SPAIN'S POTENTIALITIES IN WESTERN DEFENSE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R01012A001000010031-4
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 19, 2005
• Sequence Number: 31
• Content Type: REPORT

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TAD "A"
SUPPLEihNTAL G-Q CONTRIAIITION TO NIE 34
SPAIN'S POTn!TIALITIES IN WESTERN DEFENSE
II, WHAT INTE!'AL POLITICAL ECONO"IC N'D MILITARY FACTORS WILL
AFFECT.SPAIN'5 ABILITY TO REALIZE THESE POTENTIALITIES?
C. ?tilitary - Ground Forces
7. Short of a collapse of Spanish national spirit, of vrhich
there is no evidence, Spain is capable of opposing; any attempted in-
vasion with a stubborn resistance despite the current deficiences of
her armed forces,
The Spaniards' vtll to defend their territory is high; there is
no talk of aypeasemeernt or of neutrality, Spanish troops are familiar
with their heterogenious weapons and equipment and can be depended
upon to obtain maximum results with them in defense, particularly of
the Pyrenees region with its inherent terrain advantages.
Types of fortifications in the Pyrenees include concrete aanplasoments,
pillboxes, crude field fortifications, and obstacles, Three defensive
lines and supplemental field fortifications have been constructed, as 1l
as wire entanglements and road blocks.
Instead of continous fortified lines, primarily the terrain features
which permit coverage of the avenues of approach from France have been
fortified, Lateml routes, most of which are parallel to the frontier,
are also covered by defensive works. The principle of mutually suf?ort-
inL battalion centers of resistance appears to be u4ed,
Strong; concrete fortifications have been built on the eastern flank
of the Pyrenees. This series, all well constructed and camouflaged,
vdill be a serious obstacle to any attack from the French side, These dam
fense lines are fortified in depth and consist of mutually supporting
pillboxes, machine gun positions and a few antiaircraft batteries,
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The center section of the Pyrenees has some field fortifications of
a terporary t;pe. This sector, horevern probably would be utilized by
an attacker only for light diversionary operations beoatase the highly
channelized gorges, which would is a 0 4ep ysanf. rig the attacherge
forces and would restrict his use of armor, are highly favorable to the
defender.
From the standpoint of terrain, the most important corridor is
on tho cnzter:a flank. Thin area is ro11 provectod by fiald fortifida
cations. The road between ltplons and Irun can be blocked by the pre-
pared emplacements between Vera and Irun where the road parallels the
west bank of the Bidasoa River, a good water barrier which protects the
entire northeastern entrance to the oorridoro In addition the corridor
is Clanked on the northwest by a low range, overlooking most of its
length, and on the southeast by the foothills of the Pyrene?s.
Field fortificat_ons and dugouts an both sides of the main road
between Iran and San Sebastian have been constructed so that the roads
leading from bun and the frontier are covered. Numerous emplacements
tor artillery and antitank weapons are located in the vicinity of
Fuentorrabia to cover an attack through that corridorv
a. F- -fa or logiatio factors stfocting the defense of t2ase t'yraneasa
Logistic factors are complicated by the limited road and rail
nets in this area. In additio.., the radial pattern of both the rail
and road systems would impede lateral communioations. As stated pro-
viouely, Spanish railroads and equipment are in poor condition and the
highways, without substantial maintenance, would not stand prolonged
military traffic. Nevertheless, supplies could be moved through the
ports of Barcelona and Bilbao to the eastern and western flanks, respectively.
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bo Number of Spanish troops rquuired for the defense of the
The number of Spanish troops required to defend the Pyrenees
would depend upon the typo and strength of the attacking force? In the
event of the necessity to defend the peninsula or the Pyrenees, all of
Spain's ground forces would be available for the defense.
Spain?s ability to improve the quality of the training of her
armed forces without United States assistance is best illustrated by
noting Spanish adaptability for learning the use of modern military
aquigeaonto This was amply demonstrated during the Spanish Civil War
when the Spaniards on both sides received modern foreign materiel and
were making effective use of it in combat within 30 o 60 days.. In ehort,
there is no reason for believing that the apaniards are loan adaptable to
learning the use of such material than are the nationals of other countrioso
receiving military assistance under NATO and other international aid agree-
moats. This capacity together with the 5panniards? eagerness to prepare for
a possible war would greatly facilitate, the training of the Spanish Arroyo
It is estimated that when T/f:?a are auvuented by the necessary
U.S. materiel, the Spanish Army could provide 10 combat-ready infantry
divisions by D / 90 and one combat-ready zrnorod division by D / 180
for use in common defense outside of Spain. The morale of the troops
thus employed would rise in direct proportion to the military assistance
given to Spain.
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Economic
1. funitions 1
Spain has substantial capacity for artillery and small arms
production, but is completely lacking in capacity for manufacturing
armored vehicles. Spanish arms production, especially in light artillery,
is dependent on the acquisition of the.apeeipl alloys such as nickel,
molybdenum, etc., which Spain must obtain frcm abroad. The problem of
steel is not dependent on ore, which Spain has, but on coal and especially
on the quality of the coal. England, Spain's normal source of tais
commodity, is now unable to supply it. The production of explosives is
dependent upon the supply of such materials as toluene, dimethyaniline,
centralite, sodium nitrate, rind cotton of good quality, which are not
available in Spain. Another factor which might limit production is the
lack of a constant and adequate supply of power and water. A lack of
barium perioxide, barium nitrate, maunesium, strontium salts, and red and
white phosphorous has limited the manufacture of pyrotechnics. The
machinery in most of Spain's plants is a mixture of American, Getman, English,
and Spanish manufacture, roughly 15 per cent is relatively new, and the
remainder varies in are, from 15 to 40 years. Goverment-owned arsenals and
civilian plants are now engaged in standardization and modernization of
of weapons, but lack of materials, power, and other resources has retarded
progress.
Plants engaged in manufacture of artillery equipment, small arms,
and ammunitions are listed on Table 1, hereof.
2. E'xploaivaa
Spain possesses an ample source of sulfuric acid in her pyrites
production, which Is the largest in the world, and which is backed by the
world's largest reserves. There is also a small production of ammonia by
fixation from the air and from by-product coke ovens, but Spain is depend-
ent on imports for most of horn requirements of nitrogen. The ingredients
for most high explosives have to be imported.
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Spain contains the world's largest reserves of mercury, and pro-
duces about one-third of the world output.
3. Weapons and Ammunition
Spain's situation in regard to steel and tungsten has been
treated elsewhere. Spain produces considerable quantities of copper
and zinc, the two other most important metals in the manufacture of
munitions.
4. Power
Although Spain has coal reserves estimated to last 200 to 300
years, the country suffers from a chronic shortage of power, The quality
of the coal is poor. mighty-five percent of the country?s installed
electric genorati.ng capacity is hydraulic, but variable rainfall makes
the output fluctuate considerably. The only solution for the country?s
need for more power would be expansion of the coal mining capacity, and
generating plants equipped to burn low-grade coal.
5. Recent Developments
During the last 15 yearn, Spain's munitions industry has been
stimulated by civil war, domestic requirements, and German purchases during
World Her II. In spite of that stimulation, however, the capacity of the
industry is limitod almost entirely to weapons of prewar design. Arms and
ammunition plants are now operating far below capacity, which is a partial
result of shortages of power and raw materials. The Spanish army, heretofore
equipped mainly with miacellaniour weapons of foreign manufacture or design,
is now engaged in a program of standardiaaticn and modernization which in
1947 was expeoted to occupy all plants for three years or more, but which in
1.950 appeared to be a long way from the goal.
The efficiency and standards of the various plants vary widely, but
orb generally far below United States levoleo ~tihilo the machinery in many
of the plants is of reliable British, Getman, Swiss, or U.S. design, much
of it is antiquated, and a large portion of hand work is required. Capacity
probably would be larger than needed to meet domestic requirements, if ample
power and materials were available.
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6. Rail and Port Facilities
The Spanish railways are not in a position to handle a heavy
increase in traffic.
Shortage of rolling stook, average locomotives and poor tracks
contribute to a daily unfulfilled demand for freight can under normal
conditions.
Of the 2681 steam locomotives, of which 562 are out of operation,
1135 are more than 45 years old (1949 report).
The annual oarloading for 1949 was just over 3,000,000.
Assuming a daily carloading of 8,000 cars and an average net load
of 8 tons, about 64,000 tons of freight move per day. The turn around of
cars would seem to be five to seven days.
The railways have to rely largely on imports for manufactured
material and ties. The annual requirement for ties for replacement
purposes is two to three million. These cannot be supplied from the
country's resources.
The attached map gives the estimated military port, rail and high-
way capacities, without taking into account civil requirements.
7. Iron and Steel
The development of the Spanish metallurgical industry has never
been cormnonsurate with the considerable production and variety of native
minerals. The bulk: of mined ores are exported.
In the record year of 1929, 375,000 metric tons of pig iron and
1 millon tons of steel were produced. Steel ingot production in 1950
was 826,000 metric tons.
Iron ore is ample and well located for the manufacturing of steel,
with production in 1950 amounting to about 3,000,000 Metric tons, 1,664,800
metric tons being exported. Production in 1950 exceeded that of any year
since 1930.
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Coal exists in moderate supply and production in 1950 was 11,000,000
metric tone, Coal imports in 1950 amounted to 581,535 metrio tons, prin-
cipally coking and bunkering coal.
In the last few years steel producers have examined the many factors
limiting Spanish steel production to approximately 825,000 metric tons,
They point opt that attempts in the past at self-sufficiency have hampered
the industry.
There exists the problem of. scrap iron, of which Spain has not, in
recent years, had anywhere near the needed amount due to the severe lack
of foreign exchange. The shortage of foreign exchange has retarded normal
replacement and development in the industry and has served to keep the steel
industry at its present low level of production. The industry is also
hampered by various government controls.
Spain has ample iron ore and a moderate supply of coal necessary
for an expanded steel industry, Spain is short of coking coal and would
have to import large amounts if the steel industry is to grow larger,
In any expansion of steel production there is also the need for external
aid in the form of machinery and foreign exchange credit, special alloys
and steel shapes.
It is reported that the steel industry has made extensive plena for
the establishment of anew 600p00 ton a year steel plant.
8. Textiles
The textile industry which is concentrated at Catalonia, depends
on the rest of the world for raw materials, cotton principally. Wool is
also of importance along with rayon end silk. Domestic production of raw
cotton and raw wool is supplemented by imports6 Inability to procure
credits to import American cotton, and the shortage of electricity have
greatly hampered textile production for several yearn.
The 2,570 cotton textile mills consume about 100,000 metrio tons
of raw cotton annually and contain over 2,000,000 spindles. Cotton yarn
output is estimated at 50,000 to 65,000 metric tons annually,
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The woolen industry is second in importance only to cotton. Pro-
duction of worsted and woolen textiles curing 1950 amounted to 20,000,000
kilograms. Exports of woolen textiles during 1950 amounted to only about
565 metrio tons.
There are four factories producing rayon yarn, with 1950 production
at about 9766 metric tons. Staple fiber production in 1950 amounted to
14,547 metric tons. Silk production averages between 3QD00 and 35,000
kilograms annually.
In January 1951, representatives of the Spanish textile industry offered
to produce for the United States Army, large quantities of cotton goods
such as canvas (either gray, waterproof or camoflaged); cheating and textiles
for pillow cases cloth for underwear; ready-made underwear, cotton textiles,
dyed or undyed, for uniforms; handkerchiefs, towels, bags, etc. In a short
delivery period, 4,000.metric tons of'cotton goods could be manufactured to
United States specification.
Woolen goods have also been offered: blankets, cloth for coats and
uniforms, etc. During the single month of November, 1943, Spanish textile
mills provided the United States Forces with over one million military towels.
Provided with the raw materials and more consistent or adequate oleo
trio power; Spanish textile production could be increased.
9. Iron F~rrites
Spain possesses the world's largest known deposits of iron pyrites.
The proven Spanish reserves are 265,000,000 metric tons, half of the world?s
reserves. Production has decreased since the and of World War II and is well
below the 1936 production rate of 2,500,000 metric tons@ in 1950 - 1,
1,306,859 metric tons were produced, which amounted to a gain of 14.8 per cent
over the 1949 production.
Several factors impede the r,ostoration of the old rate of production.
There is a deficiency in adequate railroad transportation, a lack of now equip-
ment and replacement parts, and a lack of skilled labor, especially laborers
for the mines. In addition to providing for the 500Q00 metrio tons required
domestically the Spanish Government hopes to export 1,500,000 metric tons of
pyrites by the middle of 1952,
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10. Tungaten
The decrease in Spanish tungsten production
resulted mainly from the world-wide contraction of the tungsten market.
Except for several large mines, tungsten ore is mined in Spain by small
producers whose operations are extremely sensitive to price changes. Since
the beginning of 1951 Spanish prices for tungsten ore have been more in line
with United States prices, thus creating the possibility for increased
production, Officials of the Spanish Control Council of Minerals of Military
Interest (C6NEIM) estimate maximum production capacity at 3,000 -3,500 metric
tons per yearn Private producers, however, estimate maximum output at about
2,000 metric tense Spain's requirements are approximately. 200 - 250 metric
tons per year, and the remainder of her output is available for export. The
Spanish Government is currently attempting to use its tungsten surplus to
obtain raw materials in si.ort supply in Spain.
llo Mercury
The increase in Spanish mercury production during 1950 resulted
primarily from the unprecedented demand for mercury subsequent to the Korean
crisis, and the breakup of the international mercury cartel, "Consorzie
MercuriocEuropeo," at the beginning of 1950. With the drop in the Spanish
export price of mercury following the dissolution of the cartel, Spanish ex-
ports amounted to 51,499 flasks during the first quarter of the year, and
totalled 99,400 flasks by the end of the year, compared with exports of 27,620
flasks in 1949.
Current plans call for plant expansion and renovation, including the
installation of a new distillery at the mercury smelter mar Almaden del Asogue,
The Almaden mine is considered the moat important mercury deposit in the worldk
with reserves estimated at one million flasks, Because of the richness of ttw
ore, it is possible for Spanish mercury to be sold at a price considerably
lower than that at which the Italian mines can be profitably operated. If
planned improvements of the smelter are earraid out, Spanish mercury production
should be sufficent to meet the requirements of the Western nations,
$ECRE Yi
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Aypromimnte Annual Estimated
Production 0 latest Rate Annual Capacit
y
1.
Fabrica Nactlonal.
1.
Fabrica Nacion a3. do An as
2.
do OEM
Sociedad Anonim do las Arms -
7,440 gufec
3.
PTASLtPCIA
Sociedt Anon9, de Arms -
144 guns
288 guns
Am" Plant
acS,000 rds.sms.
120,000 rdn.
4.
Fabrica kraclonal do PLAIWIA
144 m unts
139,500,000 rds.eema.
310,000,000 rds.
5.
Sociedad Anonlm de Conctruccion Naval
REI JOSH: -
152.4/50 C. (nICSs) Model 18
105/26 H (Spanish) Model 1943 8
Ammo. for 152,4/50
77,500 rds.
Arent. for 105/26
465,000 rds.
Steel Production
36,000 tared
6.
Star Bonifaclo Echovarria S.A. - BAR.-
Submachine bases,
3,600
Other et 1, arses
36,000
7.
Fabrica Nacional do Artiilwia do TRUBTA
14
/
52
104
49 51
G (Gorman)
1/55
4
24
80
Fiabrica Racional do Armas do LA CORD A:
7.92 an Mooquoton
46,500
9.
P oticos Grams, S.L. - Sao SELMMON:
Irregular;
Sand Grenades
dependent on orders
?
10. T
OLO National Armes Factory:
&ra:,.l Arms As ureitioaa 100,000,000 rds.
155,000,000 ram.
Model ?A? Artillery fuses
77,5
20 at Artillery fusee,
232,000
6200.,000
11.
National Poker & Explosives Pactory -
Nitrocellulose
310,000 kg.
496,00o kg.
'PAd'1'
6220,000 kg.
930,000 kg
.
Tatryl
1550000 kg.
,
248,OOO kg?
12.
Factory of NXITANOS of the Spanish E19loeive
Union: r7amita 2,325,000 kg.
13.
Spanish Sevie'teu of Naval Corzetpuction of
00
Ravel. C oum (aediua =4/or heavy) 9 gums
Arm Field Artillery (light & mad) -
200 Sa
6
Artillery fuze (one type)
36,000
50,000
Projectiles (one caliber)
-
100,000
Submarine torpodoea
-
300 to 500
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Plant
14. National Artillery Factory of SETILLZ:
Artillery pieces of 75/22 up to 105 it
Artillery projectiles up to 105 in
Hand Grenades
Ammsatnition Boxes
15. Military Pyrotecbnios 1'actcry of SE@ILIA:
7 it Mouser Rifle Cartridges
7.92 it }user Rifle Cartridges
120 it Vickers (Navy) sbell cases
9 it Pistol ammunition
Artillery Fuzee (one type)
Piffle Amm au nition (one caliber)
Primers
20 man AA Cartridges
16, 1Bnperzenza Cia at YARQUM:
120 mmm
81 it Mortara
50 it Mortars
ammo, for 120 mm Mortar
ammo. for 81 mm
affix. for 50 M
00010031-4
A to Annual zatimatos
Production @ Latest Rate Annual Capacitt
48 guns
100 guns
124,000 rds.
250,000 rasa
500,000
10,000
12,400,000 ran.
12,400,000 rds.
124,000
248,000
18,600,000
496,000
74,1400,oo0
1,240,000
2,480,000.rds.
360
1,200
1,200
31,E
248,000
372,000