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December 9, 2016
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July 12, 2000
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March 6, 1951
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a Approved For Reese 2001/03/09 : CIA-RDP79R94912A0 Copy Ich ECTZT 25X1A9a OIR/DPF COBTITIYANION TO NIE..32: Trz annumsT mum= ma'am IN EDBEA An ITS Nilji1iffil-SDEZ-Vcdeirreirleff ICE THE xnel- V.1., 4..."..=11.,....,..1111,1m312.2.? March 6s 2951 State Dept. declassification & release instructions on file Dr:PAM= OF STATE OFFICE OF IBTEITIGENCE Emma Divlolon o2 Pascorch for For East _ . Review of this document by CIA has SITCP317 determined that ele CIA has no ohlection to declass Dr It contains information of CIA Interest that mutt remain classified at TS S C Authority: Hit 70-2 1:1 It contains ne hing of CIA Inter st Cali Reviewer Approved For Release 2001/03/09 : CIA-RDP79R01012A000800050023-2 ? Approved For Reese 2001/03/09 : CIA-RDP79RW12A000800050023-2 S3T,CREE 9-Fe32:- TM C IRIMY7 POSITION IN KOREA AND rrs EFAM: C S linhtWiET760bBSTS 077A-CriarWMIE FAR FAST ? ? ? 11. TO liaT nand.' EMS 1ZO1EAN CAMPAIGN AFFECTFD COMM= Iaj )fi dtIV.PAZIWITMS '114-2WW.B EAST= A. Neve Chimp, ena Koreem lessee to dete been sue that the 4. Nav have strnined or dieelipted the domestic eccnotChina? The Chinese CemennSete heve to date been able to support their military effort in Korea elthout seriouelyelderupting the Chinese ecenomy. Prices have been hold relatively etable and vith few exoeptione supplies of essential coneteeere cocas atypear to have been adequate to meet reqniree vents, ApTerently, the Chineeo CcEleuniste have been able to finance the cents of their Korean TeLture t1non3h the postponement of reconstraction expendituree and threuf;h n Increace in revenues made possible by the favorable 1950 crape, the enleeted tax base, and acme increave In tax rates; Moreover, the troops dispatched to Kora were largely foreee in being, and it is peobable that the costs of mobilizing, equipping, and training replace:male Lave net ns yet reached the neceseary levels to replace military loseee, In the. bo area of Mezehuria there is evidence that induetrial output has declined orghtly end that the employment of large numbersof civiliane in military erapportia3 operations has reduced eMplegment and output in suoh winter oeoupations as lumtering, marketing, and hmting. This lots of output,' hueover, is net likely to have eerious effects on either the military effort or the local econemy. B. Mould continued Chtneee-Kerean gerations inEcaoa on the =event scale be likolyto ------- 4, Cause a skenificent drain on Somiet resources? The continuance of the Kbroan campaign would very likely create an increasing strain cla the Chino economy, It le probable that vithethe eventual neceesity foe leegeeecele tempt; replacements military costa weeuld rise considerably over prom:I-It lavela and that the continued. poetpciment of reconstruction enonditures would begin to dielocate markets and production and to reduce the capacity of the Chinese Ccumunists to mobilize reeouroes. The extension szcrizr Approved For Release 2001/03/09 : CIA-RDP79R01012A000800050023-2 Approved For Rase 2001/03/09 : CIA-RDP79R0j12A000800050023-2 ZZILIET 2 The omtennion of acti7o nilitary cperations into the Manchurian frcat-f:ese seasca of 1K3y th=th. September -would have a serious effect ea fain cutout in 1951 due to the withdrawal of agricultural labor and draft animals for Pllita:2,7 nu7lort activities. A redaction of agricultural cutout to the leveln of 1S?!:-7 and 19118 years of active civil war fighting in Manchuria voula largely wipe out Manchuria's export surplunes and would greatly reduce tLe lozourscs available to the Chinese Communiste in 1952. Despite theae conraldexations: the =neat) Communists emu probably maintain the preeent rate of ex]?anditure of military reeources in Korea for some time at the sacrifice of dmeetic reconstruction and welfare. With subgtantial military reseirre forces in being which can be concentrated and ova:ported. In the grain,.euxplus area of Manchuria and supplied with Soviet materiel: it ie unlikely In the short run that economic pressures ? will substantially affect the military capadities of the Chinese CoMmunists. I:EI. MAT HAS MR TM EFFECT CF TEE =MN CAMPAIGN CE COVISMIST I1iTENTION5 SAM TEEMasoasoca?a? A, General Conpiderationp It seems evident from military preparatices now underway in China that the Cemmunists at this a:nature envisage at leapt continued military operations in Korea and poseibly also expended military action elsewhere in the 1# t. The that fUture mftlitary operatiens might assume can be analyzed In terms of three possible developments: 1. Continued Com:mist capacity for launching major offensives In Korea; 2. Lees of capacity to launehMajor offensivee in Korea tut continued Ccamunist ability to carry oa a war of attrition; 3. Reduction of Comaraniet strength to the point whore comp/ate defeat in Korea becomes a distinct possibility. 14' InPgqqam)NPITPI-PPI:a1T/441-gmllillgUitioellianIVE WOlglres 1411 ;ram' At the moment: the Communiete Probably have the capacity to launch major offensives in Korea for the achievement of limited military objectives. They probably believe: houovera that their strength in Korea lias lees in their prospects fordlrect military victories than in their capacity to absorb Approved For Release 2001/03/%64-RDP79R01012A000800050023-2 Approved For Reipase 2001/03/09 : CIA-RDP79RW12A000800050023-2 to.aue 3 fte0110 abcorb ge.'eater loocon than corlai be endured by the UN command. andato maintain a long d.ran out eee et raining UN colidarity and endurance. The Soviet Union wou11 prol:o7Dly supply such additicnel materiel as *mad be requind for an oeeration of athie type. It is probeble that lc-I-tellies has given thought to offensive MVOS ag&illat I.ocktna, Teleani. Honetong, and. poesibler other places in the Far East as a mane of 0.iveztirg UN strength from the Korean fighting. Et:mover, Chineee Camaaele.e intentiaas with respect to other offensive ravels in the Far at in any event, pr.Ohably be determineel primarily in the light of footers other than the needs of the Ccargunist military oampaign in Korea. Winery operations against UN forces In Korea weld not preclude Pei-p?Inee eirealtaneoue reeatiolpation in discussions perhaps c&2' initiated., of peaceful ecAtlereent. The Chinese Ccoramiet aim in such negotiaticns would. peotably not be the conclusion of a political settlement, bnt rather the creation of a:334.112Ch. discord among the UN allies as possible. Ca 2J !!'(L T?Ce, 0-7 Coyerniert Cepacyll to Launch Ononsive If Pei-puing -and Ho:3cmi felt that the Chinese Cow:mists Imere no longer capable of launching -Purther major offensives in Kama it le than likely that they would. engage in a war of attritiOn in the hope that the elusiviees of a clear-cut Yiethry over the Chinese and. Korean Canandet troops would sap the morale 02 the UN troops and gradually Improve Coretztalat nilitei fortunee In Korea, while sizsultaneciuely the Conesuniste sleight, by other Mimeo of aoticn, bring about a change in the international conditicns, especially tleoza in the Far East, that now enable the CS TO concentrate much of its fighting strength in Korea. Estimating that the math Korean troops would, be unable by themeolvee to deny the uq force ccese to the rialiCharien and. Siberian border?) and to maintain Communist gerecavesaatal authority on Korean 13?110 Communist China, with Soviet approval, 1..rould probably try to preserve an armed. force of its own in being in Korea to this end, probably investing additional materiel and. unofficial perzornel sent to the= by the USSR. The Soviet Union, however, would. probably not intervene openly. Communist rativen for creating diversions elsewhere in the Far Eeert, assuming their col/timed militery ability to do so, would. be equally strong as in the situation outlined under B. D. Intentions Ammar Comearelet Re nfe.,11.,......?,_eon of the Possibilitif Defemt in Korea Realization of the pocaibility of complete defeat in Korea would lead the Ccoreanists to give greater reight to ouch factors as the limitatione an the availability of iSCGsntini heavy Weapons, ammunition, and. equipment frcm. out of the Soviet arzenal limitations imposed by other &towels upon Soviet military protection. Both the Chinese Comumnist and Soviet leaders 'would. probably also maize the greater ultimate importance of strengthening Approved For Release 2001/03/09 : CIA-RDP79R01012A000800050023-2 China Cr rMITITNI Approved ForIR,v..Vase2001/03/09 : CIA-RDP79R(4012A000800950023-2 TaefLaUtIgeAl fb5.m't irri. ienger.Tause atraIng poser, projects.that noTa Ivava to ccota lAattlao Korean cempaign for whatever technical au,ISzt:::nco anl materiel tha TESB can bake evailable to Cemmanist China. rlYo lonz-7:arce consideration Could be buttressed by pdaGibly 8rowirci fimr.:Iot in PoS-p'ing over the.increaead.efforts eaeuired to emelt arta re,intair. effeetive control over the Chinese populace. The it reactSau of the Communiststo a deterioration ,of their military position ta nrs,L alE;10; be the broaching of new terms for a negotieted, settleeres7:e tvilSxWn3 eeehaps same significant conceseions to the viewpoint of ti o 7;14 cemouflaged by faceesaving gestures.. ThitemoveeTould be clooely aceueeenled by a withdrawal, as forced upon them, of the.Chirese Cceeeelet treees to a series) of. strongly defeasible pooltiene Within north Zeros.. Every attekst would be node by Peiepqn3 to make the UN militery'adeemeen costly and to stress its menopoly an a peaceful.approech to VIII colution of the Vorean problem." The Soviet role duelngethie poriorl would probably be restricted to a act:tinning provicion of ceetaSneeapaas, ammunition, and equiPmeut to the Chimes Cann:111st forces end to the support of PeW1ng?0 peace =yob in tbelMff. A deepeeete Chime? Cemmunist resort to the lawaohing of major mil1tar7 opoYatiOno elsewhere In. the Far East would net be ? likely to occur, since it would jeopardize the attalement of the principal Chinese, Communist aim -- the- coaeation of a costly conflict that thaeatened the security of a TItal azea a OhAnn and the attainment of a-eettlonent In Korea on as fav=able tozma to the Communists as possiblee g. What ATT222" 129 Pt.RK474&5?714-73:1t.catIcna IlitteEten'ect,t?ctO e Preeent Soviet intent:Lone In Lowea apparently look towara a complete defeat of UN forces'atel meeivam ana to involvement of the UN, and paietioularly the VS, in a loee Incoaciamive Sinewy. operation at a anurann, goscou my already have accepted the poseibility that the Chinese Communists will not bo able to cepol the UN frzet Korea and that a lone ?sta1emn`,0 may ersue, Id thSs'eituation and at this stege, the USSR Beene prepared to offer :morale diplomatic, and a *Detain amount of. covert military suppoet while evoiding direct intervention. If it became clearthet the Chireee Communiate faced defeat in Korea, Moscow, to achieve its orgioel objectives in the alma ati press:Tee both its own .prestige and Sinee%viet cell.aarity, would-probably inoreaose- sabstantially its aid to the Chinece and Kers= Ocumunistse Thitemight iDVOIAM the 1120 of greater mtners of Soviet pian en and_pilots, increteed numbers of tecbnicaX pomMj and perhaps "volunteers)" if necesmary. At the Game time, Meseow could le expected to support eel. particleatich on . Pelep'ingls part in diccuesion of "peaceful" settlement.. If these efforbs proved insufficient the poscibility carnet be disregaraed that the VMS would go to the extatra of waging an all out, altheugh perhaps 'still "Mtofficia1," military camai52lovorKtmea. F. Recent Approved For Release 2001/03/62TIA-RDP79R01012A000800050023-2 Approved For Rase 2001/03/09, A-RDP79RQ,1012A000800050023-2 Rocent Chinsse 1.4 ,J.:11TrIct Peace novas . Pei.peim has made 1:7-.n.i.:?ieaut &enmity naves to settas the UMW= probien, threau3b. neoaLiation. G:7.nce its counter-proyosal to the Utt of . Zarnary 17. A prmzinit:1-, C121:7.r.sLe Ceramist leader inlicated at the Scale,- ar2cnoored niowld re ace Cc:Inc:11"1n That .rerlin act February 22 that hie Goverment a1C aniort in yrinalple a 5.;orver conference to diocuoo a ueckatien of the e=715.ct tl'e Ear East* w' bet. the 9Council" did. nek suboccinent1y incmperate this proos33. into it final resolutions. SECRET Approved For Release 2001/03/09 : CIA-RDP79R01012A000800050023-2