THE EUROPEAN SATELLITE POWER COMPLEX

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R01012A000900050002-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 122
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 19, 2005
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: July 10, 1951
• Content Type: REPORT

State Dept. declassification & release
instructions on file
Approvetor Release 2005/04/26: CIA-RDP79
C..,,1' QTRAL I ]TE" G E !L*FIX t
VICE OF RES&ARCR AND STS
010R Project 6-511 Cuntribntion to !33
THE EUROPEAN SATELLITE PC!WER COTS
PIT I
INDIVIDUAL SATELLITE CODIflRIESs
E o!oaC STREdGTH3 AND USES
POLAND
10 Yui,y 1951
`-'WENT NO.
t.;) CHANGE IN CLASS.
t.i DECLASSiRED
CLASS. CHANGED TO: TO
SJ C , na ,
NEXT RFViFW DATF? V
25X1
rain report has been prepared 'at the request of the Office of Rational
Estimates as a contribution to R'IE-33 a The material for Section III eras
cwrtribated by 01As Depart t of Stated The o -ail elaeett-Ration of
the report Is Tap Secret. Certain aeetiona, hoverer, are of lower claaai-
ficatioa and are so indieatedo
Approved For Release 2005/04/26 : CIA-RDP79RO1012A000900050002-4
 Approved For Release 2005/04/26 : CIA-RDP79RO1012A000900050002-4
SMMM7 a C n si n??. ?? eQ_a ? o o a e? a?. o? o s o
' 7T1. TraWs I
y t In the ?7 r w ~r`r e of ~L f~e EconcW O ... ? . .
11 6 O A ? , n4
? Capacity or T Rs for E.Wi[ide l i ? . ? o 10
in. Living and Working Conditlone . . . . . s ? s o e ? ? o e ? o 13
1T Txsft and ? ? o ? ? . a e ? s a ? ? o a . ? o 18
To ~gt3anltsnrs o u o? O a p.?? s o a a e a s s a O? a?? p 23
TX. Iaduatriia~l~alCspaeity and Levels of Production a . . . . . . . 36
As a
Do iii M KAtals ? .. ? . . ? ? ? a . a . ? . ? . e . a . 40
C o coal 0 s, o a o o i? a.? a a e a a*?.. o???.? 45
Do Petrol . . . . . . . . . . , . . . . . . 60
E. Aides pbver a . ? ? a ? . . . e o . ? e ? . a . 65
F? Cbeteiaals O O?? a a?.... a.? O O b? a O O? a O 72
G. Minim . . . ? s . . . p ? ? o ? ? s a a o 83
Is
.~ M~~s~. ? ? a ? ? ? a o ? ? q ? ? a a a ? ? ? ? o a o 98
VII, I _r na.poo ation . ? o o s o . ? ? ? ? ? ? a 0 ? . . o O ? o 89
A. Hall ,rasd o ? . ? . ? ? o o e o . a ? ? ? o . ? ? ? o s o 90
8. Ri ? . ? O i ? 4 . O ? e ? p 96
0. Yates' Tranapoxt O O . . ? . O 6 O O O O . ? 204
r port ? ? ? A ? ? ? ? ? ? s . ? o a o e o . ? . 112
D. ~i
//
~~.,~~.~,.t
~? OurZ Allocations of Zoonaaia Reecur"s . . . . ..? . . . .
I2? Est3matod Degree of Vulnerability to Western Eoduamic
WarfiTA ? ?? o ? ? ? . ? a ? a a a ? ? a. . ? , , . ? ? ? ? ?
Ze :444eations of J tion for War o o . e . , . ? ? a o . 0
25X1
Approved For Release 2005/04/26 : CIA-RDP79RO1012A000900050002-4
 Approved For Release 2005/04/26 : CIA-RDP79RO1012A000900050002-4
CIIlWRR
Project 6.61
THE E)PFAII SATELLITE P(X7 COUP1
(Contribution to CtE-46)
PART I
IIIDI V IDUAL SATELLITE COU &
SCOHOLIIO STBH1QTIS AIM UFALUESSES
Sustssty and Conalmlons.
Poland's itxlusttial development not OE] is strengtbeniug the dorelstio
osofow but also is contributing to the Soviet rdlitazy soonomio potential.
This sonttibut&on eta be expected to increase through 1955. Poland has the
largest population among the Satellites*- Its induastrial ca aof ty is equal,
if tot superior, to that or atgr other Satellite, and its transportation systst4
w'lFi.oh is of considerable importance militarily, is strong and is improving.
Its bargaining position in international trade is strong beastass of its
ability to export coal, minerals, iirduitrial row materials, and foodstuffs.
Soviet control of Poland's econaapr is already widespread and viii not be re-
latosd, Its eoonoapr is being increasingly integrated with those of the other
Soviet B1oo countries under the diroction of the Sovietrdaninated CErSA
(Council of Eoonosic Mutual Assistance).
Sims 17orld War lla eontrol of Polendee eoonoraio organisatt.on and a*.
tivity has progressively shitted to t..aecoa. Through CE A and other agencies
the USSR has directed changes in the Polish State Planning Conaiwtsion and in
the I niatry of Pbrsign Trade. Soviet personnel have been placed in key
positions in Polish thdustsy, and under Soviet guidance pacts of oconordo
collaboration with other Satellites have been concluded. Soviet control is
fini2*r exercised through the Polish Six Year Plan (1950.55),, srhtcb is slosely'
modeled after the eoonor do b1uspo4nts of the USSR.
The level of labor productivity in Poland is relatively high for Bestern
Europe and is rapidly AWroving despite poor housing and exacting working
conditions resulting from the aooeleratod industrialisation.
Poland is dependent on essential. industrial imports from the West and has
to a large degree succeeded in obtaining these imports because of the strong
bargaining position afforded by Western European requirsnnts for Polish coal,
Without Swedish iron ore, production in Poland's iron and steel industry
would be serious r reduced unless this loss yore oaq?naated at considerable
cost by the USSR. Poland is dependent on overseas trade for rubber and tin,
Although it is oharaoterised by am" peasant darns producing at sub-
sistanoo ievols, Polish agrioulturs has made food supplies for donestio ooay.
au Lion available at levels above preeazr and ban produced surpluses of
grain, sugar, and twat for export or st*oltpiling. The tow* of the oolleoti-
visatioia program slacd dc'eu is th . first part of 1951 as compared with 19609 By
Approved For Release 2005/04/26 : CIA-RDP79RO1012A000900050002-4
 Approved For Release 2005/04/26 : CIA-RDP79R01012A000900050002-4
for ihs, larger number of oollectivoa ew in the fbrner Beeman territories,
Trhsr+e resettlement h ws been made contingent on joining collective fares.
The xoconstruction and expansion pror4mm* of the Six Year Plan rank the
iron and steel industry second in importance only to the coal industry, Iron
and steel production is sufficient for domestic demand and provides a small
surplus for export, eoland?s ferrous metal industry is dependent on Soviet
and Swedish iron ore foxy 30 percent of its requirements. Domestic production
of metallurgical aoln provides a large exportable surplus,
In the field of nonfW"w mstalso rolish production of lead and sins
provides important surpluses for export +shi oh? add to the Soviet '.loose
eoon nto-eailitary potential. Poland not nevsrtheless depend principally on
the Moo for imports of oopper, aluminmcy and untimoraW.
The Polish coal Industry holds a mist important position in Poland's
eoononV. In addition to meeting domestic requirements, coal is the major
item of export and the prime oomodity of foreign trade both with t.estern
and Eastern EUrop..
As a result of boundary changes, Poland has become a petroleum d.ftct
area and depends upon imports from tie Bloc for 75 percent of its requirements.
Refining capacity is insufficient to meet domestic deomtnd, tut 'the syathotio
roftnery plant scheduled to begin production in 1952 will.roduoo dapendenoe
upon imports-for petroleum products.
The electric power industry is a basin element in largo-scale production
In the coal, oleetrolytio, chemical, and metallurgical industries, Those
lad asteioe are important not only to the domestic sconce but a .iso to Pc land 1 s
.fbreigr- t ads position. The electric power industry is dependent on non+eloo
sour... for the new equipment needed for expansion.
Poland's chemical industry is producing at above prswer levels, but
dependence an imparts for some oheedoal requireis will oontizaae, Synthetic
ammonia, the principal basic chemical produced in Poland, is used ohiefiy In
m1b1oR nitrogenous ?brtilisets but could be quickly diverted to munitions pro-
duateton,
Do elopment in the engineering industry is not sufficiently advanced to
enable Poland to nest domestic requirements or to contribute to the r
pat ial of other members of the Bloc, Production of broad-gaup looomotiwes
is the.outstanding emoeption to this situation, and Polish locomaotive exports
sigoifioently strengthen the Blooms oar masking capabilities. Under favorable
oisoums-moon machine tools may be available for export in smell quantities
in 1952:
The Polish t r portation system. is of loey importance to the USSR both
because of tbs strategic ooamodities carried and because Poland lies on the
-2 fm
Approved For Release 2005/04/26 : CIA-RDP79R01012A000900050002-4
 Approved For Release 2005/04/26 : CIA-RDP79RO1012A000900050002-4
aajer Soviet supply route ,fen' aw 2axg's4b4e Mary operation In Wowtern
11lrrops. The balk at Polish coal worts to the t is moved t9 rail, as
are Soviet sbipsents of ore and metals to Burt Germerpr and Poland for. pro.
cessing and subsequent Soviet ire. Pestewr increases in domestic economic
activity and the heavy bane an at Soviet-Ge n rail traffic across Poland
nsossaitate esfom use of available facilities.
Currant allscatians of resoasrees.place prdaminant empibaeis on the
developsetit of heavy Indust W. In 1949, indtu tty accounted for 49 percent
of the natiaaal Incase as compared with 35 percent in 1936 and Is scheduled
to aeoomt f'av almost 60 percent In 1955. In contrast to the rapid rate of
Increase In the iadns4rial sector of the eccnoW, agricultural production
in 1955 is to be only 50 percent cr r 1949 levels, a modest goal. Prroductian
of conenaeer goods receives little attention in the Six Year Plan.
llthougb Pel.idh plans for. Inaustriaiiaation may be aimed primarily at
eeocande goals, their. aocamplislmeut v311 sigaoifioantly enhance Ps.andes
contribution to the ear capabilities of the Soviet Bloc. The increasing
conversion of the engineering I stay to monitions pr 11 cti n In 1950 is
a clearer Indication of ps~paratian for vet. 1 further clue to var ante ntioecs
viii 'be provided if anticipated meat and grain surpluses we stockpiled In
1952.
25X1
Approved For Release 2005/04/26 : CIA-RDP79RO1012A000900050002-4
 Approved For Release 2005/04/26 : CIA-RDP79R01012A000900050002-4
I. Trends in the Stacuoture of t-be Eoononer,
Sri
Soviet control of Polond's soomoata plauning and development, was sharply
intsaaified in 19500 and rho revised SIX ?oat Plsm (1950.1968) oloarly in-
dioatse the Soviet intention to integrate Polish eoomomi o de lopaent with that.
of the Soviet Dloe? By placing Soviet or personnel In key Polish
goveant monies and by directing Polish participation in eoor?nio pasts,
trade aaeswsnts,, mad joint aounails with other members of the Bloc, the USSR
ex vises direst control over Polish eoonomIn darw3opsent. Responsibility for
iscleeasabing the eooaonio progran is delegated larply to the Polish Loons o
Commission of the Couuaoil of I.nisbees. Respoaaibility gear plpn fulfillment is
than divided among the various indiviftal niaistsl es and passed down through
mmlious suberps ises, sstmblisbmxmte, and socialised institutdoam. 11ith tight
Soviet ooatrol on ivory level, 'Polish progress toward a sooialised sooaaraV
o1oee27 paralleling that of the USSR sows assured,
In 1960about fioa.,thirds of the Polish e06noi2 r was socialised. Iktional.ited
en erprises in that yew aooounted for 96 pe 'so t at total inR n trial output,
+md stoats control in the fields of finen~os, labor, ray materials. and trade was
videspread. Collective and state frames bave , produced only 6.6 percent of
the total value of agricultural output in 1960. The cautious oollectiviaation
pelt being puraed by the state is a result of peasant resistance. ,a abartage
of first rmabinery, and the med to maintain uninterrupted agrioultura1 pro--
duations
1, Control of the, Soo the anurn t ino2ud; Direct Control by
the ...:...:.....LO
a. ISOO .
(1) Ps ~ lbs.
Thu doom of 22 April 1949 establislaod a firm fretwork vith-
ins doh wary X11 1'o eoomomdo. plaioazi s condmoted and pyre the State
Ooaz lssion for Econosdo P1 nning eoctensivo posers of plan preparation sod plan
oantaol. Plsmiag procedures and the levels of responaibilitvin the planning
hierero , as Illustrated is 1950 in the prop aratdaa of the Six Yeas Plan
(3950.66), are as fbllaws All
Approved For Release 2005/04/26 : CIA-RDP79R01012A000900050002-4
 Approved For Release ~p CIA-RDP79R01012A000900050002-4
Outline of Polish Eoonania Planning
AMM:
Council of linisters
(probably through 2%# Eoorr io
Comittee)
Responsibility
Approves the Detailed six Tear Plan,
Subic is the draft decree to the Seim,,
Door" t supp leaants and changes is the
tasks as nay be necessary in the
coots, of practical realization of the
Plan. sue/
Central Conic tttse of the
,;nitod :-OltabL iivr30ers' Varty
The Sofa (probably through its
Eaoaamto Plan and Midget
Coritiaaion)
Choirman of the state Eson x io
Planning Corrnasion
State Eoonoulo Planting
CO=3dsslon
;.Iinisters and Bads of other
central planoniag units
Depwrtrrenras
Approve* tbo reeked S= . ? r,r t'laz
Covered by thD drat decree.
Approves the draft decree on Six Year
Plan as revesved #'ron the CounaiI of
L nistere,
Approves the Detailed Economic Plan
for 1950.%
Approves plans prepared by the niniatrias
mod other central authorities on the
basis of the Detailed Economic Plan,
Approve plans for dspartrmntm on the
basis of the plans approved by the
State Economic Planning Comission,
Ap1ro'w plans for units*
units Approve plans for plats,
/' MIS last AI VIM is significant because Vw- s ri
Council to issue doorees when the Sejm is not in session.
8oei t doaaktation of PoUaI economic pLmning in apparent in the
revision of the SIX Year Plans which obviously undertalaos to synchronize Polish
planning and econotdo devolopwnt with Soviet planning and development, Control
over Polish planning cad its integration with the needs of the Soviet Bloc also
are aooonplished through (1) mu bial assistance pacts with the US:;R and other,
S artellitess (2) trade agreements with all ambers of the Bloc j (3) creation 'of
joint Councils for Roonomi o Collaboration with Czeoheslovakia and Itingatys the
fbsnrer ooordi sting planl4t:g and statistical work; and (4) Poland's membership
in C12.eV
These instruments of Soviet control are supplemented by the presence
of Soviet or Soviet-strained personnel in Polish goverment agenoieso The
appoinAe nt of Liarahal Robessovs]gr as M mister of National Defense, for example,
Approved For Release 2005/04/26 : CIA-RDP79R01012A000900050002-4
 Approved For Release 2005/04/26 : CIA-RDP79RO1012A000900050002-4
resulted in a revision of the Six Year Plau to empbasisr rdlitany production. .
(2) Plan Control.
The Council of 13misters is entrusted with syst a .tic oontrol of
the fu1fil]aoat of the six Year Plan, 6 This is aaoonpli.shed through the
>socnocio Cow4 an of the Coil, mblah is responsiblo for the oporation of
plans assiipned to mob of the several individual ministries by the State
dfoonon3o Planning Ca?ission, f Hwh nod tzy or other central planning unit
is nrespoasible for Uo enrsoetica of its can plan, and the sumo prinaiplo is
extended to adadi istraU o and playing units bolou the ministerial lotrol. 1
The main burden of wbilising the working population to meet the various taske
of the Plan fills upon the miaiatriean cntcrpr zwi avid ,ocialized insti.?,
tantioQns. 1
The Snpr+sbs State Control Cam, od augod with special supertricion
of the imnleos fltr-tion of t'arW Rosolutiowe and vurkiw, dir-totly under the Council
of State, naiatains a constant check on all-plants end institutions bfoh rs.
osive state aid or perforce duties in, the field of public administration and
national a ounw. It acts as a abip to insure the attainment of plan quotaaa,,
as does its Soviet oounberpart, the Uud8try Of Stabs Control- fp
b. AdsuZaist rativo control-*
(1) Control by the omramaat.
lAdainiatarativs control of the Polish econonw is exercised by the
Council of L&n istsrs through its Eoonomio Connission, 10 sthiah is oorroeed of
the.. mrhere of the Council of Jiatsters who bars a direst official interest
in the national eeoanoi . In addition to dsrooting the various ministries rep-
resented by its rmbershipp the Eoonomio Copoission has final Jurisdiction
over the lblImIna eentral or~anisatiems 11/, the Central. Council of Trade
e the Oenttal Fe.o of Cooperavas, the ASeociation '!Union of
Pwasant BoU416 .p,* Us Polish Yat1oml Bank, the Central Board of Vocational
and the Main Amaan of Statistics.
Polish "self oritiois e" indicates that the industrial supply
organisstion oontimnsd to be deficient in 1950, Beemedial ohsngas madam 1 en
In this sector inolud~ed olearer direction of the supply fu ctions$ establishment
of a unified orgsnisation linking all levels of supply into one mystwe apply-
ing to the entire ooonrnrdo struobiro, and the establishment of the tioorcodity
organisation" to roplaoo the "functional organization" in the industrial
supply yrstum. f A trend towara ,reatsr urd fieatdon of eoonoaic sorvioes
and firmer montane by the donna! au'tisorities is evident in the unified adnin-
istration set up for the ports of Gdannsk,& GOWULAr and Sscsocin by the Roonoraio
Cornission of the Council of 11nist ere to seeur+e ocoYdinatioa of the aoonordo
plans for these ports. W
~6
it iiii>:
Approved For Release 2005/04/26 : CIA-RDP79RO1012A000900050002-4
 Approved For Release 2005/04/26 : CIA-RDP79R01012A000900050002-4
In the field of agriculture the oontraot putohaso syutem remains
an important factor in the oxocut ion of state plans This system an inh
strumont of indirect { overnaont control of agriculture? has probably becorst+ a
pormanent institution, 14/ Greater contr_c.i of agricultural science my bo
eapootod as a result of-The creation of spoctai roaearoh instilites for various
branches of aGrioulture and from the ostablishmant of e. ventral agricultural
institute to control the rosoaroh institutes. 1$
(2) Control _bX the USSR.
The Soviet Union exercises considerable atinistrativo control of
the foolish eoon v r Industry is being lnctensivoly reorganised on the basis of
plans prepared in losoow, and the location of industrial installations is frees
quvntly based on the interests of the Bloc as a hDla rather than on Polish
interosta, i6
1?;x save panotration of govft,,j=nt officos by Soviet porsonnal is
an important riesns by which the USSR has acquired econoaiu control in !'olaaa, 17
Since December 1949, hundreds of Polish intellectuals axxi engineers have been
roved to the USSR and replaced by Soviet citizens* The USSR attempts chiefly
to fill important posts in industry, but Soviet engineers, fore n, and annual
laborers also are sent to Poland in great ==bar*,. 18
Among the noet important forms of eoouonio "oooporation" botscoon
they USSR and the Satellites are the onterpriaes in which the Soviet Union and
the local governrwntss jointly participate, ostensibly on the prlncapa3' of
"cparlV* but actually under Soviet dominations 19 Suoh arrangements 1*ve not
bean 'a. s4or factor in Soviet oontrol of Polish ecoucmr, but the current pattern
in Eastern Europe indicates that joint Polish-Soviet companies may' booosm, an
Important .lnsstrcwerat of control in the .ituro.l
Z_, Factors Rolatins, to the Effectiveness of Control.
a,, Fropor$ on of the 'Boo
under Direct Government Control.
In 1-950 about to-thirds of the Polish ooonomy was socialisod, 20/
(1) Extent of nationalization of industry and Sorvicos3.,
By the and of 1949,c 96 poraont (by vol=e) of Poland's total in.
dustrial production am* from nationalised onterprisena 21/ In addition,,tho
government oautiously and gradually has gained control ol'finanoeo labor, roar
materials, and trade. W mid-1949, tao??thirds of the retail trade exterpri.ews
were govern ent.Owned, and expansion of the nets ork of etate?ovned retail out.lets, accompanied by a decree which oompls all uerchants to belong to an
organisation of private trade, fbresbadoses the elimination of the ronsindar of
privato retail eotor. Wholesale trade was alwat entiroly nationalised in the
middle of 1950. The 1950 currency refgraa, a severe blow to prjvato tractors, small
Approved For Release 2005/04/26 : CIA-RDP79R01012A000900050002-4
 Approved For Release 2005/04/26 : CIA-RDP79RO1012A000900050002-4
artisans, and individuals living on savings, roduoed speoulativo activities
and increased the pressure to join the socialized system. 22 All Polish
ship brolmrago companies were disbanded by 1 January 1051, and the gorcrrment
now supervises all Polish shipping through the LbrnI Agenoja (sea Agency r 2~
(2) Extant of Collectivization of AZioulture.
Since the au=or of 1948, when the Polish collectivization prograz
was launched, actual progress has been eaall. By the end of 1050, only lay por-
cent of all agricultural land had been collectivized. 24/ The state has t alnen
over all holdings larger than 50 hectares (except ch is properties), but
collectivization has proooeded at a slog paoo than was originally plamed.
The siawnoss of the collectivization drive is the result of a look of farm
raohinery, peasant resistance, and the pressure of immediate agricultural
needs. 251 Thus far the goverment has chosen to avoid a showdown. on the issue,
A neat stage in the development of col.leotivation began in 1050
vhsn the number of production cooperatives rose rapidly, the term "collootivi-
satd on" came into official use, and collectivization of a considorable number
of small and mediusx-sired farms was projected. The Forty, however, apparently
intends to continue its cautious policy toward the peasantry, tooling that a.
drasti.o move would threaten the success of iEporbont parallel mice, such as
increased crop production, 26 The pace of collectivization. first accelerated
in early 1:50, slao1 ned in early 19514 27
A large proportion of the Polish collectives are in the former
German territories, whero permission to resettle has been mada contingent on
Joining oooporatdveso So far no major suooeseos have bean made against the
poasant opposition to collectivisation in old ;'eland, nor are there air inr
dioations that a more rapid collectivization in this area is imminent, 28
Second in importanoo to the producers' cooporatives are the state
farms, the counterparts of the Sovietlaolkhozeso These state-owned enterprises-
have boon created chiefly from fornor private estates in the Recovered Territories,
Moro were 4,800 state Yarns at the and of 1040 covering about 10 percent of
this area and accounting, together with the producers' oooperativees, for 645
percent of Us total value of agricultural production.,
Plans for fixture collectivisation envisage a substantial increase
in the numbor of producers' oooporativeso Ono of the five main goals of the
Six Year Plan is a voluntary transition to collective farming by a considerable
number of the small and m dim peasant landholders and the abolition of the
"sources of capitalist development" in the rural areas, right percent of the
suns allocated for agricultural invostmont under the Plan will be utilized in
the dovolopmont of the socialized sector, Although ensnare of small and :,odium
farms are to be financially assistod, a policy seemingly contradictory to the
main goal of oolleotivization, the number of farce to be collectivized is tornod
"very considerable," and the producers' cooperatives are to take over an
so*
Approved For Release 2005/04/26 : CIA-RDP79RO1012A000900050002-4
 Approved For Release 2005/04/26 : CIA-RDP79RO1012A000900050002-4
"important number" of saal1 and riediun holdings, The govor=ont reportedly
plans to collootivizo 35 poroont of the farms by 1965 or 1956, but because of
a oritioul. shortago of specialists,, not more than 22 percent rrny aotual.ly be
collootdvized by that time.
Polish Conrunists are reported to believe that oc..1ootivisation
will not bo oonpleted until 1960 at least, booause the pace fbi creating
oolleotive farms will depend largely on the supply of tractors. 28 Although
the i'arty probably Brill have to oontend with peasant rosistanoe r some years
to oome, the rate of collectivization probably will increase in tho second
half of 1951 and in L 52.
b, ilongov+arnant al orgw izations as Inetruaunts of Control,
r~ ~~1 rr
The Polish goversrent, which ozeroicos complete politioal oontrol,
has been able to utilize nominally nonLovernmsntaal organizations to tighten
its grip on the national ooonogro Trade unions, for example, have bocome more
tools of the sitats (the Central Council of Trade Unions is unlar the jurisa
diction of the i oonomio Comaoission) and an used oxteneivoly to ezoouto ooo-
onomic plans and to organize work oorspetitiona* iioithor the trade unions nor
the factory oounoils, lx evor, racy overrule the plant administration on pro?
duotion matters. Trade unions are dosi@aed to create proper conditions fbr
the achievement or overfulfillmsnt of the production norm, In 1049 the trade
unions had 3,8 million members, or 45 percent of the urban population and 16
-oroent of tea total population, and their importance has since increased,
Eoonomio control is further supploiaented by the Central -)ork Instituted
established in 1948a The Institute's Department of Organization of Industry
studies nodarn methods of industrial organization and production utilis.od in
"toohnioally advanced" countries, particularly tiro USSR, whereas its Foreign
Uealtions Departsrnnt- establishes corsaissions fbr the exchange of information
with Cseohoslovakia and the l;S:.?Ra A Department of Organization of Comwroe
was boing established in 1350. $ The Polish Chamber of Foreign Trade,, which
in in oharge of the annual t fairs in Posnand in another nominally private
organization which acts entirely in the interests of the goverm enter
Approved For Release 2005/04/26 : CIA-RDP79RO1012A000900050002-4
 Approved For Release 2005/04/26 : CIA-RDP79RO1012A000900050002-4
I1,, p i of Itum Resources for Eoonordo Dmlo t.
SEEM
Fxon 1950 to 1953,, nnaagriaulturat o ployncnt in Poland 4s soheuulod to
rise from 4,4 xdilion to 5.1 r Ilion and agrioultural employxraat to decrease
from 744 million to 7,2 million. This represents alnost this resin possible
expansion of the industrial labor force. Carper hers of technically
trained personnel will be entering tho labor force, improving the ratio of
such personnel to total worltiera. Productivity has been raised slightly above
prow levels, Unlosv essential employment coals were abandoned, raobiltsationn
without ixpairing essential employment goals, would require further employment
of wom=* reductions in adrdntatrative and nonessential personnel, and further
vithdra is Prom agrioulture,.
I* Size and Distribution of the. Labor Faroe, * .
Although war, deaths, territorial shifts, repatriation., and resettlement
caused a not population loss in Poland of about 12 million persons in the 19401's,
thaw changes improved t e deamographio balance by increasing somewhat the pro.
portion of males of vorldng age and replacing, sore of the Germans expelled from
the westorn areas. A deficit of rtes of working age ram ins, hasrover, and
:to effects can be offset only by greater employment of women,
In 1950,, nonagricultural aWloyment in Poland vas 4,,4 millions and agri-
cultural ez loyment was 7.4 xdllion, totalling 11.8 million., During the Six
Year Plan (1950.55), total eaVloymant is to increase by I million. Ilonapri.
cultural enployueat is to increase by 1.3 million, with a reduction in agri4
oult*ral employment of 300,000, 2J The iaarease in the socialized sector of
the eaon n p is to be 2.1 million, of which approxtma~toly 800,000 will oo from
the private, sector of industry and 300,000 from agriculture. The anmael in.
crease of appr,.xtrtoly 250,000 in population of working age is not sufficient
for the planned growth of the nonagricultural labor forces because of military
conscriptions the slow rate of employment of fannies, and the delay in enwry
into the labor force caused by advanced schooling.
Approved For Release 2005/04/26 : CIA-RDP79RO1012A000900050002-4
 Approved For Release 2005/04/26 : CIA-RDP79RO1012A000900050002-4
am~
Polish Civilian Labor Fords
1950-53
Sector
Agriculture
I onaGricultura
7,400
4,460
6
7,36 VY/1
46700
7,300
6,000 /
7,,260
?x.100 `
Industry and Construaation
26660
1 f
2,760 11/
S9050
12/
3150
l?
Transport ad Go oatonx
550
870
590
~
610
Corn roe and Public
1 ploys nt l4
1,360
1,380
1,360
1,340
9
M
3
300
12 360
A
2
n soho u Led itcroa,ae in S.;x Year Plan,
in heavy industry) is apparent in all official statistics and discussions of
the Six Year Plan, In accordance with plazaad expansion of plant capacity and
.,tther construction needs, the oonstruation labor force in to expand 74 per.
cent between 1950 and 1955,
used on various proIeots,
7
Mlitary and paramilitary conscripts also arw
20 La"l of Teohnlaai Tr
Skill and iffi.oi~.
Poland is short of tsehnioally trained personnel. and at the boginzd zkg of
I950 had onl the following poroentagos of total rogvirer nts in specific inn
duatrios 16 s
Indus=
lbtallurgy
3408
5000
Ustal Product
264 0
8000
Coal
3200
75,0
Power
85.0
6390
Food Processing
5200
6800
Shortages of skills ore similar for other sectors of the ooonorr. Fron 1950
to 1956 the for of persons with higher technical ocxu ation is to iaoreaso
from 26,000 to 73,0001 those with avers o technical education, from 8616,000
(in the socialized sector of the econogr) to 242,0000; and those vAth average
professional education,, from 275,000 to G15, 000?1 At best the mbar aavail-
ablo will still be short of r?quiroments, and romsxr of the no sly oducatoci will
have little experience
Calculated trots abodulod total increase and previcus inoroases in transport.
The in creased eWhasis on the aocpansion of dial a loyrrsnt (particularly
Approved For Release 2005/04/26 : CIA-RDP79RO1012A000900050002-4
 Approved For Release 2005/04/26 : CIA-RDP79R01012A000900050002-4
Labor offioienoy and productivity have improved since tho ,air and have
approximated prewar levels by late 1948, 18 In 195O , ` prochuctivity per
roaorker rose by 9 goroaut in all nattonalised industry, but in coal mining
and some other seotore of rationalised industry planner increases were not
achieved, Various control measures wore instituted to oonbat shirking, care-,
lesmness, absence ia?, and a high rate of alcoholism, 19 The increase in
produotility in 1951 is planed to be 12.2 poroent. 2
4,04
8o ansibili and ib li of the Labor Ioroeb
The mmbex- of legal holideWs in Poland has already been reduced from 17 to
12 and could is an eaaergeaaoy be re uced farther a 21 Overtino is legally
limited to 4 hours a day and 120 hours a yeas. 227- By roduoing holidays and
increasing overtime an additional labor input about 10 peroont right be
derived from the present industrial labor force. It the planned employment
goals are to be aohteved, horever, ncbiliaation for war could roquire further
enploytsmt of womone reductions in personnel in administrative and other non-
essential employment, and some vitMraaala fors agriculture.
Approved For Release 2005/04/26 : CIA-RDP79R01012A000900050002-4
 Approved For Release 2005/0A-RDP79R01012A000900050002-4
1:I1. Li:E ng and TioELIM Conditions.
S
Living standards in Poland have not rogainsd prewar levels. Lbmbers of
tbo Communist elite enjoy a higher standard of living than the rest of the
populations and worlasrs are favored over norarorlszers. Fa lion with only one
wage earner find it difficult to support thee elves. Housing Conditions will
probably remain poor in 1951 and 1952. Food supplioes although adequate, are
=pensive, and t average diet Contains a disproportionate amount of grain
and potatoes , Feaith services are inadequate.
.7orla~ing conditions are severe because of seanporrer Controls and the prom
notion of work oorpatitiona To induce higher production, the government
kawps basic wages at a lerr level and grants prardwa for the ovorfulfillroent
of established toms, but the periodic raising of thews norms prevents SEW.
sign ifioant itprove rsnte in working conditions and iworess9
1. Axv as Conditions.
a. General..
Polish living standards despito recent izrover nt, are below pzwmr
levels and vary Considerably along the tbree urban classes Created by postw or
Changers in the social structure. The Communist eliteo which has eliminated
and replaood tho upper and middle classes, enjoys the highest standard of
living. Nearly all nonagricultural workers are included in the category of
state employees, who can ,supplement their normal income with bonuses and pur,
chases in "socialized" stores and state dining roorise Widows., pensioners,,
and the aged, who make up the third social Class, have below-subsistence in
COMBO
Although inoones of the elito group are kept secret, it is estiraated
that government dignitaries, members of the Central Committee of the (Coe 1st)
Tiorkerss Party, dirootorn of various econordo sectors, writers, journalists,
actors, and architects earn from 2,000 to 4#000 zlotys* por month. Those
relatively high salaries are supplemented by various privileges entitling
m ambers of this group to drew upon state "supply offices" and receive free living
quarters, light, heating, telephones, and official autonbileav
Workers and office Clerks, who with their fanilies comprise about 95
percent of the urban population, are dependent for survival upon the Combined
wages of several nembors of a family or upon premiums derived from long working
lour, s0 Tho amrago basic wage in this group in 1950 was 400 alotyrs a month.
* s 4 zlotys at the officiaa rate.
C" 13-
Approved For Release 2005/04/26 : CIA-RDP79RO1012A000900050002-4
 Approved For Release 2005/04/26 : CIA-RDP79RO1012A000900050002-4
Since 1,9200 aloiyc a rtinth are needed to support a family of fbur.9 2/ it is
o1oar that fasadlies with only ono tinge earner who eazna only the basic want
find it difficult to exist, Those incomes are supplemented by bo" logal
and quasi-legal means, Legal supplementary income accrues t 'ore premiums
and bonuaev earned in "socialist work competitions." Trading in bozuzees
and ssoarco consumer goods in a quaei?logal source of inoons,
Incomes of the third social group, including the aged,, cridosrs, and
penaioners,p are so far below the subsistenoo lovol that most of those people
are forced to live with w a o earning families,,
Despite govornmant propaganda regwrdinl; the lowering of prioos for
some articles on 1 January 1951? food Prices on the list were reduced .only
by from 5 to 10 percentt;, The prices of electrical items were reduced by,
S8 porae it, of oertain metal articles by 30 peroontg, and of window glass by
37 percent;, On the other hands the currency reform. of October 1050 raised
prices by rounding odd price figures is the conversion to the nets currency.
and, in addition, some prices rose follovsng the r?ofbrra, The not result is
.that the &meral price level is about the eons as it as in Octobor 1950,
b, 1busii 3
Despite intiensive postwar rehabilitation of damaged buildings and
conatruotion of nett buildings, heusln? in Poland in believed to be izmdequato
because of the oozes c notion priority given to industrial plants and h ovsr=eAt,
offices. Provisional figures of the December 1950 census, including rural and
urban communities, report 5,9 million dwellings with 13,7 million rooms. Al-
though there more only about 4,4 million rooms in 1946,~maoh of subsequent in.
ctaaso try be accounted for by the simple patching up of numerous dwellings
which required minor repairs. Current figures -place the average for Poland
at lean that too persons or rooms but continuing complaints from certain
arem indicate that living conditions are probably extremely crowded,
oy rood*
The average Pole oonsumss about 20900 calories a day., equal to the pre,
v%r intal0eo Chain and potatoes are the dietary staples, Although food is
unrationed9 the goterzment controls consumption by setting prices at high
levels and by maldn sow commodities available only to privileged groups,
Restrictions in the oonsumption of foodstuffs reflect the sacrifices imposed
on the Polish people for the sobs of doveloping heavy industries, Domestic
pupplies of dairy products and moats, for e=nple0 are reduced by diverting
part of production for export to hard currency countries in order to pay for
Polish imports of capital goodso
do Healthy
During the German occupation., Polish health servioesp perennially in.
adequate,,, deteriorated seriously, At the end of the war only about 60000
a14-
Approved For Release 2005/04/26 : CIA-RDP79RO1012A000900050002-4
 Approved For Release 2005/04/26 : CIA-RDP79RO1012A000900050002-4
doctors, soma 3,000 nurses, an a orzLll number of dentists very loft '.n ?o1and,
of ?69000 hospital bode, about 10,000 vrere doatroyad,, and aorae 54,000 yore
rendered unusable. It wars eeti tod that the offeotivnosa of hospitals h:-:
been reduced by 70 ) eroent at the and of the Tar j 8 The estirjatod number
doctors in 1951 is about 10,000. Sines the ,presen population is 26 million
as oor>pared with about 35 niillon before tho war, thero are nos 4 doctors per
10,000 inhabitants as cor,arod with 3,? in 19386 but because of higher postwar
disease rates, the strain on idioal personnel and facilities is a mn =roe
than bofore.
In the early postwar poriod the incidence of disease was estrerzly
high, and the food supply was Inadequate to i .main or rebuild health: Sine!
104? the public health system in x'oland hae6 been operating within the scope
of economic plannlu& and since early 1950, when the objective of budding a
unified "socialist system of public health" was announced, all health services
have been nationalised.. Although there has been considerable improvement in
health services, n ediaa1 facilities are still inadequate,, A system of con