AUSTRIAN TREATY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R01012A000500010001-6
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 10
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 24, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: January 22, 1951
• Content Type: NIE

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COPY NO. F7
ASSISTANT DIRECTOR
SET FOR
NATIONAL INTEI.LIGEN"E ESTIMATES
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE
AUSTRIAN TREATY
Published 22 January 1951
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
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T
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE
AUSTRIAN TREATY
N I E - 2 1
The intelligence organizations of the Departments of State,
the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and the Joint Staff
participated in the preparation of. this estimate and concur
in it. This paper is based on information available on
18 January 1951.
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Jai L
AUSTRIAN TREATY
THE PROBLEM
To estimate whether Austria is likely to maintain its independence and security against
internal and external pressures for at least one year after the withdrawal of all forces of
occupation.
ASSUMPTION
That the USSR abandons within approximately three months its recent tactics of obstruc-
tion and agrees to the conclusion of an Austrian treaty along. the lines already indicated as
acceptable to the US,* providing for a withdrawal of all occupation troops ninety days after the
ratification of the treaty.,
CONCLUSIONS
1. Austria will probably maintain its security
and independence against the internal and
external pressure other than overt aggression
it is likely to encounter for at least one year
after the withdrawal of occupation forces, pro-
vided the US continues to give economic and
political support and, with Austrian coopera-
tion, implements its plan to provide military
equipment after conclusion of the treaty.
2. Austria would not be able during this period
to defend its territory against invasion by
armed forces of the Soviet Satellites, but we
believe such invasion is likely only if the So-
viets estimate that Western reaction would
not lead to the precipitation of general hostili-
ties, or if the Soviets had already made a de-
cision to accept a global war.
DISCUSSION
GENERAL STABILITY OF THE AUSTRIAN REGIME.
1. The present Austrian Government and the
vast majority of the Austrian people are firmly
anti-Communist and will be strongly disposed
to preserve the independence, integrity, and
pro-Western orientation of the country. The
police force, even in the Soviet Zone of Occu-
pation, is loyal to the government. The or-
ganized labor movement is tightly controlled
by the Socialist Party, which has long been
hostile to Communism. No Communists sit
in the Cabinet, and only five in the Parlia-
ment.
2. The continuance of a pro-Western regime
in Austria will require US economic and po-
litical support. Austria cannot soon become
self-supporting at an acceptable standard of
living. An early cessation of US assistance
would cause serious deterioration of the eco-
nomic situation and resulting disturbances of
political stability. The existence of the co-
alition government would be threatened, since
the Socialists might be obliged to withdraw
from it in order to avoid losing considerable
segments of their labor support to extremist
movements, especially to the Communists.
The People's Party might also face the loss of
some of its followers, mainly to the extreme
right-wing parties. Withdrawal of US po-
litical support would permeate the country
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with a feeling of helplessness, cause the rise
of a sentiment for neutralism, and perhaps
eventually lead a future Austrian Government
to come to terms with the Eastern bloc. This
deterioration would not necessarily reach com-
pletion within one year, but the trends would
certainly become evident.
SECURITY FORCES AVAILABLE TO
THE AUSTRIAN GOVERNMENT.
3. Austrian police and gendarmerie forces
scattered throughout the country now num-
ber about 27,500. Before the middle of 1951
there should, and possibly will, be available
a mobile national gendarmerie regiment con-
sisting of three 500-man battalions trained
and equipped for light infantry action. These
police forces together would be capable of con-
trolling sporadic local disorders; they would
not be capable of maintaining internal secur-
ity against major disturbances or a succession
of coordinated disorders, or of mounting any
effective border control.
4. Existing plans call for training in rotation
through the gendarmerie regiment, before the
signature of the treaty, a. gendarmerie reserve
numbering up to 10,000 men. Upon the rati-
fication of the treaty, this reserve would con-
stitute the initial strength of the legal Aus-
trian Army. The plans further provide for
expansion of this force to a strength of 28,000
during the ninety days between' ratification
of the treaty and withdrawal of occupation
forces. MDAP aid for equipping this number
would be forthcoming. The strength of 28,-
000 is generally considered the minimum re-
quired for -adequate maintenance of internal
security and border control, as well as the
maximum which the Austrian economy could
initially support. Partly for fear of Soviet
displeasure and partly because of internal po-
litical differences, the Austrian Government
has been reluctant to push ahead with the im-
plementation of the plans. It is expected,
however, that the contemplated force of 28,-
000 men will be available when the occupation
troops withdraw.
5. Plans have also been worked out for the
US to equip and train an Austrian Air Force
of treaty strength-90 planes and up to 5,000
personnel. It is not expected that this, Aus- ,
trian Air Force will constitute a force in being
capable of affording major aid to Austrian
ground forces in the mission of maintaining
internal security during the time covered by
this estimate.
POSSIBLE THREATS TO AUSTRIAN SECURITY
AND INDEPENDENCE.
6. The Austrian Communist Party has a mem-
bership estimated at 100,000. It polled less
than 215,000 votes-5 percent of the total-
in the national elections of October 1949.
The Werkschutz organization of factory
guards in the Soviet Zone of Occupation is the
nearest approximation to a Communist para-
military force which exists; it is estimated to
have a membership of 2,000 and a trained re-
serve of several times that number. The Com-
munist Party in general is at present in-
capable, without extensive Soviet support, of
fomenting major industrial unrest or of carry-
ing out any sustained action against the gov-
ernment, and there is no reason to expect any
substantial increase in its capabilities during
the first year after withdrawal of the occupa-
tion troops. We believe that during that year
the Austrian Communist Party will possess
neither the numbers, the organization, nor
the leadership capable of achieving a position
of power in the country, unless it should re-
ceive support from across the borders on a
scale approaching open invasion, which could
hardly be kept covert.
7. Under Article 35 of the projected treaty, the
USSR receives as German assets oil and ship-
ping properties in Eastern Austria as well as
exploration rights in certain oil-bearing areas.
While these properties are to remain subject
to Austrian law, the concessions nevertheless
constitute a limitation of Austrian sover-
eignty. The Kremlin could exploit this situ-
ation: '(a) to bring political pressures on the
Austrian Government for alleged violations
of Soviet property rights; (b) to use the Soviet
properties for subversive activities of all types:
smuggling Communist leaders in and out of
the country; training paramilitary forma-
tions; preparing acts of sabotage; establish-
ing arms caches, etc.
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IM T
Soviet exploitation of this situation, mainly
because of the weakness of the Austrian Com-
munist Party, is not likely to endanger Aus-
trian security during the first year after the
withdrawal of occupation forces. In the long
run,'Soviet possession of these properties and
their use as bases for subversive activities may
well present a serious security problem to the
Austrian Government.
8. The Austrian armed forces would certainly
not be able to withstand an invasion by the
armed forces of Soviet Satellites. At the pres-
ent time, however, there is no buildup of "justi-
fication" for overt military attack, the Hun-
garian and Czechoslovak armies are being
reorganized, and Satellite troop dispositions
do not indicate early attack on Austria.
Nevertheless, the Soviets are capable of de-
veloping propaganda "justification" swiftly,
and full readiness or lengthy advance indica-
tions by Satellite forces would not be neces-
sary, owing to the relative weakness of Aus-
trian security forces during the period covered
by this estimate. Although a 'direct military
attack by the Satellites upon Austria would
almost certainly provoke counter action by
the West, the Soviets might estimate- that
such reaction would be slow, limited, and in-
decisive.. We believe that such a Satellite
attack would be made only with the full ap-
proval of the USSR, and only if the Soviets
estimate that Western reaction would not lead
to the precipitation of general hostilities, or if
the Soviets had already made a decision to ac-
cept a global war.
T 3
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ANNEX
PROVISIONS OF THE PROJECTED AUSTRIAN
TREATY HAVING SECURITY IMPLICATIONS
Article 2
PRESERVATION OF AUSTRIA'S INDEPENDENCE
1. The Allied and Associated Powers declare
that they will respect the independence and
territorial integrity of Austria as established
under the present Treaty.
SECTION I
Article 17
LIMITATION OF AUSTRIAN ARMED FORCES
1. The maintenance of land and air arma-
ments and fortifications shall be closely re-
stricted to meeting tasks of an internal char-
acter and local defense of frontiers. In ac-
cordance with the foregoing Austria is au-
thorized to have armed forces consisting of
not more than :
(a) A land army, including frontier guards,
antiaircraft troops, gendarmerie and river
gendarmerie with a total strength of 53,000;
(b) An air force of 90 aircraft including
reserves, of which not more than 70 may be
combat types of aircraft, with a total person-
nel strength of 5,000. Austria shall not pos-
sess aircraft designed primarily as bombers
with internal bomb carrying facilities;
(c) These strengths shall in each case in-
clude combat, service and overhead person-
nel.
2. Austria undertakes not to reestablish any
military installations or fortifications which
were destroyed in accordance with the instruc-
tions of the Allied Commission for Austria.
3. The. number and size of aerodromes should
correspond strictly to the tasks of the Aus-
trian air force and to the requirements of
civil aviation in. Austria.
Personnel not included in the Austrian army
or air force shall not receive any form of mili-
tary training or military air training as de-
fined in Annex 1.
SECTION II
Article 21
PROHIBITION OF SPECIAL WEAPONS
Austria shall not possess, construct or ex-
periment with-(i) Any atomic weapon, (ii)
any other major weapon adaptable now or in
the future to mass destruction and defined
as such by the appropriate organ of the United
Nations, (iii) any self-propelled or guided mis-
sile or -apparatus connected with their dis-
charge or control, (iv) sea mines, (v) tor-
pedoes capable of being manned, (vi) sub-
marines or other submersible craft, (vii) motor
torpedo boats, "(viii) specialized types of as-
sault craft, (ix) guns with a range of more
than 30 kilometers, (x) asphyxiating, vesicant
or poisonous materials or biological sub-
stances in quantities greater than, or of types
other than, are required for legitimate civil
purpose, or any apparatus designed to pro-
duce, project or spread such materials or sub-
stances for war purposes.
The Allied and Associated Powers reserve
the right to add to this Article prohibitions of
any weapons which may be evolved as a re-
sult of scientific development.
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Article 28
PROHIBITION OF GERMAN AND JAPANESE
CIVIL AIRCRAFT
Austria shall not acquire or manufacture
civil aircraft which are of German or Japanese
design or which embody major assemblies of
German or Japanese manufacture or design.
Article 30
DURATION OF LIMITATIONS
Each of the military and air clauses of the
present Treaty will remain in force until mod-
ified in whole or in part by. agreement between
the Allied and Associated Powers and Austria
or, after Austria becomes a member of the
United Nations, by agreement' between. the.
Security Council and Austria.
.3. The forces of the Allied and Associated
Powers and members of the Allied Commission.
for Austria shall be withdrawn from Austria
as soon as possible and in any case within
ninety days from the coming into force of the
present Treaty.
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