IRAN'S POSITION IN THE EAST-WEST CONFLICT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R01012A000200050001-5
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 14, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: April 5, 1951
• Content Type: NIE

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COPY NO. ,Z
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE
IRAN'S POSITION IN THE
EAST-WEST CONFLICT
CUMENT 14 t
f. CHANGE N Cl.
DECLA WEED
CLAS. C NEED
HEX ?RE IEW b
AVM R 70.2
BATE: Fi WE if- 01.3 9
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
NIE-6
Published 5 April 1951
DOCUMENT NO. /
NO CHANGE IN CLASS I-
'D< DECLASSIFIED
CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS S C
NEXT REVIEW DATE:
AUTH: HR 70-2
DATE: ISO rIREVIEWER:_Q 0s.' vs. 7
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tional defense of the United States within the meaning
of the Espionage Act, 50 U.S.C., 31 and 32, as amended.
Its transmission or the revelation of its contents in any
manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
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41,0.9xida-R-EIT.J?
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE
IRAN'S POSITION IN THE EAST-WEST CONFLICT
NIE-6
Published 5 April 1951
The intelligence Organizations of the Departments of State,
the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and the Joint Staff par-
licipated in the preparation of this estimate. All members
of the Intelligence Advisory Committee concurred in this
estimate on 2 April.
*.s.E.g4RrEAr-ob
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?fte$,E,GrRiE=Paaw
IRAN'S POSITION IN THE EAST-WEST CONFLICT
THE PROBLEM
To estimate the position of Iran in the East-West conflict.*
CONCLUSIONS
1. US security interests in Iran have dur-
ing the past six months been progressively
undermined by political and economic
developments that have: (a) weakened
the present regime; (b) induced the gov-
ernment to adopt policies favorable to the
USSR (and hence unfavorable to the
West) ; and (c) increased the influence of
ultranationalist elements, which have al-
ready compelled the government to adopt
policies unfavorable to the West and may
force the adoption of additional measures
against Western interests.
2. For the future, US security interests in
Iran are threatened by:
a. The ever-present Soviet military ca-
pability to launch an attack on Iran with
little or no warning, and Iran's incapabil-
ity of defending itself against such an at-
tack.
b. The possibility that the Iranian Gov-
ernment's policy of restricting Western
interests in Iran may be further extended,
perhaps to the point of eliminating West-
ern interests.
c. The possibility that disorders in the
oil field area, whether or not Communist-
inspired, may restrict or cut off supplies
of Iranian oil to the West.
d. The political and economic instabil-
ity of Iran (particularly as aggravated by
subversion) , which might result in the
breakdown or paralysis of government
control and might lead to the collapse of
the present regime and the establishment
of a completely anti-Western or even a So-
viet-dominated government.
3. With respect to these threats, we be-
lieve that:
a. Unless the Kremlin considers gen-
eral war to be imminent, the USSR is un-
likely under present conditions to take the
risk of international complications in-
volved in overt military action in Iran.
The Kremlin must estimate that there
would be at least an even chance that the
US would oppose any overt military action
by the USSR in Iran.
b. The Iranian Government probably
will impose further restrictions on West-
ern interests, but is unlikely to eliminate
these interests completely.
c. Although there has recently been un-
rest among some of the oil workers, dis-
The importance of Iranian oil to Western Europe, and by implication to the US, has been assessed
in NIE-14, The Importance of Iranian and Middle East Oil to Western Europe Under Peacetime Con-
ditions. The military effect of the loss of Iran on the defensibility of the rest of the Middle East and
its psychological effect on countries of the Near East will be discussed in NIE-26, Key Problems in the
Near and Middle East Affecting US Security Interests.
eiebziexatats
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orders on a scale that would seriously re-
duce supplies of oil to the West are
improbable so long as the government re-
tains effective control of the security
forces.
d. Although there is insufficient evi-
dence to indicate that recent events in
Iran have seriously shaken the govern-
ment's ability to maintain its authority,
there is nevertheless a continuing danger
of a breakdown of government control and
possibly of a political collapse, which in
turn would provide an opportunity for
Communist seizure of power, with or with-
out overt Soviet assistance. If the pres-
ent trend continues?leading to actual
nationalization of the Anglo-Iranian oil
concession, exclusion of the West from ef-
fective participation in Iran's economic
and financial recovery, further political
assassinations, increased weakness in gov-
ernment and in the control of Army and
security forces, and greater exploitation of
unrest and intensification through Soviet
subversive activities?then Iran is likely
in time to become a second Czechoslo-
vakia.
4. Increased Western economic and mili-
tary assistance, if accepted by the Ira-
nian Government, would in the short
term strengthen the present regime and
might in the long run increase Iran's basic
political and economic stability. Such as-
sistance would have to be regarded as a
long range, continuing investment. It
could not be expected to result in a firm
or permanent alignment of Iran with the
West, or increase significantly Iran's small
defensive capability against the USSR.
DISCUSSION
Iran's Present Position
1. Iran's strongest existing connections are
with the West. Iran is presently dependent
on the Western Powers for markets, money,
equipment, and technical advice, and West-
ern commercial interests (primarily British)
play a major role in the Iranian economy.
The Anglo-Iranian Oil Company alone ac-
counts for an estimated 6 to 8 percent of Iran's
national income, provides approximately a
quarter of the Iranian Treasury's total re-
ceipts, and contributes materially to Iran's
foreign exchange through purchase of rials
for local use. Most Iranians are better dis-
posed toward the West than toward the
USSR. The Iranian Government is a recipi-
ent of US military assistance and has US mili-
tary advisers for its army and gendarmerie.
It has consistently supported the US in
the UN.
2. This relationship with the West, however,
is seriously threatened. Iran is extremely
vulnerable to Soviet attack. In addition, the
country's political, economic, and social in-
stability exposes it to subversive and disrup-
tive pressures. The government's recent
tendency to cooperate with the USSR may
facilitate Soviet subversive activity. Finally,
the current eruption of anti-Western feeling
in Iran threatens Western interests with
expulsion.
Iran's Vulnerability to Soviet Attack
3. Iran is incapable of effectively resisting a
Soviet invasion. Its armed forces are not only
small but also weak in materiel, leadership,
and tactical organization. The USSR could
geize key points in Iran with airborne troops
and in any event could quickly occupy the
most important areas of the country by over-
land invasion. Rapid Soviet overland ad-
vances could be temporarily delayed if effec-
tive use were made of demolitions on bridges,
tunnels, and other transportation facilities
2
11;4^-0014);14,114.
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along the invasion routes. Some guerrilla
resistance could be carried on if government
leaders were able to escape to selected south-
ern mountain areas, but the effectiveness of
such resistance would be limited.
4. There is no present prospect of a marked
improvement in Iran's military capabilities.
Although the US military missions have
helped considerably to increase Iran's ability
to maintain internal security, it will be a long
time before the deficiencies of the Iranian
armed forces in leadership, organization, and
training can be overcome and before these
forces can make effective use of modern West-
ern equipment.
5. Although the USSR is capable of invading
Iran at any time without warning, the Krem-
lin may consider the achievement of control
over Iran not sufficiently urgent to warrant
open employment of military force. The
Kremlin may further consider that Iran's own
defensive capabilities will remain negligible,
and that Iran's ability to resist subversion
will decline, and that consequently the ad-
vantages of an early attack on Iran would
be incommensurate with the risk of interna-
tional complications involved. The Kremlin
must estimate that there would be at least an
even chance that the US would oppose any
overt military action by the USSR in Iran. If,
however, the British were to send their armed
forces into Iran to protect their nationals in
the oil well area, the Soviets might take action
based on their interpretation of Article 6 of
the Treaty of 1921.
Iran's Vulnerability to Subversion
6. Internally, Iran is subject to a variety of
strains and stresses.
a. The Iranian economy is backward, ineffi-
cient, and saddled with extensive absentee
ownership. To raise the traditionally low liv-
ing standard of the bulk of the population to
a satisfactory level would require a long-term
'development program considerably more am-
bitious than any thus far initiated. In addi-
tion, the weaknesses of the economic system
make it subject to periodic dislocations. For
example, crop failure in 1949 produced wide-
spread unemployment and hardship, and bad
management has resulted at present in an-
other of Iran's recurrent financial crises.
b. The central government has failed to
gain the full support of the tribes, an only
partially assimilated and potentially recalci-
trant element which constitutes about 25 per-
cent of the population. Tehran's neglect of
provincial interests and its use of extortion
and force in exercising its authority have en-
gendered continuing resentment in the hinter-
land, notably in the northern border province
of Azerbaijan.
c. Iran is politically unstable. Although
Iran is formally a constitutional monarchy
with popular representation, effective control
of the governmental machinery still rests in
the hands of a small ruling group whose con-
duct of affairs has been marked by factional-
ism, intrigue, and failure to respond to the
country's needs and aspirations. Iran has
few strong leaders. The Shah occupies a spe-
cial position by virtue of his command of the
army, his constitutional prerogatives, and the
prestige of the Crown. Ultimate power, how-
ever, still rests largely with the few hundred
landlords, tribal leaders, merchants, army of-
ficers, and clergy who dominate the social and
economic life of the country and supply the
membership of Parliament. Motivated by in-
dividual and class interests, the various fac-
tions in Parliament have engaged in a con-
tinuing contest with the executive in recent
years. Attempts to initiate political and so-
cial reform have been effectively frustrated,
despite the fact that growing popular desire
for better living conditions has led every gov-
ernment since 1941 to endorse political de-
centralization, expanded health and educa-
tion facilities, higher wages, and improved
production methods. The Seven Year Devel-
opment Program, from which much was
hoped, was first broached in 1946 but is still
stalled in the preliminary stages. Meanwhile,
the lack of cohesion within Parliament has
made it a ready vehicle for obstructionism and
special pleading.
d. This state of affairs has had an unsettling
political and social effect which makes the
position of the old ruling group increasingly
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insecure. This group has thus far retained
its traditional pre-eminence, and the vast ma-
jority of the population, despite its grumbling,
remains politically apathetic. Nevertheless,
there is a growing feeling of insecurity and
dissatisfaction, notably among students, white
collar workers, and industrial laborers. This
feeling can find expression only through ex-
tremist movements. The USSR has worked
assiduously to exploit popular insecurity and
dissatisfaction in Iran, not only through its
support of the subversive Tudeh Party but
also through special efforts to revive the sepa-
ratist spirit in Azerbaijan and to rouse the
traditionally restive Kurdish tribes, who had
a short-lived "people's republic" of their own
in 1946. The only other force attempting to
exploit this popular discontent is the reac-
tionary ultra-nationalist element which
blames Iran's troubles on foreign domination
of Iran's economy and foreign influences on
Iran's way of life. These ultra-nationalists do
not at present constitute a large organized
group; there are only a handful of National
Front deputies in Parliament. Nevertheless,
the popular appeal of their nationalist agita-
tion and the violence of their terrorist fringe
has enabled them to exercise, both before and
after Premier Razmara's assassination, an in-
fluence out of all proportion to their numerical
strength.
7. The assassination of Premier Razmara by a
religious fanatic on 7 March and the subse-
quent threat of terrorism have increased
Iran's internal tensions and provided new op-
portunities for factional conflict and subver-
sion. Although Razmara failed to gain any
real support from the Majlis for his attempts
to provide strong leadership, he was a stabiliz-
ing influence, particularly with the army, and
his death points up Iran's shortage of strong
leaders. His forcible removal from the scene,
together with the hesitancy displayed by the
Shah in the face of ultra-nationalist efforts to
capitalize on the situation, tends to undermine
the government's authority and to encourage
the Tudeh Party and other groups to advance
their special interests. Ultra-nationalists,
without assuming major executive responsibil-
ity, may be able to impose their will on the
government on a variety of issues.
r
8. The government's ability to maintain its
authority depends primarily on its control of
the security forces. This control over the se-
curity forces may be critically shaken if the
present crisis is prolonged and exacerbated by
further violence and mob pressure or if the
economic situation is allowed to deteriorate to
such an extent that minimum relief from
hardship is not provided. At present, how-
ever, the government retains control over the
army and gendarmerie, and so long as it con-
tinues to do so the pro-Soviet forces will prob-
ably not be able to gain power without actual
armed intervention by the USSR. Martial
law is now in effect in Terhan and the oil area.
a. The Communist-dominated Tudeh Party,
though it has apparently succeeded in build-
ing up a unified underground organization
and has shown various signs of renewed vi-
tality in recent months, remains a conspira-
torial organization whose membership is
drawn mainly from the small intellectual and
industrial classes. It has accomplished little
toward arousing the peasantry, which consti-
tutes the vast majority of the population, and
evidently has not succeeded in effectively pene-
trating the army and gendarmerie or in build-
ing up the reserves of arms and equipment
necessary for a successful coup d'etat. The
Tudeh Party may eventually be capable of
seriously interfering, through strikes and
sabotage, with the supply of Iranian oil to the
West. At present, however, disorders on a
scale which would seriously reduce this sup-
ply are improbable so long as the government
retains effective control of the security forces.
b. The USSR's agitation in Azerbaijan and
the other northern provinces has apparently
heightened fear of a Soviet invasion rather
than generated a desire for revolt; despite
their grievances against the central govern-
ment and their landlords, the people of these
provinces would generally oppose the return
of the Russians or their Iranian disciples.
c. Although there have been periodic re-
ports of an imminent Kurdish revolt, there is
no firm evidence that the USSR has succeeded
in transforming traditional Kurdish hatred
of the authorities into an active revolutionary
spirit and in securing the cooperation of the
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Kurdish tribes. Even if the Kurds did revolt,
they would probably be ineffective outside
their own tribal areas.
d. The present capabilities of other ele-
ments in Iran for directly challenging the
government's authority are also limited. The
ultra-nationalists, though they have success-
fully exploited popular sentiment to get their
way on the explosive oil issue and have gained
political influence in the process, do not now
have the organized strength to establish con-
tinuing political control over the government
or to defy the security forces. The non-Kurd-
ish tribes could present a serious threat only
if they were able to submerge their differences
and act in unison. Individual tribal upris-
ings, however, could be put down so long as
the security forces remained loyal. In any
event, it is doubtful that any of the tribes
could operate beyond its own territory unless
a breakdown of the central government had
taken place.
9. The USSR might conceivably launch an in-
vasion of Iran with guerrilla forces under the
lead of the exiled Barzani Kurds and Aber-
baijan Democrats. These exiled elements are
few in number, however, and would not be
militarily effective unless supported by large
numbers of Soviet "volunteers."
10. Development of greater internal stability
in Iran will at best require a number of years.
Expanded US economic and technical assist-
ance might bolster the position of those Iran-
ian leaders who have been advocating internal
reform. In terms of material improvement,
however, such US assistance would have to be
looked upon as a long-range investment.
Progress would undoubtedly continue to be
hampered by Iranian lack of skill, by graft
and political maneuvering, by resistance to
change by both the vested interests and the
population at large, and by lack of persever-
ance. There is a real danger that Western
advisers, as in the past, will either become
overwhelmed by the complexities of the situa-
tion or, by their zealousness, incur the oppo-
sition of the Iranians. Nevertheless, Western
aid and guidance, if accepted by the Iranians,
would contribute to the development of greater
internal stability.
Iran's Probable Course of Action
11. Iran's foreign policy is currently unsettled.
Between the end of World War II and mid-
1950 the Iranian Government moved closer to
the West, in part because of its desire for eco-
nomic assistance, but mainly because of the
menacing attitude of the USSR. The USSR
attempted unsuccessfully to discourage Iran-
ian association with the West by frontier in-
cidents, threatening notes, and propaganda
utterances accusing Iran of allowing the US
to organize bases for aggression on its soil
and reminding the Iranians of the USSR's
"right" to move in against such bases under
the 1921 Soviet-Iranian Treaty of Friendship.
The Iranian Government made repeated pleas
for US economic and military support, and
the Shah and the late Premier Razmara (then
Chief of Staff) asserted that Iran was com-
mitted to the West. Nevertheless, Iran has re-
tained a basic preference for isolation and neu-
trality and a strong attachment to? its tradi-
tional and previously successful policy of pre-
serving Iran's precarious independence by
playing the great powers off against each
other and distributing Iran's favors impar-
tially so as to prevent any, one power from
gaining a dominant influence. These senti-
ments have been reinforced by resentment of
past Anglo-Russian interference in Iranian
affairs. The Russian Communists are gener-
ally hated and feared like their Czarist pre-
decessors. The UK, though no longer gen-
erally feared, has remained an object of wide-
spread mistrust and?through its interest in
the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company and the once
Iranian-controlled island of Bahrein?a favor-
ite target of Iranian xenophobia. Within re-
cent months strong pressures for the curtail-
ment of Western privileges and a return to the
old policy have emerged, particularly in view
of: (a) annoyance with the fact that US eco-
nomic assistance has fallen short of Iranian
expectations; (b) growing doubts about US
willingness and ability to protect Iran; (c)
resentment of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Com-
pany's refusal to make more than limited
changes in its concession agreement with
Iran; (d) irritation with Western attempts to
push internal changes; and (e) the Soviet
Union's reversion to a more friendly attitude
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toward Iran?a move which stimulated an
Iranian hope of staying on good terms with
the USSR. During the fall of 1950 Iran in-
creased its dealings with the USSR, notably
through conclusion of a trade agreement.
The trend toward nationalism and neutrality,
earlier manifested in the cancellation of VOA
and BBC rebroadcast facilities, restriction of
travel by foreign nationals in Iran, and obsti-
nate bargaining over the terms of the pending
$25 million Export-Import Bank loan, has now
culminated in overwhelming approval by both
houses of Parliament of a resolution for na-
tionalization of the oil industry.
12. It is unlikely that the present movement
away from the West would lead Iran to align
itself with the USSR. The vehemence of cur-
rent feeling against the British is a manifesta-
tion of Iran's basic resentment of foreign in-
fluence rather than an expression of pro-Soviet
sentiment; the number of Iranians who ac-
tively support the USSR is very small. Soviet
sympathizers who have infiltrated the ultra-
nationalist faction will probably try to steer
Iran closer to the USSR if the ultra-national-
ists should succeed in solidifying their cur-
rent position of vantage. It is probable, how-
ever, that other pressure groups would unite
to prevent the alignment of Iran with the
USSR. The great majority of Iranians, and
particularly the present regime, are unlikely
to be won over by a friendly Soviet policy even
if such a policy were long continued. The
favorable impression which the USSR created
by its recent actions has already begun to
wear off, in view of the limited usefulness of
the trade pact, the failure of the Soviet-Iranian
border commission to produce concrete re-
sults, and the USSR's continuing role as a
hard bargainer on such matters as Iran's gold
claims.
13. It is also unlikely that Iran will com-
pletely eliminate Western interests. Al-
though the small group of ultra-nationalist
deputies in Parliament has succeeded in ex-
ploiting popular feeling against the British
and has been able to seize the initiative in the
period following Premier Razmara's assassi-
nation, most of the governing group would
probably wish to retain some Western sup-
port as a counter-balance to Soviet pressures.
Despite Parliament's overwhelming endorse-
ment of the principle of oil nationalization, it
is not certain that the Anglo-Iranian Oil Com-
pany will in fact be obliged to cease its opera-
tions in Iran in the near future, not only be-
cause of the magnitude of the economic, legal,
and technical problems involved but also be-
cause of the self-interested opposition of many
members of the ruling class.
14. There is little doubt, however, that Iran
has embarked on a course involving a loosen-
ing of its connections with the West and a
guarded extension of its dealings with the
USSR. Although the British may be able to
patch up their relations with Iran on the oil
question, ultimate expropriation of the oil
company has at least been brought closer, and
the curtailment of the few other commercial
advantages which the UK still enjoys in Iran
will undoubtedly continue. The Shah and
some other leaders will probably continue to
try to obtain Western economic and military
aid, but Parliament's willingness to accept
such aid is far from certain. In any event,
the Iranian Government can be expected to
insist that US help be provided on Iranian
terms, to refuse any overt commitment to the
West, and perhaps to waver in its support of
the US in the UN. Although the Iranian Gov-
ernment will probably not cancel the US mili-
tary missions, it may well further curtail the
freedom of action of mission officers and other
US and UK officials. Meanwhile, Iran will
probably be willing to develop additional com-
mercial and cultural ties with the USSR,
though it will attempt to control the extension
of Soviet influence. Iran would probably not
go so far as to grant the USSR an oil conces-
sion or to agree to establishment of a joint
Irano-Soviet oil company.
15. In the event of war, Iran's policy would
probably be as follows:
a. If Iran were attacked, the Iranians would
offer some resistance, meanwhile calling for
US and UN aid.
b. If an isolated Soviet or Satellite attack
took place against some other country, Iran
would remain neutral or, at most, support the
UN without contributing armed forces. Al-
though Iran is unlikely to restrict the supply
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rAtiathaz.tt," maliewoqvab
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of oil to the West, it would not allow the use
of Iranian territory for air bases.
c. If a general war in which Iran was not
initially attacked took place, Iran would prob-
ably attempt to remain , neutral. There is a
remote possibility that Iran might attempt to
avoid provocation of the USSR by curtailing
the supply of oil to the West, though the finan-
cial loss involved would militate against such
a move.
16. The extent to which Iran's association
with the West can be strengthened is prob-
lematical. A satisfactory British-Iranian
settlement on the oil issue is a prerequisite to
improvement of Iran's relations with the West.
An expanded US economic assistance program
would tend to strengthen the position of those
who have looked to the West for help. A more
explicit US pledge of military support, either
unilaterally or through a US-backed regional
security organization, might quiet the present
fears of the Shah concerning the remoteness
of Western support. The assassination of
Premier Razmara, however, has not only re-
moved a leading advocate of a pro-Western
alignment but has greatly strengthened the
position of the ultra-nationalist leaders. The
success of further US gestures would be ren-
dered questionable by Iran's underlying dis-
like and fear of foreign influence and by
its awareness of its extreme vulnerability to
Soviet attack. Most Iranian opinion would
probably remain skeptical about the degree,
permanency, and unselfishness of US interest
in strengthening the country. Even given a
more favorable attitude toward the US, most
influential Iranians would probably oppose
any attempt to align Iran firmly with the
West on the ground that such an arrangement
would be unduly provocative to the USSR and
at variance with the tradition of maintaining
an independent position with respect to the
great powers.
? va: J. I TELT
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ONMENTIA
GPO--SSO-6523
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