Document Type: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
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Document Creation Date: 
December 9, 2016
Document Release Date: 
July 10, 2000
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Publication Date: 
October 18, 1951
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PDF icon CIA-RDP79R01012A000800020002-8.pdf265.22 KB
SECRET Approved For RV se 2000/08/29: CZAR P 9R01012V800020002-8 The pages were omitted from DRS contribution to UM -29/2: TO ESTIMTE THE POSSIBILITY OF AN INVASION OF IIIQOSLM1VIA PRIOR TO MID-'1952, October 18, 19510 State Dept. declassification & release instructions on file Ileviow of this document by CIA hat d/termined that o CIA has no objection to declass p It contains information of CIA interest Mat must remain classified at TS S o It contains ~ nothing of CIA into str Bak 4 ~ Reviewer - .5 SECRET Approved For Release 2000/08/29 : CIA-RDP79RO1012A000800020002-8 Approved For Release_ /08/29 : CIA-RDPR12A000800020002-8. Nod, (4) Local and Regional Problemss 15(a) Mace: Historically, one of the most vulnerable areas in Yugoslavia is Macedonia, focal point for the manipulation of local antagonisms. The Tito regime has shown itself to be acutely aware of this vulnerability-and has taken political.. economii.c, and cultural steps to lessen it. In the past two years Belgrade has indicated increasing confidence in its ability to successfully corn- 'bat Comin4'orm intrigues as shown by the absence of special security measures in L;acedonia and Belgrade's anti Bulgarian propaganda campaign. At the same time, however, Moscow does possess certain poten- tialities which it presumably hopes to exploit in Macedonia. These include (1) continued existence of local petty antagonisms; (2) the fr esence of elements desiring either an independent Macedonia or one more closely tied to Bulgaria; and (3) persistent economic problems.' These possibilities have been enhanced, at least theoretic- ally, by the current attitude of the peasants towards the Tito regime. In the flush of the first indigenous nationalist government in centuries, Macedonia more than any.of the other republics has, moved, further and more forcefully towards the establishment of Com- munist methods of production. This is especially ' true with regard to the creation of agricultural cooperatives* The federal govern. ment has supported and encouraged this trend in the hope of winning the loyalty of Macedonian nationalists by assisting their economic progress. In creating a large socialist agricultural sector Belgrade has established a_group of young Communist officials dependent upon Approved For Release 2000/08/29: CIA-R98T1012A000800020002-8 Approved For Release 2WO /08/29: CIA-RDP79PZM 000800020002-8 15 (b) .*./ the continuation of the system. This group may ncrN be wary of the effects of the current trend towards-liberalization will have on their personal power, They cannot be expected to view with equanimity such measures as the announcement made in late September that 50 per- cent of the members of the Peoples' Committees in Croatia and Serbia were being dismissed in the interest of greater efficiency. The temporary shelving of the touchy Aegean Liacedonian issue does not seem to have worked against the Tito regime despite the fact that Cominform.propaganda has characterized Tito as the betrayer of the legitimate rights of the Haeedonian people because of his alleged indifference to the fate of Greek Macedonians now under "monarrcho- fascist" rule., Apparently, the lengthy program of assurance under- taken by the Macedonian Comunist Party for several months prior to the closing of the Creek-Yugoslav border on August 2, 19h9 has been effective. The creation of the Society for Aegean Macedonian Refugees, while ostensibly for social welfare purposes such as housing and employment, has political implications for the Yugoslav Macedonians in that it indicates that the Yugoslavs are not insensitive to the present plight and future disposition of Aegean PMacedonians. Recent reports from Macedonia indicate continuing efforts by the Cominforn to win over the people to its cause, particularly members of the ,_acedonian Communist party. These efforts have ap- parently included (1) dropping leaflets from aircraft; (2) sending barges loaded with propaganda leaflets across the border at Strumica; and (3) lately an attempt to revive the ILTRO organization in Greek and Yugoslav 1Sacedonia, This is in addition to the incessant anti- Approved For Release 2000/08/29: CIA-RDP7 ;W 2A000800020002-8 Approved For Release 2000/08/29 : CIA-RDP79RO1012A000800020002-8 e SEA 15 (c) Yugoslav propaganda emanating from Radio Sofia and the Tree Creek So far all evidence points to the conclusion that Bulgarian propaganda efforts have not been successful. The recent attention devoted to the re-activation of TR0 under Communist auspices seems to be a tacit admission of the failure of these efforts. In a recent Interview with US Embassy officials a local Macedonian Cabinet mamber said that the Cominform had actually succeeding in reeving the old terrorist organization in northern Greece, but only on a limited scale. He added, however, that the situation would bear watching because the IMRO tradition was still -strong in the mountains and that under clever leadership a revival of fl RO could conceivably occur. Cominform efforts to re-activate the IMRO have soft edeled the Communist and Bulgarian sponsorship and instead emphasized Macedonian nationalist aspirations and Yugoslavians alleged betrayal of the Macedonian cause. Macedonia continues to be plagued by economic problems, none of which, however, are any different from those affecting other areas in Yugoslavia. A major disappointment, according to one Macedonian official, was the notable lag in the planned rate of industrialization. Although he readily admitted that this could be laid directly to the Comuinformystill he indicated the resultant situation was irritating. Housing is a problem and is complicated by the flow of Albanian and Bulgarian refugees as v4ell as the presence in Skoplje and other cities of groups of Aegean Mac?doiiiansr Macedonian cities are not large enough to accommodate the increased Approved For Release 2000/08/29: CIA-RDP7~ 2A000800020002-8 Approved For Release 2000/08/29: CIA-RDP7982CJA000800020002-8 15 (d) urban population caused by even the limited industrialization. Peasant resistance to the regime seems on the upswing with the govern- ment in several cases being forced to call out the militia to quell riotous peasants. The severe-taxes and enforced collections of grain are not popular with the peasants who still am their own land. The albanian and Turkish tyoslems are apparently not happy with the CP'Y's decree abolishing the veil for women and polygamy as.a religious practice. There is obvious discontent in Macedonia as in other areas but at the moment it does not appear to be of-'such propor4ions as to seriously threaten the'Tito regime; Montenegro: Montenegro represents another area peculiarly susceptible to Cominform pressure. FIistorically and culturally oriented towards Russia., it has shown itself still open to Russian influence. Some of the most prominent Cominform defectors have been 11ontenegrins, including Max Goranovic and Voja Srzenticj The btontenegrin terrain is suit3d to'guerrilla warfare and for the infiltration of agents from Albania. One of the main complaints heard in Belgrade ar~d Zagreb is that the Montenegrins are running the central govern- ment. Some Slovene and Groat Communists resent the attention given backward areas like Montenegro instead of their oven more industrially- advanced areas,? Montenegrin mentality peculiarly lends itself to police activities and to the traditional Balkan.type espionage activity. There are some who believe that the predominance of Mona tenegrins in the secret police (UDBa) and the security troops (KNOJ) actually represents a serious threat to the security of the regime. SECRET Approved For Release 2000/08/29 : CIA-RDP79RO1012A000800020002-8 Approved For Release 2000/08/29 CIA-RDP7 O jPt2A000800020002-8 15 (e) Another factor which the Cominform could conceivably play upon is the traditional resentment of primitive. peoples to government con- trols. Belgrade has catered to Montenegrin economic and cultural sensibilities but not at the exponse of relying on them entirely, Yugoslav Army units from other areas of the country are stationed in Montenegro and any attempted uprising, would be faced with the prospect of immediate armed retaliation. The Yugoslav Government is acutely aware of these political weaknesses and is constantly employing measures, including harass- ment by the secret-police, to keep them in check. Short of armed intervention in the country, there appears no reason to believe that the stability of the Tito regime will be affected by either one or all. SECRET Approved For Release 2000/08/29 : CIA-RDP79'R011PF2A000800020002-8