DI/USAF CONTRIBUTION TO NIE : -32 EFFECTS OF OPERATIONS IN KOREA ON THE CHINESE COMMUNIST REGIME

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R01012A000800050015-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 20, 2005
• Sequence Number: 15
• Content Type: PAPER

Approved FVelease 2005/04/26 : CIA-RDP79R0VA000800050
DI/USAF CONTRIBUTION TO NIE,-32:
EFFECTS OF OPERATIONS IN KOREA ON TES CHINESE COMMUNIST REGIME
I. WHAT EVIDENCE IS TORE THAT THE KOREAN WAR HAS
Created basic disageements or cleavtmusal/UtIllAgaer militaa
.and ?Utica' echelons of the Chinese_Cinistjavar..?
015-1
There is no reliable evidence that the Korean war has created any
basic disagreements or cleavages among the higher political and
military echelons of the Chinese Communist regime sufficient to
affect the over-all political and military control of that regime?
There is some evidence of dissatiefaction on the part of some
political and military elements, but these are not expected to
develop into an active threat to the regime as long as present rigid
police controls remain unchallenged?
B0 Lessened or increased the 2ular regime?
Although the Chinese Communist regime initially met with fairly
general acceptance among the Chinese people, there were indications
of dissatisfaction and disillusionment even before Chinese Communist
intervention in Korea? The costly and indecisive Korean military
operations have intensified these adverse attitudes? The groups most
resentful of the regime are believed to be; the peasants, who are
suffering from increasingly heavy tax burdens; business and professional
people who have -become increasingly disillusioned by the economic,
educational, and eultural.policies of the Communist regimes and Christian
and other religious groups which are experiencing increasingly severe
Communist suppression? The Communist measures to destroy the traditional
Chinese family system have met with strong resentment among all elements
or the population?
C? Affected the rezkriers1125431.V to soetzlth hostile, internal forces?
It is believed, on the basis of evidence received, that the Korean
hostilities have not yet prevented the Chinese Communist regime from
coping with hostile internal forces. In order to maintain control
over these dissident forces, however, the regime has found it neces-
sary to maintain in mainland China a considerable portion of its
armed forces *Lich would otherwise be available for combat. in Korea?
With respect to the Chinese Communist Air Force, the Korean hoatilities
have had no. measurable effect, as CCAF participation in those hos-
tilities has been slight and as the Chinese Communists are not known
to have employed, to date, any air elements in maintaining control
over hostile internal !Woes? Review of this document by MA has
determined that
CIA has no objection to declass
r, It contains information of CIA
Lju (t.4; Interest that must remain
*USAF Deelass/Release Instructions
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22,1q!E!#.2._!trein&t ariodo or otherwiseaffected_Sino-Soviet relations?
There is no evidence at this time of signifieant dissenaion between
the Chinese Communist regime and the Soviet Union. The principal
effect of military developments in Korea on Sino-Soviet relations
has been to?in(Weaae progressively the dependence of the Chinese
Communist regime upon the Soviet Union for materiel and technical
asaistanceo Soviet failure to provide the required assistance in
the face oe continuing or increasing Chinese Communist losses in
Korea would provide n potential for serious dissension?
Ho WHAT EVIDENCE IS TAERE THAT THE KOREAN WAR HAS
A. Affected the internal econom of China in terms of suoh factors as
induatrial includirig muniti ons ahljtEricaTUial out uiTrauiran.
rehabilitagi-Zid develeematztaolms. forei n trade in:Audi:la
lttAtlEatmalI2.612_9!tterials and harmaceuticals internal
IMIlEnt,t-L2n?
Bo Elicited economic aid from the Soviet Union?
.M?1?111??????????????1111.11?11111.9.1.0????????,.....111?10110?111000-4104,...wh 1.1.0.?????????????????????0 +???????????=
On the basis of fragmentary information9 it is believed that the
Korean war, to dater has had relatively slight effects on the over-all
economic position of the Chinese Communist regime. It is believed,
however, that the transportation system has been somewhat strained,
inflation has continued, and probably increased, and development pro-
grams have probably been retarded? The Soviet Union is not known to
have provided the Chinese Communists with economic aid specifically
as a result of the Korean hostilities?
III. WdAT IS TiE EVIDENCE REGARDIM
A. The uantitative and ualitative Chinese losses in military_rasom
and materiel in the Koreanwar?
Estimated cumulative losses inflicted on the enemy (Chinese Communist
and North Korean)by UN aircraft as of 3 May 1951 include the following
approximations: 235 aircraft. 1000 tanks, 1610 field guns. 70,200
buildings, 15,500 trucks and other vehicles. 690 locomotives, 4875
railroad cars. 550 bridges, 440 barges and boats, 975 warehouses, 65 oil
storage tanks, 180 machine gun and mortar positions, 3 freighters,
770 pack animals, 2 oil refineries, 1 oil tanker, 29 power plants and .
9 trains destroyed: 280 aircraft, 930 tanks, 1265 field guns, 46,700
buildings, 10,325 trucks and other vehicles, 675 locomotives, 8e10
road cars, 1085 bridges, 875 barges and boats. 535 warehouses, 15 oil
storage tanks, 72 machine gun and mortar positions, 2 freighters, 2 oil
refineries, 18 power plants, 60 railroad yards, 14 trains dmmagedo A
total of 1400445 enemy troops are estimated to have been killed by air
action. It is believed that the Cainese Communist losses in aircraft and
pilots have not been such as to reduce the over-all combat capability
of the CCAF0
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Bo The portion of trainedlillilltytiallmajltlii2.201cific
mt_n_l.ty tasks in China?
There is no evidence to indicate that the Chinese Communists have
committed any portion of their available air strength to specific
security taske within China* The Chinese Communists are not known
to have used their uir strength to any appreciable extent, if at all,
in operations against anti-Communist dissident forces in Chinao
Although the Chinese Communists use believed to have strengthened
their coastal defenses in mainland China (particularly in the south
and southeast), the bulk of the CCAF air strength currently is believed
to be located in northeast China and Manchuria, Those air units
disposed elsewhere in China are believed to be primarily in training
status.
Co The number of uncommitted reserves now available within China?
To date, there is no known distinction between first line and reserve
manpower (eee Par. IV, Bo for comments on flexibility of employment).
The chief limitations on the use of these resources?
The CCAF is largely dependent upon Soviet, direction and technical
assistance, Therefore, much depends upon' the emphasis which the Soviets
place on its continued development. Little is known of stockpiling of
POL in China, but there are indications that limited logistical capabil-
ities would be a restricting factor in any sustained effort by the CCAF0
An additional limiting factor would be the relatively email number of
trained pereonnelo The CCAF is currently estimated to have a total of
1200-1600 active pilots?
Do The nature of military traist_LakinsltalELS1/1..a.?
It is believed that the :training capability of the CCAF has been steadily
increasing and improving. As yet no reliable basis exists for ascertaining
the scope and proficiency of the present training program, although about
3000 pilots are reported to be in tekiniag in schools in China and Manchuria,
Present air activity indicates that some CCA k units are conducting oper-
ational unit training and may be approaching a level lei training.wnich, by
CCAF standards, might he considered a state of combat readiness.
S. Defections from Chinese Communist militlularme
.O?ameamviase????eg.V.seaeanem?s?nr,
To date there have been no known defections from the Chinese Communist
Air Soros,
Fe The extent of mobilization for either offensive or defenelvls.amutt?
It is believed that the CCAF is mobilized to the full extent of its
available facilities and equipment. However, the estimated scope of
the present training program would provide the CCAF with personnel
necessary for further expansion*
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Go The nature and extent of-SOviet military asbistance to the Chinese
Communists? ----------
With the exception of a few US types acquired by defection or capture
from the Chinese Nationalists, all of the combat aircraft and virtually
all of the aviation equipment and supplies now available to the CCAF
were supplied by the Soviets? There is substantial evidence that the
Soviets are now supplying the CCAF with radar, anti-aircraft equipment,
and technical personnel, and it is possible that SAF volunteer persons.
nel are operating some of the aircraft currently available to the CCAF.
IV? HOW HAVE THE FOREGOING DEVELORIENTS AFFECTED CHINESE CUMUNISTS SILITARY
CAPABILITIES
Ao Against UN Forces in Korea?
The Chinese Communists have utilised their air strength sparingly so
far in the Korean operation and thereby have avoided serious attrition?
No specific figures for enemy air personnel losses during the Korean
operation are known. As of 3 May 1951, enelw aircraft losses both on
the ground and airborne were reported as 336 planes destroyed and 2a0
damaged. These figures include hostile aircraft encountered over Korea
irrespective of their nationality? TheT Chinese Communists currently
are estimated to have available approximately 860 aircraft? Since the
Chinese Communist air strength has substantially increased during the
Korean operations, despite the above mentioned losses, and since the
state of readiness of the Chinese Communist pilots has also undoubtedly
improved with additional training, and continued Soviet guidance and
assistance, it is not evident that 'Chinese Communist losses in aircraft
.and pilots have been such as to force a curtailment of operations which
may nave been planned for the Korean campaign On the contrary. the
Chinese Communists now possess a far greater capability to conduct
aerial warfare than they had at the outset of the Korean operations?
kW? Against Taiwan and Southeast Asia?
It is estimated that currently the bulk of the aircraft believed to be
available to the Chinese Communists are located in NE China and in
Manchuria? However, these aircraft could be redeployed to prepared
airfields with little delay in the event of operations against Taiwan
and Southeast Asiao Since the Chinese Communist air capabilities have
increased during the Korean operations and since the aviation losses
suffered by them in that campaign have been light to date, it ii
believed that such lobses alone have' not caused, in whole or in part,
the aurtaikent, cancellation or deferment of operations possibly
planned 14 the Communists against Taiwan or Southeast Asia? Moreover,
in view of the limited nature-Of Communist lair action in Korea to date,
such redeployment could be effected without affecting substantially the
present type of Communist military operations in Korea, although it would
remove much of the present threat of large-scale Communist air action?
Materiel support of large or sustained CCAF operations against either
Taiwan or Southeast Asia would be difficult as long as Korean operations
continue on the present scale? No significant stockpiles of POL and other
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aviation supplies and equipment are known to exist south or the
Yangtze River* The principal line of communication for maLeriel
support of military operations both in the Korea area and in all
parts of China is the Trans-Siberian Railway and the connecting
Chinese Changchun Railway in Manchuria* Present evidence indicates
that because of higher priority thus far given to supplies for Soviet
Far Eastern military installations and for Communist ground forces in
Korea, the quantity of POL and materiel available to the CCAF, even in
North China and Manchuria, is little more than sufficient to support
current operations* Thus, any large or sustained COAF operations against
either Taiwan or Southeast Asia would probably require a reduction of
Soviet materiel support for Korean operations or a reduction of stock-
piling at Soviet Far Eastern military installations* It in possible,
however, that sufficient stooks of POL and materiel are available at
airfields in South China to support air operations of short duration
either against Taiwan or against adjoining countries of Southeast Asia*
061 (c-.)il
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