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Document Creation Date: 
December 20, 2016
Document Release Date: 
October 13, 2006
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April 30, 1954
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Approved For Release 2006/10/13: CIA-RDP79R00971A000500010011-9 79199 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY 30 April 1954 IM AIQDM Ft T HE II ADVIS Ca4KI'1TEE SUBJECT: Post Moartem of 1953 Production 1. Attaehed (Enclosure "A") Is a state mennt of Intel ligenee deficiencies which have been identified by revi,ewi the NM's Prodmed in 1953. This stat++ nt was considered by your representatives on 27 April. 2. The procedure followed in this case teas ezperimsntal; it differs from the appretwed procedure (Etolosure "B") In that the total Production was used as a basis for the statement of deficiencies rather than having a sepe ate statement prepared for indiridva1 estimates. 3. As a result of this exercise. we believe that some modification of the present procedure is desirable aloft the lines of Enclosure "C". b. The Pest Mrtm of 1953 Production will be placed on the IAC agenda at an early date. The ppraposed revision of the procedure is su Etted for review. Yang representatives will, be nested within the next few days for their views before it is formally submitted to the IAC. National Estimates Distribution "A" CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS Q C l NEXT REVIEW DATE: ~--- AUTH: HR 70-2 DATE: i t2 DOCUMENT NO. - -NO CHANGE !N CLASS, t I I I25X1 Approved For Release 2006/10/13: CIA-RDP79R00971AO00500010011-9 Approved For Release 2006/10/13: CIA-RDP79R00971A0005500_0010011-9 ! c1o f "A" 30 April, 1954 The topaz g is a r view of Lntelli ace deftc teueies revealed durirt potion of 1awttcnal last e1ii enca during 1953. The priaaeipa .. eti tea upot ,ith the 'ivai:- r are based are 1.i stead in TAB A. '' as a. An imprtmm* in the L tai n b twee ? ,' inte.i .i., via,me ec,bMal .a* it the tie l-i ax z .c.; Waaahlagtor vnv.ld re "salt in the more of inte:il.igerce ark the receipt of ad 1ti, Intels.i re e b. rmr1y, to L a re ea~si _ obt;.aat,:,r v` }, y or. moist r : and a t , Derl.?) t h a n on the M Ti o "ince te'11i1jeaice uty, the . atel: Itie representative of ti L)IfU& reaer's=ate;; the >n paragraph a , v Approved For Release 2006/10/13: CIA-R.DP79R00971A000500010011-9 Approved For Release 2006/10/13: CIA-RDP79R00971A000500010011-9 ~- `mi'l help in analyzing developments in the USSR, an expanded effort should be made to exploit all available channels for obtaining economic, political, scientific, and military information on the Satellites. c. In view of the relative paucity of information and intelligence on the USSR, it is important that what is available be exploited fully. Soviet propaganda is one source which possibly could be more fully exploited. 2. SOVIET BLOC The gaps in our intelligence with respect to the Soviet Bloc have been widely recognized for a long tima. Many of them will probably never be filled. During 1953 a need was expressed for more effort on the resistance potential in the Bloc. Accordingly, on 8 December 1953, the IAC authorized creation of an Ad The Resistance Intelligence Committee. Experience during 1953 also indicated a need for greater collection and research efforts in the following key areas: a. Aircraft Production. With the growth of Soviet atomic power, accurate estimates of Soviet long- range and fighter aircraft production are of critical Approved For Release 2006/10/13: CIA-RDP79R00971A000500010011-9 Approved For Release 2006/10/13: CIA-RDP79R00971A000500010011-9 importance. Efforts should therefore be continued to improve the basis of estimates of Soviet aircraft production* b. Basic Science and Technology. Special emphasis should be put on the collection and research effort in the field of electronics. c. Air Offense and Defense. Continued emphasis on weapons having possible dual offensive and defensive mission; missile development and production; and, aircraft development and production. d. Soviet Offensive Capabilities. Submarine characteristics, particularly propulsion, and of weapons for use with submarines (torpedoes, mines, and missiles). Of continuing interest are Soviet capabilities and developments in the fields of ASV RW, OW, and CW. *e. Soviet Defensive Capabilities. Early warning, filter process, and coeurminications relating to air defense; airborne radar; and ground control intercept. * The representative of the DI/USAF' reserved the position of AFOfl on paragraphs c., d., and e. _3_ Approved For Release 2006/10/13: IA-R P79R00971A000500010011-9 Approved For Release 2006/10/13: CIA-RDP79ROO971A000500010011-9 wrr f. Economic Trends. Intelligence materials on the various sectors of the Soviet economy are inadequate for fully satisfactory analyses of economic develop?ents and trends. All agencies having intelligence production responsibilities in this field should re- examine and refine so far as possible the materials relating to its specific areas of responsibility and each should seek to imp-ova its field collection efforts. European Satellites. Significant gaps in intelligence on the Satellites revolve on the extent and nature of resistance movements, and the nature of the Soviet mechanism for exercising control in these countries. EAST 3. PAR Hwy of the intelligence deficiencies in the Communist Far East are similar to those that exist for the Bloc as a Whole. The most critical gaps throughout the Far East include: a. Sino-Soviet Relations. Our ability to estimate Communist capabilities and courses of action in TOP SEG 7,' Approved For Release 2006/10/13: CIA-RDP79R00971AO00500010011-9 Approved For Release 2006/10/13: CIA-RDP79ROO971AO00500010011-9 the Par East will depend to a large extent on our knowledge of the nature of all aspects of the Sino-Soviet relationship. This is largely a collection problem and should be given a very high priority. b. Communist Courses of Action. The reaction and extent of the effect on Commtnist courses of action in Asia of a significant change in the military situation in Indochina. c. Chinese Communist Economy. Experience during 1953, particularly in the preparation of SE-37, indicated a continuing need for more specific and reliable information on Chinese economic development. One important example is China's transportation capabilities, particularly as these affect Chinese military capabilities. d. Viet Minh Capabilities and Intentions. During 1953 we have continued to rely almost exclusively on French sources for information concerning Viet Minh capabilities and intentions, both military and political, and concerning Chinese Caaaunist TOP SECRET Approved For Release 2006/10/13: CIA-RDP79R00971A000500010011-9 Approved For Release 2006/10/13: CIA-RDP79R00971A000500010011-9 support of the Viet Minh. Steps should be taken to develop independent sources of intelligence in this field. f. Indonesia. Preparation of NIE-77 and SE-51 revealed the continuing and urgent need for more information on the political orientation of the Indonesian Goverment and the capabilities and intentions of the Communist and other dissident groups in Indonesia. g. Burma. The fluid and confused situation in Burma requires a steady flow of information on the orientation of the Burmese Government and its capabilities and intentions with respect to Communist and other dissident groups. * The G-2 representative reserved the position of G-2 on paragraph a. -6- Approved For Release 2006/10/13: A-`RDP79R00971A000500010011-9 Approved For Release 2006/10/13: CIA-RDP79R00971A000500010011-9 `ma'r 1 25X6 TOP SE MM 5- MIDDLE EAST-AFRICA Experience during 1953 indicated that over-0.l intelligence coverage of the Middle East is good. The top priority targets _7w Approved For Release 2006/10? 3! ;1R-RDP79R00971A00050001001.1-9 Approved For Release 2006/10/13: CIA-RDP79R00971A000500010011-9 TOP SECRET remain Iran and Egypt. The principal intelligence gaps noted -- were: b. Indian Border Areas. Reporting from the Indian border areas, particularly from Kashmir and Nepal, was inadequate in view of increasing Cammcmist interest in the area and indications of increasing friction between these areas and India. c. t. Although coverage of the Anglo-Egyptian dispute was excellent, further coverage would be useful on the internal political situation, particularly on the activities of the opposition. d. Africa Intelligence coverage of Africa is meager. We rely too heavily on the European metropoles for the limited Information we receive on such issues as Communism, nationalism, racial tension, and intertribal relations. Assuming TOP SECRET Approved For Release 2006/10/13: CIA-RDP79R00971AO00500010011-9 Approved For Release 2006/10/13: CIA-RDP79R00971A000500010011-9 %W 14~ continued growth on the itrortance of Africa . as a raw material source for the US, and growing unrest throughout the continent, broader intelligence coverage will beconve increasingly important. 6. Lim AMERICA Ovar-all intelligence coverage of Latin America is good. How- ever, deficiencies exist in the following fields: a. Military opinion: Fuller reporting is desirable on the political positions of important military figures and an treads in the political views of both senior and jwiior military officers. With respect to Guatemala, more information is desirable on the degree of disaffection or anxiety in the officer corps resulting from Arbenx' collaboration with Ca nsun(sts and the army's inability to obtain US military material. b. Commmism. Fuller inforz tion is needed on trends in Commilnist party strengths, and on Commtwist infiltration' of government, labor, and intellectual circles, especially in Argentina and Bolivia. -9- TOP Boom Approved For Release 2006/10/13: CIA-RDP79R00971A000500010011-9 Approved For Release 2006/10/13: CIA-RDP79R00971A000500010011-9 Co The situation of labor. Nbre concrete information is desirod on the political orientation and the economic status of both organized and unorganized labor in all the countries with politically significant labor mots, Approved For Release 2006/1 0 :qI WP79R00971A000500010011-9 Approved For Release 2006/10/13: CIA-RDP79ROO971AO005OO010011-9 %00 Imr, TAB "A" 0/NE Memo 30 April 1954 PRINCIPAL ICE PRODUCTION BASE FOR 1953 PORT NUM M FINDI*38 1. SOVIET BLOC MR-65 Soviet Bloc Capabilities through 1957 NIE-81 Probable Soviet Courses of Action with Respect to Germany through Mid-1954 ME-87 Probable Developments within the European Satellites through Mid-1955 ME-90 Soviet Bloc Capabilities through Mid-1955 MIS-95 Probable Soviet Bloc Courses of Action through Mid-1955 SE-36 Soviet Capabilities for Attack on the US through ltd-1955 SE-36/1 Soviet Capabilities for Attack on the US through Mid-1955 SE-38 Soviet Bloc Capabilities and Probable Courses of Action in Electromagnetic Warfare SE-39 Probable Consequences of the Death of Stalin and of the Elevation of Maler3kov to leadership in the UM Communist Reactions to US Establishment of a "Volunteer Freedom Corps" SE-42 Current Communist Tactics BE-46 Probable Long-Term Development of the Soviet Bloc and. Western Power Positions SE-47 Probable Effect of Recent Developments in Eastern Germny on Soviet Policy with Respect to Germany TOP SECRET Approved For Release 2006/10/13: CIA-RDP79ROO971AO00500010011-9 Approved For Release 2006/10/13: CIA-RDP79R00971A000500010011-9 Iwo V w 2. FAR BAST NIE-71 Probable Developments in Burma through 1953 HIE-77 Probable Developments in Indonesia NIE-OC) Communist Capabilities and Probable Courses of Action in Korea .NIB-91 Probable Developments in Indochina through 1954 SE-37 Probable Effects on the Soviet Bloc of Certain Courses of Action Directed at the Internal and External Commerce of Communist China SE-45 Thailand's Ability to Withstand Camso'nist Pressure or Attacks through Mid-1951 SE-48 Capabilities and Probable Courses of Action of the Republic of Korea with Respect to the Armistice in Korea SE-51 The Significance of the Nov Indonesian Government SE-53 Probable 0,swinist Reactions to Certain Possible Developments in. Indochina 3. WF N EUROPE HIE-63 France's Probable Future Role in the Western Security System NIE-63/1 Probable Short Term Dwelc rents in French Policy NIE-71 Probable Outlook for Italy NMM-93 Probable Devulopnenta in Yugoslavia SE-51 The Political Outlook in Italy TOP SECHET Approved For Release 2006/10/13: CIA-RDP79R00971A000500010011-9 Approved For Release 2006/10/13: CIA-RDP79R00971A00050;0010011-9 4. NEAR EAST AFRICA EM-73 Conditions and Trends in the Middle East Affecting US Security NIE-75/1 Probable Develorwnts in Iran through 1953 NIE-76 Probable Developments in Egypt NO-79 Probable Developments in South Asia NIE-83 Conditions and Trends in Tropical Africa ME-102 Probable Developments in Iran through 1954 SE-49 The Current Outlook in Iran IN AH RICA NIE-84 Probable Developments in Guatemala NIE-85 Probable Developo&nts in Chile NIE-86 . Probable Developaents in Brazil TOP SECRWI' Approved For Release 2006/10/13: CIA-RDP79R00971A000500010011-9 ac1osure "W' CENTRAL T ua T2 L L ! G E mY SA E k _:J x' ~' ten (XIM OF NATIONAL 3 June 1952 D A.Sa .> Director/Adm. Vatl mil H'3t ter Approved For Release,2006/10/13: CIA-RDP79ROO971A00 }5 }0010011-9 IMICU ;BI x FOR TIC SUB3:'CT> Proqedure for Reducing z I~'f e i f~ OW tell genre Eet i to The at h d procedure ha n teen p r: ? d and bb e iculated for information pursuant ~ c IA fa r: et on an 22 lby (see der 2,, :r, t4 ` .) o Approved For Release 2006/10/13: CIA-RDP79R0091A000500010011-9 Approved For Releaae_2006/10/13: CIA-RDP79R009P1A000010011-9 OR X SECUWIT ' I UTTIM C E N T d L : i L N T .; L 1. 1 G it ik' ~t E A `~:i u t 1 C Y 3 Jute 1952 E` 'aa Dm ! ILIGENer IN ILAg~y IOAYtf.Ha ~' ILI{ II:.1C.,?a .T?.V .o~..~.1` m 1. When term u'? of reference are cfra ,&3 'dye roles, VM be requested asovIA at or i in tae `: ela a regarding .ioh the is : na 0e to int illiprce. Each a g oy viii refer h i s< ie to appropriatc= *2aecti ,n agencies with a request that neo&ed I n, alligen se da. when ;? 'asctit bla in time for ae in the ett 2. ftring t< pro-p"ation of the inte6at aft, Inadequacies that qtr di ooI d In twtribi Lions I "Li be referred to the cr `xibuting agonelcz Jeln anion. This m97 be dome in ling or though forml .ouXoi nape , Some- times the elAba tl n will a imt fix ref ramm h, At other times collection ma~r be :.aces. 3. DuAng t'ha time when the aim ft ant:' to iv Wore LAG rep aentati . a if the of dlab) ; tte131gence to # 4, th:a requirement may be di,SCU' sssa d a i1h within the meeting or i ormany outside U. if a subsequent draft this draft will note the requirement with a sit eme t t' e a priate agency eitl has been or In there1q requested to olari or am< . the post. SECRET Approved For Release 2006/10/13: CIA-RDP79R0091A000500010011-9 Approved For Release 006/10/13: CIA-RDP79R00971A00Q509010011-9 4. ArUw _ estJte is fi s ted each, me Rim coUesxt co n nt s from appropriate ttr en and refer than to t: yj mis'tn Director for Natlcww2 & t tes. Ora the baz ls the tents, m pplemented by kLa mm ? .- , the Off lm of National Fasttwtt z a. Prepare a "Consolidated Critique" containing the octtsmwits reoeived 4 age sies and also O/ vlam with a r y i di tin waak- nessem in the conclusions or supporting ovideme that, ara a ested etth by thn commmts or by Q/IE itself, Such a uGormlidated Cr1tigcte' will . be cl nilat. ed to they agemies. for infer,=-, mt:'atx, ba In dition$, on its own :r itlat-i a or at the request of ejM- of the psr ,icilmtti 'r C agsnaies~ draft a proposed "Stat nt of te1li oe Def,tcienclesa" This ll 1 inte11ig' deficiencies pointed out in ommments received t a noiis and also those believed by O/M, to OXIAp Approved For Release 2006/10/13: CIA-RDP79R00971A000500010011-9 Approved For Release 2006/10/13: CIA-RDP79ROO971AO 0500010011-9 %10 1 5, Folio dng circulation of a daft Statensent, (der, 4 b), o w i l l c am a meeting to be attended by x presentative of the agencies,, and of the Assistant Director for Intelligence Coordination, CIA. pose of this mew 9 g gill be (1) to determine other existing inteUigence is inadequate and in what rea cts; (2) to determine whether corrective action is needed in the collection or research fields 6, After this meting a State nt of findings will, be forwarded to the Director of Central Intelligence. This State- ment nay be accompanied by reco ndations for actions; if appropriate, or by a statement that no specific action is recosmended and that e-, agency will take continuing action within the field of ite x sponsibi_lities. Upon receipt of this Stat * t the Director of Central Intelligence will forward it to the members of the I,AC for info. .tion or action, as appropriate. 7. By receipt of a copy of the Statama t, the :1aict- t Director for Intelligence Coordination will be designated as the DCVs action officer. - 3 .. SBCRET Approved For Release 2006/10/13: CIA-RDP79R00971A000500010011-9 Approved For Release 2006/10/13: CIA-RDP79R00971A000&~500010011-9 ftclosura "C" DRAFT I IOF:APIDUM FOR TIE INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE SUBJECT s Revision of Procedure for Reducing Intelligence Deficiencies in National Intelligence Deficiencies REFERENCE s Paragraph 2p IAC4!'71 and ONE Memorandum to IAC on above subject dated 3 June 1952, lo The existing procedure!for reducing intelligence deficiencies in National Intelligence Estimates has been found unsatisfactory and is only occasionally used, The principal reason for this disuse appears to stem from the difficulty of using individual and often specialized estimates as a basis for formulating comprehensive guides for collection and research by the appropriate agencies. Based on a trail run covering 1953 productionp the IAC representatives have concluded that such comprehensive guidance could better be provided by a quarterly critique on intelligence gaps to be published as part of the quarterly program for the production of National Intelligence Estimates. Such a.publication would permit the IAC to discharge its responsibility for detecting and reducing intelligence deficiencies more effectively than a series of overlapping and narrow directives tied specifically to individual estimates. Approved For Release 2006/10/13: CIA-RDP79R00971AO00500010011-9 Approved For Release 2006/10/13: CIA-RDP79ROO971AOOQ500010011-9 RDCONNDAT ION 3o It is therefore recommended that the IAC revise its procedure as follows (reference ONE Memorandum of 3 June 1952): ao No change in Paragraphs I thru 3 bo Paragraphs 4 thru ? to read as follows: "lto After an estimate is finished, each agency will collect comments from appropriate sources and refer then to the Assistant Director for National Estimates. On the basis of these eommints,supplemented by its own views, the Office of National Estimates will prepare a quarterly "Statement of Intelligence Deficiencies". The statement may be accompanied by recommendations for action, if appropriate, or by a statement that no specific action is recommended and that each agency will take continuing action within the field of its responsibilitieso After the IAC representatives have convened to discus this draft statement, the final report will be submitted for approval by the IACo" SECRET Approved For Release 2006/10/13: CIA-RDP79ROO971AO00500010011-9