POST-MORTEM OF NIE PRODUCTION FOR FIRST SIX MONTHS OF 1954

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R00971A000500010006-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 1, 2006
• Sequence Number: 6
• Publication Date: November 1, 1954
• Content Type: MF

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SECRET 10170#-c
C E N T R A L IN T E L L I G E N C E A G E N C Y
1 November 1954
MEMORANDUM FOR THE INTELLIGI?NCE ADVISC RY C012-11ITTEE
SUBJECT: Post-Mortem of NIE Production for First Six
Months of 1954
1. Attached are the consolidated findings on intelligence
deficiencies noted in NIE product on for the period 1 January -
30 June 1954.. Tab A lists the estimates produced in the six-
month period on which the findings are based,
2. This review of intelligence deficiencies has been prepared
in compliance with the IAC action of 11 May 1954 (IAC:' 151directing that such a paper be produced semi-annually for IAC
noting and circulation by the DCI.
3. This will be placed on the agenda of the IAC meeting
scheduled for 9 November.
Deputy Assistant irec or
National Estimates
The classification of TAB A is SECRET
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C E N T R A L I N T E L L I G E N C E A G E N C Y
1 November 1954
SUBJECT: POST-MORTEM OF TIE PRODUCTION FOR THE PERIOD 1 JANUARY
TO 30 JUNE 195+
The following is a review of intelligence deficiencies re-
vealed in the preparation of National Intelligence Estimates
during the first six months of 1954. These deficiencies identify
areas in which intelligence information is inadequate due either
to gaps in collection or in research and analysis. No attempt is
made to deal with the validity of substantive judgments made in
the estimates. No order of priority is implied in the listing of
gaps within sections. The estimates upon which these consolidated
findings are based are listed in Tab A.
1. General
Since the intelligence deficiencies noted in this report
reflect only the estimates undertaken during the six month period
being reviewed, the list is by no means complete. In spite of the
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substantial intelligence information available, there continue to
be numerous areas in which significant data are lacking. In general,
it will be noted that the most important intelligence deficiency in
the Soviet Bloc is one of collection, a fact which emphasizes the
necessity for greater collection efforts in this area. Meanwhile,
there is a need for full exploitation of available information. In
most other areas, notably in Western Europe, the over-all coverage
is good and vast quantities of data are available. The problem here
is largely one of research and analysis rather than collection.
Soviet Bloc (excluding; Communist China)
Gaps in intelligence on the Soviet Bloc continue to be those
inherent in the restrictive security policies of the Communist
states. However, the methods npen to US intelligence for ex-
ploiting the limited range of data available are capable of
further development and improvement. In general, the most
significant gaps continue to be those relative to economic trends
and scientific and technological developments. There also are gaps
in many aspects of Soviet military capabilities. Estimative work
in the period under review indicated a need for greater collection
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efforts or more effective and more generally acceptable analytical
methods in the following fields:
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3. Far East
The most critical uncertainties in this area recurred in
one form or another in the preparation of many of the estimates
produced during this period. Certain of the gaps listed probably
can never be closed, others could be closed by greater collection
efforts, while the remainder could be narrowed by improved
analysis of available data.
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4. Western Europe
The major intelligence problems with regard to Western
Europe primarily involve the evaluation, analysis, and synthesis
of vast quantities of data, rather than collection deficiencies.
However, production of NIE 100-54, "Probable; Effects of Increasing
Nuclear Capabilities Upon the Policies of US Allies," revealed the
importance of systematic collection of all possible evidence on
the attitude and fears of foreign peoples and governments with
respect to the threat of nuclear warfare in an age of "nuclear
policy."
5. Middle East-South Asia
The two national intelligence estimates in this area
completed during the first half of 1954 confirmed the continued
existence of intelligence gaps noted previously. (See ONE
Memory ndum to the IAC, "Post-Mortem of NIE Production for 1953,"
dated 13 May 1954, pages 8 and 9.)
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6. Latin America
Over-all intelligence coverage of the Latin American area
is good, although deficiencies still exist in the following forces;
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7. Miscellaneous Estimates
The NIErs produced during the period is the 100 (Miscel-
laneous) series were rather specialized estimates dealing
primarily with questions involving speculation and Judgment on
which little "evidence" was available. However, NIE 100-3-54
"Consequences of a Relaxation of non-Corrnunist Controls on Trade
with the Soviet Bloc" indicated, as have other East-West trade
estimates, the need for better evidence with respect to Soviet
scientific and technological developments in order to more ad-
equately determine the "qualitative" (as opposed to the quantita-
tive) importance of imports from the West to Soviet military
strength.
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