POST MORTEM OF NIE PRODUCTION FOR 1953

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R00971A000400060011-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 15
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 7, 2006
• Sequence Number: 11
• Publication Date: May 13, 1954
• Content Type: MF

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'fSECRET
II
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE. AGENCY
23 May 1954
MMOAIMUM FCR TBE .LI EM E ADVISCY C02CTTEE
SMUT t Post Morten of NIE Frodwct1 t for 1953
1. The attached findingsa, noted by the I&C on 11 May,
have been appravad by the Director of Central Intelligence
for diseeaaation.
2. Recipients are reheated to take date action
When rev-ieving research and collection proms.
Di sibution "AR
Acting Assistant Director
National Estimates
JOB NO, ----
~K_
11
NO CHANGE IN CLASS. i "-
[ I DECLASSIFIED
CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS S? C
NEXT REVIEW DATE:
AUTH: HR 70-2
DATE: Z" 2 REVIEWER]
Pl T
AORI/CDF
-14
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Nwe w
,F''SECR T
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
13 May 1954
POST MORE OF NIl PRODUCTION FOR 1953
The following is a review of intelligence deficiencies
r led during preparation of national Intelligence Estimates
during 1953. The principal estimates upon which these findings
are based are listed in TAB "A."
a. An improvement in the liaison between operational
and intelligence echelons in the field as well as
in Washington would result in the more timely re -
ceipt and production of intelligence end the receipt
of additional intelligence,
b.
Generally, information is more easily obtainable
on the Satellites (particularly on East Germany
and Nast Berlin) then on the USSR. Since in-
telligence on the Satellites if of considerable
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Co
help in at lyzing derelopmeats in the USSR, an
e pei1ed. effort should be made to exploit all
available channels for obtaining economic, poli-
tical, scienfific, end military information on
the Satellites.
In view of the relative pmzcity of informrtion
and intelligence on the USSR, it is important that
.hat is.availshle be exploited fully. Soviet prove-
Made is one source a+hich possibly could be mare
fully exploited.
2. SOVIET H OC
The gaps in our intelligence Frith respect to the Soviet Bloc
bans been vilely recognized for a bang time. During 1953 a need
was expressed for more effort on the resistance potential in the
Bloc. Accordingly, on 8 Decen?er 1953, the INC authorized creation
of an M Hoc Resistance Intelligence Ccnmittee. Szperience during
1953 also indicated a need for greater collection and research
efforts in the following key areas:
a. Aircraft Production. With the growth of Soviet
atomic parer, accurate estimates of Soviet long-
read and fighter nircre t t production are of critical
Tor, SECRET
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S1'EiSI'
b.
importance. Efforts shvu)4 therefore be cooti-
nued to improve the basis of estimates of Soviet
aircraft production.
Basic Science and Tecbmolo r. Special emphasis
should be put on the collection and research
effort in the field of electronics.
Co Air Offense and Defense. Continued emphasis on
weapons having possible duel offensive andL defensive
mission: missile development and production; and,
eireraft develonent and production.
s..
e.
Soviet C ffenWive Capabil ties. S zb riyxe character-
istics, particularly propulsion, and of veapons for
use with sins (torpedoes., mimes, nod missiles).
Of continuing interest are Soviet capabilities and
developments in the fields of AW, IOW, B'l, and CW.
Soviet Defensive _il.itiea. Early warning,
filter process, and communications relating to
air defense; airborne radar; and ground control
intercept.
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f.
IL.
Economic Trends. Intelligence materiels on the
various sectors of the Soviet economy are in-
adequate for fully satisfWtory analyses of eco-
naamric develoymsats and trends. All agencies having
intelUgpnoe production responsibilities in this
field should reexamine and refine so tar as possible
the materials relating to its specific areas of
responsibility ae4 each should seek to improve its
field colleetton efforts.
European Satellites. Signif i aunt gays in intelli -
gence on the Satellites revolve on the extent and
nature of resistance movements, and the nature of
the Soviet mechanism for exercising control in
these countries.
3. FAR LAST
Many of the intelligence deficiencies in the Communist Far
cent are similar to those that exist for the Bloc as a thole.
The most critical gaps throughout the Far Last include:
a. Sind-Soviet Relations. Our ability to estimate
Communist capabilities and courses of action in
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b.
the Far East will depend to a large extent on our
knowledge of the nature of all aspects of the
Sino-Soviet relationship. This is largely a
collection problem and should be given a very
high priority.
Communist Courses of Action. Intelligence is required
on the reaction end extent of the effect on Communist
courses of action in Asia of a significant change in
the military situation in Indochina.
c. Chinese Communist Econosay'. Experience during 1953,
particularly in. the preparation of SE-37, indicated
a continuing need for more specific and reliable
information on Chinese economic development. One
important example is China?s transportation capa-
bilities, particularly as those affect Chinese
military capabilities.
d.
Viet Minh Capabilities and Intentions. During
1953 ae have continued to rely almost exclusively
on French sources for information concerning Viet
Minh capabilities and intentions, both military
and political, and concerning Chinese Commmist
TOP SECT T
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"?v TOP EECET
support of the Viet Minh. Steps should be taken
to develop irs9epeadent sources of intelligence in
this field.
a* south Korea. Preparation of SE-148 revealed a
deficiency in firm intelligence on President Rhea's
intentions.
to
Indonesia. Preparation of N33-77 and SE-51 revealed
the continuing and urgent need for more information
on the politicaa orientation of the Indonesian
Government and the capabilities and intentions of
the Communist and other dissident groups in Indonesia.
Burma. The fluid and confused situation in Burma
requires a steady flow of information on the orienta-
tion of the Burmese Government and its capabilities
and intentions with respect to Commrmist and other
dissident groups.
4. WL9MM 15UROPL
The major problem with regard to Western Europe is not one
of collection but primarily involves the analysis, evaluation, and
synthesis of vast quantities of available factual data. Yugoslavia
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constitutes the major nationall, intelligence ge-p; there are gaps in
our knowledge of the interre]atiooship and position of the top-
ranking Y`ugrslav I*edere, general economic condition., and military
strengths axed weaknesses. The other areas or Items on which there
are still important deficiencies are:
C.
A. The connections and relationships between East
Germany wad various groups in West Germany.
5- DOLL ZAST.AFRECA
Experience during 1953 indicated that over-all intelligence
coverage of the Middle East is good. The top priority targets
TOP sECk T
The magnitude and importance of the French comm?reial
and industriall, investment in Indochina and North Africa,
and the influence exercised by the industrial and cotn-
mereiai interests.
The, policies, personalities, and factions of the
extreme left-wing parties in Italy (ComMMists,
Nonni socialists).
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revain Iran and Egypt. The principal intelligence gaps noted --
and these were not critical -- were: 25X6
b.
Indian Border Areas. Reporting from the Indian
border area, particularly from Kashmir and Sepal,
vas inadequate in view of increasing Communist
interest in the area, and indications of increasing
friction between these areas and India.
nr. Egypt. Although coverage of the Anglo-Egyptian
dispute was excellent, further coverage would be
useful on the internal political situation, parti-
cularly on the activities of the opposition.
d. Africa. Intelligence ccrerage of Africa is
meager. We rely too heavily on the European
metropoles for the limited inforwation we receive
on such issues as Commumiam, nationalism, racial
tension, and intertribal relations. Assuming
-.8 -
TOP BET
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TOP SC
continued growth on the importance of Africa as
a raw material Source for the US, sad growing un-
rest throughout the continent, broader intelligence
coverage will became increasingly important.
LATIN AFRICA
Over-ell, intelligence coverage of Latin America is good. How-
ever, deficiencies exist in the following fields:
0. Military _%LnLcm. Fuller reporting is desirable on
the political positions of important military figures
and on trends in the political views of both senior
and Dior military officers. With respect to
G=temala, more informeltion is desix-able on the de-
gree of disaffection or anxiety in the officer corps
resulting !roan Arbena' collaboration with Comnists
and the army's Lnabi]ity to obtain US military material.
b. Communism. Fuller izaforzation is needed on trends
in Communist party strengths, and on Communist
infiltration of government, labor, and intellectual
circles, especially in Argentina and Bolivia.
TOP SXCEW
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*"we lkw~
C.
The situation of labor. More concrete information
is desired on the political orientation snd the
eooni is status of bath orgenised and unorganised
labor in all the countries with politically signi-
ficant labor mope snts.
=FW
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TAB "A"
0/11 19
13 WY 1954
PEIi i AL N339 PR(VtX TI0It BAS! FO t 1953 PO51' MCA PM[Dn S
1. SOVM BLOC
Mm-65 Soviet Dim capabilities through 1957
AIE-81 Probable Soviet Co-usea of Action with
respect to Germany through Mid-1954
Itn6-87 Probable Developments within the European
Satellites through Mid-1955
NU-9D Soviet Bloc Capabilities through Mid-1955
NIN-95 Probable Soviet Bloc Courses of Action
through Mid-1955
SE-36 Soviet Capabilities for Attack on the US
through Mid 1955
5E-36/1 Soviet Capabilities for Attack on the US
through Mid-1955
5E-38 Soviet Bloc Capabilities and Probable
Courses of Action in Elactromagnetie
Warfare
5E-39 Probable Consequences of the Death of Stalin
and of the Plsvation of Malenkov to loader-
ship in the USSR
5E-0 Communist Reactions to US Establishment of
a "Volunteer Freedom Corps"
SE-42 Current Communist. Tactics
86146 Probable Long-''erm Derelopeeat of the Soviet
Bloc and Western Power Positions
85-47
Probable Effect of Becefit Develoysenta in
Eastern Giiermecy on Soviet Policy with
Respect to Germany
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SEMIET
2. FAR EAST
M-74 Probable Developments in Burma through 1953
MM -77 Probable Developments in Indonesia
RIN-80 Communist Capabilities and Probable Courses
of Action in Korea
BU-91 Probable Developments in Indochina through 1954
SE-37 Probable Effects on the Soviet Bloc of Certain
Courses of Action Directed at the internal
and External Commerce of Communist China
SE-45 Tbailaad's Ability to Withstand Communist
Pressure or Attacks through Mid-1954
SE-48 Capabilities and Probable Courses of Action
of the Republic of Korea with Respect to
the Armistice in Korea
SE-51 The Significance of the New Indonesian Qomermmnt
SE-53 Probable Communist Reactions to Certain Possible
Developments in Indochina
3. W&MM EUROPE
N33-63 France's Probable Future Role in the Western
Security System
NIE-63/1 Probable Short-Term Developments in French Policy
N33-71 Probable Outlook for Italy
NIE-93 Probable Developments in Yugoslavia
5E-54
The Political Outlook in Italy
TAP SICCRdT
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4. WAR LOT AFRICA
73
Conditions and Treffis in the Middle East
Affecting US Security
BU-75/1 Probable Develoynents in Iran through 1953
76 Probable Devrelante in Egypt
ZJX-79 Probable Developments in South Asia,
Conditions =A Trends in Tropical Africa
0
Nn-102 Probable Devoe a in Iran through 1954
s.49 The Current Outlook in Iran
LATIN ACA
9339-M Probable Developmeate in Guatemala
P U-85 Probable Dereloy nts in Chile
DTI-86 Probable Developwntg in Brazil
1.3
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P06T MC1RT
31. may 195
1. ftVX&jjy these findings do not ewe before the W. because the
t al paper has been a CIA document rather than an TA C doom ent.
This paper brought up because:
. Reservations taken by certain agencies.
b. Proposal to change the review period.
3. The only procedural change which should be brought up at this
stage: got agreement to do the review quarterly. C?/ME will
follow-up with formal change in procedure
ry_~r,( 1~1- ENT NO
AUTF#: HR 70.2
DATE: Ai'VIEWER
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