OIR/DRF CONTRIBUTION TO NIE 27/1 CHINESE COMMUNIST CAPABILITIES AND INTENTIONS WITH RESPECT TO TAIWAN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R01012A000700020024-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 10, 2000
• Sequence Number: 24
• Publication Date: February 1, 1952
• Content Type: NIE

Apprc vopd or Rel a VOOO/08/29: CIA-RDP79RO101;UO0700020024-5 ,1 s
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SF,CURITX ,FORM. TION VA
P
OIR/DRP CONTRIBUTION TO
NIE 27/1
CHINES COMHUNIST OAPAEILITIES AND INTENTIONS
WITH RESP T TO TAIL --
IAN
February 1, 1952
DEPARTMENT OP STATE
OFFICE OF INTELLIGENCE RESEARCH
Division of Research for Par East
State Dept. declassification & release instructions on file
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SECTJQITY INFORM TION
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r. E. What are Chinese Communist capabilities for infiltration of
Taiwan prior to the assault?
It is doubtful that the Chinese Communists could successfully
infiltrate Taiwan with a large number of agents prior to an assault
on the island. Some could be sent in via Hongkong under cover, but
they would be subjected, on Taiwan, to surveillance by the police
and would have little opportunity to do any proselyting for their
Several former Nationalist officials have recently been
arrested and executed in Taiwan because they had defected to the
Communists on the mainland and subsequently entered Taiwan as
Communist agents, The Communists thus probably could send a few
emissaries to arrange for defection of Nationalist officers when and
if an attack is launched but if agents were to be landed in number,
surrepticiously on isolated beaches of the island, it is lilely that,
unless they found refuge in rural areas or in the mountains, they would
soon be pitied up by police. In any case their activity could be
effectively curtailed until the time of a Communist attac'c#
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II. B. What aro.? the factors in the political and economic situation
on Taiwan that affect the; capabilities of the Nationalist
armed forces? How do these factors affect the Armed Forces?
The basic factor in the Chinese Nationalist political complex,
affecting the capabilities of the military forces, is the propensity
of President Chiang Kiai-shek to maintain power through personal relation-
ships rather than by constitutionalism. This manifests itself in his
practice of giving orders directly to the generals concerned rather
than going through normal channels, thus weakening the over-all command,
and in his tactic of playing off, against each other, the various con-
tending groups under him. Jealousy among the three most powerful
groups (headed by the Premier, General Chten Chiang, the Governer of
Taiwan, K. C. Wu, and the Generalissimots son, Chiang Ching-kuo) has
weakened the Government and has prevented adoption of measures that
would strengthen its position to meat the Communist threat, Similar
frictions within and between the various military services further tend
to limit their effectiveness as a fighting force.
Chiang Ohing-kuo, as the head of the Political Department of the
Ministry of National Defense, excercises such control over military
commanders that they have little freedom of action.. This would not only
prove dangerous under battle conditions, but tends to discourage
initiative and thus decrease effectiveness at all times,. A further
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result of Chiang Ohing_kuots activit " s a loss of popular support
for the Government, which might be crucial in the event of Communist
attack,
Another factor that cannot be overlooked is the possibility
of defections in the face of attack. Officers and men foresee little
future on Taiwan or any real prospect for returns to the mainland
and, in the event of an attack, might therefore resort to defection
as a means of preserving life and returning home. At present it
appears that the population would assist in the defense of the island
or: remain passive. There appears to be a new awareness in Taiwan
of the dangers of Communism, resulting from the excesses of the Communist
regime on the mainland, and it is probable that for this reason
popular defection would be at a minimum at least until it became
evident that the attack would be successful and further resistance
hopeless.
On the economic side, the situatioi3 in which the resources of
Taiwan are being seriously strained -- and. yet are obviously inadequate to support the present military establishment, is likely to have
adverse effects on troop morale. Pay and subsistence standards, despite
US military aid, are unlikely to be greatly improved under the very
heavy budgetary pressures. The troops, moreover, have few local ties
with the Taiwanese because of their different cultural backgrounds
and are identified by the Taiwanese as the major cause of present
domestic economic pressures.
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II. C. What is the scope and nature of the Chinese Communist sub-
versive effort on Taiwan? Sow does this effort affect
Nationalist capabilities to defend Taiwan?
The nature and scope of Communist subversive effort on Taiwan
cannot be accurately assessed because, aside from sporadic reports
emanating from either Hongkong or ..t o mainland of agents being sent
to Taiwan, the only source for this kind of information is the
Chinese National Government. Reports of the latter are of questionable
value because these are frequently designed specifically to insure
confidence in the Nationalist regime and to impress the US of the
Communist danger and because the Nationalists tend to label all
opposition activity as Communist. The Nationalists claim, however,
-- with considerable credibility -- that there was a sudden decrease
in Communist activity in Taiwan in the fall of 1950, and that slow but
steady progress has been made since that time in suppressing such
activity..
It appears probable that there are Communist agents on Taiwan
at the present time, but that they have been. restricted to operating
as individuals or in small groups, and that there is no large Communist
organization. Furthermore, it appears that because of strict police
surveillance, their activities must be largely covert and that their
opportunities for recruiting among the local population are slight.
There have been many possible cases of sabotage, but evidence has not
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been sufficient to clarify whether these were accidents, act's of
Taiwanese dissidents, or actual cases of Communist subversion. As
recent arrests have purportedly disclosed that certain individuals
charged with Communism have actually been members of the Chinese
Communist Party for 20 years, it is possible that there are still
Communists in official positions in the Government who have not yet
been ferreted out.
It is believed that under the present circumstances, the
Communists may be able to operate a limited network of sabotage and
espionage agents. Those presently on the island, however, will have
little freedom to act before the period immediately preceding an
attack. A few men may remain in key positions, who could defect
at the critical time, and a few covert agents may be able to send
out reports by clandesti-ne :radio stations or other devious methods.
Any expansion of present Communist strength on the island would be
extremely difficult.
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N. How do the following factors influence Chinese Communist intentions
with respect to Taiwan?
A. Communist Strategy in Asia. Communist strategy in Asis might
dictate that Taiwan be the next target for Communist aggression, follow-
ing a possible Korean setlement. However, since the seizure of Taiwan
could probably not be carried out br internal subversion, infiltration,
and covert external aid, Communist strategists will have to consider the
problem in terms of the risks involved in a frontal assault against the
US-supported ~?"[' forces. The experience of the Korean war has indicated
that the Communists might not hesitate, if necessary, to attack American
armed forces, but the course of the cease-fire negotiations suggests that
the Communist leadership may wish to avoid a widening of hostilities in
Asia at this time, such as would probably be involved in an attack on
Taiwan.
It remains a stated objective of the Chinese Commiunists, an ob-
jective endorsed by the USSR,. ultimately to gain control'of Taiwan, The
method employed to achieve this end would, however, depend partly on
Communist estimates of US intentions and capabilities and partly on the
general international situation, including the attitude of the UN and UN
members towards. the question of the disposition of Taiwan.
B, Soviet Interests in Taiwan, Since a Chinese Communist assault on
Taiwan would inevitably involve a sizeable Soviet commitment of materiel,
probably including naval and possibly air units, considerations of Soviet
interests will play a large role in a ConnAunist decision to attack,
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Conceivably the USSR might desire a Chinese Communist attack on Taiwan
for any or several of the following reasons:
1. To main another military base and eliminate an anti-
Communist strong-hold. Taiwan is not of critical
security importance to the USSR, but does represent
a potential threat to Communist China. How important
a consideration this is to the Kremlin is not known.
Communist possession of the island would breach the
chain of US island bases and provide a possible base
of operations against the, Philippines.
2. To involde the US in possibly debilitating and lengthy
military operations that raight lead to a reduction of
western military capabilities elsewhere.
3. To exploit the existing differences in western countries
in regard to the US "neutralization" policy.
4. To keep Sino-US tension at a high point with the ooncom-
itantly increasing dependence of Pei-piing upon the USSR.
5. To exacerbate tension in the Far East in line with cur-
rent Soviet emphasis on colonial areas.
At the same time the USSR might desire to postpone any Chinese
Communist attack on Taiwan for reasons such as the following=
1. Moscow might want to avoid the risk of an expanded
war in the Far East which might necessitate direct
Soviet involvement.
2. The consequences of failure or stalemate of an assault
on Taiwan, following the 'Korean venture, might be severe
in terms of loss of prestige, materiel, and trained mili-
tary manpower.
3. Irrespective of the need for direct Soviet involvement,
an attack on Taiwan might require Soviet materiel and
other military aid on a scale the USSR is not willing
to commit, particularly in view of the secondary strate-
gic importance of the island to the USSR.
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4. An attack on Taiwan would reduce Communist capabilities
for action elsewhere. The Communist leadership may esti-
mate that greater gains could be achieved, for example,
in Indochina or Burma, at less cost and with no greater
risk of widened hostilities or global war,
5, Moscow may be satisfied that US support of Nationalist
China assures continued Sino-US tension and continued
aggravation of American relations with those countries
that do not share the US views on Taiwan.
Co Communist Estimate of US Intentions. The Communist leadership
probably recognizes that under present conditions the US "neutralization"
policy will remain in effect, but it may hope to gain an eventual revision
of that policy, possibly following a Korean settlement, However, the
Communists probably recognize the domestic political repercussions in the
US of any suggestions to turn Taiwan over to the Pei-p?ing regime,
D, Communist Estimate of Possible US Counter-action. A possibly de-
cisive consideration in any Communist decision on Taiwan would be the
Communist estimate of US counter-measures. The Communist leadership pro.
bably believes that any invasion attempt would be met by resolute opposi-
tion by US naval and air units and that an invasion attempt would be
followed by a relaxation of the "neutralization" policy to permit the
Formosan government to retaliate against the mainland. In addition, the
Communists probably feel that there is a considerable risk that an attack
on Taiwan would be followed by US naval and air action against the main-
land bases supporting an attack. Furthermore, the Communists probably
realize that once US forces are committed, it may be difficult to localize
hostilities, and that the danger of a general Asian or world war would be
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greatly increased, In view of the estimated probability that the Kremlin
desires to launch neither a general Asian nor a world war during the
time period of this estimate, considerations of possible US counter-
measures probably weigh heavily agaipst a decision to attack Formosa.
E. The Korean Situation
2. Truce Negotiations. In view of the estimated probability that
the Communists desire a settlement of the Korean war on a basis acceptable
to them it is
questionable that they; would risk wrecking the Korean talks
and jeopardizing possible political '.scussions after a cease-fire by
initiating an attack on Taiwan.
F. Possible Reaction In non-Communist Countries. The possible re-
action in non-Communist countries to a Chinese Communist attack on Taiwan
would not deter the Communists from an attack, particularly since many
non-Communist countries have a large measure of sympathy for Chinese Commu-
nist claims to the island?
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V. What are the indications of Chinese Communist intentions with
respect to Taiwan?
Recent Chinese Communist propaganda has evaded the question of
invading; Taiwan, Whereas the 1950 New Year's message of the Central
Committee stated that part of the tas'c for the coming year was to
liberate Taiwan, Hainan Island, and Tibet," the, various messages a
year later subordinated the question of Taiwan to the more general
struggle against American "Imperialism," and gave no assurance of
any specific action against Taiwan during 1951, The 1952 official
New Year's editorial cited Taiwan merely as a case of US aggression,
and made no reference to the island's 99liberation.11 Chairman Mao's
New Yearns message for 1952 made no mention whatsoever of Taiwan.
Although Premier Yoshidals letter to Mr? Dulles regarding the signing
of a Japanese peace treaty with the Chinese National Government
offered an exdellent opportunity for comment on the issue. the retort
given by the Communist Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs, Chang gang-fu,
on January 22, 1952 avoided any mention of a Communi.at I'liberation"
of Taiwan, and the general tone of the statement was directed against
Japan and the US for uniting in "aggressive measures....against Korea
and China."
That Pei-p;ii.ag has not abandoned the "liberation" of Taiwan
as an ultimate objective, howevor,.is..indicated by etch statements
as Chou En:lails political report to the WPC on October 23, 1951,
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when he declared "the Chinese people are determined to liberate
Taiwan from the grip of the American aggressors and will never:-relax
until they have achieved that end." However, this statement was
made in the context of the Chinese Peoplets "long term struggle to
resist American aggression and aid Korea.." The "liberation of
Taiwan" has also been declared to be one of the objectives of ;,.
Fei--plingts grogram of military modernization.
V. D. UN iVegotMt s
Soviet and satellite representatives in the UN demonstrated
considerably less interest in Taiwan during 1951 than in 1950. The
USSR repeatedly charged the US with plotting aggression against
Communist China and Southeast Asia, including the transportation of
MT troops from Taiwan to Thailand and Burma, but these charges
seemed to be a part of the general Soviet propaganda offensive, and
not specifically designed to lay the groundwork for a possible invasion
of Taiwan.
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swim
Copy No. SECURITY INFORMATION Sa
ADDENDA TO OIR/DRF CONTRIBUTION TO NIE-27/1: 25X1A9a
CHINESE CON*7NIST CAPABILITIES- AND
INTFNTI S WITH R SPELT TO TAIWAN
February 25, 1952
On Page 3, between second and third paragraphs, insert following dis-
cussion of political situation;
"It is possible that,,, 4n ,the :event of. the- a6at1? of=`the
Generalissimo, the regime. might; be, s,eri.ously dlsxtiDted by faction-
alism, with Chten Chleng_,and Ch4ang Ching.-juo.-emergirg' as the chief
protagonists. Ch:1,en enjoys extensive personal loyalty among
Nationalist force,,whia.e Chiang,has.estab'lished'-eons iderable poll
tical control within ,toe same; consequently; asaesisment~ 'of 'their
relative military etrezxgthia difficult. .Thus, in the'event that
succession to power were not quickly established,.-.the:National'iet
potential for resisting either external attack or internal subver-
sion -- including defections -- would probably be greatly decreased.
It is possible, however, that if the Communists decided to take
advantage of such a situation, the people on Taiwan would have
sufficient warning of the impendiA3 attack to subordinate private
differences to the over-all emergency and to rally around a single
leader. It is estimated that there will be no serious outbreak
of factionalism within the regime so long as the Generalissimo re-
mains alive."
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On Page 6, at the, end. of the..first .paragraph of ri A, insert:
If the Korean negotiations should fail and fighting in Korea
be extended, Communist strategy toward Taiwan would probably be
goverrned'primarily"by military considerations. The Communists
might launch a diversionary . attack on Taiwan, but would be un-
likely to shift their primary ,military emphasis from the atrategi-
caUy more important areas.of Korea and Manchuria. if the Korean
negotiations should lead. to a Korean armisti'co and to political
attaokiag Taiwan while p4litical I%egoti Lions are in progress in
order not to prejudice their position''et the bargaining table or
discussions, it is ..likely that the C?numinists will refrain from
before the eyes of the world. "
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