SOVIET MILITARY ESTIMATES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R00971A000400050034-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 7, 2005
• Sequence Number: 34
• Publication Date: November 13, 1969
• Content Type: MF

25X1 Approved For Release 2005/07/13 : CIA-RDP79R00971A000400050034-1
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 Approved For Release 2005/07/13 : CIA-RDP79R00971A000400050034-1
BAND VIA COMINT TALENT'KEYHOLE.CHIANNELS ONLY
> mm TOR a The Honarabls Wills P. JOIM3 //-9
The Swore of 8 1,4
The Honorabis Kelvin R. Lotted --(~'' 1
r
Thee S.cretaz r of VON" ,I
The Rouorab2o iii A. Rissiaegsr 14
Assistant to the President for j~. -1,53 Wattanal Sed ty Affairs
SUBJECT s Soviet M3litsry l sti s*ts
1. For moss tins I barrens teltt that vane shoo d re-esaieains the
tam and content of the .**or Esti. . Ie 121-61=e Esthetes on
Soviet aailit-a>y subjects. ?Moo papers tit on mbstanti,alr their
present torn. nearly a diced. ago in to the u pressed or tst-
plied needs not only of highest 2 tl policy rs but at Mary
planners as well. We wish to xisks arose that they we nods an
responsive as possible to taft'e =oft*
2. Each year these Estiaatosi, p shed In the tall, examine
in considerable detail a ba range of dos -wfrem the goals
of Soviet strategic policy to the voibm of baeloopWs to Soviet
Ncral Aviation - and after the judViente of the is UMSOnce can-
runity on all these wattaers. Sane of the 1eebjscts +1 ered ere aaa-
plex and contraav reialj ae, ees sx* sloplo, or at least undUTaWl
aacaae appear almost without obaea fran an ys ass to t anat. The
probleza of Janus and staraotaring all this steal to difficult*
3. It would be out Itee1pta2 It YW4 s 4% sae i views or
suggestions as to the . sinner in which 'twee a sdg t be made nest
useful to yen? ft m of the questions gain thmao aw sift to-
gether with notes pertinent to, t esations, are outlined the
attachment. I also + e copies of the to nest recently issued
Fetirates on Soviet aailitary mpMUUesp to raid of hor Hasse
papers are presently at , too . Betare asbaecrktng on the lengthy
process leading up to next yew's attioasr, t sbmM be slant grate-
ful for aaa r guidance you can give is this wetter.
Attachxents - 3
1) Questions
2) 131E No. 11-3-69
3) NIE No. 13-8-9
Abbot Smith/Richard Helms tecd 13/1.1/x39 4qW4*S4&j -W6e4eee5eH341ff P
Distrib ecOFera miRgq?(%I TAj14 - -
1 F.R I - Mr. A. &dth,
i
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I
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Considerations on the Structure and Content
of Estimates of Soviet Military Forces
1. Is the present division of the subject matter into three papers
covering the military missions -- Strategic Attack (11-8),
Strategic Defense (11-3), and General Purpose Forces (11-1lt) --
the most relevant and useful way of meeting the needs of the
Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, and the President's
Assistant for National Security Affairs?
NOTE: This arrangement was developed to parallel the way
United States military program planning has been
done in recent years. In this connection, we note that
the tentative format for the Department of Defense Five
Year Force and the Program Plan (circulated by Dr. Kissinger
on 31 October 1969) continues to structure United States
forces by mission, as well as by Service and Defense agency.
For this reason, the present approach to Soviet forces may
continue to be useful for threat evaluation and for com-
parisons of United States and Soviet forces and military
R&D efforts.
2. Is the amount of detail presented in these estimates excessive?
Assuming; it is necessary for the military planner, is it also
necessary for top policy makers? Should we issue different
types of estimates for different readers?
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NOTE: The three major Soviet military estimates present
a considerable amount of descriptive information on
individual weapons and forces on which there is essential
agreement within the intelligence commiunity. There details
provide the analytical foundation for intelligence judgments
on Soviet capabilities and objectives made in the estimates.
They are, of course, vital to the total estimative process,
but we have some question whether they are all needed for the
highest-level users of these NIEs.
Do present procedures adequately provide the chief users of these
estimates with the intelligence judgments of most vital interest
to them and with adequate indication of the evidence or argument
on which these judgments rest? Do present procedures adequately
help the principal users to understand differences of view within
the intelligence community and the reasons for the differences?
NOTE: The three major Soviet military estimates are now
produced on a yearly basis, usually in the fall of
the year. This annual cycle of production, together with
the compendious nature of the estimates, tends to cause the
major issues to be intermixed with matters that may be of no
particular moment so far as current problems important to
the Secretaries are concerned. Moreover, the large number
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of separate judgments in each paper makes it impossible
to set forth adequately the considerations lying behind
each one; selectivity in this matter would be inescapable.
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