NIE-29: YUGOSLAVIA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R01012A000700040038-8
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 15
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 11, 1999
• Sequence Number: 38
• Publication Date: February 13, 1951
• Content Type: NIE

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AES
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF PATION&L EST.IPAATES
13 February 1951
SUBJECT: NW-29: YUG LAVIP
TIC PROBLEM
To assess the capabilities and intentions of the USSR
and its European Satellites with respect to action against
I.ugoslavia during 1951.
CONCLUSIONS
The Kremlin aim to eliminate the Tito Oovernt,
to replace it by a regime subservient to the USSR, and to
integrate Yugoslavia politicall1y, economically, and stx'atee
igical.iy into the European Satellite struc,ire.
2 Titoes regime will not be overthrown during 1951
by internal revolts, or by subversive activities, no matter
haoc such such activities may be supported from across the
border. Overt, --armed invasion will be required if the Soviet
objective is to bs accomplisheda
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3. The Yugoslav armed forces would now be capable of re-
sisting fuU-soale invasion by the armed forces of the USSR
for about one month if the defense were withdrawn and canaen-
trated in the mountainous area of Bosnia, Hercegovina, and
Nantenegro0 If nab so oanoeutrated, reaistanos by regular mili-
tary forces would probably and within two weekso
4. Against invasion by the armies of the four neighbor-
ing Satellite powers (Bu,7.g$rias bias Hungary, and Albania),
organized Yugoslav resistance could be expected to continue for
about three months, but probably no more than four months under
the most favorable defensive conditions. In either cases guer-
rilla-type resistance would oontinuo after the collapse of or-
ganized resistance.
5. If substantial Western military assistance, in the
form of weapons and equipment which could be readily integrated
into Yugoslav units, were' furnished swveral months before a
Soviet bloc invasion, the period of Yugoslav resistance to a
Soviet invasion would be considerably lengthened, the invasion
would be more costly to the attacking forceps and Yugoslav
defensive capabilities could permit a successful defense against
a Satellite invasion,
6. indication of recent military build-up in the Satel-
lite countries (stockpiling, re-equipment, gasoline conservations
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stepping-up of war industry, eta.) all point to a great and
recent increase in Satellite capabilities for military action.
Although the Satellites now have the capability for an attack
against Yugoslavia during 1951, and sunk a possibility cannot
be overlooked, recent indications neither prove nor disprove
an intention to launch such an attack,
74 There is no reason to believe that the OSSR, solely
to attain its objective of overthrowing Tito, would run grave
risks of precipitating Wor1d War TIT. Soviet leaders can
hardly fail to estimate that a Soviet or Satellite invasion of
Yugoslavia in strength would involve grave risks of warn
3. If the Kremlin for other reasons decides .to accept
grave risks of general war during 1951., or to precipitate such
a war,, it might vnell begin by attacking Yugoslavia.
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DISCUSSION
SOVIET OBJECTIVES WITH RESPECT TO YUOOSLAVIA
1? The Kremlin aims to eliminate the Tito Goverment, to
replace it by a regime subservient to the USSR, and to inte-
grate Yugoslavia politically, eoonomically, and strategically
into the European Satellite structure.
STRENt#TH AND STABILTTY OF TITO'S REGIME
2. The Tito regime is stable. Internal security forces
are large and efficient, and have dealt successfully with
active opposition elements. Efforts of the Cominform to
penetrate and undermine the regime by subversive means have
thus far conspicuously failed. Available evidence reveals
no effective, organised opposition groups operating within
the country and no serious personal rivals to Tito himself.
3. Not only in the machinery of control thus undeniably
effective, but the regime also enjoys considerable popular
support. A majority of the Yugoslav population prefers it to
the reestablishment of control by agents of the USSR. Tito'.
bold and successful stand in the face of mounting Soviet and
Satellite pressure has appealed strongly to Yugoslav national
pride. Even the long-standing national minority problems in
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the country are at a low point of intensity. The improve-
ment of Yugoslav relations with the Western Pourers, and par-
ticularly with the US, has met favorable popular response.
Relaxation of the program of agricultural collectivization,
political controls, and the campaign against religion have
also reduced tendencies toward popular dissatisfaction.
4. Since his break with Moscow, Tito has faced severe
economic problems, arising partly from the embargo which the
Soviet orbit placed upon all trade with Yugoslavia, and more
recently from crop failures within the country. Tito has been
fairly successful in reorienting Yugoslav trade westward, and
the assistance of Western countries has eliminated the worst
danger of the food shortage. Economic difficulties are not
likely to cause any serious internal disorders.
5. There are, on the other hand, various weaknesses in
the regime, some of which can be exploited by the USSR and
its Satellitos. Titoes break with the Ccminfotm and his en-
suing vigorous campaign against Cominform sympathizers in the
Party hierarchy put severe strains upon the mechanism of to-
talitarian controlo A few of Titoes supporters, though seemingly
loyal, may in fact be biding their time until an opportunity
occurs for them to improve their fortunes at the expense of
their leader. Moreover, the scars of the Communist revolution
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after World War TI have not healed. Nationalization of the
eoonamys campaigns against religion, and the development of
police state technigtes were bitterly resented. Probably the
majority of Yugoslavs are anti-Comet, even though they are
pro-Tito under present oiroumstanceso
64 Tito'a freedom of action in dealing with various poli-
tical problems is somewhat restricted by his ambivalent ideo-
logical position, Any considerable retreat from Ce mnunist
theory or practice, and any conspicuous aseooiatiarle with the
Western Powers, give substance to the Kremlin's contention that
Tito is a traitor to Communism; if such developments were to go
far enough, they might cost Tito the support of some of his
more zealous Marxist followers, who are indispensable func-
tionaries In his totalitarian regime, On the other hand, if
he adheres too faithfully to Communist dogma, he alienates the
Western Powers, and antagonizes non-Cc c-unist elements within
Yugoslavia whose support is f'undamontal if national independence
is to be maintained,
7. We believe that Tito's regime will continue to be
strong enough to deal with all its internal difficulties, de.
spite strenuous Soviet and Satellite efforts to exploit them,
Even in the event of invasion, the great majority of the Yugo-
slave would support Tito, and would faithfully carry out what
resistance was militarily possible,
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KrLITARff yuLNERABn=
8. Most of the peripheral areas along iugoslavia a s. ex-
tended frontiers are highly vulnerable to Satellite invasion.
Norbhweatern Yugoslavia, including Slovenia and northern Croatia,
could be quickly out off from the rest of the country by a drive
southward from Hungary through Zagreb and toward Fiume. That
country north of the Sava River between Zarb and the Danube
could also be easily invaded at a number of points along the
Hungarian frontier. The Danubian Plain north of Belgrade is
especially vulnerable to armored attacks from either Hungary or
Ruin niao The Belgrade areas although partially protected on
the north by the D8 ube, would be hard to defend against attacks
across the Danubian Plain or from the south through the Morava
River valley. Yugoslav Macedonia could be cut off by attacks
from Bulgaria and Albania directed toward Skop14e.
9. The large mountainous area which includes Bosnia, Her-
cegovina,, and Montenegro In suitable for the organization and
maintenance of a strong defense. However, this area would be
dependent for outside supplies on several moderately good
Adriatic Sea ports, access to which could be threatened by
Albanian air and naval bases on the eastern shore of the Straits
of Otranoo The mountainous defensive area would also be vulner-
able to enemy penetrations from the directions of Zagreb and
Fierce if such penetrations were undertaken before the organization
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of defensive positions. Several points along the Dalmatian
coast might be vulnerable to amphibious attacks launched fora
Albanian bases.
IN The Yugoslav munitions. industry could not most, the
country's wartime requirements except in the production of light
infantry weapons and small-arms ammunition* Most munitions pro-
duotion is centered around Belgrade and would be vulnerable to
ground and air attack in the early stages of hostilities. The
main ports of entry and transportation routes through which'
supplies from abroad might be obtained also are highly vulner-
able. Rail and motor routes from Trieste and Fiume would, in
the event of an attack from Hungary, probably be out off at an
early staged Road and rail routes from Salonika are vulnerable
to ground attack from Bulgaria and Albania., The only transpor-
tation facilities likely to remain In operation during extended
hostilities are the ports, r:bads, and railways along the Dalma-
tian coast. Even these are of limited capacity and are vulnerable
to air attacks
MEASURES SHORT CP WAR LIKffi.Y TO BE APPLIED AGAINST YIROSIAV]A
lle Since the break between Tito and the Kremlin, an eco-
nanic blockade has been maintained by the Soviet orbit countries
against Tugoslavia. Diplomatic relations have also been virtually
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suspended and Yugoslav diplamats have been harassed and intimi-
dated by Cominform agentso Tito has been portrayed as a life.
long "Fascist agent" and a willing tool of western imperialists
in a conspiracy to attack the Soviet Unian, The resulting eco-
nomic and diplomatic isolation of Yugoslavia was for a time ex-
tremely dangerous to Tito n s regime; if the support of his former
Eastern associates had not been replaced in part by support
from the Western Powers,, Tito might have collapsed. This danger
now some to be overt,
12. Attempts will undoubtedly be continued to weaken
Titoes regime by the infiltration of saboteurs and subversive
agents. It is impossible to estimate how many such agents may
cross the frontiers. Although the Yugoslavs are not easily
frightened, Moscow may also have same slight success in spread-
ing the fear of war and invasion among those parts of the Yugo-
slav population who dill close to the vulnerable frontisrso
The USSR can also attempt to stage violent internal uprisings
in Yugoslavia, linked with guerrilla raids from the neighbor-
ing Caminform countries. It can sponsor attempts to assassinate
Tito. It can nourish any elements of Titoes own party with
Ceminform tendencies who may hope for an opportunity to succeed
to powero
130 We believe that none of the methods short of war which
the Kremlin may use will substantially weaken Titoes regime, and
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certainly will not overthrow it. Over a period of same three
years the Kremlin has already applied to.Yugoslavia the strong-
est economics, political, and psychological pressures of which
it is capable. Tito has not been appreciably weakened by them;
indeed his suooessful stand has apparently strengthened his
position with the Yugoslav peopled He is thoroughly conversant
with the tricks and techniques which may be need against his.
The period of his greatest vulnerability to such methods is past.
It will now require armed invasion to shake his reg1meo
SOVIET AND SATELLITE ARM FORCES AVAILABLE FCR AN ATTACK
ON YUGMmix
1I. Soviet forces presently disposed in countries ad-
jacent to Yugoslavia consist of six line divisions-two each
in Austria, Hungary? and Rumania.--and are insufficient by them-
selves for a successful invasion of Yugoslavia. Additional
forces could, however, readily be drawn from the USSR to make
up an adequate force for an invasion,
15. The armies of Albania, Hungary, Rumania$ and Bul-
garia now total approximate]y 440,000 men, buts, with partial
mobilization over a period of at least 30 days, could be in..
creased to 925,000 men organised in 47 Jim divisions, 11 cam.
bat brigades, and supporting independent regiments. .Additionsl
equipment would be required, but this could readily be supplied
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by the USSR by the and of April 1951. Satellite air forces
total approximately 900 combat aircraft; their combat effective.
ness is lows Satellite naval forces are negligible,
16, The fighting qualities of these forces would be at
least good in comparison with Yugoslav forces, particularly in
sucoesaful offensive operations. Bulgarian and Rvadanian forces.,
are the beet trained and equipped of the four Satellite armiese
but all Satellite forces would have the major advantage of ex-
tensive and timely Soviet logistical support for an invasion of
Tugoslavia0
YWOSLAV FORCES AVAILABLE FOR DE1 E
17. The Yugoslav Army has a current strength of approxi-
mately 275,000 men and could be expanded in 30 days to 600,9000
men organized in 40 divisions, Yugoslavia has a further mobilisa.
tion potential up to 1,000,000 men six months after commencing
mobilization, but current and future availability of weapons would
restrict arms for additional units to light infantry weapons and
some field artillery, Yugoslav weapons are generally of good
quality but heterogenous, with Soviet and German World War II
models predominating. The outstanding weaknesses in equipment
are in tanks, antitank weapons and anti-aircraft artillery,
Yugoslav effectiveness would decline rapidly in the event of hoa-
tilities because of inability to replace material lost in combat,
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The Yugoslav air force totals approximately 650 planes,, but
is hampered by a shortage -of spare parts. The Yugoslav navy
is sman and inefficient but is nevertheless capable of success-
fully opposing az Satellite naval operation?
18. Yugoslav forces are capable of good combat performance,
particularly if committed to the defense of the mountainous area
of Bosnia, Hercegovina, and Montenegro rather than the Danubian
plain, Mary of the officers and non-commissioned officers had
combat eocperienoe in World War II and since then have had fairly
good training,
19. tinder present circumstances, only limited improvement
can be expected in Yugoslav capabilities during 1951? The Yugo-
slave are currently attempting to .purchase arms and equipment
from foreign sources, and some material, such as small area and
light artillery, is being manufactured locally, Production is
slow, however, and it will be some time before new equipment can
be produced in significant quantities. Western military assist-
ance in the form of weapons and equipment which could readily be
integrated into Yugoslav units would materially strengthen Yugo-
slav defensive capabilities if the program were oommenced several
months before an invasion, Combat capabilities could be further
increased by the acquisition of certain items of equipment, such
as anti-tank weapons and rocket launchers from the West' but only
after Yugoslav personnel had been trained in their use, Major
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assistance would be required to bring the Yugoslav air force
to equality with the combined air forces of neighboring Satellites.
SOVIET AND SATELLITE MILITARY CAPABILITIES AGAINST YUGOSLAVIA.
20. Soviet armed forces could successfully invade Yugo-
slavia, overcome organized resistance, and eventually bring guer-
rilla opposition under control. 'Under present circumstances, it
is estimated that organized Yugoslav resistance could be destroyed
'within one month, The elimination of guerrilla opposition would
take considerably longer and would depend on the extend of out-
side aid to the guerrillas and the scale of the Soviet effort.
Timely Western aid could considerably lengthen the period of re-
sistance to a Soviet invasion and, at the same time, make such an
invasion more costly to the USSR.
2lo Under present circumstances, the Yugoslav armed forces
are incapable of successfully opposing an invasion by the com-
bined forces of Bulgaria, Rumania, Hungary, and Albania. It is
estimated that organized resistance against this force would con-
tinue for about three months and probably no more than four months
under the most favorable defensive conditions. Guerrilla resis-
tance would, of course, continue beyond that period. Substantial
Western military assistance, if commenced several months prior
to an invasion, could enable Yugoslavia to defend itself success-
fully against a combined Satellite invasion.
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PROBABILITY OF SOVIET OR SATELLITE ATTACK ON YUGOSLAVIA
DMING IM
22e Indications from all the Satellite countries border-
ing Yugoslavia point unmistakably to a considerable military
build-up., The nuabers of the armed forces have been increased;
various items of heavy Soviet-made equipment have recently been
observed in the possession of Satellite forces; stockpiling of
food and materials is taking place; rationing of gasoline and
electricity has been introduced into most of the countries; emer-
gency programs for industrial war production have been instituted,
and the movement of foreign diplomatic personnel has been more
strictly confined., The USSR has meanwhile laid the progaganda
groundwork to justify an attack on Tito, These and over indi-
cations definitely establish that in 1951 the Satellites are or
will be better prepared for an attack on Yugoslavia than they
were in 1950; they do not prove that the'Satellites will in fact
make such an attack, The capability for a successful attack
exists? however, and its possibility cannot be overlooked*
23o. In assessing the probability of a Soviet-,Satellite
attack, the considerations presented above demonstrated that no
small-scale or surreptitious operation could overthrow Tito ?s
regime; there must be-full-scale invasion, by all the Satellite
armies, or by some of them with the overt assistance of Soviet
armed forces. Indeed, if Tito receives sufficient military
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equipment from the West, he can probably stand off ar*r attack
in 'nhich the USSR does not openly join. Moreover, a Soviet de-
cision to invade Yugoslavia involves the acceptance by the
Kremlin of extreme risks of US intervention and perhaps of World
War III. We do not believe that the Kremlin is willing to accept
this risk for the sole purpose of attaining its objectives against
Tito.
24, If, however, Moscow intends during 1951 to accept '
grave risks of World War III in pursuit of its general policy,
or to precipitate such a war, there are Some good reasons for
starting the action in Yugoslavian As the first step in a gen-
oral European war, the Soviets might feel impelled to eliminate
the potential flanking threat presented by a hostile Yugoslavia.
By doing so they would also give themselves an improved stra-
tegic position for further action against Greece and in general
against the Mediterranean regiono
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