ALBANIA MILITARY STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R01012A000900050004-2
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 29
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 16, 2000
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: June 29, 1951
• Content Type: REPORT

. ALBA.?tIA
fe'leaio* 4.1101 1 1"IfI p SECRET
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k 41TARY STRii.r.GTHS 1 -1) .,,hL.k;5Sk
Although Albania has no air force and there is no evidence of art;; Soviet
intention to establish ai. Albanian Air Force, there are potential airfield
sites and a few established airfields in Albania which may be developed by
1954 to aecomodate military aircraft. The loc:.tion of Albania, from the
Soviet point of vie::, is important Tiith respect to possible air campaigns
against Greece, Italy, dediterranen shipping, or Allied bases'in North Africa.
In vier. of the established Soviet program of airfield improvement in other
3atollite'nations it is logical to assume that there will be some improvement
in existit:g air facilities in the near future at leapt in the Tirana area.
Ho-7evor, Albania's exposed position and the probably logistical difficulties
the Soviets mould encounter in supporting armed forces in Albania in the event
of hostilities will probably be a deterrent to the creation of any significant
air strength in this satellite. Military air bases, if built, will be primarily
intended for possible use by Soviet military air forces.
The only evidence of military aircraft in Albania'is the presence of Soviet
manned aircraft used to patrol Albania to prevent overflights of the country.
There is also evidence of the storage of disassembled Soviet aircraft in Albania.
There hav, been several unconfirmed reports of a few. politically reliable
Albanian youths receiving flight training in the Soviet Union. Also of impor..
tnnee as an indication of a possible rebirth of the Albanian'Air Force is the
presence of Soviet Air officers acting as "Advisors" to the government.
The government and the military of Albania are under the direct control of
the Soviets and it?has been reported that the Soviet Union has 10,000 security
troops based in; Albania. Even the Albanian Civil Air Fleet is under the direct
supervision of Soviet Officers.
u aatolw nothing of CIA
Rea ~,
. j Reweer I~~~
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Review of this document by OIA ko,~
ermined that
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Interest that must remain
classified at TS C a
Aathorltyi HA 70.2
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I_ IIMU ?~R~T, iT W AND WFA sSES
A. C ntt at en the Air Force ine1. in trained and secuzj j
un mm AND TYPES
,
LE
Fighter
TYPE AIRCRAFT
Jet
come
100
Yak-9
Attack
300
IL-10
Loa Danb.r
300
Per-D
45
Ned. 20407
Tratnrlolrt
JU-52
20
Fl-156
TOTAL
385
DISPOSITIOE OF TACTIM VNITS
NO. I
=z &Twmn
Lam
,
Hq. M. BNtt LiT.
agar Ignatiew
15h. f t. Dsri asgt.
20 Pe-2
Gra! Iaaatiev
25tkt. I t. Der. t.
20 TU'Z
Dalaik
35th. Lt- Bore amt.
sq. 6th PTA. DIV
20 Pew2
Varaa/3es $m em Bojuriste
20 Yak-9
Bojuriste
6t PTh amt.
20 Yak-9
Karlovo
36th PTa. 8.9t4
20 Yak-9
Stara/Z& Gora
H. 2ode.G.A. DIV.
Plovdiv
12th. Gel. tst.
22 IL-10
Plovdiv
29nd. G.A6 i.Nt.
22 IL-10
Gorna,/Orehovitsa
32nd. G.A. !tent.
22 IL-10
Eruaovo
631 Ste. lisoooa. Asst o
10 FI-156
Yanbol
Transport B&Bt.
10 dU-52
Vrajdebna-
206
Pilot? 390.
Total Personnel 7800
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1._ Changes since 1 Jaws= 1 50?
During the last year one Light Bomber Regiments, one Fighter
Regiment and one Ground Attack Regiment have been added to the Bulgarian
Air Force.
2., Changag to occur throuuh19527
Arpsrentlj the role at Soviet infiltration, is nearing o
pletion.in Bulgarian Moscow seems to place greater trust in Bulgaria than
in aeq of the other satellites and no less than 3,500, Soviet officers, and
enlisted men are reportedly engaged in reactivating the Bulgarian armed
forces,, As the airfield improvement program progresses it is logical to
assume that the Bulprien Air Faroe will be further enlarged and also and.
.sated-with Soviet.unitss There have been reliable reports at Soviet. JO
fighters stationed in Bulgaria. Other reports of lessir reliability have
indicated that conventional Soviet aircraft may be based on various Bul'
prima airtiplds. There are,, however, no identified SAP units known to be
based in Bulgaria. While there is no firm evidence, indicating a buildbW
of Soviet air. strength in, Bulgaria at. this time, such a build-up would be
entirely logical in view of the confirmed Soviet Air Force expansion in
other satwlltte countries,
a. m~_arrggt_status of eouipment?
The aircraft assigned to the Bulgarian Air Force are of Soviet
or German manufacturso The majority of the aircraft are of WW II vintbge4
Maintenance and serviceability areUw.
1Q What s does this r'es ..n.t sine 1 Jgoua~,19507
There bas been no, change in the typs of equipment in the
Bulgarian Air Force in the last year. As.*mentioned previously however,
there has been an increase of three regiments since 1 January 1950. Due
to the age of the equipment, and the lack of adequate spare parts, and
the lack of trained airerewaen and mechanics the serviceability and efleom
tiveniss of the Bulbarian Air Force are lee.
2.. Chang Ilk-01y to occur i ugh 19527
Contiariad rrequipment will probably be carried out in the
Bulgarian Air Force by the Soviets as equipment becomes. available and as
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the airfield improvement program provides suitable fieldso It is estimated
that in the near future the Bulgarian Air Force will be augmented by Soviet
air units,
Co Currant Status of Air Facilities:
There are 37 airfields in Bulgaria, some of which are currently under
construction., Prior to current airfield improvement program, only 2 fieldse
Sofia/y/rashdebna, and Graf Igaatiev, had permanent runways and the longest
was that at Graf Ignatiev (4,980 feet).
1. Chae:ejg~singe 1 Janua :
A wide-spread program of airfield development is now underway
in Bulgaria under the direction CC Soviet authority,, No particular urgency
appears to be attached to the work underway; in fact, judging from the type
of construction laborsr used and from the relative lack ct heavy equipment
in use, there are indications that some of the airfield improvement mm be
in the nature of "made work", Three implications rising from the construe-
tion picture are interestings j. a pattern: of-underground hangars (one large
hangar, divided into 4 bars, with each bay suitable for 30 fighters) is
becoming apparent; k. a pattern of 8,500 foot concrete urnways.seema to be
emerging; and g. the Tambol area, most of Burgas and near the.Blaek Sea,
seems to be a focal point of coeistrunctiono Two now airfields and onus old
airfield in the Tambol area now. undergoing improvement may eventually prove
to have 8,500 foot runways (Bower, 42 27N 26 23E; Sredets, 42 21N 27 l1E;
Alatitsa, 42 11N 26 43E) Four fields are reported to have underground bane
gars under construction as described; Besmer; Dobric 43 360 27 49E; Yokren,
42 45N26 36Ep and Okop, 42 23N 26 34E9 Of the tour, three are in the viein~-
ity of aaa q It appears that a program of izpansion of natural -surface
landing fields and improvement of buildings is a corollary to concrete
runway conatrdotiona
2a Chances likely, occur throuach 14:
See paragraph one above
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,Da Present Status of Air Defansea
Continued reliance upon visual and sonic methods of early warning,
is reportede Air warning in this country, as in all the Satellites, probably
serves primarily to warn the Soviet Union rather than I
However, there have been reports within the last year thdt air-raid precau-
tions have been taken throughout the country and that AAA guns are located
in the vicinity of the principal cities particularly in the Sofia areao
l6 Changes since 1 Januarys 1950?
The Air.Defense system of Bulgaria is under Soviet control and
is being slowly expanded by then. There are some unconfirmed reports that
the early warning net in Bulgaria is being augmented by Soviet radars
2. Changes like v to occur through 122,:
It is believed that the Soviets will continue to build up the
early warning net. in Bulgaria and that there will be relatively extensive
placement of early warning radar in the vicinity of the Iambol area where
the majority of the airfield improvement is taking placed
So Current Status of Training and Political Reliabili s'
The cycle of Soviet infiltration is nearing completion in Bulgarian
Gaps in the Air Force ranks resulting from drastic purging of loyalist
personnel are being filled with airman trained in the latest Soviet opera
tienal techniques by Soviet instructors, both in Bulgaria and the Soviet
Union. The Oilot training program is Soviet sponsored arA directed0 Manny
of the politically reliable cadets ere being sent to the Soviet Union for
training.
1o Changes mince,Januer~r 150:
Bulgarian tactical doctrines, tactics, and techniques are
being continually_oriented to Soviet theory and practice. Translations
of Soviet manuals and military literature are now widely disseminated-within
the air force, while Soviet advisors and instructors, in all echelons down
to adepaey level, are held responsible for assisting Bulgarian commanders
to learn Soviet tactics and techniques. indent unconfirmed reports state
that Bulgarian pilots are being given jet instruction in-the Soviet Union
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2a. C n?es likel4 to occurrthrooua
TheBulgarian Air Force is now under the absolute domination
and control of the Soviets and it is believed that through 1952 there will
be an even greater integration of Soviet officers into the air force. Pol-
itical indoctrination will continue to be emphasized throughout the training
program, It appears that the Soviets are making a decided effort to boost
the morale of the air force by stimulating trust and respect for the Soviet
Air Force, increasing training, and assigning responsible tanks to the
Bulgarian Air Force.
Fo S.i}tus of_Soy-let Control and li reotan:
The Bulgarian Air Force is'under the absolute domination and oontmol
of the Soviet Union. The integration of Soviet officers extends down through
company level, Soviet "advisors" are attached to all united Bulgarian
.tactical doctrines., tactics, and tLahniques are thoroughly oriented to
Soviet theory and practiced
1. Chances likely to occur through 19521
It is believed that the present situation will continue and
that the Soviets will continue to develop a politically reliable and effi-
oieat fighting force in Bulgaria. It is evident from the airfield improve-
meat program am in progress that the Soviets have plans for building up
the offensive sled defeasive air capabilities of Bulgaria either with Bul?
gariala Air Force or. their own.
G. r en_t and Future D
l lities .of tb. gjAUrMn &M Zorn
The combat value of the Bulgarian Air Force is negligible in vela'
tier to nations of ooaparable size or as a satellite'supportor of the
Soviet Union at'present.. With the recent completion of the purging of the
politically unreliable from the armed fore"' it is believed that the Bul-
garian Air Foiroe is considered dependable by the Soviet Onion, It the
Soviets continue the present buildup of the air force and supplies the
needed instructors. and equipment it is considered that the efficiency and
eftectiveneaa of the Bulgarian Air Force will increase euansiderabl7 In the
nest few years
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H. Military Program for Par Readiness:
While efforts are being made by the Soviets to build the individual
Satellite air forces into effective fighting units, there appears to be no
great urgency to achieve this goal in Bulgaria, As in all of the Satellites
the buildup seems to follow a set pattern: ao the airfield improvement
program,, b, the r,sequipment of units with newer aircraft,, and co the building
of permanent facilities,
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CZIi:CII05LLVAILIi
I. l $ t Strew- s and Weakn eesa .
A. ent Stre gf the Air Force:
Amber Role Type . Aircraft
lighter (jet) 10 ME-262
5 Type-16
Conventional Fighter 150 ME-109
Attaok
Light Bomber
Transport
Trainers
4 LA -5
2 LA.-7
20 IL-2
25 IL=40
20 PE-2
20 Mosquito-6
20 C-47
15 JU-52
6 Siebel
30 Siebel
7 FI-156
15 ME -109 (dual)
3 Type-26 (dual)
4 I4osquito-6
8 iJo. 5
8 Siebel
14 Arado-96
73
81
86
Personnel Strength: Total 8L00 (of which 300 are pilots)
Lm4
1. Changes since 1 January 1950.
With the exception of a few Soviet built jet aircraft the increase of
some 70 aircraft since Jan 1950 is composed of World War II type aircraft.
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L. B.
ATT
FA
R
FTR R
JiT
TRA
S
MIS
:
.
k.
_,_,.
C. .
T TAL
Jan.
In The Units
40
20
63
10
19
92
249
1950
Total he. A/C
46.
20 1
49
10
27
400
652
June
In Tac Units
40
45 1
23
-
29
70
312
1951
Total ho. A/C
40
45 1
56
15
41
424
721
2. Ghan?eslikely to occur through.1? 52.
The CAF at ;resent is probably the lowest in combat value of all the
satellites. The morale is at a very low ebb and the political reliability is
practically nil. Recent uncoi.firmed reports that an all out effort is being made
to recruit political reliable aviation cadets may indicate an interest in the re-
birth of the Czech Air Force. The ir,trodueticf of 5 type 16 and 3 type 26 Soviet
jet aircraft for training, _: car ose , 3:. aLuiti.Qn to Czech cadets rod ortedly, under.
taking flight ;ruin rg :I.s, the USSR may indicate a ;reater political reliability and
therefore more support fro, the Soviet Union in the no,-,.- future.
B. Current S?trttus of Equi icnt.
(see par. A)
The equipment of the Gzechosloval.:ian Air Force; is ? a In.;;ecllaaheous col-
lectiox: of Soviet, German arid ri.ti.si. aii;?urdf;; of ,crit. =;ar 11 vi.itatt;C. The main-
telisaT,ce rc.,
Fao:. to ~. L2?.'.'iiG:: c:f ftrr,::~r
RAF-trainee Czeclic; .:h4 t,.Crc: czarry the rr:antc _...ce
1. Charr.r-e s s:!.r ce I Jarrruar ~` >.
The prejent y-c4rtus -Of :,lie iz:.,?,:h Air Force ecjui;iient doe:: not rep--
rcerit ct chmri: a since Ja:;i~ zr:* lr'
is e_ c c,;t f cr the a_ poar_ -,ce of a few j ct ara.rc:c?a.Ct
Of Soviet manufacture.
2. Chap
#r: s 11.' l , t~ . c cur trrruui ' ?
UDC to the irtroductiun cf jot ircrart in i.at2 195) and the early
i.art of 1951 it a,.l;eared that the Soviets were perfectly x7i3.lirg to let the Czech.
oslovakian Air Force die c1n the vine c::cept for limited caretaker action. Revir..ed
interest ii. fly; ng trair.J r,g, hot.cver, and the ir:troductiun of Soviet jet aircraft
may be the be_irarir,g of a gradual rce.;uipment ,.rogram.
C. Current Status of Air Facilities.
At present ,there are 56 airfields located within Czechoslovakia.
Four (4) are fully suitable for sustained operation of Heavy and
Medium bombers an,, jet aircraft.
Two (2) are suitable for liaited oper_tion of heavy and Medium
bombers and jet interceptor a
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One (1) is a potential field for the sustained operation of Heavy
and tedium bombers and jet interceptor aircraft.
Four (4) are suitable for operation: of conventional type fighter
aircraft, ground -ittaec, Light bomber anc: transport aircraft.
These fields arL also suitable for limitcd operation of jet fighters.
The remaining fielus are t.otentially important with a minimum runway length
of 20000 with either perrmanert, temporary or natural surfaces.
1. Changes since 1 Jar.uar, 1950.
The current status of air facilities in Czechoslovakia represents a
gain of four concrete runways, 8500? long and one 60001 long since January 1950.
2. Chances likely to occur throuer 1952.
2.
Additional rurrv ays ::ossibly 05001 logy are expecteu at rilzen and
Praha Kbely, the latter represeritinQ~ ar: c..tension of a newly built 5.250' runvlay.
D. Present Status of Air Defense.
Civilian Defense in Czechoslovakia has been limit--d to the construction
or rer:air of a fei bomb shelters, most of these in the capitol itself. Black-out
paper alQ&, lias :,een aistributed for use in industry.
Early warning radar coverage in the gap bet:.een Germany and Austria is
eurr?.ntly provided b;; the Czechs, utilizing old German equipment. -Although this
equipment is obsolescent, it is capable of providing relatively complete coverage.
There has been no indie-tion that the Soviets have made any effort to improve the
situation. with more modern equipment.
1. Chances since January 1950.
The current status of the Civilian Defense does not represent a change
since January 1950.
2. Chang likely to cccur t rough 1952.
There is no indicatic,n of any chan.!~es to, take place in the present
civilian defense system in Czechoslovakia.
E. Current status of training and political reliabilitZ.
(see par A2)
Since taking over the Czechoslovakian government, the Ioscovr controlled
comraunists have successfully purged the CAF of apprcximately 95 percent of its
pro-western elements., In spite of this purge, never-ceasing political indoctrination
and personnel policies desi;.;ned to produce politically stable officers, strong
aoatwcil has been markedly slow in developing,
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Cornciomitant ,.ith communist ina:,ility to develop atronC control, the
CAF deteriorated to a point inhere its combat effectiveness all but disappeared.
Recent events have indicated however, that control measures are bc;inr.sn to
produce the desired results-at least to a deice. In A#,ril 1951, thirtyfive CAP
pilots :.ere reported to have completed jet transition training in the USSR. These
are positive indications that some progress has been made in political indoctrination.
This may.,be the reason for the introduction of Sc:viet jets in the GAY. The Soviets
are exp ated to place more reliability on the CzecL Air Force.
F. Status of Soviet Control and Direction.
There is no k noun Soviet officers Integrated into the Czech Air Force,
however, roving advisor't*ams are attached to the Czech Air Force. The function of
the advisor is to check on the progress of Soviet indoetriization in training and
political reliability of officer personnel.
G. Present and. Futur .,roe of Effl aienof. DeUerdability gnu Capab tie
of the Czech Aix- Force.
The Present degree of efficiency and dependability of the Czec.i Air Force
limits its capabilities for Iinterr al Security, Defensive and :.ffensive action. Ilov..
ever, v;it1 the increases: de,;reo of t.oli ical reliability and the consequent ix.tro-
ductior. of Soviet fi htcr aircraft, training activities have i.-.creased. Due to
these changes the capability for internal security and defensive action viill prob-
ably increase. tffensive ::^_ction capability ti:il depend entirely on the amount of
au port given by the US-2.
H. W litarx kro .nn for War Read
There is no indic tion that .: zechoslovakia?s military air program intends
to achieve war readit.ess by an early date. The jet aircraft training now being
ecndueted may lead to the forma ion cf an air defense unit.
11,
4
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The Soviet Zone of Germany has no air force similar to the air forces
which exist in other satellite countries, however, reports received during
the past year indicate .that cadres of politically reliable East German youths
were being organized end. trained to form an Air Police in the Soviet Zone of
Germany.. Early in 1950 all Valkspolizei schools and Alert Police unites were
ordered to : compile lists of all former German Air Force personnel. In aid-
1950 the Fast German Administration for .I bor ordered Its reelowl officers
to register all foam . or Luftwaffe personnel. It appears that a headquarters
element of the Luftpolizie (the air arm of the Volkpolizie) was established
4ar1,r lea 1951. Firm evidence, hoevsr, is not ' available on the extent of
the formation of an.Air Police organization, In arq'.event, it appears that
such organization is in an embryonic stage, A cadre of politically reliable
former Luftwaffe officers have been assigned to it. The number of aircraft
and airtie
c assigned to .the organization is not known, Training is be-'
lieved to be in the early stages of implementations Reports indicate the
Air Police mey be using Soviet and former German World War II aircraft
types for training purposes.. The possibility that pilots for the Air
Police may be in training either in Poland or the Soviet Union should dso
be considered. A training course for glider instructors under sponsorship
of the Free Garman Youth (FDJ) , the official East German youth organization,
has been repotted. with attendance almost exclusively from the Volkspolissi 0
The FAJ,. thrcug - its glider training schools, undoubtedly could be able to'
furnish an organized, partly trained, politically reliable manpower fcr an
Air Police tr a similar organization0.An Ain Police in time praabably could
be rapidly expanded into a fc matl Air Force since it has or will have
access to a considerable number of pertly' or wholly trained personnel from
the FDJ, the Volkspolizei, and former Luftwaffe pilots and groundcrews.,
An Air Police would serve as the air supplement to the existing Alert Police
ground end Ls.ritims Police units, theroby providing the final necessary' comet
potent for a future formal armed force in East Germanys
The most extensive airfield construction of any of the Satellite touts.
tries is in progress in this son*,, In addition to s*teaasion of existing
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runways and tuildiag net long runways, a widespread pro, ram of rehabilitation
and construction of Angara, personnel aceoec dations, and fuel tank installi-
tions is being pursuedo The Soviet Zone of Germany, has at present seven
airfields capable of supporting sustained heavy bomber/medium bomber opera
tions with permanent runways in excess of 79000 feet; thirteen airfields are
suitable for limited heavy bomber/aediua bomber operations, .Another fourteen
fields have runways of 6,000 feet or more. The runways of seven other fields
are being lengthened to 6fl000 feet and possib]y 8,200 feeta The Soviets have
a total of fifty two eirflelds in this acne. The airfield improvcieot pro-.
gram surpasses the requirements of aircraft types current4 based in the
Soviet Zone of Geraany and can be expected to continue at the same pace
through 1952.
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Amur
The Hungarian .fir. Force0 reactivated in April 1948? is an autcnoma
service on tho same level as the Army, Its mission is to provide tactical
air support for the Hungarian ground forces and to defend the country e.gainst
aerial attack, The Air Force is believed to have about 340 aircraft, an
increase of 180 over.January 1950. The number of tactical aircraft avail-
able to"the HLA,F,,?s mission has increased since January 1950 from 86 to
235, while the number of tactical unite has apprc imately doubled and now
consist of two figlter regiments, two attack regiments, and a reconnaissance
squadron. The 8.A.F. has no bomber units. The U.S.S.R. has recently supplied
Hungary with approximately 100 YAK-90s and 100 IIelDeso It is not believed
that the acquisition of these aircraft has yet produced a significant change
in the low combat capability of the Hungarian Air Force. The present combat
value of the H,A.FO is considered to be low in relation to the air forces
of neighboring states and as a contributing satellite of the U080S.K. The
ice level of training.and frequent purges of qualified personnel Have re-
duced the efficiency of the organization, Personnel strength has increased
to about 5700 officers and enlisted from the estimated 2500 officers and
enlisted personnel in January 1950.
The Hungarian Air Force, which hitherto has received relatively little
Soviet attent4On new appears to be undergoing rapid buildiupo With continued
logistical support by the Soviets the combat effectiveness of the R.A.F. can
be expected to improve through 19520
Faui~oaent
Current H.A.F. equipment consists primarily of Soviet World War IX type
aircraft. The 100 TAK,9es recently received are believed to be aircraftree-
conditioned subsequent to being replaced with jet aircraft in the Soviet
24th Tactical Air Army in Germany. Since January 1950 the H.A.F,?_s I1-2
attack aircral't,have been replaced by the higher performance I1-100.so The
Hungarian.budggetary appropriations for the purchase of aircraft and the
maintenance of airfields have been increased from $1100,000 in 1950 to
$4,0000000 in 1951. The aircraft strength has been more than doubled since
January 1950. The serviceability of aircraft is believed to be fair with
continued improvement expected through 1952 as additional qualified psonpel
are trained.
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61C Fag,? ties
Airfield construction since 1949 bas greatly increased Hungariaa air
field pottential, and the planned building program is believed to be nearing
completion. Of the 27 air facilities in Hungary, five have permanent.'ways of more than 8,000 feet, one has a natural surfaced runway of more than
7,000 feet, and still another has a natural surfaced runway of more than
69000 feet. Construction in progress will provide an auditional field with
a permanent runway of 81,000 feet. The airfield improvement program surpasses
the requirements of aircraft types currently based in Hungary, It is oz
pected that future efforts will be devoted to making field installations
and improving airfield facilities
Air Defense
There are indications of a planned program of air defense in Hungary,,.
This has taken an the appearance of a slow but steady effort and is believed
to be in the early stage of development. Little is known of the air warning
system However, a network of spotters is believed to exist on the Austrian
and Yugoslav frontiers. Plan is being implemented to ring the Budapest
area with AA installationsfl searchlights, and radar. American World War II
early warning and ground control intercept radars were recently observed
on an airfield used as a Hungarian Air Force training based Any improvement
of the Hungarian air defense capability will depend upon the degree of
assistance received from the U.S.S.R.
Training and PoliCi l Reliability
#xtensire training is being conducted for pilots and a parallel course
of instruction in being given enlisted personnel, A substantial number of
HoAoF.. pilots have received jet aircraft transitional training in the U.S.SoR.
The current leaei of proficiency however is considered low because the pilots
have had limited experience in tactical aircrrift0 Operational units are
not fully qualified. The H.AJ was seen ope:rating with ground forces for
the first time in the autumn of 1950, The political reliability of the
H.A,F. is believed to be relatively high as a result of frequent purges and
continuing political indootrination, Emphasis an political indoctrination
and improvement of combat efficiency is expected to continue through 1952,
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 Approved For~Rel6ase 2000/08'*A',: P79F n012A000900050004-2
Status of Sov9.et.Co1ntrol Bag Diction
Soviet personnel are serving with the Hungarian Air Force at the top
levels of coamands, and are possibly serving in an advisory capacity is the
lower echelons. This supervision by the Soviets can'be expected to continue
through 1952,
Present and Future Degree of Effic~ay, DDependabil and Capabilitiesiof
the H''n ka clan Aim tForoe.
The number of aircraft and tactical units in the Hungarian Air Force has
increased considerably since January 1950. Significantly, the airfield con-
struction program in this Satellite is nearing completion. Just recently the
Soviets have supplied 100 fighter and 100 ground attack aircraft to the H.A.F.
However, these factors. have not yet produced a significant change in the low
combat value of the H.A.F. an intensive training program is underway, both
wen-rounded pilot and grounderew training program is being aggressively
pursued. This training program is expected to appreciably raise by 1952 the
present. low combat effectiveness, both offensive and defensive, of the H.A.F.
A. in all Satellite, nations, however, the future capability of this air force
will depend to a great extent upon the amount of assistance furnished by the
U.S.S.R.
Military Program for War Readiness.
While efforts are being made to increase the combat efficiency of the
Hungarian Air Force, there are no indications of any intention to achieve war
readiness by an early date. If such intentions do exist, the emphasis appears
on a defensive rather than an offensive role for the Hungarian Air Force,
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Tam
Sun - of , Aircraft straw
-
E A, AIRCBIT
Fighter
Jet
ftc~
Connventional
]45*
Tak-9
Attack
90
ILc10
light Bomber
Mediae Bomber
Transport
4
LI?2
Reoaiszaldsa?os
Trainers
i6
1* IS
5
X47
7
lakd9
4
!akbll .
12
IL-lb
6
ZLIN
Miscelineous
3
Aerm4S
12
Arado-96
3
Kama
32
AT'2
TOTAL
343.
Bucher
* 100 at these delivered in early 19510 Assignment unreportede
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 Approved For"Release.200.01 12 CIA-RDP79F 0 012A000900050004-2
Wj If 1
T LE I
SUMMARY AND DISPOSITION OF TACTICAL UNITS AND MISSION AIRCRAFT ASSIGN
UNIT MISSION AIRCRAFT
WCTION
Iiq
Tactical Air Division
Budapest
?
Ftr diet 12 Yak-9
Tckol
hr Regt 30 yak-!
Veeprea
0/A Regt 30 IL-10
Tokol
0/A Regt
30 IL 10
Veeepre?
Ketones Sqdn
? Iakm9
Saekeefehervar
Potential Mission a/a
103 Yaka9
30 IL-10
TOTAL 23'5.
P__
Of
T LEYR
ONNEL STRENGTH
1 ed
TOTTA
pilots
260
400
660
Other airar
240
240
Other
TOTAL
706,
$031
5737
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 Approved For Release 2000/08/29 : CIA-RDP79RO1012A000900050004-2
POLA O
I, Mi1 xt& ,Suer. th s and Weaknesses
Current Strea4th of the Air Force,
Poland has the most effective air force of the European Satellites
countries. The aircTaft are better maintained and the Polish Air Force re-
calves relatively better logistic support from the USSR than do the other
Western Satellites, The Air Force, and independent force on the same organi-
national level as the Army and Navy, has approximately 520 aircraft compared
to abou.440 in January 1950, The current total personnel strength is approxi-
mately 9,)500, a slight increase over the Janwvey 1950 figure, including Soviet
persoftne1 who are serving as members of the P.Ajj0 The present strength is
considered to be its current maximum mobilisation potential. The reserve
system, which ap.'ears to be presently in the planning stage, consists of
numerous air force sponsored paramilitary organisations and the "company"
schools for reserve officers? training,
The combat vas as of the P,L.7, would be good in the role of home
defense, The acquisition of 40 jet fighters from the USSR In the spring of
1951 and the activation of a now air defense fighter unit has undoubtedly
increased this capability,
Poland also has a small Naval Air Arm,, organized into one naval air
regiment directly subordinate to the Chief of the Polish Navy,, It has about
50 aircraft and 1200 personnel, an increase over the approximately 300 personnel
and a dozen aircraft in January 19501
Improvement of combat efficiency and political Indoctrination of personnel
in both the Air Force and the Naval Air Arm are expected to be erphasised through
1952 In conjunction with continued Soviet logistical support,
+. ?'ant Stat~f Nouinmento
The P,A0F? is believed to have received 36 Type 16 jet fighters and
four Type 26 (two-place jet transitional trzd.ners) from the Soviets. Other
POAQF. fighter units are equipped with Ta1~-9P aircraft,, a type which became
operational in tZe Soviet Air Force in 1946, The majority of the light bombes
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 Approved For Release
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are ?e 2?9 which were operational in 3.942.although the P,Aj is believed
to hams six TE-2? s ? a moebru Soviet medium bomber, The P,L0Y0 0 s IL-2
attack aaircraft? operational in 1941, are being replaced with ILa1O1so
operational in 19440
Equipment of the Naval .Ai :+ Am includes IOU-20a,, IL-100a and Yak-9POM,
PQaISR Al R MAC*
S
MART' OF AXRCRAIT ; " TH
ME
HLUER
TYPE /bI CRA7T
N
Jet
36
Type-16
1?0
Y 9P
At~ta~ .
125.
II10
15
M-2
53
P1 2
6
Tik=2
s I- M j !A7 Pi
6
C=4IP
6
LIL2
2
IL-22
10
PG2
2
71-156
6
siebel
4
Tyae=26 (two place jet)
50
F0-2
20
UT 2
6
Sieb k
9
PI-156
P 3 VA AIR
ZICIASAL
&T?t
Conventional
Sarni esa~ac,~
Mg 11 O
10
10
10
2
PE-2
Ttl
TOTAL 52
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'. fW
 Approved For` Release 20 ! M: , , CIA-RDP79RO1'O12A000900050004-2
10 phamil sines 1 January19500
The assignment of jet fighters,* IL-10 attack aircraft and TU= 2
bombers to the P,L,F, has taken place since l January 19500
2, OhanapL L
Akelgto Occur Throueh9M0
It is probable that the Soviets will continue this re-equipment
program through 1952, The fact that the Polish Air Force is receiving some
of the better performing aircraft is an indication of the importance of
Poland in Scrtet Planning,
Co 9ta r p?i ieso
The airfield development program which the Soviets have been conducting
throughout the Satellites since the and of World War II has brought two formerly
unimportant Polish airfields(, Stolp/Beits and Prausto into prominence. These
air facilities are or will boo caaable of supporting sustained jet-interceptor
operations, They are also potential heavy and medium bomber airfields, Warsaw/
Bornerowoo with a runway more than 89000 feet long has been comnleted0 Poland
now has a total of 88 air facilities, but only seven have runways 58000 feet
or longer. Six seaplane stations are not active although an occasional aircraft
is seen at one, It is probable that air facility improvement work will be
vigorous in Poland through 19520
D0 Status of Air Defense
Air defense in Poland is a joint res-ionsibility of the Polisk Air Force
and the new Polish air defense organisation, O,P,L,o which was authorised in
February 1950, The 0,P,L, has demonstrated marked similarity to the P,Yo00
system of the USSR. Although there is no information available concerning
coordination between O,PoL, and Pog000o the presence of Soviet Military
personnel in O.P.L. command. and staff positions indicates that it will be
close, Heretofore, the Polish forces.have played practically no part in
the air defense of Poland, primarily because of equipment and limitations,
Activation of new anti-aircraft artillery units, believed supplied and
trained by Headquarters(, Artillery, Polish Army(, have been reported, Anti.
aircraft artillery equipment includes the Soviet 37 sus(, 96,2 Mae and 86 MM
suss, Fire control equipment, including radar- has been observed,
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 ~. 2S) ME
,.~
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There is no known Polish warning or intercept System in.operationo
With the exception. of a few radar units aspparently used by the Polish Air
Force for training purposes, all radar in Poland is under the direct control
of Soviet units,, Any warning system, visual or electronioo in operation in
Poland is probably tied in with existing telecommunications systems and would
be controlled by the Soviets. The north and east approaches to Poland are
covered by Soviet radar warning systems in Germany and on the Baltic Coast,
The assignment of jet fiters and modern ground equipment to Poland
along with other measures indicates that the Soviets are taking forceful stops
to build up the Polish air defense capabilities. This program is expected to
be maintained throaa' 1952,
g,, 't tun 21 1 an P
The Polish Air Force is apparently considered politically reliable
by'the Soviets-following frequent purges to remove personnel considered
unreliable, Soviet; personnel have been integrated into the PQA,F0 which
assists in its c1oes supervision and absolute control by the Russians. Air
training is completely dominated by the Soviets, The proficiency of Polish
airmen exceeds that of the other European Satellites but below that of the
Soviets. Training production is believed adeouate for present requirements
and is capable-of considerable expansion,. Propaganda occupies a large
portion of the training agenda as political indoctrination continues to be
emphasised. It appears that the Soviets are making a decided effort to
boost Polish morale, ahd gain valuable allies 'by stimulating trust and
respect for the Soviet Air Force, increasing training, and asai:gmaing
responsible tasks to the Policah Air Foseoeo
ro
Ai
The 'Polish Air Force is under the absolute domination and control
of the Soviets. Compared to other European Satellite air forces, it has
an abnormally high percentage of Soviet Air Force personnel serving in its
ranks., The Integration of Soviet officers extends from the Cosmtander, Polisk
Air force, all the way down to the squadron commanders and pilots* A large
percentage of the enlisted men are also former Soviet airmen,,. The. commander
of the Polish Air Forts is directly respohsible to the Marshal of Polandn Koietanty
L kossovski, a wfallbknown Soviet officar0 lntegrstioa of Soviet personnel
into .the Air Force will be continued through 1952 to the extent the Soviet
considers necessary to retain control and domination,,
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G. PRISE !T AND FUTU ts' 1)SC . OF `.F-;,FDEPENDABILITY AND CAPABILITIES
The Polish air force is the most efi'ective of the European Satellite Air
Forces. The P.A.F. receives relatively better logistic support from the USSR
than do the other Western Satellites. Any estimate of the capabilities of the
Polish Air Force must take into consideration the factor of U.S.S.R. assistance.
Its capability in the future will depend in large measure on the degree of support
supplied by the Soviets. The present combat value of the Polish Air Force would
be relatively good in the role of home defense. The acquisition of 40 jet fighters
in the spring of 1951 and the activation of .a. new air defense organization has
increased this capability.. Offensively, the P.A.F. would be fairly eff a yy
against such a -minor power as Yugoslavia but would be completely outolaeaed.:by
Sweden. The Soviets would probably hesitate to use the Poles in an agressive role
because of the political reliability question. It is more likely that the trend
is toward creating in the Polish Air Force a valuable adjunct for the air defense
of the USSR and the Baltic. areas under its control.
Ho MILITARY PROGRAM FOR MAR READINWSI.
While efforts are being made to increase the combat efficiency of the
Polish Air Force, there are no indications of any intention to achieve war
readiness by an early date. If such intentions do exist, the.emphasis appears on
a defensive rather than an offensive role for the Polish Air Force.
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 Approved For Release 2000/08/29 : CIA-RDP79RO1012A000900050004-2
1. MILITARY STREi(miS AX
A. Current Strength of the Air F.
ison to
neighboring countries and its contributior. as &a ally of the U.S.S.R.would be
negligible. Its strength consists of aFFproximately 330 World her II type air'
craft and 128000 officers and uen. The aircraft and ~:ersonr.el strength has
not changed significantly since January 1950. The air force, hoiiever, has been
in the proce:.s of reorganization under 6ovict ditrectior, since that tii.:e. This
has incauded the auoptior. of Soviet tar:.i.:a1 organization, t'aining procedures
and combat procedures. It may be expected that the revitali:,ation program will
oon"t nue during 1952 and that higher l erformanee aircraft uiil be furnished by
the Soviets as soon as they consider it expedient to do so.
B. Current and Future Status of F&uinment.
Alth,:Iugh aircraft e.;uiprent is I.redominantly of Soviet design, it also
consaists of German and Rumanian types. Fighter aircraft in operational units,
for example, are believed to consist of 40 EI09G?s (German)., 32 Zak-91s (Soviet)
and 25 IAR 3o (Rumanian). Other aircraft in the force have a similar performance
level. daintenar.ce and sezrvice:-bili.ty are 1loz--i due to continta. ,l purges of personnel
and the failure of the Soviets to ;_rov?de e:cte.~uate lou:;_stic support The situation
surroundi.ra ; e luij...ient h?s nut chanced si naf icar;tly sir,.ce 11 0. Ir vie;i of the
ass "stance the Soviets are be.;;:,:i1xa;:z.g to give other Yseut:;rn S ;tcilites, ho :eves,
it may be that they initiate some build-up of the Rum avian force by the end
of 1952.
Alit
Rumania has 52 airfields an d Mealp1 zr:c st tior,s but only one of them has perm
marient runt.ays 6,000 feet long or longer. Lack of hard?surfE.ced run .ays and
tnxl.t:ays limits their potential for year-.srcund operation.
An extensive runway coristruotion program has been initiated since 1950, hot.
even and this airfield development prngr~~ia ?is .likely to be continued though 1952.
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AIR DEFUSE:
At present, Rumania is without an effective air defense system, and the
situation has not charmed a great deal since January 1950. Reliance upon visual
and sonic mpnuhods of early warning continues. 'Antiaircraft artillery has been
undergoing expansion for some time,, ho.sever, in the Rumanian army. In the pa:'.t
nine months, gun defenses have been established in the Ploesti and Bucharest areas
and increased air raid precautions, such as the building of shelters and the
organization of civil de;arse, have been taken. Any significant improvement in
the Rumanian air defense capability through 10~2-dill depend upon the assistance
supplied by the Soviets. During World. Bar II, the Germans. established extensive
radar defense networks in Rumania, primarily for the protection of the Plroesti
fields. !tamp of the operative and maintenance personnel tare Rumanian. With
the end of the war, howeir, the equipment fell into disuse.
TRA11vIi.4 Al-L PI.L~ TICA , RI .LIABILITY:
Training ,rithipthe Rumanian Air Force is believed to be inereading in tempo.
recently 18 officer..; of this. foie were' reported to have begun training by the
Soviets in jet aircr.-ift. The tactical organization, train. ng proeed}wes and
comb-t doctrines in the R. A. F. folloti. thoso of the 4.-S. S. H. Like other
Satellites, purges since V4orld.War 1I of capable officers and men considered un-
reliable have reduced the efficiency of the K. A. F. The de roe of the political
reliability of the K. A. F. is not Itnov but the stepped up training sug:.;est that
it is considered improved by the Soviets. Emphasis on training and political
inaoctrination probably can be_ expected through 1952.
SLVIET C A.TROL Aa.D Dfl LCTIL :
Soviet Air Force ersonnel are on duty with the Rumanian Air Force throughout
the vari:.us sections of the high command and probably with the'training establish-
ments and tactical units down to Division level. Soviet personnel function as
advisers to the R. A. 'F. section heads and comwancj zp and uindoubtedlf have a great
deal of authority. The situation surrounding soviet control and direction has
changed little since Januar, 1950 and the Soviets are expected to maintain their
close sul.ervision.
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 Approved For`Reldase 2000/08/29 : CIA-RDP79R012A000900050004-2
.G. PRESENT AND FUTURE DEGREE OF EFFICIENCY DEPENDABILITY AND CAPABILIT E`3
OF THE I fMANIAN AIR FORCE.
Present.confirmed information indicators the court value of Rumanian Air
Force is extremely limited. The Air Force was reliably reported to hc3ye undergone
a large-scale reorganization in January,. 1951, involving the activation of many
new units and the introduction of Soviet medium bombers and jet fighterso Because
of many inconsistencies in the report and the absence of any confirming evidence,
this information is mentioned only as a possibility. The amount.of Soviet support
is the key to-,+?t,-.e-...future capability of this Satellite Air Force. Present confirmed
evidence indicates its capability has not.changed significantly since 1950. The
R.A.F. s effectiveness appears negligible offensively and low defensively.
H. MILITARY PROGRAM FOR 'AR UADINE.SS.
The Rumanian military program does not indicate any intention to achieve
war readiness by an early date.
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 Approved Fo(elee 2000/08/29 : CIA-RDP79R6'I'012A000900050004-2
RUMANIAN ALL' FORCE
TABLE I
SUAL..ARY OF AI.,CHa T STRi.1GTH
NUMBER
TY11- AIHGRAr'T
Fighter
Jet
Conventional
40
1i-109G
50
Yak-9.
30
IL-2
25
1AR-CEO
15
IAR-Sl
Light Bomber
15
1-9-2
Medium Bomber
Tranapcrt
5
JU-52
5
SM-79
5
01-60
Recounaieecnce
30
PG-2
1Q
Flu-156
25
IA39
Trainers
20
Yak-ll
20
Pt,-2
Miscellaneous
15
bardi-305
Ft.-58
3
JU-88
5
Zlin
Total
333
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 Approved For ReI ae se 2 /
-:EFTA-RDP79R 1012A000900050004-2
WW
RUAi1IA1' Alit. b URC=I
T i.ULE 11
SL.,...ARY Ai;z i)ISF,LiSITIU.. vk' TACTICAL WIT.-J----4X ;.ISO-IL.. AIRCR ;?T AS 3IGGi.IA
1st Air Division
1st Ftr ,:tegt
tad Ftr Regt
3rd Ftr Regt
2nd Air Div
4th G/A Regt
5th Rci Regt
6th Bmr Regt
7th Air Regt
8th Trans Regt
9th Li.aison Re j-t
Potential 'iiission a/c
t4IS61w. AIRCRAFT LLC.1 ILL
Bucharest
13 RE-109-G Bucharest/ ,kire a
16 Yak-9
13 ME-109-G Craiova
16 Yak-11"
.14: Me 109.G
Unknown (probably
Yak-9
Targsorul.Irou
25 IAR-$0
7 PE-2
30 PU-2
30 Ii2
5 JU-52
5 SV'19
5 C--60
lb. FIo156
18 Yak-9
a5 ,IA.?-ol
230
TABLE III
PF SOLM L STl~.E;hGT~{
Personnel all categories 12,040 i Estimated)
Brasov
Qalati.
Turda & uu eia
Brasov & Craiova
Galati
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 'W72 9 ~
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PART II: THE SATELLITE:i AS- A COLLi CTIVE UNIT.
I. HOWL TIVE ARE THE SATrELLITE3 AS A COLLECTIVE; MILITARY INSTRUMENT?
A, There is no evidence of any attempt by the USSR to organise and coordinate
the Satellite Air Forces as a unit and no evidence of joint maneuvers among the
Satellites. However there is a similarity in organization. Some satellite Air
Forces are a component part of the army while others share equal status. All
are controlled by Soviet Air Force advisers if not actually directly commanded by
Soviet Air force officers. Of interest is that all Satellite Air Forces are now
using Soviet training manuals.
The equipment in the Satellite Air Forces has not been completely standardised
up to now but the influx in the- past nine months has shown a tendency to stand-
ardise the fighter regiments with Yak 9's, the ground assault regiments with IL-1098
and the light bomber regiments with Pe-2 and Tu-2's. By 1952 all Satellite Air
Poi'css are expected to be standardized.
Although the Satellite Air Forces have been politically conditioned it is
doubtful at the present time that they could operate as a unified force. Little
information is available on the nature and estimated capability of the reported
inter-satellite organized guerrilla force. Major problems that the USSR would
face in attempting to use Satellite Forces collectively are (1) Language difficulty.
(2) Problem of cooperation due to-nationalist feelings. (3) Standardisation of
equipment has not improved enough as yet to solve. the problems of serviceability.
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