NIE-33 - THE EUROPEAN SATELLITE POWER COMPLEX

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R01012A000900050003-3
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 10, 2000
• Sequence Number: 3
• Content Type: REPORT

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ONI CONTRIBUTION TO:
x-33 - THE EUROPEAN SATELLITE POWER COMPLEX
PART Is INDIVIDUAL SATELLITE COUNTRIES.
No comments are submitted on Czechoslovakia or Hungary since neither
country has naval forces as such.
I. WHAT ARE THE MILITARY STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES OF EACH COUNTRY?
A. Naval Strength
DD (destroyer)
1
SS (submarine)
3
Patrol Vessels
17
Mine Vessels
17
Landing Craft
10
Auxiliaries
7
Active
7600
Reserve
3600
ONI DECLASSIFICATION/RELEASE
INSTRUCTIONS ON FILE
1. No change since 1 January 1950.
2. It is possible the USSR may transfer some naval vessels to Poland
when she considers the Polish Navy politically reliable, although no evidence
of any such future transfers has been received.
B. Equipment
Although almost all vessels are at
are reported in good condition.
1. No change.
2. No change.
D. Present Status of Defenses
1. Naval Fortifications.
least ten years old, the majority
Review of this document by CIA has
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Into-rest thai must remain
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The seacoast of Poland is not heavily defended. There are few per-
manent defensive installations except near Swinoujscie (Swinemunde) and the
Gdynia-Gdansk-Hel peninsular areas. It is assumed that the Poles have drawn up
over-all plans for the defense of each border and that in all probability special
attention has been given to the long and vulnerable Baltic coast of Poland. The
Polish Navy is patterned after the Soviet Navy and has special Coast Defense
assignments. The Polish Navy is based at Gdynia, Hel and Swinoujscie (Swine-
munde). Emergency bases exist at several other points, principally Kolobrzeg
(Kolberg) and there are many havens for vessels up to the size of destroyer
escorts and small submarines. Swinoujscie (Swinemunde) and the nearby area is
defended by a number of coastal defense guns, most of them captured German
pieces. The Hel Peninsular-Gdynia-Gdansk (Danzig) area also has the former
German guns and probably a few additions. An efficient coast watching system is
in operation. Steel or wooden towers have been placed at frequent intervals
along the entire coastline and are manned by border guards. In general, the
Poles have shown little inclination to develop strong permanent fortifications.
In all probability they are depending on a mobile defense.
2. Early Warning Radar.
Warning and detection devices are apparently limited to radars
located at Wiecko (Vieckerstrand), Swinoujscie (Swinemunde) and Hel. The exist-
ence of radar at other points on the coast, particularly at Kolobrezg (Kolberg)
and Gdynia-Gdansk is suspected but not confirmed.
3. Civil Defenses.
The Polish Navy is not known to have any role in civil defense.
4. The status of defenses outlined above represents no change since
1 January 1950.
5. No new trends are anticipated through 1952.
E. Current Status of Training and Political Reliability.
The training of Polish naval personnel is believed to be under the super-
vision of Soviet officers. Although efforts are being made to speed up training,
the lack of modern equipment and the time wasted on irrelevant subjects, parti cu-
larly political indoctrination, necessarily limit the professional qualifications
of the officers and men. Despite careful screening, purges and intensified
political indoctrination, it is believed that the Polish Navy as a whole cannot
be considered as politically reliable.
1. The above represents very little change since 1 January 1950.
2. The training will probably be intensified and political reliability
will be strengthened to some degree.
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F,
F. Status of Soviet Control and Direction.
1. Soviet control and direction of the Polish Navy is complete. It is
believed that the Commander in Chief and his principal deputies are former
Soviet naval officers. Soviet officers are also believed to have been integrated
into the Polish Navy at a lower level. Soviet naval officers are believed to be
in charge of operations and training.
2. As the degree of political reliability of the Polish Navy increases,
it is believed that additional small units -will be received from the Soviet Union.
Otherwise no change is anticipated.
G. Efficiency and Dependability of the Polish Navy.
1. Although internal security in the Polish Navy is still a problem, it
is expected that eventually the matter will be resolved by purges, political in-
doctrination and the effective informer system.
2. The Polish Navy's defensive action is limited to coastal minelaying
and minesweeping, inshore patrol and beach defense at selected strong points.
Little if any improvement is expected in the future.
3. The Polish Navy has no offensive capabilities and no future improve-
ment is anticipated. Unsupported, its activity would be limited to the initial
phases of an assault against the Polish coastline.
H. There is no indication of any intention on the part of the Polish Navy
to achieve war readiness by an early date. It is believed that the Polish Navy
in wartime would become an integral part of the Russian Navy.
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BULGARIA
I.
A. Naval Strength
Vessels
ODD (old destroyer)
1
Patrol Vessels
25
Mine Vessels
16
Auxiliaries
2
Active
2100
Reserve
5000
1. No confirmed increases since January 1950, though reports of low
evaluation claim the Soviet has transferred 12 PT (motor torpedo boats) and 3 SS
(submarines) to Bulgaria.
2. Although no evidence of future additions is available, it is possi-
ble the Soviet will transfer some vessels to Bulgaria at such time as the
Bulgarian Navy is considered politically reliable.
B. Equipment
1. All equipment is old and in fair to poor condition.
2. Further deterioration of old vessels.
D. Present Status of Defenses
1. Naval Fortifications.
There are no naval fortifications. All coastal fortifications are
under Army control. The only coastal installations operated by the Navy are ob-
servation posts equipped mainly with visual signalling equipment. They are
usually manned by a crew of approximately 10 enlisted men commanded by a non-
commissioned officer.
2. Early warning Radar.
So far as is known, the Bulgarian Navy operates no radar stations.
Such radar installations as are located in Bulgaria are under Army control.
3. Civil Defenses.
The Bulgarian Navy is not known to have any role in civil defense.
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). The status of defenses outlined above represents no change since
1 January 1950.
5. No new trends are likely to develop through 1952.
E. Current Status of Training and Political Reliability.
The level of training in the Bulgarian Navy, never very high, received
a severe setback with the elimination of German instructors and German trained
personnel. Under Soviet tutelage it has progressed little. Communist control
of the Navy has been largely completed. From top to bottom, military control
is now subordinate to political control by the Communist Party. It is doubtful
that any organized dissident elements exist within the Navy at present. The
majority of the officers and non-commissioned officers may, in general, be con-
sidered at least nominally loyal to the Communist regime. The bulk of the en-
listed personnel, however, are non-Communist.
1. Under Soviet supervision the level of training since 1 January 1950
has improved somewhat, but the process has been seriously handicapped by politi-
cal considerations, which have governed procurement and promotion of both officer
and enlisted personnel, and by the fact that the Bulgarians are not a seafaring
people and lack mechanical training. There has been no perceptible change in
political reliability since 1 January 1950, as complete Communist control extends
back to approximately the winter of 1947-1948.
2. The level of training is not expected to improve much through 1952.
As a nation, the Bulgarians have little aptitude for naval warfare. It can be
expected that all members of the naval establishment will be continually subjected
to political indoctrination and any signs of disaffection or disloyalty will be
summarily dealt with.
F. Status of Soviet Control and Direction.
1. So far as is known, no Soviet officers have actually been integrated
into the Navy. A Soviet advisory group, however, consisting of a Naval Advisor
and assistants, is attached to the Navy. Although nominally assigned in a con-
sultative and instructional capacity, the Soviet Naval Advisor undoubtedly exer-
cises a very considerable degree of influence on naval policy and activity. This
influence is perhaps so great that, in actual practice, he may exercise true com-
mand functions, in which case he could well be regarded as the real head of the
naval forces.
2. The status of Soviet control and direction is estimated not to change
substantially during 1952.
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G. Efficiency and Dependability of the Navy.
1. Internal security can be rated good. To maintain the subservience
of the military establishment to political direction, political commissars have
been distributed throughout the Navy. They work closely with the various in-
telligence and security agencies and attempt to assure that only personnel loyal
to the Communist regime remain on active service, In the future it is certain
that the government will attempt to ferret out any evidence of nationalism among
the Communist personnel in the Navy -- particularly among the senior officer
ranks.
2. In the event of war defensive action on the part of the Bulgarian
Navy would be limited to coastal patrol, anti-submarine warfare, and mine war-
fare for local defense. The Navy's capabilities in this respect are weak due to
lack of real war experiences and the Soviet Navy's reluctance to provide expen-
sive equipment or to reveal secrets. Its capabilities may, however, be expected
to improve slowly under Soviet guidance.
3. The Bulgarian Navy has no offensive capabilities and cannot be
expected to develop any in the foreseeable future.
H. The Navy's program does not indicate an intention to achieve war readi-
ness by an early date. The Navy is merely a weak component of Bulgaria's armed
forces and is handicapped by poor leadership and old units. Maintenance of
ships, due to lack of skilled labor and modern machinery, will remain poor.
Bulgaria's shipbuilding facilities will remain limited, and her industry cannot
be expected to produce naval ordnance or marine engines of any appreciable size
or quality.
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ALBANIA
I.
A. Naval Strength
Patrol Vessels
14
Minesweeper
3
Landing Craft
2
Active
800
Reserve
300
1. This represents an increase of 9 patrol vessels since 1 January 1950.
These were PT (motor torpedo boats) shipped from a Polish port.
2. No evidence is available to indicate any likely changes through 1952.
B. Equipment
All equipment, with the possible exception of the 9 PT mentioned above,
is old and in poor condition.
1. No evidence of change since 1 January 1950.
2. No available evidence of change through 1952.
D. Present Status of Defenses.
1. Naval Fortifications.
Soviet personnel in Albania have been supervising the rehabilitation
of the old coastal defenses by replacing the obsolete German and Italian guns
with modern Soviet equipment. However, the progress is so slow and the coastal
batteries are so few that little significance may be attached to this program.
2. There is no early warning system, radar or otherwise, in operation
in Albania.
3. The Navy has no active part in the civil defense program, which is
under the direction of the Ministry of Defense.
E. Current Status of Training and Political Reliability.
1. The current status of training in the Albanian Navy is at a level far
below that of the Western European nations. There have been no changes in the
,training program of the Albanian Navy from 1 January 1950 to present. The
Albanian Navy is so small in personnel and ship strength and the naval facilities
are so limited that little can be accomplished in future training. The political
reliability of the naval high command is relatively high while the reliability of
other personnel is unknown. However, it is felt that the feelings of the naval
high command vary proportionally with the stability of the present regime.
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t -v.
F. Status of Soviet Control and Direction.
1. The Albanian Navy is under complete Soviet control. Soviet officers
and advisors have been placed as assistants in key controlling billets through-
out the service. The Albanian Navy has received little material aid in building
up its ship strength, hence the number of Soviet personnel assigned to the Navy
is relatively small as compared to the Army and the State Police.
2. Future developments of Soviet control and direction over the Albanian
Navy are problematical and depend solely on Albania's position in the Soviets'
strategic planning and the trend of international events.
G. Efficiency and Dependability of the Albanian Navy.
1. The Albanian Navy is capable of maintaining internal security within
its service. However, in case of an East-West conflict a large number of per-
sonnel would escape to the West.
2. The Albanian Navy can wage a defensive war for a limited time only
because of its size, strength, and limited facilities and experience.
3. The Albanian Navy is unable to wage an offensive war of any size.
H. The country's naval program indicates no intention to achieve war readi-
ness by an early date.
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RUMANIA
A.
Naval Strength
Vessels
ODD (old destroyer)
2
OSS (Old submarine)
1
OPG (old gunboat)
2
Patrol Vessels
13
Mine Vessels
4
Auxiliaries
2
Active
7500
Reserve
4000
1. Four minecraft built in Rumania have been added since 1 January 1950.
2. At such time as the Soviet considers the Rumanian Navy politically
reliable it is possible she will return some of the following Rumanian naval
vessels seized in 1944: ODD (old destroyer) 2; SS (submarine) 2; OPG (old gun-
boat) 1; mine vessels 2; patrol vessels 3; BMR (river monitors) 4; auxiliary 1.
No evidence of such a transfer has been received. It is possible the Rumanian
Navy may add a few mine and patrol vessels of local construction through 1952.
B. Equipment
With the exception of the 4 new minecraft, all vessels are old and in
fair to poor condition.
1. No change.
2. Further deterioration of old vessels.
D. Present Status of Defenses.
1. Naval Fortifications.
Naval coastal batteries are located at four places on the Black Sea
and consist of seven batteries. Four of these batteries are located around Con-
stantsa with a total of 13 guns. The fifth, at Cape Midia, north of Constantsa,
has four guns. The sixth and seventh, at Agigea and Mangalia, south of Con-
stantsa, have four and three guns respectively. Anti-aircraft guns are set up
as anti-aircraft defenses of all coastal batteries.
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2. Early Warning Radar.
So far as is known, the Rumanian Navy operates no radar stations.
Such radar stations as may be located in Rumania are under Army control.
3. Civil Defenses.
The Rumanian Navy is not known to have any role in civil defense.
4. The status of defenses outlined above represents no change since
1 January 1950.
5. Plans have been made for the use of other types of coastal defense
weapons at the stations listed in D.l. The guns planned would increase the
ranges and provide better anti-aircraft protection for the batteries.
E. Current Status of Training and Political Reliability.
The level of training is not considered adequate, since a great pro-
portion of it remains theoretical, with emphasis on political indoctrination.
No organized dissident elements exist today in the Navy. Political reliability
is now guaranteed by the Naval Information Service, a counter-intelligence
agency which has as its primary function the detection and prevention of sub-
versive elements in the Navy.
1. Under Soviet supervision the level of training since 1 January 1950
has been gradually expanded and intensified. There has been a definite improve-
ment in discipline and loyalty of officers as a result of improved living con-
ditions and systematic purges that have eliminated many of the anti-Communist
officers and all active anti-Communists.
2. The effectiveness of training cannot be expected to improve through
1952 unless the Navy obtains reasonably modern ships and technical equipment. As
a result of the policy of selecting only reliable persons as candidates for
officer and NCO schools, an even greater increase in loyal officer and NCO per-
sonnel can be expected through 1952.
F. Status of Soviet Control and Direction.
1. So far as is known, no Soviet officers have actually been integrated
into the Navy. A Soviet Advisory Mission, attached to the Ministry of Armed
Forces, is believed to issue general directives relating to training and function-
ing of the Navy.
2. The status of Soviet control and direction is estimated not to change
substantially during 1952.
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G. Efficiency and Dependability of the Navy.
1. Internal security is good. The system of political commissars is
being used to maintain the subservience of the Navy to political direction. The
present level of internal security can be expected to be maintained in the future.
2. In the event of war defensive action on the part of the Rumanian
Navy would be limited to defense of the coast against enemy landings or invasions,
security of river communications, defense of maritime traffic, and support of
Army operations along the coast and on inland streams. At the present time the
Navy is utterly incapable of carrying out these missions in the face of any but
the weakest opposition. No improvement can be expected in the foreseeable future.
3. The Rumanian Navy has no offensive capabilities whatsoever and will
undoubtedly have none in the foreseeable future.
H. The Navy's program indicates no intention to achieve war readiness by an
early date. The Navy is merely a weak component of Rumania's armed forces and
is handicapped by old units and a shortage of experienced, well trained personnel,
especially officers. Even before the Navy purges, Rumanian Naval personnel gen-
erally showed inability to grasp the essentials of sea power and to exploit fully
the means at hand to wage modern naval warfare.
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GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC
I. A. Naval Strength
Vessels
Patrol Vessels
Personnel
Active
3500
1. All vessels have been acquired since 1 January 1950.
2. It appears likely that at least 15 patrol vessels, 1 minecraft, and
5 auxiliaries will be acquired by the East German Navy through 1952.
B. Equipment
The current status of equipment is good to excellent.
1. Not applicable.
2. No change likely.
D. Present Status of IEf ens e
1. Naval Fortifications.
No naval fortifications known to exist.
2. Early Warning Radar.
None known to be controlled by East German Seepolizei. (Some radar
installations have presumably been made by the Soviets on the Baltic coast; one
such installation has been reported on the tip of DARSS peninsula, probably to
cover the sector of the sea between DARSS and the Danish coast.)
3. Civil Defenses.
None known.
la.. Changes represented since 1 January 1950: None.
5. Trends likely to develop through 1952: Important developments in
respect to the foregoing items are not anticipated.
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E. Current Status of training and political reliability
Training as. distinguished from instruction in schools, has not reached
a very high level in the Seepolizei. Political reliability is probably high;
membership in the SED (Communist-controlled) party is required for Seepolizei
personnel; most of those in leading or command positions are convinced Communists.
1. Changes represented since 1 January 1950: The entire Seepolizei pro-
gram has been developed since 1 January 1950.
2. Trends likely to develop through 1952: Training will be energetic-
ally stressed and largely perfected, and political reliability will remain high
due to careful indoctrination and screening policies.
1. The exact degree of Soviet control and direction of the Seepolizei
is not clear. However, a Soviet Navy Captain serves as Liaison officer at the
principal training establishment, where a Russian Kommissar is Chief Interpreter.
Presumably similar positions exist in other establishments. German Seepolizei
officers to be assigned as instructors are expected to receive instruction aboard
Soviet vessels, including destroyers and submarines during the Soviet Baltic Fleet
maneuvers beginning in May 1951, and later for six months in the Soviet Union.
2. Developments likely to occur through 1952: The future of the See-
polizei will be dictated by the Soviets. The direction and rapidity of its de-
velopment will depend to a degree upon the general trend of world affairs (East
vs West). Its capabilities probably will not be permitted to expand beyond
those comparable to the U.S. Coast Guard.
G. Present and probable future degree of efficiency and dependability of the
armed forces, and their capabilities for:
1.
Internal security - )
2.
Defensive action
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3.
Offensive action
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At present the Seepolizei is a police
force, having slight capabilities in
either defensive or offensive action
owing to inadequate training and equip-
ment. It has the possibility of becoming
a fast, hard hitting, attack or small
battle unit.
H. Does the country's military program indicate an intention to achieve war
readiness by an early date? No.
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I. EFFECTIVENESS OF THE SATELLITE NAVIES AS A COLLECTIVE INSTRUMENT
A. The Satellite Navies are completely under Soviet influence and control,
which points to their eventual intended use as separate adjuncts of the Soviet
Fleet. The only exception is the Albanian Navy which is so small, ineffective
and far removed from Soviet naval forces as to be of little consequence as an
adjunct. The Soviet Union has made no effort to date to coordinate the Satel-
lite navies.
B. The command structure of the various satellite navies is such that coor-
dination could not readily be accomplished without making basic alterations.
C. Logistical support would present a major problem because equipment has
not been standardized. Although some Soviet equipment is being supplied as re-
placements for the satellite navies, the bulk of it still consists of a hetero-
geneous collection of material of British, German, Swedish, French and Italian
manufacture.
D. It can be said that the Bulgarian and Rumanian Navies have been condi-
tioned to operate as a unified force politically. The Polish Navy has not yet
become politically reliable to the extent that it could be expected to operate
dependably with other satellite forces. As for the Albanian Navy, it has not
yet reached the point where it can be trusted outside its own waters.
E. This paragraph does not apply to the satellite navies.
F. The Polish and Albanian Navies, by their location, could obviously not
be used collectively with each other nor with the Black Sea satellite navies. It
is doubtful that the USSR would even attempt to use the Bulgarian and Rumanian
Navies collectively beyond coordinated patrolling of the Danube River and the
west coast of the Black Sea. Lack of thorough training, inability to engage in
offensive warfare, reluctance of the USSR to provide expensive equipment and
modern ships, poor leadership and questionable morale, poor maintenance of ships
and differences in command structure would all militate against the use of these
navies collectively.
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