INDIA'S POSITION IN THE EAST-WEST CONFLICT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R01012A000500040001-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 4, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: September 4, 1951
• Content Type: NIE

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COPY NO. 153
IMOMP
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE
INDIA'S POSITION IN THE EAST-WEST
CONFLICT
NIE-23
C, 7. ?
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DA ;toga/
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Published 4 September, 1951
is C
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
1141111 MT
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WARNING
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tional defense of the United States within the meaning
of the Espionage Act, 50 U.S.C., 31 and 32, as amended.
Its transmission or the revelation of its contents in any
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tenedict K. Zobristv. Direct,-
Harry S* Truman Library.
aationel Archives and Rector:5c Administration
Independencel MO 64050
Dear Mx. Zobrist:
?
aer
r? 19 AUG 1985
2-4-(7
This is In pre to your letter. of 30 Uovemb:er 1961 in
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Sincerelyt
Info 4,n4, y dinator
Enclosures.
STAT
r.
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NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE
INDIA'S POSITION IN THE EAST-WEST
CONFLICT
NIE-23
The intelligence organizations of the Departments of State,
the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, And the Joint Staff par-
ticipated in the preparation of this estimate. All members
of the Intelligence Advisory Committee concurred in this
estimate on 30 August.
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.2
-211M10 MILO!'
INDIA'S POSITION IN THE EAST-WEST CONFLICT
THE PROBLEM
To estimate India's present and probable future position in relation to the East-
West power conflict, short of the outbreak of global war.*
CONCLUSIONS
1. India is presently determined not to
commit itself to either side in the East-
West conflict. This determination has of
late resulted in a tendency to appease
world Communism and in failure to sup-
port the West in its program of combat-
ting world Communist aggression.
2. India's policy is unlikely to be changed
in the near future by further Soviet ag-
gressive moves in Europe or the Near East
or by advance of Communist power in
Southeast Asia.
3. Communist aggression against Burma,
the principalities along the Indian border,
or India itself, would probably lead the
Indian Government to seek military aid
from the West.
4. Continued deterioration of the Indian
economic situation might in time enable
the Indian Communists, especially if sup-
ported by the Chinese Communists, to
seize control of the government.
5. The threat of Communist domination
of Southeast Asia is already serious.
Communist control of India would almost
certainly result in Communist domina-
tion of the area (including Indonesia) .
Neutralism in Iran, the Arab Middle East,
and the Philippines would be greatly en-
couraged.
6. India probably cannot by its own efforts
and means stop its economic decline.
Substantial outside assistance over sev-
eral years might check the decline.
DISCUSSION
India's Foreign Policy
7. The present Indian Government is deter-
mined to maintain an independent position in
the East-West conflict, despite its predominant
* This estimate does not consider the effect on
India's position of an outbreak of war between
India and Pakistan. The effect of such a develop-
ment is to be considered in NIE-41, "Probable De-
velopments in the Kashmir Dispute to the End of
1951."
' economic and cultural ties with the West and
despite its opposition to Communism within
India. Its determination to avoid a commit-
ment to the West is based on the following
major considerations:
a. India's leaders are jealous of India's
newly won freedom of action and therefore
oppose any arrangement which might entail
foreign interference or foreign entanglements.
They believe that India is not now a likely tar-
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get of Soviet or Chinese Communist attack
and that a military alliance with the West
would only involve India in quarrels in which
it has no direct interest. They fear that such
an alliance might even invite Soviet military
attack in the event of a general war.
b. These leaders are strong advocates of
Asian nationalism and are reluctant to associ-
ate themselves with what they regard as the
forces of colonialism. They believe that the
Western Powers are bent on preserving their
influence in Asia regardless of the interests
and desires of the Asians. These suspicions
of the West are reinforced by desire to have
India itself assume a role of leadership in
Asia and by irritation with Western efforts to
secure a UN solution of the Kashmir dispute.
Much of India's old antagonism for the British
has been transferred to the US now that the
UK has granted India independence.
c. Nehru in particular feels that Western
militancy in the face of Soviet expansionism
is both dangerous and morally wrong. He
fears that Western efforts to check the USSR
may plunge the world into general war and
thus deny India the period of international
peace and stability which it desperately needs
in order to build up its own economic and po-
litical structure. He believes that India can
most effectively work to preserve peace by serv-
ing as a mediator.
8. In practice, India has not only taken pains
to dissociate itself politically from the West
but has also demonstrated a strong tendency
toward appeasement of the Communist bloc.
Nehru concedes that the USSR is an aggres-
sive and expansionist power, but he argues
that Soviet expansionism should be checked
primarily by preventing the development of
"revolutionary situations" which invite So-
viet intervention, rather than by the develop-
ment of military defenses against the USSR.
He has also argued against a militant attitude
toward Communist China because of the con-
viction that Mao's victory over the US-backed
Nationalist regime in China was a major
triumph for Asian nationalism and self-de-
termination, and on the ground that militancy
would force Communist China into closer as-
sociation with the USSR. He probably also
takes this position because of a desire to get
along with a powerful neighbor, particularly so
long as India is militarily preoccupied with
Pakistan. With respect to other Asian-coun-
tries, India has usually backed its fellow
Asians against the West, regardless of the
issues involved, and has displayed the utmost
contempt for those Asian regimes which ac-
cept Western leadership.
Prospects of an Early Change in Policy
9. We believe that there is little reason to ex-
pect an early change in India's policy of neu-
tralism. Nehru, who is largely responsible for
the formulation and promotion of these poli-
cies, is a man of strong conviction. These
policies, moreover, reflect the widespread anti-
Western feeling in India. Even if the right
wing leaders of the Congress Party should
come to dominate foreign policy, they would
find it difficult to abandon formally the policy
of neutralism. A right wing government,
however, would be more intent on obtaining?
US ecpnomic assistance. As a result, it would
probably adopt a generally more cooperative
attitude toward the US and might even con-
clude various unpublicized understandings
with the West.
10. We believe that further Soviet aggressive
moves in Europe or the Near East, by increas-
ing the danger of general war, would be more
likely to strengthen India's neutralism than
to induce India to associate itself more closely
with the Western bloc.
11. We further believe that the advance of
Communist power into Tibet and Southeast
Asia is unlikely to produce an early change
in India's policy of neutralism despite their
importance to India as potential spheres of
Indian influence, as military buffer areas, and
(in the case of Southeast Asia) as a source of
most of India's 800,000 tons of annual rice im-
ports. At present the Indian Government is
attempting to dissociate itself from the Tibet-
an efforts to retain autonomy. Indian lead-
ers appear to minimize the strategic import-
ance of the Tibetan settlement recently an-
nounced by Peiping, even though that settle-
ment would permit the stationing of Chinese
troops along India's northern frontiers, would
force India to abandon its role as guardian of
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Tibetan interests, and might even result in the
expulsion of Indian commercial and military
representatives from Tibet. It is unlikely that
overt Chinese Communist intervention in
Indochina or subsequent Chinese attacks on
Thailand or Malaya would lead India to give
effective political and military support to
Western countermeasures?though India
could be expected to strengthen its own de-
fenses.
12. A serious Chinese Communist threat to
Burma would create considerable alarm in
India. The Indian Government would prob-
ably not intervene openly should Peiping's ef-
forts to gain control of Burma be confined to
covert reinforcement and logistical support of
indigenous forces. In the event of an overt
Chinese Communist invasion of Burma, India
would probably decide to send its own troops
to the assistance of the Burmese, but might
fail to act promptly and effectively in view of
its desire to retain its military superiority in
Kashmir and along the Pakistani border,
where most of its forces are now disposed.
13. India would certainly resist, however, and
would probably look to the UN and the West
for military aid, if Communist China at-
tempted to gain control of Nepal, Bhutan,
Sikkim or parts of the Indian province of
Assam (to all of 'which territories China has
at one time or another laid claim) . India
would also resist Soviet or Chinese efforts to
infiltrate or subvert Kashmir.
Economic Deterioration and India's
Foreign Policy
14. In the four years since liberation, India's
basic problem of supporting a dense popula-
tion with a backward and badly organized
economy has become progressively more acute.
Despite the efforts of the Indian Government,
economic rehabilitation and development have
not only failed to keep pace with a popula-
tion growth of almost five million persons a
year but have even failed to check the deteri-
oration of existing production facilities.
Productivity has actually declined. Unless a
large-scale economic development program
can be financed and effectively executed, India
appears doomed to a steady decline in living
standards, periodically intensified by crop
failures.
15. The magnitude of India's economic diffi-
culties is beginning to produce widespread
popular dissatisfaction with the present gov-
ernment, particularly in view of the high
hopes of economic betterment raised by the
establishment of India's independence. It is
impossible to predict with confidence the ef-
fects of mounting popular unrest on the po-
litical structure or the foreign policy of India.
By increasing its already strong control over
internal security and assuming a more and
more dictatorial character, the present Indian
Government might be able to suppress any
violent opposition at least temporarily. On
the other hand, intensely nationalist groups
or non-Communist leftist groups might suc-
ceed in capturing public support. Finally,
India might be disrupted by economic pres-
sures and revert to the disunity of earlier cen-
turies.
16. The possibility also exists that economic
deterioration would in time result in Commu-
nist control of India. The Communist Party
of India, weakened by a premature resort to
violent tactics and by the vigorous and effec-
tive opposition of the authorities, has a cur-
rent strength of only about 50,000 and does
not represent an immediate threat to the re-
gime. Nevertheless, Communist doctrine
makes a powerful appeal to the intellectuals
who mould politically effective opinion, and
the Communists alone appear to have the mili-
tancy and organization needed to exploit popu-
lar dissatisfaction to the full. The splinter-
ing of the Congress Party provides a good op-
portunity for use of popular front tactics to
reLestablish Communist influence, and \the
Communists might also be able to develop
support among the various depressed groups
in Indian society. The Communists have al-
ready had some success?particularly in Hy-
derabad and in nearby areas of Madras?in
the tactics of rural revolt employed by the
Chinese Communists.
17. If the Communists gained control of India,
neighboring states would be exposed to mili-
tary threat from the flank, the Communist
bloc would be in a position to threaten the
3
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principal communications route between Eu-
rope and the Far East in time of war, and
Asian opinion would be driven toward the view
that Communism represented the "wave of
the future." Southeast Asia, including Indo-
nesia, would probably fall completely under
Communist domination. The generally pro-
Western governments of Pakistan and Ceylon
would find it difficult to take a firm position
against the USSR and its Asian allies even if
strong Western military support were forth-
coming. Neutralism would be greatly en-
couraged in Iran, the Arab Near East, and
the Philippines.
18. Communist control of India would- deny
the West a major source of manganese, mica,
shellac, kyanite, and jute products. The loss
of these supplies would in the short run con-
front the US with serious problems of procure-
ment. But in the long run alternative sources
and/or substitutes (with the possible excep-
tion of mica) could almost certainly be de-
veloped. The Soviet bloc -apparently has less
need than the West for India's products.
Should Communist control of India lead to
the absorption of Southeast Asia into the So-
viet bloc, however, the economic effects would
be even more serious, inasmuch as critical
sources of tin, rubber, and petroleum would
pass from Western to Soviet hands.
19. A Communist India would not add sig-
nificantly to the military power of the Soviet
bloc in terms of materiel. It would, however,
provide an army in being of about 400,000 men
and a vast supply of manpower. India al-
ready has an estimated 1,500,000 trained re-
serves and, given Soviet equipment, might in
time develop an army comparable to that of
Communist China.
20. It is possible that outside economic assist-
ance could check and in time halt the eco-
nomic decline of India. In order to achieve
this end, such aid would have to be substantial
and would have to be continued for several
years. Even if such aid were provided, the
Indian Government might be unable to effect
the sweeping and politically difficult social and
economic changes required to achieve eco-
nomic stability. Despite the obvious element
of risk involved, however, external economic
assistance appears the only possible means of
checking an economic decline which would
otherwise create greater difficulties for the
West and which might result in a graver
threat to the Western position throughout
Asia.
4
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GPO-SSO-7214
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