YOU ASKED ONLY FOR A GENERAL APPRAISAL OF THE IAC ESTIMATE OF NOVEMBER 9 (#32682), COPY 26 OF WHICH YOU LEFT WITH ME, BUT I THOUGHT THAT A SERIES OF DETAILED COMMENTS MIGHT BETTER EXPRESS MY VIEWS ON IT.

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R01012A000200020006-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 20, 2012
• Sequence Number: 6
• Publication Date: November 15, 1950
• Content Type: LETTER

25X1
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Mt INSTITUTE FOR ADVANCED
Prineetoul New Jerse.
School of 'Historical Studies
Dear Bill:
November l5 1950
You asked only for a general appraisal-of the IAC Eetimate of
November 9 (02682), copy 26 of which you left with me, but I thought
that a Aeries of detailed Comments might better express ene views on
it. If there it any general comment I would have to make, it is that,
like so many of our intelligence :estimates, it suffers fraa an exces-
sive rigidity e' language, and form (LL: probably.unavoideb10). It
seems to me that the rigid and schematic concept of the questions -
which ought to be answered in such an estimate forces us to try to
compress too much into given compartments, at the risk of artificie,
ality and over-simplification (aLs: Certainly true). But you will
see better what I?meadlif I Make my detailed cemmentsvto-wit:
Comments on DISCUSSION
a. Page 2, Paragraph 5: The diseussion of the motives Which
might underlie a Soviet resort to armed force seems to me to give too
little attention to the possibility that war may flow from a whole
series of complications in which the Soviet rulers feel their hand
forced and see no acceptable alternative than to fight. We are apt
to? forget their internal political problems and, the extent to which
they are sensitive to any threat to the stability of their rule (Tate
Yes, agree absolutely).,
.b. Page 3, last two lines of paragraph 9: This refers to the
advantage to the. Soviets of "control over the resources of Western
Europe and other areas obtained as a result of Soviet conquests in,
the early stage of the war."
It is my feeling that we greatly over-rate the ability of
the Soviet authority to develop with aay efficiency, or speed the
economic resources of a conquered area. Mere, we are probably yielding
to the temptation to fight the last war instead of the,negt one, and
are identifying the Russians with the Germane. The Russians tend to
be as destructive as grasshoppers, and productivity does not exactly '
spring up at their first military touch (WLL: Good point. This whole
matter requires development with reference to Soviet practice in
Balkees).
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c. Page 4, paragraph 16, next to last sentence: When the
Soviets have attained this atomic capability, the U.S. superiority in
total numbers of atomic bombs will no longer be a deterrent to the
Soviet decision for war, in the same relative degree as before."
I would watch this one. It is extremely important, and seems.
to me to involve some sloppy thinking. The question is whether, if
the Soviets feel that war would mean terrible and crippling blows to
their own cities and economy, they would take that prospect with
greater equanimity if they felt they could inflict comparable or
greater damage on the West.? From the thesis stated in the papery one
could only conclude that the main concern of the Kremlin was only to
make sure that the conflict should not be one-sidedly damaging to the
U.S.S.R., but rather mutually suicidal. This ascribes to them motives
and attitudes quite different from what I believe to be their real
ones. It ignores the strong probability that the Soviet leaders are
more concerned to protect what they have .than to destroy what they
haven't. It overrates the importance which we enjoy in their eyes,
and it falls into the dangerous error of believing that final decisions
in the use of mass destruction weapons will rest on the total equation
of probable destruction rather than on the limit of what the individual
government feels its country,can take. We should not forget that there
are limits of cost, in terms of destruction within the Soviet Union,
beyond which it would not be economical for the Soviet Government to
effect any amount of destruction abroad (WLL: On the face of it this
makes excellent sense. We must make greater effort to view things from
the angle of their interest. Every power must have grave reservations
on this score).
d. Pap 5, paragraph 25: Herev and at other points in the paper,
there is reference to the Soviets "accepting the risk of a general warn.
This phrase is vague in most of the instances where it is used. Does
the word "risks" mean "risks flowing from the events of a general war
once one has developed" or does it mean the risk that one may develop?
This latter risk already exists. Would it not be better simply to say
"to accept a general war"? (WIAL: Yes.)
e. On the same page, the entire discussion of this aspect of
Soviet intentions seems to me to view a possible war too much as a
boxing match, detached from the question of political purposes and con-
sequences (WU: Right).
f. Pace 8, paragraph 39: This envisages only the possibility
that a general war might occur as a result of some Soviet action
undertaken without deliberate intention to precipitate a general war.
I think it ought also to envisage the possibility that it might occur
2.
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C unrulti 0
as a resat of some such action on gur part or some other inoident ?
.flowing from the entire trend of international events and ndt just
from their action (NLL: Again we Diast considerahow they view oz'
actions).
g. Page 8, paragraph 40; It seem*) to me that the use of the
worn "aggression" and the phrase "policy of aggression", while perhaps
morally justified ,nnd useful for propaganda purposes, should not have
a place in dispassionate estimates of ?this sort. Whether civil con-
flict in Korea was properly classified as Soviet "aggression" is some-
thing which, it seems to me, need not be argued in this connection.
If the Soviet "policy of aggression" means moving Soviet forces across
International frontiers in unilateral aggressive actions, without any
legal or practical justifications, then probably the invasions of Fin-
land and Eastern Poland in 1939 were the only clear eases. If, on the
other hand, it means encouraging Soviet supporters in other countries
to rise in insurrection whenever they feel themselves strong enough to
seize power, that is a different thing. From that standpoint, I think
the use of the term "aggression" is misleading.'(WLL: Good old problem
about direct and indirect aggression. Might be worth re-examining
Soviet stand in 1939 end present "Vishinsky Doctrine",)
h. Page 8, paragraph 41: To my-mind, this analysis is quite
wrong. See the attached draft of a letter (not sent) to Anne 011iare
McCormick (WLIa Check this).
k
IG Page 9, paragraphs 45 and following paragraphs: All of this
,pains me for its lack of historical perspective and for the impression
it gives that all of us, including the Soviet rulers, were born yester-
day and that today represents some new sort of platform for new deci-
sions and schemes of Soviet policy. It is said that the Soviet rulers
"may attempt" to achieve their objectives by two alternative courses,
both of which are here outlined. But points a and b of ,Course One rep-
resent may an over.-simplification of what has been standard Soviet ?
practice for over thirty years.- Why, then, say they "may attempt" to
do this? They have attempted, are attempting, and no doubt will con-
tinue these attempts. They will continue them as long as they can
(WIL: Right).
Again, I object to the wording in point 46.2. As here t
stated, this Can hardly fall into the category of "mama short of
war". I know of no new places where Soviet armed forces could under,
take "local aggression" without running strong risk of launching a
new war. Would it not be more correct to say "to undertake local armed
action by Soviet forces in circumstances not calculated to lead to
war"? (MI Agree.)
3.
ET
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j. Page 9$ paragraph 47: I have my doubts abonA.; the last .
sentence. If the Kremlin comes to the decision that war is inevita-
ble and decides to begin it at a moment favorable to itealff: it will
probably rate very highly the factor of general surprise, and may
therefore not wish to give us the advance notiee'of a provocation
(WU: I would sUppose that atomic: war would almost certainly take
the form of surprise attack).
k. Page 11, paragraph 55; This discussion, contains a number
of implications which bother me. The Soviet leaders do not turn guer7
rilla activities off and en, like water faucets, in other Countries.'
Most of these activities are intimately connected with local situa-
tions which produce and favor them.- What Moscow does is to encourage
and support, or not encourage 'and support.
The last sentence of this paragraph seems to me to be mean-
ingless. This all depends on circumstances (ULL: Yes -- what does
"control the situation" mean?).
1. Page 11, paragraph 56: 1 find, this misleading. Again, we
have the implication that life begins today and that one of,the courses
open to the Kremlin would be to start a wholly new situation, namely
guerrilla activities in Greece. The Kremlin leaders have no objection ?
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whatsoever to guerrilla activities in Greece as things are at present;
and if such'activities are not highly deVeloped? it is because the
Yugoslays have withdrawn their support and 'conditions have been
extremely unfavorable, not because Moscow did not make a plan or did
not want them to exist. In general, it should be understood that the
? Kremlin always favors civil War and trouble in other countries where
circumstances permit. Whether the CommuniSt Parties are used for
civil insurrection is not a question of Kremlin planning (dUi
Partially??).; it is 4 question of the opportunities presented to them
by the policies of the respective countries. If the Turks continue
to be ruthless and consistent in the destruction of Communist agents,
Moscow will not sit down and "plan" indirect aggression in Turkey. -
Again, on the Asiatic side, I reiterate: life does not
begin today. The Communists are doing everything that they possibly
can; for example, in Formosa the ceiling of their activities is pro-
vided by the possibilities afforded for such subversive action, not
by decisions in Moscow. The same is true of Hongkong.
The paragraph about Germany (no. 57) seems to me to be sound;
but the paragraph on Asia (no. 58) agnin seems to assume a machine-
like subordination of the Chinese Communists to Moscow discipline.
4.
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4,00, 1.4A.8,93,4.14
cr
I am not denying Moscow s obvious influence in Peiping, but such a
view is too pat and over eimplified (Wa: Obviously requiree further
intelligence and study).
na Page 14, paragraph 66: About all this, I hare the greatest
doubt, and cannot imagine we can assert flatly that the Soviet
Government would try to do all these things simultaueously. All this
reminds me of the joke about ,Its your dream, ladyn. I think it
entirely possible that in the event of war the operations of the Red
Army may be extremely limited ones in the init3a1 stages, and that
the rest may depend in large degree on the course of political de-
velopments. All this imputes to the Russians a logistical potential
greater than I believe them to have and a pattern of intention which
would be plausible only if they, like ourselves, insisted on viewing
war as an event in itself detached from political purposes and conse-
quences (wIL: I agree. The whole program as outlined seems to me
extravagant).
n. Page 15, paragraph 69: The last sentence on this page seems
to me to have no other value than that of a blanket disclaimer for
all future responsibility on the part of the CIA. I really find It...
impossibleto believe that the maintenance of such a state of prepara-
tion would be a physical possibility for even the most efficient of
nations, and the Russians are decidedly not inclined to just' this
sort of preparedness (WLIA Note this -- I doubt if such a disclaimer
was intended. Furthermore, the CIA is not alone involved. I share
these doubts).
o. Page 2, Appendix A: I would point out that our obligations
to other countries now embrace not only our commitments under written
pacts but also the moral commitments we have incurred by the accept-
ance of international support in Korea; toward the Turks, the British,
the Australians and the Canadians, for example, we now have obligations
far more serious than treaties of alliance.
p. Page 41 Appendix An paragraph 18: To my mind this gives an -
erroneous impression. The basis of the obedience which the Communist
leaders can command in Russia, in eeace as in war, is fear not enthu-
siasm. Doctrine is not the mainstay of the regime; intimidation is.
This same thought applies to paragraph 19. Of course the vast majority
would acquiesce in the decision of the Kremlin, as long as the alter-
native is death or the concentration camp. But this should be dis-
tinguished from the state of mind in which they would go to war.
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,..sS saf.rimfall4;#4.
45
q. Page 49 Appendix A, paragraph 20: I find this discussion
inadequate, Bear in mind that now a great portion (WIL: Now groat?)
of the Soviet citizens would be happy Li' this regime could be replaced
tsith another one. While they would not show this by their words or
behavior, they would wish, in time of uar, that the war might result
in the overthrow of the regime. But their attitude would be extensively
affected by the way in which we conducted the war and by the skillful-
ness of our political approach to them (WLL: Can this be true of large
numbers?).
.r. Page 4, Appendix A, paragraph 234 ? I hope that this may not
be taken to mean that. rebellion is regarded, as possible only. among the
national minorities, The feelings of the Great Russian people are
_little, if anyvleas bitter and they should not be ignored- (WU:
Would be interesting to have the evidence on this.). ? -
s. Appendix B:- Several of the above comments apply to this..
appendix as well. .
The statements in paragraph 19 (page 3-5) about the possibility
of satellite forces over-running Yugoslavia again reflects a tendency
? to treat the satellites as bloodless pawns of the Kremlin and to assume
that military factors are the only criteria governing the determination
of M03C0WIS policies (WIALa And there is further question whether mili-
tarily Yugoslavia could withstand combined satellite attack). In
examining the desirability of using the satellites against Yugoslavia,
the Kremlin would have to take into account a host of delicate political
questions, such as future territorial settlements, effects on the
political stability oftthe other Balkan satellites, nature of the
regime to replace Tito in Yugoslavia, etc. These questions are not
by any means as easy as they sound. They are the ones Moscow will
think about--not just about who might win the military encounter.
Our stubborn insistence on viewing military action outside of its
political context?as though nothing mattered but the military result--
is a dangerous act of self delusion (lWIL: Again, let us think more
of how the Soviets view the situation).
t. Page B-6, paragraph 23:. TO read this paragraph, you would
think that. Communist guerrilla operations in Greece would represent an,
unheard of situation we had never faced before. Why should such opera-
tions be a greater problem to us, new that 'stability and confidence
and economic life have been restored, than they were in the dark days
or 1947?
ua Page 3-7, paragraph-25: "Communism has little appeal to the
Turks..."; this is not the point, or not the way to put it. What is
important there is not a question of popular "appeal"; What is important
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Xs that governmental policy in Turkey makes that country relatively
resistant to internal Commanist presstres._ Again, ehen you say the
Soviet Union "could exert" presetre on the Turks by fostering the move-
ment for Kurdish autonomy, why give the.impnession that life begins
today and that the Kurds represent a faucet handle the Russians might
decide to turn? (wIL: 1 mbscribe wholeheartedly to this criticism.)
The Kurdish autonomy movement has been going on for decades, The
Russians have made, and will continue to, make, exactly as much politi-
cal profit from it as circumstances permit; why imply that there are
some new Potentialities which they have never exploited up to this
time but might for some reason now decide to exploit? -
Similarly, in paragraph 26 (page B-7), why should the Russians
at, this time undertake an "intensification" of propaganda and attempts
at sabotage? Their aspirations with respect to Turkey are not new.
Does anyone really think that they have been restraining themselves or
soft pedalling these activities in the past for some reason of delicacy?
Again, the ceiling of what they do is the limit of what they can get
away with.
Again, in the case of the Ifear 4astern states one might
think from the wording of this that the Politburo had sprung into.
existence ori?say.-July 1, 195) and was now Sitting down to draft a
program of world dominatien frem scratch,(II: AUch of this can be
corrected by changing the tense of the verb).
-von Page B-15, paragraphs 62 and 63: This -seems to me to be very
skimpy and Over-simplified treatment of an extremely Important problem.
It ignores entirely the relation of Soviet ction to external factors
(see pry draft letter to Mrs. McCormick, attached).
w. Page-B460 paragraph 65ry This discussion is inadequate.
There Is no the Japanese Communist Party". There are two parties--
one loyal to the Cominform, the other to Mao. The ability of the
Japanese Government to cope with them depends on what we decide to,
give it in the way of an internal police establishment, plus several
other factors. I think we should not be-too smug about the situation
In Japan, especially until we see the psychological results of the peace
treaty operation and the subsequent retention ota U.S. military estab-
lishment there.
Is/ George-F. Kennan
George F, Kerman
?-?
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