POST-MORTEM OF NIE PRODUCTION FOR FIRST SIX MONTHS OF 1954

Document Type: 
Collection: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
CIA-RDP79R00971A000500010009-2
Release Decision: 
RIPPUB
Original Classification: 
T
Document Page Count: 
5
Document Creation Date: 
December 16, 2016
Document Release Date: 
August 17, 2005
Sequence Number: 
9
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
October 7, 1954
Content Type: 
MF
File: 
AttachmentSize
PDF icon CIA-RDP79R00971A000500010009-2.pdf136.98 KB
Body: 
--TOI' SECRET Approved For Fase 2005/08/24: CIA-RDP79R00971A0500010009-2 101708 7 October 1954 MEILORANDUM FOR CHIEF, ESTI]L4TES STAFF SUBJECTS Post-Mortem of NIS Production for First Six Months of 1954 1o There is attached a draft of consolidated findings on intelligence gaps noted in NIE production for the period 1 January 30 June 1954. This draft consists largely of the contributions received in response to my memorandum of 8 September to the several section chiefs with only minor editorial changes. 2. It is proposed that this draft be considered in detail by the General Group at the earliest possible date with a view to submitting a revised version to the Board as soon as possible, 3. The target date for IAC consideration is 26 October. In order to meet this, the following schedule is recommended$ Completion of General Group Review: 11 October Completion of Board Review and dispatch to I&C representatives: 14 October Meeting of IAC representatives: 20 October Copies: This memorandum may be downgraded to SECRET when the attachment is removed, I 25X1 25X1 Approved For Release 2005/08/24: CIA-RDP79'200971A000500010009-2 Approved For Rase 2005/08/24: CIA-RDP79R00971A500010009-2 TOP SECRET Enclosure A 7 October 1954 SUBJECT: Pont Mortem of NIB Productionfor the Period 1 January to 30 June 1954 The following is a review of intelligence deficiencies revealed during the preparation of National Intelligence Estimates during the first six months of 19540 The estimates upon which these consoli- dated findings are based are listed in Tab A. In most cases substantial intelligence information wee available for the NIB V5 produced during the period under consideration. In many casess however$ there continued to be a serious need both for more reliable intelligence and for more timely receipt and evaluation of this intelligence in Washington. In particulars there is a continuing need for better intelligence Since' generally, information is more easily obtainable on the Satellites (particularly on East Germany and East Berlin) than on the USSR TOP SECRET Approved For Release 2005/08/24: CIA-RDP79R00971A000500010009-2 Approved For F~Wase 2005/08/24: CIA-RDP79R00971 0500010009-2 TOP SECRET and since intelligence on the Satellites is of considerable help in analysing developments in the USSR,, an expanded effort should be made to exploit all available channels for obtaining econotic, political, scientific, and military information the -satellites. 2.o Soviet Bloc Gaps in intelligence on the Soviet Bloc continue to be those inherent in the restrictive policies of the Ccmunist stateso However, the methods employed by US intelligence for exploiting the development, Estimative work in the period under review indicated a need for greater collection efforts or more effective and more generally acceptable analytical methods in the following fields: limited range of data available are probable capable of further 25X1 Approved For Release 2005/08/24: CIA-RDP79R00971A000500010009-2 25X1 Approved For Release 2005/08/24: CIA-RDP79R00971A000500010009-2 Next 7 Page(s) In Document Exempt Approved For Release 2005/08/24: CIA-RDP79R00971A000500010009-2 Approved For Fuse 2005/08/24: CIA-RDP79R009710500010009-2 25X1 Miscellaneous Estimates The NIE?s produced during the period in the 100 (Miscellaneous) series were rather specialized estimates dealing primarily with questions involving speculation and judgment on which little "evidence" was available, However, production of NIE 100-54 "Probable Effects of Increasing Nuclear Capabilities Upon the Policies of US Allies," on a subject generally agreed to be of continuing and increasing Importance, Indicated the necessity for systematic collection of all possible evidence on the attitudes and fears of foreign peoples and governments with respect to the threat of nuclear 'carfare in-an age of "nuclear plentyo" NIE 100-3-54 "Consequences of a Relaxation of Non-'Communist Controls on Trade with the Soviet Bloc" Indicated, as have other East-West trade ostimates, the need for better evidence on the "qualitative" (as opposed to quantitative) importance of imports from the West to Soviet military strengtho Approved For Release 2005/08/24: CIA-RDP79R00971A000500010009-2