(UNTITLED)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R01012A001000010016-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 26, 2000
• Sequence Number: 16
• Content Type: NIE

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n. A. Spain's ability to realise its full potential in western de.
feeme is limited by the narrow base of the present government's popular
support: Since 1939 Spain bas been governed by a dictatorship supported
by a coalition of conservative groups, primipsl2y the Arey, the Church,
the Falange and the Country's business and land-holding Interests. The
present regime came to power through civil war, and has perpetuated itself
by utilisation at the normal totalitarian devices. Large segments of the
population, particulrrly the Industrial workers, remain unalterably
opposed to the present government, and Cannot be expected to follow it
willingly in MV Commitments it might undertakes although all groups
would rally to the defame of. Spain in the event of invasion. Nor are the
prospects favorable for a more broadly based government in the foreseeable
future. Even were the present regime replaced, the characteristic Spanish
Inability to compromise and the magnitude of the issues dividing the
country would remain.
1. Stability In. Spain today is more seriously threatened than at ax-
time since the and of World War II. Nevertheless, the regime will probably
be able to maintain itself in power, although not to prevent some industrial
and political unrest.
Among the chief threats to the continuance in power of the present
regime are the drastically deteriorating standard of livings the long-
standing hostility of labor, the new willingness of students and workers to
take direct action methods, the increasing difficulty of the government's
attempts to ascribe Spain's difficulties to external interference and the
regime's long tenure of office. Starting from a standard of living much
lower than the already inadequate levels of 1936, workers in recent months
have seen their position deteriorate still further as a result of inflation
and the a reported lack of spare-time jobs. Factory eaployess in Catalonia and
quo provinces recently engaged in effective mess strikes, and a
series of work stoppages and boycotts followed in other industrial sections
of the country. The gravity of the situation is indicated by the fact that
the worker enjoyed the sympathies of basically pro-r a groups, such as
the Falange in Catalonian the Church In the Basque-region and the asployare
in both areas. At the same times it in Clear that not even an Improvement
in the economic situation-will alter aignifioantly the worker' hostility
to the regime. Prior to the Civil Wars the Spanish labor movement was one
of the most powerful and militant in Europe, and much of its syndicalist
tradition undoubtedly has beam perpetuated under clandestine conditions.
Moreover, the workers have now discovered that with discipline and restraint
thep can strike with virtual impunity against poor living conditions, and
may be tempted at some future date to utilise the same weapon for purely
political ands. Similarly, students in the State universities have struck
and demonstrated on a number of occasions when they felt their interests
thrreatened, and this development too may have troublesome consequences for
the future. After 12 years in powers the regime In faced with the character-
istic Spanish intolerance of human frailties, which bas rarely permitted a
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government to ranain in power as long as the present one. The regime has
also been deprived of powerful propaganda weapons by the removal of the UN
boa pgaist Spam, which for f outsidanaW ad the government to e interference in the domestic
to Spanish pride by citing alleged
attain of the country.
At the same time, there are indications that a change in the attitude
of a minority of the priesthood toward the regime has taken place, with
possibly disruptive affect on the country. According to a number of re-
ports, the more liberal and socially-conscious Vatiosa-Influenced elements,
alarmed by the identification of the Church with a regime unable to guar-
antee a decent minimmum standard of living for the people, have decided to
agitate for reform. At the same time, the Church is apparently attempting
clgro groups
to secure an entry into the trade union field -hr of the Catholic
have traditionally been ineffectual at expense of the
syndical system. In view of the tremendous political Importance
Spanish Church, both through its hold on large numbers of people and on
the armed forces over which it has spiritual Jurisdiction, its detection
from the ranks of regime supporters would have the most serious effect on
ly be
political stability. Pe dinng further evidence, however, ttca rege
assumed that the Churroh will. remain fundamentally loyal to
Nevertheless, a number of vitally important factors in the Spanish
political scene seen to militate against a sudden change in the regime.
There remains a universal fear of civil war, understandable in view of the
more than one million deaths and the tremendous physical destruction of
the 1936.39 holocaust. The only organised opposition group of any im-
portence, the ibaarchiat$o its aialia constituent st coalition,, iodilettritidm of the
obvious incompatibility groups
most Monarchists inside Spain, and the decimation of the clandestine
Anarchist and Socialist unions by the police. Regionalism is still an
important force in Spain, and remains a bar to concerted nationwide action
by the opposition, at the same time that it hampers the government's
centralist and nationalist tendencies. Although the media of public in-
formation are lees influential in Spain than in any other western European
country, and approximately one quarter of the children of school age do
not receive a formal education, some success by the government in the
propaganda field should be assumed.
Most important of all, is the continued loyalty of the Army, despite
a recent decrease in its own living standards. The Spanish Army, since
before the turn of the century, has eadsted primarily as a national police
force interested in the maintenance of domestic tranquillity under con-
servative governments and in its own political and financial positron.
Under the present regime the armed forces enjoy a disproportionately large
share of the national budget and are represented on the highest political
institutions of the country. Moreover, the ranking officers, many of whom
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amid with Fresco in the Moroccan caripaigos, are reportedly loya1 to the
chief of 8tsts, and respect and fear his abilities. For hie part, Pnnco
closely sups., me their activities and has in the past moved swiftly to
discipline those suspected of disafteotiun. However, should civil unrest
become widespread, it would be well within Spanish tradition for the armed
roroes, inaauding the civil Ouard as well as the An r, to iutervene to
bring about a change in regime.
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2. Censorship and bans on virtually all forme of self-expression in
Spain make it impossible to determine accurately the oxtent of public support
for defensive alliance with the west at this time. The overwhelming majority
of the Snaniah'people is anti-Communist and anti-Soviet for religious, political,
and historical reasons, and all groups can be expected to resist tenaciously
and, to the limit of their abilities, effectively any attempted Soviet invasion..
Rec.me supporters can be expected to welcome Spanish inclusion in western
defense arrangements because of ideological conviction and for political and
economic advantage. Hwever, important segments of the population, including
a majority within such ethnic groups as the Banque and the Catalans, and
political and economic groups such as the "narcho$yndicalists and Socialists,
an unalterably opposed to the present regime. an wolf as to the Soviet Union
and Communisme leaders of the clandestine labor unions have threatened to
sabotage Spanish association with western defense arrangements primarily becauvvc
they feel that any move in this direction would tend to bolster the present
regime. There is little doubt of their ability successfully to cripple
important sectors of the Spanish industrial machine should they desire to do
so. While they are not expected to engage in such activities if tk independent
existence of Spain is threatened, under present international conditions
sabotage is a distinct possibility. The probable failure of sabotage to halt
Spanish inclusion in defense arrangements would than drive the opposition
groups into a profoundly neutralist attitude. On the other hand, anti-Vest
sentiment would be mitigated to some extent by any substantial increase in
the ?tandard of living,
3. Closer relations with the west will probably have little net influence
for change on the apructurs and domestic policies of the Spanish regime.
Association with western defence planning can be expected to strengthen the
loyalty of Army leaders, who would be furnished with modern equipment and a
foreign mission, but might, if troops are sent abroad have a disruptive effect
on the rank and file as a concomitant of experience with the higher living
standards and free institutions of other European countries. The dispatch of
any large number of troops abroad would seriously threaten stability within
the country by depriving Franco of the instruments of power on which the
regime ultimately depends. There should be little expectation of liberaliza?
tion as a result of closer association with western Europe; the regime's
makeup virtually precludes any basic change.
b. Franco's foreign policy also servos as a barrier, although a
relatively minor one, to the full utilisation of Spanish resources in the
East-West struggle. The present regime ideologically is committed completely
to the anti-Soviet cause, but has been prevented from associating with
western defense plans ,by the attitude of its neighbors. Western European
dislike and distrust of the Franco government is deep rooted and atoms. from
the regime's. origin and nature. This repugnance has been reenforced by a
postwar Spanish foreign policy that has been anything but conciliatory.
Any totalitarian regime is forced to justify its existence by the alleged
presence of an external threat to the Nation, and the Franco government made
effective use of the international "Marxist and Masonic" plot against Spain
during the years of the UN ban. The revocation of the operative clauses d'
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the UN resolution of December 1946 created the need for new propaganda themes,
and in recent months the regime renewed forcibly the traditional Spanish
demand for Gibraltar and charged French complicity in Spanish strikes. Official
propaganda of this nature is obviously not designed to facilitate Spanish
entry into more cordial relations with the other NATO powers.