POST MORTEM OF 1953 PRODUCTION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R00971A000400060013-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 20
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 13, 2006
• Sequence Number: 13
• Publication Date: April 30, 1954
• Content Type: MF

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79199
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
30 April 1954
IM42UMUR FCg THE 1 11; LIGEl' ADVISC tT COMMTMEE
SUBJECTS Pbst Mortemn of 1953 Production
89
1. Attached (Enclosure "A") is a statement of latal-
liges deficiencies which -have been identified by reviewing
the ME's produced in 1953. This statement was considered
by your representatives an 27 April.
2. The praosd re followed in this case was experimental;
the diffe" from the approved procedure (Eneiosure "B") in that total production was used as a basis for the statemext of
deficiencies rather than hawing a separate statement prepared
for individual estimates.
3. As a result of this exercise, we believe that saw
modification of the present procedure is desirable along the
lines of Enaloavre "Co.
4. AMU=
The Post Mortemm of 1953 Production will be placed
on the IAC agenda at an early date.
$? The proposed revision of the procedure is subitted
for review. Your representatives viii. be contacted
within the next few days for their views before
it is faamnlly subedtted to the IAC.
Distribution "A"
National Estimtss
Director ,
4 LL
NO CHANGE. IN CLASS. L
I. ] DECLASSIFIED
CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS V C / / ! Z 25X1
NEXT REVIEW DATE:
AUTH: HR 70-2
DATE: I-1tA
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13EC Z
. "A"
CENTRAL I R T E L L i 0 E.N C 2 A G 2 N C. I
30 Apri3. 1954
SUBJECT: 019 +M Of 195-, +k LAOD
The to ..oti is a reviev of .thta llidence liericlancle:
revealed during posparation
DLBla,.L tail.tgetri :e
1 1953. The voincipi . a y3.ir t: ass upon w bleb
a h,i, orz vauld x ebu1 t #v the wort time,
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arx 4 .6T`.i< , u) W n *eri no We MR. site*
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* rep a mt*t v Of the 0/ Ay' r ae, ved the wai:tj
on . ra r r a
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help in analyzing developments in the USSR, an
expanded effort should be made to exploit all
available charnels for obtaining economic, political,
scientific, and military information on the Satellites.
C* in view of the relative paucity Of information
and intelligence on the USSR, it is important
that what is available be exploited fully.
Soviet propaganda is one source which possibly
could be more fully exploited.
2. soynT BLOC
The gaps in our intelligence with respect to the Soviet Bloc
have been widely recognized for a long time. Many of them will
probably never be filled. During 1953 a need was expressed for
more effort on the resistance potential in the Bloc. Accordingly,
on 8 December 1953, the IAC authorized creation of an Ad Hoc
Resistance Intelligence Committee. Experience during 1953 also
indicated a need for greater collection and research efforts in
the following key areas:
as Aircraft Production. With the growth of Soviet
atomic power, accurate estimates of Soviet long-
range and fighter aircraft production are of critical
SECRET
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importance. Efforts should therefore be
continued to improve the basis of estimates
of Soviet aircraft production.
b. Basic Science and Technology. Special emphasis
e C.
#d
should be put on the collection and research
Air Offense and Defense. Continued emphasis on
weapons having possible dual offensive and defensive
mission: missile development and production; and,
aircraft development and production.
Soviet Offensive Capabilities. Submarine
characteristics., particularly propulsion, and of
weapons for use with submarines (torpedoes,
mines, and missiles). Of continuing interest
are Soviet capabilities and developosents in tho
fields of Aft, Rid, BW, and, CW.
e. Soviet Defensive Capabilities. Early yarning,
filter process, and communications relating to
air defense; airborne radar; and ground control
intercept.
a
The representative of the DI/USAF reserved the position of AFOIM
on paragraphs c., d., and e.
_3_
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f. Economic Trends. Intelligence materials on
the various sectors of the Soviet econmW
are inadequate for fully satisfactory analyses
of econcc.developments and trends. All
agencies having intelligence production
responsibilities in this field should re-
examine and refine so far as possible the
materials relating to its specific areas of
responsibility and each should seek to improve
its field collection efforts.
g. European Satellites. Significant gaps in
intelligence on the Satellites revolve on the
extent and nature of resistance movements, and
the nature of the Soviet mechanism for exercising
control in these countries.
Many of the intelligence deficiencies in the Ccemunist Far
East we similar to those that exist for the Bloc as a whole. The
most critical gaps throughout the Far East include:
a, Sino-Soviet Relations. Our ability to estimate
Cammunist capabilities and courses of action in
TOP SECRET
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TOP SECRET
the Far East will depend to a large extent on our
knowledge of the nature of all aspects of the
Sino-Soviet relationship. This is largely a
collection problem and should be given a very
high priority.
b. Com mmist Courses of Action. The reaction and
extent of the effect on Communist courses of
action in Asia of a significant change in the
military situation in Indochina.
c. Chinese Cacmunist Economy. Experience during 1953,
particularly in the preparation of SE-37, indicated
a continuing need for more specific and reliable
information on Chinese economic development.
One important exaa ple is China's transportation
capabilities, particularly as these affect Chinese
military capabilities.
d. Viet Minh Capabilities and Intentions. During
1953 we have continued to rely almost exclusively
on French sources for information concerning Viet
Minh capabilities and intentions, both military
and political, and concerning Chinese Ccununist
TOP SECRET
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TOP SECRET
f. Indonesia. Preparation of RIE 77 and SE-51
support of the Viet Minh. Steps should be
taken to develop independent sources of
intelligence in this field.
revealed the continuing and urgent need for
more information on the political orientation
of the Indonesian Government and the capabilities
and intentions of the Communist and other dissident
groups in Indonesia.
Burm. The fluid and confused situation in Burma
requires a steady flow of information on the
orientation of the Burmese Government and its
capabilities and intentions with respect to
Communist and other dissident groups.
* The G-2 representative reserved the position of G-2 on paragraph e.
-6-
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MIDDLE EAST-AFRICA
Experience during 1953 indicated that over-all intelligence
coverage of the Middle East is good. The top priority targets
-7w
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remain Iran and Egypt. The principal intelligence gaps noted and these were not critical` -- were:
b. Indian Border Areas. Reporting from the Indian
border areas, particularly from Kashmir and Nepal,
was inadequate in view of increasing Communist
interest in the area and indications of increasing
friction between these areas and India.
C. Fgrpt. Although coverage of the Anglo-Egyptian
dispute was excellent, further coverage would be
useful on the internal political situation,
particularly on the activities of the opposition.
d. Afr~ ice. Intelligence coverage of Africa is
meager. We rely too heavily on the European
metropoles for the limited Information we receive
on such issues as Communism, nationalism, racial
tension, and intertribal relations. Assuming
TOP SECRET
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continued growth on the importance of Africa
as a raw material source for the US, and growing
unrest throughout the continent, broader intelligence
coverage will become increasingly iaportant.
6. IATIIIY AFRICA
Owar-all intelligence coverage of Latin America is good. Mw-
ever, deficiencies exist in the following fields:
a. Ali tary opinion: Fuller reporting is desirable
on the political positions of important military
figures and on trends in the political views of
both senior and junior military officers. With
respect to Guatamgla, more information is
desirable on the d gree of disaffection or
anxiety in the officer corps resulting from
Arbenz' collaboration with Commmists and the
azgy's inability to obtain US military materiel.
b. C_____amtmmissmm. Fuller information is needed on trends
in Communist party strengths., and on Cam mist
nist
infiltration of government, labor, and intellectual
circles., especially in Argentina and Bolivia.
-9-
TOP SECMT
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c. The situation of labor. More concrete information
is desired on the political orientation and the
economic status of both organized and unorganized
labor in all the countries with politically
significant labor at
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SEC E1 TM "A"
OINE MM
30 April 1954
PEAL BYE PRODUCTION BASS FOR 1953 POO M MM FMMMS
1. SOVIET BLOC
ME-65 Soviet Bloc Capabilities through 1957
EM-81 Probable Soviet Courses of Action with
Respect to Germany through Mid-1954
NIE-87 Probable Developments within the European
Satellites through Mid-1955
HIE-90 Soviet Bloc Capabilities tbrovgh Mid-1955
NO-95 Probable Soviet Bloc Courses of Action
through Mid-1955
Soviet Capabilities for Attack on the US
through Mid-1955
SE-36/1 Soviet Capabilities for Attack on the US
through Mid-1955
S9-38 Soviet Bloc Capabilities and Probable
Courses of Action in Electromagnetic
Warfare
SE-39 Probable Consequences of the Death of Stalin
and of the Elevation of Malenkov to
Leadership in the USSR
SEE-40 Communist Reactions to US Establistsaent of
a "Volunteer Freedom Corps"
SE-42 Current Communist Tactics
SE-46 Probable Yang-Terrm,Development of the Soviet
Bloc and Western Power Positions
SE-47 Probable Effect of Recent Developments in
Eastern Oernany on Soviet Policy With
Respect to Germany
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yol~ Spam
2. FAR EAST
MM -74 Probable Developments in Burma through 1933
MR-77 Probable Developments in Indonesia
1NIB-80 Ccxmnunist Capabilities and Probable Courses
of Action in Korea
NIII-91 Probable Developments in Indochina through
1954
5E-37 Probable Effects on the Soviet Bloc of Certain
Courses of Action Directed at the Internal
and External Commerce of Camawnist China
SE-45 Thailand's Ability to Withstand Commtn ist
Pressure or Attacks through Mid-1954
SE-48 Capabilities and Probable Courses of Action
of the Republic of Korea Frith Respect to
the Armistice in Korea
SE-51 The Significance of the Nov Indonesian Goveruoent
8E-53 Probable Cosmunist Reactions to Certain Possible
Developments in Indochina
3. WESTER EUROPE
NIE-63 France's Probable Future Role in the Western
Security System
PIS-63/1 Probable Short Terms Developments in French Policy
MM -71 Probable Outlook for Italy
M-93 Probable Developments in Yugoslavia
88 -54
The Political Outlook in Italy
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4. NEAR BAST AFRICA
NIN 73 Conditions and Trends in the Middle East
NIE-75/l
NIE-76
NIE-79
NIE-83
Affecting US Security
Probable Developments in Iran through 1.953
Probable Developments in Egypt
Probable Develo nts in South Asia
Conditions and Trends in Tropical Africa
ME-102 Probable Developments in Iran through 1954
SE-49 The Current Outlook in Iran
LATIN AMERICA
MR-84 Probable Developments in Guatemala
NIE-85 Probable Developments in Chile
NIE-86 Probable Developments in Brazil
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3 E 1i1 P R A, L i. 1` a ,G L d,~' .La? / Al .lJ
17FICE ;~!,
Vac1o ure "B"
3 Jane 1952
i l?1OUNDui.i MR THE ` ; MULL 2JI A V1.4;rc '101 1 I P+}5
~j 9~ ry#g1 p~~ ,,y q~~ y \
L1AJe.1 'J'iJ d. i?,? " `r.p c
The attu :lfc1 * ~ ^e ham 1tee ay} c d wvi 1
cfca1c ted for inf'oi.x: atia p v2t'wzt c 1110' action an Z,
'l
,,,see para. 2, c-11-?!,1.} v 25X1
F OlV E~ for
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SECS
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