? . ? ? ? 31
The Eastern European S tellitos . . . . . . ? . . ? . . . 11.0
IV. ECONOTTC . ? . ? . ? ? . . . . . ? . . . ? . . . ? . ? . ? 148
Introduction. r ? ? ? r 48
General Nature of the Soviet Economy. . . . ? . . . . . ? 50
Rate of Growth of the Soviet Economy. ? . . ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 51
Size of the Soviet Economy. ? . 53
_Cr._cuulture . ? . ? ? 53
SovIet Trade with the Free ~iorid. ? 55
V. MILITARY ? ? ? ? . . . . . . . . . . . . . ? . 58
Introduction .8
Soviet 1,1ilit ;ry ] cpenditures. . .. . . . . . . . . 0
2ersonnel Strength of Soviet niied Forces . . . , . . . . 62
Nuclear 1,4eapons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 611
Guided Missiles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
Jet Medium Bombers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
Heavy Bombers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
Submarines . . . . 85
Other Soviet Military Strengths ? ? r . ? . . . . . . ? 88
Soviet Military Capabilities. . ? . . . ? . . . . . . . 3
Some Judgments from NIE-3 ? . . ? . ? . . . . . ? . . ? 97
Approved For Release 2000/06/07-.*ffA.R15 R00971A000300050001-8
 Approved For ReleaseO/06/07: CIA-RDP79ROO971AOOO3O0OOO1-8
?- SECRET
Patio
VI,
SOVIET COURSES OF ACTION . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . .
100
Soviet Objectives . . , . .
? . . , . , ? . . . . ? .< .
.
100
Soviet Policies in General; T
he Likelihood of War . . . .
.
110
Germany . . . . . . , .
. . . 0064 00 . . . . . .
a
125
The Middle Fast . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
.
129
VII.
EPILOGUE . .
, , k .
131
,T4)? SECRET
Approved For Release 2000/06/07 : CIA-RDP79ROO971AO00300050001-8
 Approved For Release, 00/06/07: CIA-RDP79R00971A00030QVO001-8
.P6'' SECRET
NOTE
It is devoutly hoped that all statistics and
verbatim quotations in this study are correctly
transcribed from the National Intelligence Estimates
whence they were taken. They have not been re-
checked, however,, and it is strongly recommended
that none of them be used from this paper for any
important briefing, memorandum, etc., without
referring back to the original document.
SECRET
Approved For Release 2000/06/07 : CIA-RDP79R00971A000300050001-8
 Approved For Release 2,0/06/07 : CIA-RDP79R00971A000300Q5 001-8
--Trap SiCRbT
INTRODUCTION
This piece was intended to be a "validity study" of all National
Intelligence Estimates concerning the USSR which were prciuced by the
machinery as presently constituted, from its beginning late in 1950
through 1957. In theory the making of a validity study should be a
simple matter get out the old papers, read them, and note whether
the estimates turned out to be true or false. In practice it is not
that sample. Indeed it is so much more complicated and difficult that
it has proved in many respects to be impossible, and this study has
turned out quite differently from what its author had hoped it would.
Here are the main problems that arise:
lo Most of our estimates still cannot be labelled as either
valid or invalid, because we still do not know the "facts" about
the USSR even as they were five or ten years ago. Hence one is
reduced to comparing an estimate made at one time with another
made subsequently; this does not give a conclusion as to valid,
but only one as to consistency. To be sure it may be justifiable
to presume that an estimate which does not have to be changed over
several years is a valid estimate -- but this is only a presumption,
and it mny sometimes be very wrong.
Approved For Release 2000/06/$ERDp79R00971A000300050001-8
 Approved For Release100/06/07 : CIA-RDP79R00971A00030 0001-8
_0V S R T
2. When we try to compare one estimate with subsequent
ones, we find that they are frequently not comp'rable. In the
presentation of economic statisti6q. for example, different base
years are often used In successive papers, or different modes of
measurement, or figures which cover different periods of time.
In political estimates the attendant contingencies may be differently
postulated, and so on. It is worth mentioning that the military
estimates are by far the most ca.sily comparable, perhaps because
they have been standardized by the longest practice and tradition.
This is the main reason why the military section of this discourse
is the longest, and the nearest to being satisfactory as a "validity"
study.
3. There Are hundreds -- probably thousands -- of "estimates"
in the corous of Soviet "?IE's. Some are in si--ale sentences, some
in fugitive words or phrases, some weightily and solemnly set forth.
It would be weary and unprofitcble to attempt to examine the validity
of them all. Which are important -- which ought to be selected for
testing? Presumably there is someone who had some interest in every
judgment we made, but I have h'-d.perforce to pick and choose, doubt-
less omitting many matters that are esteemed by some as of first
importance.
Approved For Release 2000/06/07~R00971A000300050001-8
r~
 Approved For Release 20/06/07: CIA-RDP79R00971A000300001-8
"Tc SECRET
ti.. ,That about the little hint, or the passing mention, of a
point that turned out later to be of first-rate significance?
Shall we hail this as a triumph of the estimative -process, or
shall we condemn it because it carried no impact corresponding to
its subsequently revealed importance? I have inclined to the latter
view.
5. What about the general atmosphere, or "feel" of a
paragraph or paper? There can be a generally correct impression
conveyed despite a considerable amount of incorrect detail, and
vice versap Or one can make a "valid" estimate which is yet so
limited in time-span, or so hedged with conditions, as to be
invalid in a broader sense.
6. Finally what about the estimate which failed to be borne
out by events because of some development not to be foreseen --
perhaps some US action changing the situation? Should we label
the estimate invalid?
The effect of such problems is to render an "objective" validity
study virtually impossible, except ~.,n a ccmpryratively small number of
points. Accordingly, I have abandoned any attempt to produce something
_ P SECRET
Approved For Release 2000/06707 : CIA-RDP79R00971A000300050001-8
 Approved For Release 200/06/07: CIA-RDP79ROO971A000300 ?001-8
which could be of official use; this paper had best be kept strictly
within the confines of ONE. I have felt quite free to use the first
person singular, indicating that I am expressing my on judgment and
making my personal critique. This being the case, it cannot be expected
that everyone will agree with what is said.. I have tried to avoid the
reckless expression of personal prejudices, but I do not pretend that
the opinions expressed here are the only defensible ones on the subject.
In short, everyone must make his own validity study.
There are two rules I have generally observed, or tried to observe.
First, I have seldom gone behind the published papers. To be sure, I
have sometimes tried to justify the estirates, or to explain why they
were what they were, or to show why some failures were understandable or
inevitable. But there is no attempt to compare what the NIE said with
what the contributions said, or with what other authoritative pronounce-
ments may have contained at approximately the same time. Neither have I
distinguished one agency's opinion from another's, save when such distinction
appears by a published dissent. Since I participated in making many of
those estimates I can often recall that the Board's opinion differed
somewhat from that contained in the NIE, but I have ignored that fact.
When I say "we estimated" something I mean that this was what appeared in
the finished document.
- 4-
Approved For Release 2000/06/07 : CIA-RDP79R00971A000300050001-8
TOP SECRET
 Approved For Release aVOO/06/07 : CIA-RDP79R00971A000300Q#0001-8
Secondly, I have tried to read the papers as if I were a consumer
rather than a producer, and to road them, moreover, with only decent
and reasonable care. We all know that there are various devices of
language by which we cover ourselves. We put in escape clauses,
ingenious disclaimers, qualifying adverbs, and areas of fine print
which will sometimes, in a pinch, lot us out of an embarrassing
estimative commitment. I have tried to pay about as much attention
to these as I imagine a reasonably intelligent reader would, and I
doubt if a reasonably intelligent rorvier would weigh the exact significance
of each syllable. When I think that the langua.re conveys a certain
impression I h-ve examined the validity of that impression, and ignored
subtleties which I think most readers would have ignored. This is one
reason why I expo-ct disagreement with some of the judgments expressed
heroin.
In spite of its inordinate length this dissertation is by no means
a complete validity study. Some of the reasons for this have already been
mentioned there are too many estimates to test, and too few means
of testing them properly. Another reason, however, is that I have allowed
myself to be discursive, and to write at undue length about various matters
that interested me. For this I apologize, but I do not propose to spend
the time necessary to prune and polish as should be done. The spring has
come, and I have had enough of this job.
25X1A
Approved For Release 2000/06/07: CIA-RDP79R00 001-8
1 May 1958 WN"
 Approved For Release 2Qp0/06/07: CIA-RDP79R00971A000300Q001-8
TOP SECRET
GEME2AL SURVEY
The Soviet Estimates in General
Between 15 November 1950 and 31 December 1957 the lAC machinery
ground out about 85 national estimates relating primarily to the USSR
and its European Satellites, The count is bound to be inexact; I
have excluded estimates dealing mainly with Communist China and the
Far East, and those concerned with single Satellites. If one were to
include these, and also the "WWorld Situation" papers and various others
having much to say about the Bloc, the total might run well over a
hundred. But 85 is the lowest reasonable figure, and it is with
approximately that number of Papers that the present study deals.
Of the o ;. r'hty-fisre, ten. were what we now generally call "annua 1+r
Soviet estimates. The term is obviously a misnomer it does not
properly apply to any of the papers before th?t of 1951 (3TIE 11-4-54) but it will serve to designate those which treated of the Soviet Union
(or the Bloc) in a, general and inclusive way. Twelve were Papers on
Soviet capabilities to attack the US -- to this number may be added
three on the probable warning we should receive of such attack. Six
wore about the European Satellites -- the Satellites in general, not
- 6..
Approved For Release 2000/06/071(JEPR00971A000300050001-8
 Approved For Release.4WOOIO6/07 : CIA-RDP79ROO971A00030Q 0001-8
individual countries. Eight were about Soviet policy respecting Germany
(or Berlin) -- this does not include a few papers restricted to the
internal affairs of East Germany. There were four papers devoted to
the Soviet nuclear energy program, plus four sanitized versions of the
same, and four devoted to Soviet guided. missiles (the latest of those
was on the ICBM only). Two deilt with Soviet Air Defense, and three
with the likelihood thit the Soviets would initiate gener?1 war. One
was on capabilities and trends in Soviet.Scionce and Technology. All the
rest we will call "miscellaneous," and anyone who wants to contemplate
the richness and variety of t his group had best begin by viewing the
complete list as published in the annual "Index of National Intelligence
Estimates.''
The "Annual" Soviet Estimate
Scarcely had ONE started in business when there was issued NIE-3:
"Soviet Capabilities and Intentions" (15 November 1950). This was a
stop-gap; it did not receive the full ONE treatment. It is described
on the title pare as "an editorial adaptation of with certain
modifications ?+nd additions to bring it up to date." The Problem was
stated as follows: "To estimate Soviet cannbilitios and intentions
7_
Approved For Release 2000/06/07TP81A'-*T19R00971A000300050001-8
 Approved For Release?ZPOO/06/07 : CIA-RDP79R00971A00030Q, 0001-8
TOP SECRET
with particular reference to the date at which the USSR might be prepared
to engage in a general war." This formulation gave the paper a powerful
slant towards the obsessive question cf general war -- a slant which was
understandable not only because this was in origin a military estimate
made by the military, but also because the recent intervention of the
Chinese Communists in Korea had increased international tension to the
highest point since World War II and awakened a lively fear of expanded
hostilities.
NIE-3 runs to twenty-three printed pages. Mach of it reads
curiously now, yet if the problem set for the estimators be kept in
mind the paper apnehrs to have been a workmanlike job. The strengths
and capa'>.litios of the So,riets were concisely set forth. The whole
world was surveyed, area by area, and the nres and cons of Soviet
military action in each area wore discussed. The conclusions were
pretty alarming, but it was an alarming, time. What is more important
for the present study is that NI.+-3, or more correctly the traditions
and conventions of military intelli e ncc as exemplified in NIE-3, influenced
the form and content of subsequent papers to a marked degree. This influence
accounts for the talk of "capabilities", of "factors influencing capabilities"
and so on. Our'Uoctrine", insofar as we had one, was a doctrine of military
intelligence. Indeed there was no other doctrine for us to cling; to, and
there still is no other.
Approved For Release 2000/06/07 : CIA-RDP79R00971A000300050001-8
TOP S ECR ET
 Approved For Release U00/06/07 : CIA-RDP79R00971A000300Q4@001-8
ONE soon set about the production and coordination of its own
general view of the Soviet Union, and forthwith fell into difficulties.
Several interim papers were produced; e.g. NIE-11: "Soviet Intentions
in the Current Situation" (5 December 1950), and NIF,-15: "Probable
Soviet Moves to Exploit the Present Situation" (il Deccmher 1950). Not
until 1 August 1951 did the first "annual" Soviet estimate appear from
ONE; this was NIE-25: "Probable Soviet Courses of Action to Mid-1952."
Once again the problem was "To estimato probable Soviet courses of
action to mid-1952 with particular reference to the probability of direct
hostilities between the US and the USSR."
Every old inhabitant of ONE remembers NIE-25. For weeks and months
the Board wrestled with its problem. Successive staff members prepared
drafts., argued them for a while, then were ejected from the Boardf s
presence, draft and all, and another victim chosen. One Board member
put his own august pen to work, and succeeded no better. The sounds
of contention emanated from the meeting r.oom even to the "ar-removed
office of the present author, who at that time was unconcerned with
Sovi.c.t matters. When the paper finally appeared tho ""aerio i. of the
estimate" hPd less than eleven months to run.
-9-
TOP SECRET
Approved For Release 2000/06/07 : CIA-RDP79R00971A000300050001-8
 Approved For Release 2060/06/07: CIA-RDP79R00971A000300RW01-8
NIL-25 is not one of the better papers, though it has the virtue of
brevity -- there are only five printed pa?tes. The argument is often
tortuous in the extreme. Every separate thread of discourse appears to
load to the conclusion that deliberate initiation of.general war by
the USSR is unlikely, yet the paper Winds up as follows:
We recognize the desirability and the importance of
concluding this estimate with a simple: and direct
statement of the likelihood or unlikelihood that the
Kremlin will deliberately precipitate or provoke general
war during the perioi here covered. Existing intelligence
does not enable us to make such a precise forecast.
P y should such a forecast be called "precise". I wonder.]
he USSR, has the c ability to ]n.unch general wnr and may
decide to nrecipit,ato -enoral war. Moreover, the inter-
national situation is so tense that at any time some issue
m.-ht develon to a -aoi.nt beyond control.
It is easier to express disdain for this para~ranh now than it would
have been to write and coordinate a 4otter one in the midst of the
Korean war. Nevertheless, the Director of Naval Intelligence was
bold enough to enter a dissent, sayinzf.; that he believed it "unliksly
that the USSR will deliberately choose to precipitate or undergo the
hazards of general war during the period covered by this estimate."
The next "annual" paper was published in two parts, an Appendix,
and a third part as a kind of afterthcu;,_~ht. It is said that General
TOP -SECRET
Approved For Release 2000/06/07 : CIA-RDP79R00971A000300050001-8
 Approved For ReleaseW0/06/07: CIA-RDP79R00971A000306WO001-8
Bedell Smith wrathDilly demanded that "capabilities" and "intentions"
be separated. Anyway, the 'roduct pored as follows:
NIE-6L (P,"rt I) : Soviet Bloc Cep .bilities, Through Mid-1963
(12 November 1952),
NIE-64 (Part II): Probable Soviet Bloc Courses of Action,,
Through Mid-1953 (il December 1952).
NIE-614. (Part 1)/i: Soviet Bloc Capabilities Through Mid-l954
(l December 1952). ""A Su,>plememt to and Revision
of NIE-6L (Part 1), .."
Appendices to NIE-64 (Part i): Soviet Bloc Capabilities?
Through Mid-1953 (21i December 1952).
It is worth remarkin ; that the A,)pendices were concurred in by the IACs
not merely noted. The reason for the appearance of NIE-64 (Part I)/l
is obvious when one realizes that the "y)oriod" of the other estimates
had scarely six months to run w hen they were published.
Parts I, II, and the Ap nendieos of A'IE-6 , together filled 45 printed
pros. (A record high of 80 was set by TIE 11-}-56). The statements
of the Problem omitted mention of war -- they wore: "To estimate Soviet
Bloc capabiliti s for political and military warf,-ro, through mid-1953";
and "To determine :aro'_able Bloc courses of action, through mid-1953.11
NIE-6I4 is in fact the first reasonably complete estimate we iiade of the
TOP S;CRIT
Approved For Release 2000/06/07 : CIA-RDP79R00971A000300050001-8
 Approved For Release, ,600/06/07 : CIA-RDP79R00971A00030QQ60001-8
Soviet Bloc -- political, economic, and military factors are all included.
It deserves to be called the first "annual" estimate.
Next came NIE-65: "Soviet Bloc 04pabilitios Through 195711 (16 June
1953). As the title indicates this paper of 15 pages confined itself
to a treatment of capabilities and the factors affecting them. It was
prefaced by an Assumption: "That there will not be general war within
the period of this estimate." The four-year period was longer than we
had previously risked committing ourselves to.
On 2 August 1953 speeared 1IE-9O: "Soviet Bloc Caosbilities
Through Mid-1955." This was followed on 25 Sontemhor bT,r NIE-.95:
"Probable Soviet Bloc Courses of Action Through Mid 1955," and by
Ap).endicos issued on 15 October. Those three documents together
constitute the second complete "annual" estimate, covering a period of
two years. In June 1954 an inttrirr: short paper was produced -- NIE 11-5-54:
"Soviet Capabilities and Main Lines of Policy Through Mid-1959." This was
a brief pro-view of NIE 11-4-54, which came out in September, and being
published all in one volume, and covering a period of five years, was
the first annual estimate to take on the form currently familiar to
us. In clue course NIE t s 11-3-55, 11-4,56 and 11-4-57 appeared.
TOP Sc:O ,E
Approved For Release 2000/06/07 : CIA-RDP79R00971A000300050001-8
 Approved For Release,00/06/07 : CIA-RDP79R00971A00030%60001-8
The most obvious development in the history of these "annual"
Soviet estimates has been their increase in size -- up to a total of
80 printed pages in NIE 11-4-56, then back down to 63 in NIP 3.1-4-57.
This has been partly awing; to a fuller treatment of all the subjects
considered: the military sections, for example, have become much more
detailed, though treatment of Satellite and Chinese military strengths
was abandoned with NIE 11-5-56. Political sections, both on domestic
and foreign affairs, have grown luxuriantly. Most striking of all has
been the development of the economic section, which came to full flower
in NIE 11-I4-54 and reflected the maturing capabilities of OR.R. In some-
what the same way the Scientific and Technical section has expanded.
Now sections have been added: e. , on the Soviet Estimate of the
World Situation in NIE-95, and on Soviet Strategy for the Initial Phase
of a General War in NIE 11-L-56.
There was, however, a su:!atlor change which came over these papers,
and whici is difficult to define without distorting. One may say that
they have become more objective, more academic,, less tinged with emotion,
more ~'escriptive and less hortatory. None of these adjectives is exactly
accurate or altogether fair. Perha-s it will he better to illustrate
what happened than to attempt to analyze it.
- 13 -
Approved For Release 2000/06/07 : -If300971A000300050001-8
 Approved For Release,,,J00/06/07: CIA-RDP79R00971A000300001-8
Most important is the fact that the sheer increase in volume, the
proliferation of detail, and the addition of new subjects, changed the
tone of these estimates. The economic sections and those on domestic
political affairs in the USSR have become quite learned disquisitions;
one can read many paragraphs a4-if they described an empire the actions
and intentions of which were of only academic interest to Americans.
In the earlier papers, on the other hand, one seldom goes unreminded,
even for a sentence, of the imminent and dreadful threat. This is
partly because there were many fewer sentences in the earlier papers,
and they wore therefore nearly all directod to matters of the most pressing
and immediate concern. There was no time for extended analysis. It was
partly also because the climate of opinion in the intelligence community,
and outside it as well, was conducive to alarm and distress, and to
all sorts of horrific imaginings.
Consider also the mrtter of headings. Right through NIE 9O
(So ptembor 1953) all the )olitical, economic and scientific material
is put under a ho:nding: "Non- Military F ,~.ctors Affecting: Bloc Capabilities."
With NIE 11-4-54, however, there appears a Table of Contents listing
Political, Economic, Military, and other matters all separately and all
equal. There is nothing wrong with either system -- the earlier followed
w 14 w
TOP SECRET
Approved For Release 2000/06/07 : CIA-RDP79R00971A000300050001-8
 Approved For Release S000/06/07 : CIA-RDP79ROO971A000300WO01-8
the conventions of a military intelligence estimate -- but there is a
change in the "feel" of the papers after the earlier heading is abandoned.
Then there is the subject of "Political Warfare." Again right
through NIE-90 (and its Appendices) there are extensive sections on
"Political Warfare Strengths and Capabilities." Political Warfare is
defined at length in a footnote to NIE-95; it is said to include not
only infiltration, subversion, propaganda etc., but also diplomatic
action, both through normal intergovernmental channels and in such
international org?nizatioos as the UN, political and economic pressures
and inducements, trade union activities, the fomenting of civil war
and colonial revolt, and so on. Moreover, the words "political warfare"
are constantly reiterated throu heut the early papers. With NIE li-L-51 ,
however, the section on Political `l arfare is abandoned., and the phrase
itself virtually disappears.
This harp ingg on "political Warfare" had the effect (and was intended
to have the effect) of c;?nstasitly reminding the reader that every act
of the Soviet government was an act of war. I am not now c^ncorned with
whether or net this was correct, or whether it was a rood thing to
indoctrinn.to the ruder in this fashion. All I wish to note is that when
the -hr-se ":,olitical warfnrE " sli;e ed into the hackgroun-.., there was a
change in the tone of the on-pers.
15
Approved For Release 2000/06/07 : CIA-RDP79R00971A000300050001-8
TOP SIICRET
 Approved For Releas 00/06/07: CIA-RDP79R00971A00030WBOO01-8
Finally, there was naturally a profound change in feeling when
deliberate initiation of general war by the Soviets was agreed to be
unlikely. This occurred fairly early -- in NIE-t8 (8 January 1952)
to be exact -- but it took a little time to sink in. The sense of
imminent danger diminished, and the tone of the estimates changed
accordingly.
All this is not to say that the estimates after 1953 became
complacent or optimistic. There continue to be many passages setting
forth the wickedness of Communism and the threat to US seeurity; indeed
these things are treated at greater length and with greater detail than
in earlier papers. It is explicitly and eloquently said that the Communist
leaders view the world as an arena of conflict, unremitting and relentless.
Yet the emphasis is subtly different; there is much material in the
papers which is only indirectly related to the conflict; and the reader
probably does not get as scared. One may perhaps best express the
change by saying that earlier papers described an imminent threat to
the US; later papers described the Soviet Union.
The Papers on "Capabilities to Attack the US".
There is little that needs to be said in general about theseplpers,
but a chronological list of them may be interesting, for I daresay most
of us have forgotten how busy we were with this subject from the very earliest
day&PP'1 P4 figr eppp Q%fO6/07 : CIA-RDP79R00971A000300050001-8
 Approved For Release 2W/06/07 : CIA-RDP79R00971A000300Q,001-8
NIE-18 (10 January 1951); The Probability of Soviet Employment
of BW and CW in the Event of Attacks upon the US.
NIE-31 (l.j September 1951); Soviet Capabilities for Clandestine
Attack Against the US with Weaoons of Mass Destruction
and the Vulnerability of the US to such Attack (Mid-1951
to mid-1952).
SE-10 (15 September 1951); Soviet'Czpnbilitics for a Surprise
Attack on the Continental United States before Jul),r 1952.
SE-14 (23 October 1951); Soviet Capabilities for a Military
Attack on the United States before July 1952.
SE-36 (5 March 1953); Soviet Capabilities for Attack on the US
Through Mid-1955.
SE-36/1 (3 August 1953); Soviet Capabilities for Attack on the US
Through Mid-1955.
SNIE-11-2-514 (24 February 1950; Soviet Capabilities for Attack
on the US Through 1957.
NIE 11-7-54 (17 August); Soviet Gross Capabilities for Attacks
on the US and Key Overseas Installations Through 1 July 1957.
NIE 11-7-55 (23 June); Soviet Gross Capabilities for Attacks on
the US and Key Overseas Installations and Forces Through
1 July 1958.
SNIE 11-10-55 (2 August); Soviet Gross Capabilities for Attacks
on the US and Key Overseas Installations and Forces in
1965.
NIE 11-56 (6 March); Soviet Gross Capabilities for Attack on
the US and Key Overseas Install tiorts and Forces Through
Mid-1959,
SNIE 11-6-57 (15 January); Soviet Gross Capabilities for Attack
on the Continental US in Mid 1960.
TOP SECRET
Approved For Release 2000/06/07 : CIA-RDP79R00971A000300050001-8
 Approved For Release 2QO0/06/07: CIA-RDP79ROO971A000300QW001-8
Let no one believe that the earlier of these papers were primitive
and unsophisticated efforts; SE-15 covers the subject admirably, and
is almost as long as MIE 11-56 -- the longest.
These papers exemplify a special kind of intelligence estimate --
the "capability study." They were prepared for a particular purpose.
For consumers who knew what capability studies were they were good and
useful, but to a more innocent romader they must have appeared alarming
in the extreme -- or perhaps somewhat ridiculous, for the spectacle
of clouds of TU-lets attacking the continental United States was scarcely
convincing, Yet, indubitably,. the TU-41s could do so, and this was what
the papers had to set forth.
The trouble with these capability studies is that while in theory
they describe everything the enemy could possib do,, actually they
rarely go so far. In the name of feasibility and reasonability they
subtract a, good deal from whet is possible. Hence they give us something
which is almost certainly outside the bounds of probability, yet within
the bounds of possibility. This is good stuff for the pnrticul-r people
who need capability studies and know how to use them. For the ordinary
mortal, these papers contained enough verisimilitude to scare him out
of his wits, yet probably not enough to give him a really legitimate fright,
Approved For Release 2000/06/0 96IR l9R00971A000300050001-8
 Approved For Release00/06/07: CIA-RDP79R00971A00030%60001-8
Other Papers
Under this heading I would like merely to r e-emphasize the fact
that while more than eighty NIA have been reviewed for this study,
many that might have been included have been omitted. For example:
papers on the World Situation; estimates of the effect of increasing
nuclear weapons capabilities; estimates of Par Eastern matters and of
Communist China; estimates of Middle Eastern and Western European affairs;
and so on. Virtually All published estimates contain something about
the USSR, but they have not been taken into account in preparing this
study. Moreover, the render must not expect to find references in the
following pages to Each of the 85 NIE's under consideration. Most of
them are not mentioned at .Al,. A validity study which attempted to
cover them would occupy several volumes.
Validity of the Estimates
There is one compelling reason apart from that of convenience for
attempting at this point a general statement as to the validity of those
estimates. In following chapters a considerable number of invalidities,
inadequacies, and other varieties of blunder are dragged out of past
19 ..
Approved For Release 2000/06/07: CIA-RDP79R00971A000300050001-8
 Approved For Release WR0/06/07: CIA-RDP79ROO971A00030OQ 0001-8
NIEts and put on display. There is also note of a good number of valid
estimates-and correct forecasts, But the impression may nevertheless
be given th .t failures substantially outwei~,;had successes. This would
be an unjust and wrong impression, and can only be set right by some
sort of generalized account.
Before attempting to strike a balance .and ,rri.ve. at a net judgment,
however, lot me present some s1ecifics, and first a list of the principal
errors, omissions, and failures in the Soviet NIE's. Most of these are
discussed at greater length in the following chapters. They are here
briefly stated, in rough order eef importance -- or at least in what I
think to be order of importance, for on this point opinions may well
differ. We will begin with three truly serious examples:
(a) We wholly failed to foresee, and for a long time we oven
failed adequately to recognize and describe, the changes in the
character and conduct of Scviot policy -- especially foreign policy --
that occurred after the death of Stalin.
Approved For Release 2000/06/07 : CIA-RDP79R00971A000300050001-8
 Approved For Release000/06/07 : CIA-RDP79R00971A0003OQW0001-8
(b) We failed to foresee the upheavals in the European
Satellites that occurred late in 1956 or even to hint that such
upheavals were possible. Indeed, in 1955 we estimated that
"popular resistance of an organized and active kind is unlikely
to appear in any of the Satellites during the period Lo mid-196
(c) We failed to foresee Soviet intervention in the Middle
East in late 1955. On the contrary, we estimated in the middle
of 1955 that Southeast Asia would "almost certainly appear to
the USSR to be the most profitable field for the extension of
Communist influence, at least during the early period of this
estimate."
To this list might be added one other item which would be of
equal importance if it could with equal assurance be judged a mis-
estimate. In earlier papers we played up very rrently the idea of
general war, devoted much emphasis and attention to it, and conveyed
a notion that it loomed 1..).rge in the minds of the Soviet leaders.
Hindsight suggests that we may have overdone this -- that the Soviet
leaders never seriously contemplated. encral war. If this hindsight is
correct, we did our consumers a grave disservice. For many and obvious
TOP SliCRET
Approved For Release 2000/06/07 : CIA-RDP79R00971A000300050001-8
 Approved For Release 800/06/07: CIA-RDP79R00971A00030WBOO01-8
reasons, however, it is impossible to be sure what the Soviet leaders
thought about war, or whether the trend of their thoughts may not have
been sis;nificantly altered by actions of the US government, taken
perhaps because of the tenor of our estimated.
Now follow some more bad estimates., i;m portant but not as important
as those just cited:
(a) In 1954 and 19.55 we estimated that the Soviets would have
the 1CBM in 1960-61, as the e^.rliest possible date. Lately we
have changed the date to inid--1958-1959.
(b) Our estimates of current and_ future Soviet production of
U-235 previous to NI 11-4-56 were understated by a factor of
about fcur.
(c) In 1964 we said that Soviet military expenditures would
;)rob-bly remain a,pprcadma.tely constant through 1959. But they
mn,rkedly i.ncronsod.
(d) In 1956 we o:stimntcd that the Sixth Fi-re Year Plan would be
renera.lly fulfilled. Next year the Soviets revealed th^t it would
not,
Approved For Release 2000/06/07 : CIA-RDP79R00971A000300050001-8
 Approved For Release? X800/06/07: CIA-RDP79ROO971AOOO3OQMOOO1-8
TOP ar.,Ci iT
(e) In 1955, 1956 and 1957 we greatly overestimated future
production of BISON and 13&R aircraft.
(f) Production of long-range submarines of non-nuclear
propulsion ceased in mid-1957 contrary to our previous
estimates.
(g) We underestimated the personnel strength of Soviet armed
forces in the early 1950xs.
(h) We said that the Soviets would probably not make an
Austrian TreAty and withdraw from the country -- but they did.
The list could be lengthened -- more examples will be found in
following pages. None of the others, to my mind, compares in importance
to those just cited.
The worst has now been told, and some of it is pretty bad. Yet
we must now set against it some oxamplus of what was done right.
Consider, then, the following:
The reader must be reminded that the words "rijit", "correct",
"accurate", and so on, when applied to our estimates, must till
be taken in a provisional sense. Only in a comparatively small
number of instances can we be perfectly sure that we were "right".
But I am giving us the benefit of the doubt, at least in the above
paragraph.
-23-
TOP SECRET
Approved For Release 2000/06/07 : CIA-RDP79ROO971AO00300050001-8
 Approved For ReleaseSOO/06/07: CIA-RDP79ROO971A000300WO01-8
(a) The essential stability of the Soviet state, through and
aftcr the denth of Stalin, wns correctly foreseen.
(b) The sill-important Soviet domestic nolicif:s of concentration
on he vy industry and military power were always emphnsizcd.
(c) The basic hostility of the Soviet regime to the West was
always recognized, always hammered in.
(d) The dimensions of the Soviet economy, its rate of growth,
its component sectors, and so on, were described with a high
degree of accuracy.
(c) The Soviet armed forces were in general correctly described.
There were mistakes in detail, a few of which were important, but
as far ns we know now the number of serious errors was remarkably
small, considering, the magnitude of the job done on the Soviet
military.
(f) Soviet scientific )nd technical capabilities were well judged.
The only real defect here was thit the estimRtes -- correct as they
generally were -- were seldom stated with the eloquence and emphasis
they deserved, They lacked imp pct, which was reserved for propositions
about general war, etc.
Approved For Release 2000/06/07 : CIA-RDP79R00971A000300050001-8
 Approved For ReleaseJp00/06/07: CIA-RDP79R00971A00030W60001-8
TOP S LCRBaT
(g) Soviet policy respecting Germany was correctly estimated
in every important particular.
(h) Sino-Soviet relations appear always to have boon correctly
And, so on. The list might be lengthened almost indefinitely.
There were hundreds of ju'1gments in these naoers, and by f!r the
p;reator number of them were sound. I -,m inclined to spy that the
estimates look very well indeed in spite of the three or four grave
blunders th-)t have been recorded, a nd the considerable number of lesser
slips which were made.
Some Further General Observations on the Soviet Estimates
One phenomenon strikes me quite forcibly -- it is the degree to
which our most important wrong estimates,, all of which were in the
political field, arose out of resistance to the idea that change and
development would occur in the Soviet Bloc. The single greatest blunder
we made was infa.iling to see that the death of Stalin meant the end of
an era. -- that the new men would be virtually compelled to net differently -
-that the "objective situation" (to borrow Communist terminology) was altering.
- 25
-
TOP S, .itET
Approved For Release 2000/06/07 : CIA-RDP79R00971A000300050001-8
 Approved For Release 2Q,0O/06/07: CIA-RDP79ROO971A000300 001-8
Our papers continued fora time to have an almost St,-linist, monolithic,
orthodoxy. This indisposition to recognize change had its virtues, to
be sure. Suppose, for instance, we had judged that the death of Stalin
would bring about an end of hostility between the USSR and the West; this
would have been a far grosser and more serious error than any we made,
Or suppose we had yielded to those few who thought that Malenkov would
throw over the concentration on heavy industry and military development
in favor of appeasing the Soviet consumer. We did well to avoid these
extremes, but we would have done still better if we had steered further
way from their opposites.
It would be a great mistake, however, to regard the f --.1i lure of
FIE1s in this re *erd ns owing to mere i ;norance or stupidity in the
intelli-once community. The problem was old and basic it was that of
evaluating, woi.f.;hinp, Pnd describing; the elements of continuity in a
situ=;tion as ar;ainst the, elements of chanfgge. There is no more difficult
problem, either in the writing, of history or in the formulation of
intelligence estimates, When all the embellishments of our function are
cleared away, this problem remains at the center.
- 26 -
Approved For Release 2000/06/07 : CIA-RDP79R00971A000300050001-8
 Approved For Release 0/06/07 : CIA-RDP79ROO971A000300 001-8
Everyone will probably agree that nothing short of Olympian wisdom
is sufficient to evaluate properly elements of continuity versus those
of change. We must struggle with the problem as best we can; occasionally
we shall go wrong. There seems, however, to be a Law th-t operates among
intelli:ence estim--tors in this connection, which we mi-ht well recognize
and respect. It may be fo.rmulrted in this way: when dealing with hostile
nations or groups, we tend toward overestimating the elements of continuity
in the situation; when considerinE, friendly powers, we tend toward over-
estimating the elements of change, Prob^bly this is attributable to
prudence if we must err, it will be better to err in the manner
indicated. It was probably better that we should dwell upon the iniquity
and hostility of the Soviet Union than that we should risk bemusing the
consumer with hopes of basic change, even though we would not intentionally
have misled him.
Yet this sensitivity to the -possibility of certain special kinds of
misinterpretation by our readers led to some curiosities in the estimates.
We have been anxious nho?,e all things that our oapers shall not provide
justification for eomolacency, and accordingly we sometimes belabor
the Soviet Union with epithets. And, on the othrr hand, we have been
Approved For Release 2000/06/07 : CIA-RDP79R00971A000300050001-8
 Approved For Release 2J0106107 : CIA-RDP79R00971A000300001-8
constrained by our natiohality and status to adopt the policies and
attitudes of the US as an implicit standard of reference. I would risk
the observation that some of the papers, especially the earlier ones,,
lack objectivity. Occasionally a sentence or a paragraph here and there
seems designed not so much to convey sound knowledge as. to inculcate
correct sentiments. Perhaps this was right and proper, but I think we
should strive to avoid it.
One notable omission in our papers is now gradually being remedied --
this was the failure to discuss Soviet military oolicies, doctrines and
stra.teggy, or to sucnest vari.ous possible imniica.tions of known developments
in the Soviet armed forces. It is curious that while we held forth at
length on Soviet political theory, ideology, economic doctrine, and the
like, we have until recently slighted comparable aspects of the Soviet
military situation. Why the 175 divisions, for example? What is the
meaning of the unexpectedly high production of jet medium bombers, or
the continuing high output of day rather than all-weather fighter air-
craft? What is the function of the army in the totalitarian Communist
state? We seem to work under a tacit assumption that Soviet military
theory, in the broadest as well as in the narrowest sense, is essentially
Approved For Release 2000/06/07 : CIA-RDP79R00971A000300050001-8
 Approved For Release 4900/06/07: CIA-RDP79ROO971AO0030&MO01 -8
the same as our own. Yet this cannot be altogether true. There is
still a rich field here for cultivation,, though it may well be that the
community cannot rech agreement on what flowers shall bloom,.
There are innumerable other observations that might be mmde and
problems that might be pondered in connection with these papers. Are
they too long? Who can say -- it de1aends on who reads them and what
he requires from them, and hence there is no answer. Are they too dull?
No, I do not think so. They are not written to amuse but to instruct;
they are full of meat; they are coordinated; on the whole they are nowadays
very well written, considering what they go through. Are they too bland?
Yes, I suspect so. One is always glad to come upon a footnote of dissent,
an admission that last year's paper had been wrong, a vigorous affirmation
of some sort. Such things are scarce but not wholly. lacking. I do not get
the impression, however, of a watered down least-common-denominator of
opinion in these papers. The judgments are seldom very startling, but
for the most n'rt they are remarkably clear and useful. The vapors are,
in short, a most imnressive achievement.
One finpl obscrv^tion, wholly personal. I p-rticipated in the
o?reduction of many of these pn.pors, and I know there were great arguments
over words and phrases, and pain of spirit when we in ONE lost an engafement,
Approved For Release 2000/06/07 : CIA-RDP79R00971A000300050001-8
 Approved For Release 00/06/07: CIA-RDP79R00971A00030
001-8
U"IU
and triumph when we won. Now, on wandering again through the fields of
these battles, I can scarce remember what the fighting was about, and
when I do remember I can hardly over recall why we were so excited. In
about four cases out of five I believe that the outcome of the argument
was immaterial -- practically any reasonable and grammatical form of
expression would have done as well. The fifth case was important. Could
we not think of some way to call off four out of five of our wars of
coordination ?
- 30
Approved For Release 2000/06/07 : CIA-RDP79R00971A000300050001-8
 Approved For Release 2QpO/06/07 : CIA-RDP79R00971A000300Q001-8
THE INT}: ?T\Tn L POLITICI STTU ^ TI ON OF THE USSR AND THT{ BLOC
During the first two years of CNi,'s existence only two National
Estimates gave much attention to the internal political situation in
the USSR. The first was that freak among papers, SE,16 (The Strength
and Capabilities of Soviet Bloc Forces to Conduct Military Operations
against NATO; published 12 October 1951) which was prepared "for the
guidance of the United States Deputy Representative to the Standing
Group, Military Committee, North Atlantic Council." The second was
NIE-6L, and especially the Appendices to that paper, which were published
on 2L December 1952. As observed above, NIE-.64 was the first of the full-
fledged "annual" estimates of the Soviet situation. It devoted eight
paregr.ohs to internal political affairs, ns one of the "non-military
factors affecting Bloc capabilities".
No doubt there would in any event have been an increpso of concern
with Soviet internal policies as the estimates after 1952 became more
Approved For Release 2000/06/07 : CIA-RDP79R00971A000300050001-8
 Approved For Release4P0/06/07: CIA-RDP79R00971A000308#t0001-8
voluminous. However, the death of Stalin in March, 1953, at once brought
these matters into a position of high interest and importance. On 12 March
1953 there was published SE-39: "Probable Consequences of the Death of
Stalin and of the Elevation of Malenkov to Leadership in the UJSR." Shortly
thereafter 1,,TIE-65 (June 1953) and NIE's 90 and 95 addressed themselves
to the problem, though still only briefly and in general terms.
NIE 11-4-54 (14 September 1954) intornil affairs were given treatment
in length and detail, and subsequent "annual" Soviet papers followed
the pattern,
From the point of view of. US secur~.ty, the nrincinal estimative
problem relating to Soviet internal affairs has been to judge the basic
stab&,lity of the regime. In this re,;,ard, the estimates have had a high
degree of validity, NIE-64 (A,.)pendix) said "the Soviet regime is securely
entrenched in power, and there is no apparent prospect of its control
being threatened or shaken". This has been pretty much the verdict in
all successive estimates, and so far as we know it has always been accurate.
It is) of course, the heart of the whole problem; no other question
concerning the Soviet domestic situation approaches it in importance.
The effects of Stalin's death, howoo;ver, were by no means easy to
judge, either before or .after the event. NIE-64 (December 1952) looked
- 32 -
Approved For Release 2000/06/07 : CIA-RDP79R00971A000300050001-8
 Approved For Release 9"0/06/07 : CIA-RDP79R00971A000300Q&0001-8
cautiously ahead, and thought that the initial transfer of power would
probably proceed smoothly, but this paper did not commit itself as to
what might happen in the longer run. A day or two after Stalin died
SE--39 apooeared, and was by no means a bad paper under the circumstances.
"A struggle for power", it said, "could develop within the Soviet
hierarchy at any time," but it felt that such a struggle "would probably
be carried on within the Party organization and higher echelons of the
bureaucracy". It conveyed the impression th-t even if such a struggle
broke out, the Soviet regime would almost certainly survive in recognizable
form. It was, of course, a very brief raper, not intended to present
an exhaustive treatment.
NIE-65 appeared in June 1953, and must have disappointed reader
who hoped for a definite opinion. The text of this paper is hopelessly
vn.ue -- for example, it is said that "conflict within the ruling group
would be the internal development most likely to jeopardize Soviet
stability during the period of this estimate; yet there is no estimate
as to whether such a conflict is likely. To the excessively woolly
paragraph of text, however, State, Army, and JIG contributed a useful
dissent, in which they went back to the earlier judgment of SE-39.
They admitted that it was imoossiblc to estimate with confidence whether
- 33 -
Approved For Release 2000/06/07 : CIA-RDP79R00971A000300050001-8
 Approved For Release'WO/06/07 : CIA-RDP79ROO971A00030 O01-8
there would be a prolonged struggle for power among the new leaders,
but opined th-t "if such a stru;-rg;le for power should develop, it would
be confined to the higher echelons of the Soviet Communist Party and
Government and would probably not precipitate open conflict within or
between the armed forces Qnd security police, or involve the Soviet
population." They followed with a firm verdict th.-t the stability of
the regime w^s unlikely to be endangered by differences among the
Soviet leaders.
This dissent of State, Army, and JIG subsequently became the
received doctrine, and appears even today in almost the same words
in the annual Soviet paper, By Au,~,ust of 1953 CIA appears to have
recovered from its doubts, and the unanimous judgment of NIE-90
(approved 11 August) is as follows: "There is no evidence that the
basic economic and military strength of the Soviet Bloc, or the authority
of the Soviet regime) have been weakened by developments since the death
of Stalin. We believe it unlikely that appreciable weakening in these
respects will occur during the ieriod of this estimate" (i,e, through
mid-1955).
It is worth whale to ~^use a moment over this wavering judgment of
Soviet internal stability which informed our estimates between March
-3L-
TOP SECJ LT
Approved For Release 2000/06/07 : CIA-RDP79R00971A000300050001-8
 Approved For ReleaseQP00/06/07 : CIA-RDP79ROO971AO003004lf 0001-8
and Au