G-2 RECOMMENDS THE FOLLOWING CONCLUSIONS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R01012A000600020010-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 22
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 2, 2002
• Sequence Number: 10
• Publication Date: July 20, 1951
• Content Type: NIE

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J,, SEC r : sue
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE "OF NATIONAL ESTILIATES
20 Julj 1951
NIE 25
0-2 R coma ends the following Couoluaions s
e believe that during the period covered by the estimates
The Soviets will continue to pursue vigorously their
most important immediate objectives of halting Western,., West
German,, and Japanese rearmament
b. Opportunities will exist for the Soviets to make
limited progress towards both their immediate and 3.ong.-range
objectives by political warfare and Satellite aggression in
certain areas, particularly Southeast Asia*
co The Kremlin might attempt to achieve some of its
objectives by encouraging the Chinese Commumiats to engage in
additional military operations; they might estimate that such
operations could be so conducted that general war would not be
precipitated.
d. A Chinese invasion of Surma and Indochina is a
definite possibility.
on A Chinese Communist attack on Taiwan is unlikely q as
long as U. S6 Fleet units are employed for its defense.
f a Forceful. seizure of Hong Kong and of imiaa" " - -LASS.
^ DECLASSIFIED
Chinese Costs is unlikely, CLASS. CHANCED TO: TS of 25X1
NEXT REVIEW DATE:-- AUTH; HR 70-n
SE= DATE: REVIEWER:
,TW ARMY, NAVY, USAFAO VI@R6A"l dCIA-RDP79R01012A000600020010-1
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go It is unlike r that Soviet forces will attack
Japan, unless such an attack is in furtherance of general
war operations by the USSR,
he A Satellite Invasion of Y ugoslavia is url4kel7
unless such an attack is in furtherance of general war opera-
tions by the USSRe
ie Attack on either Greece or Turkey is unlikely, unless
such an attack is in furtherance of general war operations by
the VSSRO
Jo A Satellite attack on the Allied foross in Berlin,
West Ge r or Austria is unlileely, unless such an attack is
in furtherance of general war operations by the USSR.
ko It the British ahould use military force in their
dispute with Iran, the Kremlin might invoke the 1921 Treaty
and occupy at least northern Iran, estimating that it could
do so with relatively little risk of feral ware
le Soviet forces are in an advanced state of readiness
'for war and could initiate general war at any time with little
or no warning. Intelligence is lacking to permit an eatimte
as to when they might do soe It must be recognized that ri$t
of general war exists now afld hereafter at any time when the
Kremlin may elect to take action which threatens, wholly or
in part, the vital interests of the Western Powers. The
international situation is so tense that any issue might
develop to a point beyond the control of even the KremUxo
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NOW
"The principal immediate Soviet objectives ares
(1) To divide the West,
(2) To halt Westerns West Oerman, and Japanese rearmament.
(3) To prevent implementation of the U.So overseas-bases
policy
SECRET
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Ptra sio
A P Recommends
Beginning with the second sentence revise as fo3lcrosa
*Both military and non ci itary stocks, with the possible
exception of aviation fuel, are believed to be in sufficient
quantity and so distributed as genera' to meet estimated
Soviet requirements for sustained military operations during
that period even though U. S. atomic capabilities were ful r
exercised against strategic targets in the USSR. However, if
Soviet to istical planning and implementation parallel to ar5,ir
its World War II
almost certain to develo 1, especially in the electrical. and
mechanical fieldso The de a to which these short !Es would
operate to retard the Soviet advance is not now ascertainabb
ionce some serious ehhorta
SEcBET
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Nee
~70P SEGRET
N1E .2
Para 7?
A P rende deletion of -faotnie 0
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TOP SECRET
Line 6. Insert "limited" after "making";
Line 8. Delete colon and adds "The reluctance of the
Western Pov rs to become involved in general war";
Delete sub.paras (a), (b), (c) and (d).
A F recommends
Change first sentence an follows t
Mile in Soviet theory and practice war is an ac..
ceptable, and on occasion necessary, instrunnt for attaining
Communist objectives, the Kremlin pmImeb;r to ice ,Mould
prefers if possible to attain its objectives by course short
of resort to general war,"
Pat` 9 a, Change a s follows t
"The deterrent effect of the or able Communist capa-
bility to overrun most of Eurasia at wills"
TOP SECRET
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TOP SEOEiET %WY
5
Para 20
ONI 3'econua mis reading as foUo rs s
"10. In discussing courses of action short of ggnwa3.
ware it is necessary for clarity to Oxadne a ach separatily.
fees Soviet poltc r embram f. d all. possible
con e8 of action' ~ politjcal warfare, ' Satellite
or Soviet ag easions and even ge era]. . Whits, therefore,,
separation for purposes of eacpo itioa is essentials the in.
separable connection of all possible courses of action must
be kept In mind.
TOP SECRET
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'POP SEC ter,
NIE.,25
Para u
ONI xeao deletion of " udulent]jn on 7.ine 74
TOP SECT 'T
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TOP SECRET
NIEw25
Para 130
A P racomrnende a
Beginning w ith the next to last sentence revise as
"The Chinese Communists almost oertain]y have the
capability for conquering Burma es and an invasion is
considered to be a 2Lasj&jgt although not a probabi
The Chinese Communists are now capable of overrunning virtually
all of northern Indochina and are i 1RE2LIM their transportation
ad=ties in the border area o ,An in -sion of Indochina a the-ro-
fore is also Possible and preparations be a
However, view of the unoertainty
of the outoom of the Ion,tiMit is lle tg
assess at this time whether or not a Chinese Co?mmiat
vasion of Indochina is,prob ble.
TOP SECRET
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TOP SECRET
N13,25
Para 24
0Th recommends revision of last sentence to reads
*We therefore believe it tmlikely that the USSR, in
prevailfng circumstances and in the absence of intent to
precipitate general would either encourage or participate
in a Chinese Communist attack on Taiwan."
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TOP SECRET
M E-25
Para 17
( recommender
Change last sentence to reads
"In balance, a Satellite invasion of Yugoslavia is
unlikely unless such an attack is in furtherance of general
war operations by the USSR",.
A F reconi nda s
Beginning with the fifth sentence revise as follows r
". o o However,, in view of the increasing Western sup.
port of Tugoslavia, the Kremlin probably estimates that
qnnnt_usllg a Satellite attack on that country would involve
npt only serious risk of war between the U. S. or UN and the
Satellites,, but also the danger that such a conflict would
develop into a general war between the U. S. and the USSR.
There is xrobab3.v also a period of time during which the
USSR estimate that such a Satellite attack Gould be
On the other hands the Kremlin might consider
the T ugoslav issue as of such importance as to warrant ac-
ceptance of the risks involved in a Satellite attack, esti-
mating Dartioula ly that those risks would be less than at
some later date o"
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TOP SECRET
Om rocor ends that last sentence read as fol1 ss
"A Satolltte invasion.of Tugoelavia must therefore,
:.sae in the absence of intent to gEei tats neral ~rar
be regarded as a serious poeeibilitt."
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Ss w
the :tint as Toll,o,es
"Satellite aapabMtIes fciu attack on area" aM pa Ou_
lar%r an T a" II.Td w iii um . it
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TOP MMMT
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TOP BE w
tbethird ~anro.Uom_
Umft~ W ode suGh forces with
~ Ot3 ? and Iog etf l-a aid .
+a3t~.f+lr~9 ,mod It It QOng
wed the risk eeoeptabAe,
p"ide, "ro,lu~n diet forces
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ME-25
Pmts. 21
OIR rye addition of fo2lo dng to the last eentemst
"eo long as the '{USSR does wt itxtmd to pr ecipita to
general ter"
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TOP Sam"
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Be91rWAZ vith second sentence ob=p as follows
"? ? ? If, bowvvw, the K mljn concluded that the Co mat.-
nict fame t wuable to retain control of North Mrera, or
that, as a result of the exbwudm of the area of military op,w
eraatiane, the Chinese Com=ist reg3m? itself weave endangered,
the MmmUn
ad a resort to inCrfteI3** drastic
des. These meaauareeT_& , inalnde such
thinl q.-veiled oomndtmant of Soviet forces against U. S. forces
that the U. S. and the USSR could be edged in a do facto local
war which, if the V. S. felt a ged to recognize its eecistenoe,
might at ajW ti de"lop lift a gwwraj %
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TOP SEM
1IE-25
Bus. 26
G-2 des
tans 2 - Delete "dude the West and to".
W X roocnxmdu a dbW fal7.owing sentene s
" 22 &MUA t ~to,ggnclnde that this sacra tmsaat
Monad the nonLim of , that the US$R
War n of m Men i tr, vs ? li s,o that the &gal" ZMM
0
AF recoaaa mndss
Change seed sentent a as follows:
". . If the Kremlin should ftil to make sufficient
progress toward that end by methods short of general war and
it in addition it should become convinced that its euperdordty
in oon ntiosaa2 forces was 4e y"usa aba t I g be o?
'(whetbar tea NATO and Wont Gerzoan cn~ Japanese rea memo
or throR Western ad s in dotal arm e), tie
believe the KreW in vould consider the a dvisabd lityr of pa iPd,-
tatiug general warn.
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12, P41a Igo Par 26. Be ibg With lacy seabonm "vise as
fo17 ovs:
"~* On the other band, if the KremUn w to ~e
that Ole xeaT tr threatened the net xrity MUM fMM*jA
wen d zer a it of the t R? we believe the Kvemilin uouM
precipitate generral wont At At
bad a clear mxgfn of m c city and that delay w*ul4 tip the
scales of power S ievaablr amt the USSR. Tkd is of
oritsr the & Ulu ra'esin tate sae 'al. W , act of
UWWitg mmob" acme by other am.
no =122d, for ate
03Rrec ds that last two sentences read as followat
"Hoover, we believe it in likely that the Krelfn vauld
adopt this co se of action so long as Western roammuOent yap..
peai'ed to it only as a transitory bayri ;+!!! t to fu 'h?r
Soviet ,and Satal.hite expansion,. On the other hand, we belie"
that the KreWln would precipitate general war if it eaetdmted
that. this raarmamealt threatened ~ the security of the t R, that
the. W;e~ptern rg A]jMgft _bLvA a clear nergin of su-
pelriority, cad that delay would tip the scales of power irre-
trievab7y against the USSR."
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R
ME-25
Pisa. 27
AF rernds revising Paragraph as follows:
"We bell u that within the period covered by this estixmte
U. S. NATO, West Geium and Japanese remit is unlikely to
pmogresa to the point where the Sremlln tmould in fact regard it
as an inmaaed1nte threat to , security of the and/or
ita tiara3 ,no as a old r>draet~, We are, howenrer,, tumble
to determine at that stage of the. Western raaz meat program the
M SR might Consider "o Mawd
and we+ recognise the possibility that the
Kremlin might at air time m'txt at Western de fensfive mmeaaeurea
an indicating an imineont attack on the USSR.,
03R rec w ds that paragraph read an follower
"27. We believe, that within the period covered by this esti-
mate US, 17M, West German and Tapenoeo rearmament is Unlikely
to progress to the point where the Kremlin would An Caw*
easily regard it as an irsmrediate threat to Soviet security. We
are, however, tenable to determine at what stage of the Western
rearmament program the USSR might. actt lly consider its security
3mmed#ately or potentially threatened anA %a We also recognize
the poesibilitj that the Kremlin might at arr time misinterpret
Western defensive measures as inndicating an I=dnw attack an
the USSR."
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*A SHCI
tyc ]ast eaeme as fo7 1 .
..
in ww events low
gut ao"2 to a paint 'bed is
,,
tense that OW MR
c lam'
#, +e.
es iwe&*iaai of "fit" in first
OIR
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SECS 1W
ME-25
New Paragraphs
0.2 recomm We t
Insert the following as pairs 28, to follow Para 27, and
then renumber present 28 as pare, 29:
28. While intelligence is lacking to permit a valid pre-
diotioa as to whether or when the Soviet Union may actually
exercise its initiative and capability to launch a general war,
it mast be recognized that the risk of general war exists now
and hereafter at any time when the Soviet rulers may elect to
take action which threatens, wholly or in peat, the vital in-
terests of the Western Powers.
0111 recommends:
Add the following paragraphs
"29. Although the possibility of war by miscalculation
cannot be discounted during periods of high internation l
tension, we believe that, all aspects of the Soviet problem
considered, it in unlikely that the USSR will deliberately
choose to rink the hazards of general war during the period
covered by this estimate. 24oreaver, we believe that in:
suing various 6mwme of action short. of war with the US, the
USM will atop t to increase its power and damage the Interests
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i.+
of tbe- US *Wmw and w ov z' feasible, but will ate t
ttxeu seek to IOit each ooze of action with each doss
as to a old gro ds for action of direct rhtiltar7 aggression
age nst the vital interests of the United States".
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