(UNTITLED)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R01012A000700040004-5
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 10, 2000
• Sequence Number: 4
• Content Type: NIE

ate lAppto ass 400g/O A Fntirm 7COddt0040004-5
SECRET OIR'S Proposed Revision of
"Conclusions" of Feb. 24
draft of HIE 29
tinned survimml of the Tito regime and has made clear that it desires the
replacement of this regime by one subservient to Moscow. The Soviet Union
has, however, given no evidence that it feels compelled to eliminate Tito
1, The Soviet Union has demonstrated great seneivitivy over the con-
at any coat or within any time period.
in
0014 #A-
its treatment of the Tito problem has neither implicitl ' i#Thxplicitly
suggested that itds-to bring about the overthrow of t e ito regime
Instead the,Kremlin?s position has
.a} been that with the "unmasking" of Tito by the Cominform, the Yugoslav peopla
themselves can be expected to take appropriate action./(A Soviet decision
to attack Yugoslavia. either directly or through the satelliteso would
therefore probably be motivated by broader considerations than merely the
replacement of Tito., It would be based upon a caldulation that the conquest
of Yugoslavia would itma?diately and substantially further the over-all
Soviet aim of undermining, either for defensive or offensive purposeso the
Rent ern power position,
2? The USSR probably estimates that an attack on Yugoslavia, whatevsr
the guises would carry with it such risks of precipitating general war as to
require full readiness for general war before it could be safely undertaken;,
The USSR might. of course, act against Yugoslavia without the intention of
thereby precipitating general war, but it would probably calculate that
general war was sufficiently likely to result that it would .not make the
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E3CRET d ormis
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p It Contains Informatlow of CIA
interest that most remain
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Aathorltyt me 10.2
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.move unless it had reached a stage in the development of its policy where
it was willing to let armed conflict determine the outcome of its power
struggle with the US*
It is highly unlikely that the Tito regime can be overthrown
during 1951 by a Soviet-inspired coup or by internal revolt
4. Recent military buildup in the 4atellite countries. (increase in
armed foroesa stookpilingo remequtpment. gasoline conservation, stepping-Up
of fir industry, etc,) points to a great increase in satellite capabilities
and readiness for military notion, This build-up has not been limited to the
satellites that would logically be involved in an attack on Yugoslavia, but
has included Poland and Caeahoslovakiao
The Cominform?s war-of-nerves against Yugoslavia continues
aia lst, there beinr constant emphasis on Tito's aggressiveness. alleged
border violations and preparations for offensive operations, and hints of
the inevitable day of reokoningo However,, since the sum+ser, of 1950 there
has been no change in themes or tone sufficient to surest isdnent aggression.
Although the themes obviously encompass the gamut of those required for
psychological preparation for ware there is nothing about the current treat6
ment that raises a unique danger signal. Moreoverv moat of the same themes
have appeared in the propaganda campaign being waged against Greece and to a
lesser extent Turkey.
6. Although these indications reveal a definite Soviet-satellite
program to accelerate military and. psychological preparedness, they do not
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SECRET 3
appear to Justify singling; out Yugoslavia as a peculiarly sensitive area.
We believe that an attack on Yugoslavia will be made in 1951 only if the
USSR has decided to place principal reliance on the direct use of force in
its oonf liot with the West o The possibility cannot be disregarded that the
USSR, may have in fact made suoh a deoisiono On the basis of present
intelligence, however,, we are unable to determine the probability of such a
decision having actually been madeo
7, We estimate that, against invasion by the armies of the four
neighboring satellite powers (Bulgarian Rumania, Hunppry, and Albania).
Yugoslavia alone could maintain effective organized resistance for about
three or four months, auerrillatype resistance would continue after
collapse of organised resistance*
8. ffe osttmate that. in the event of fullosoale invasion by Soviet-
satellite forces, Yugoslav forces would be incapable of maintaining effective
organized resistance for more than a month,
9, Yugoslav capabilities and morale are such that substantial
5'estern assistance in military materiel might enable Yugoslavia to defend
itself successfully against a satellite attacko and even to withstand a
Soviet-satellite attack for considerably more than a montho However, such
materiel would have to be adapted to the special requirements of Yugoslav
forces and would have to be delivered several months in advance of an
attacks
SECRET
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