CONTRIBUTION TO NIE-35/1: PROBABLE DEVELOPMENTS IN INDOCHINA THROUGH MID-1952

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R01012A001000030007-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 10, 2000
• Sequence Number: 7
• Publication Date: January 28, 1952
• Content Type: REPORT

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January 260 1952 ?
00NSRseuTICN To II1.36fis PROBABLE DsviriOPIBS28 25X1A
IN INDOCHINA TWUGH Mm-lm
I. FACTORS IWW O11Ri MOM OOWADIi82 POLICY 'IOIiAOD IIDOCHIIA
P. tat trends ss beech-Vbtere s.e'eapabilitis to russet
~m.
Viet efiah-Chimse 0esssmist p e uure an probable thrsweb
aid-1!6!t
S. In political strsogth and stability within Vtoteatt
there is little indication that the internal political situation
in Indochina will vary in soy iaportmat particular, fraa the pattern that
persisted throughout 1951. During this period the Vletnemose rvera-
ment vas slow to develop and continued to suffer from lack of strong
leadership, despite the efforts of the Minister of security and acting
mn
v y Zsly governor of worth Vietnam, Igigaa van Tea, to restore ssourity in
C A ~ y fC m ~
e w> c m c main are" of the Tonkin Delta from which the Vist Minh had been
.e " tietnsm*se government are likely to be those cited in Nis aye' lingering
"` =y
Vietnamese suepieioa of say Pteewh.
wpported r'cglwc, combined with the
apathetic and "rents.sitting" attitude of the bulk of the peoples
French reluctance to relinquish ultimate control of political and
economic affairs; the difficulty of a new government in training the
necessary personnel and building an efficient adsiaistration; and the
failure of factional and emotional groups to unite in a concerted national
effort. An additional disturbing faotoi detracting from support for
the Vistmameme Oovetaent had been the growth of an anti-Preach, anti-
Mated. Factors continuing to inhibit the growth and progress of the
Viet Miimh "third force" under the dissident Caodai Colonel Trish Minh She,
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Than Van Run will probably remain as Prime Minister in the
absence of any likely successor, but it is most improbable that he
will be able to attract additional or mere representative support to
any significant extent, Hat's diplomatic efforts at the Japanese
Peace Conference and at the meeting of the High Council or the W.noh
Union appear to have achieved an immediate spurt of enthusiasm for
the Huu government, but the affect in each ease was not lasting4
Despite promises that a Ministry of National Defense will be created,
there seems to be no dynamic governmental or public backing for
Vietnam's national army. The significant faction of *fence-sitters'
and many supporters of the present Vietnamese Government"are likely
to continue to argue that the missing element that might inspire
additional political strength, evidence of France's intention to grant
independence on the model of the British Commonwealth, is not, forth-
coming. This attitude, combined with the ever-present threat of a
Chinese Communist invasion, may cause many Vietnamese to resign tame-
solves to a feeling of hopelessness, rather than inspire them to rise
to the support of the government of Vietnam and the f)anoo-Vietnamese
forces.
b. In the determination to resists
a. Political and economic developments within France?
Trends through mid-1952 in French capabilities to prosecute the
war in Indochina depend on the stability and composition of governments
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succeeding the Pint coalition, as well as on the quantity of additional
US aid?
There is a strong probability that the Fame Government, if
invested, will be ease more unstable thsa the former Pleven Government.
Assuming investiture, however, official Indochina policy will initially
be similar to Pleven'ss no abandonment of the territory, pursuit of
military, operations, coupled with pressure on the OS for 'lwsiwasid.
Inasmuch as the Frenob Treasury will probably be short of funds through-
out the year, credits actually budgeted and voted may not be available
for expenditure in Indochina. A national budget deficit resulting from
simultaneous Indochina and NATO commitments indicates French requirements
of approximately 950 million dollars to reach adequate military levels,
of which a part would have to be financed by supplementary 08 aid.
Moreover, renewed price rises in France will probably reduce the real
level of the funds already allocated. Economies which might notably
diminish the amount of the deficit are improbable because of basic
divergencies between the moderate Left and Right political parties.
Hance, should US financial aid fall very short of whatever deficit
eventuates, the Arsuoh will to continue the struggle will progressively
weaken in the light of difficult alternatives, 1) failure to meet NATO
commitments, 2) curtailment of the Indochina effort, or 3) a resort to
directly inflationary finanoing.
A government which included some Gaullist# but not General do
Gaulle might succeed a weakened Pleven-type coalition. This appears to be
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predicated on a split within the RPF, however, so.that consequences
for Indochina would not be greatly different from those already out-
lined.
Lad by General de Gaulle, an Extreme Right goverment would
maintain the effort in Indochina. However, Gaullist demands on the
XIS for a revision of the French role in NATO, for ro-*Xmmination of the
European Defense Community and of present plans for an SDF would take
on renewed acuity.. In the Amiably debates on December 29, 1961,
Gaullist spokesmen pressed for an "interallied theatre of operations,"--
that is, for XIS entrance into the Indochina war;
b. Political and economic developments within Indochina?
As long as the military situation does not deteriorate, and the
threatened Chinese Communist invasion does not become a reality, there
is likely to be little change in the will to resist of the Vietnamese
Government. General de Lattre's death is unlikely to have serious
repercussions among the Vietnamese, providing effective military leader-
ship is provided by his successors It is not felt, however, that
Vietnamese morale is presently such that it would support sustained
resistance against either the Viet Minh of the Chinese Communists
cooperating with the Viet Minh in the event the military situation be.
gins to deteriorate? The Vietnamese Goverment proper would probably
be willing to cooperate with the French as long as the French effort
was pursued, but it might be expeoted that a majority of the population
would attempt to avoid commitment and even a portion of outspoken
government supporters might attempt to make their peace with the Viet
Minh, An exception and potential rallying point for anti-Communist
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resistance sight be the "third force" represented by Colonel Use
Should the UN or the UK and US and troops in support of the
Franco-Vietnamese effort, Vietnamese resistance would probably stiffen,
and some support might be drawn fray the Viet pink it such a military
effort were iiooompanied by political guarantees of future independence.
Neither Cambodia or Los, if invaded in toree, may be expected
to otter effective resistance to sitter the Viet Minh or Chinese
Communists.
It is unlikely that economic developnents in Indochina will be
such as to influence the situation to any appreciable extent. In the
absence of security rsquisite'for the restoration of the normal economy,
the Associated States are unlikely to accrue additional revenue to
support their national armies or asst their budgetary defioitsj this
burden will continue to tall to France,
0. What is the importance of Indochina to the USSR and to Communist
China?
The importance of Indochina to the Communist Bloc. (1) Potential
Importance. The potential importance of Indochina to the Communist
bloc and particularly to Communist China is based upon the fact that
in Communist hands Indochina would become (a) a possible strategic
stepping stone to further Communist conquests in &puthsaet Asia; (b)
a major prestige factor for the Kremlin-?the conquest of Indochina by
the. Communists would seriously weaken the determination of Thailand,
Burma, and other areas to resist Communist aggressions (o) an important
"buffer" area., preventing the "encirclement" of Communist China by
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non-Communist states and safeguarding Other possible Communist conquests
in (outheant Asiaj and (d) an important economic area, providing the
Communist bloc with a rice surplus, rubber, coal and other economic
advantages,
(2) Present Importance, Within the time-locatext of this estimate
the Communist leadership will probably primarily consider not the long-
range importance of Indochina, but the resent importance of the areas
now under DRY control, and in particular the fact that (a) the existence
of the DRY armed forces has compelled France to maintain a considerable
military investment in Indochina, seriously reducing French eapabilities
for contributions to WATOj (b) the DRY, as the only Communist regime in
southeast Asia recognised by tae Communist satellite states, represents
a considerable prestige investment in Asia which has so far prevented
the Associated States from assuming full international status in the eyes
of many "neutralists" or pro?Cammunistsj (a) the DRY, while not consti-
tuting a firm "buffer" for south China, has helped to prevent the
establishment of stable non-Communist forces on China's border,
(a) Importenoe in case of World War, In the event of a general
Par Pastern or world war, Indochina might be of less relative importance
to the Communist bloc than at present, unless a determined drive into
southeast Asia is dictated by the Soviet need for raw materials, If it
should become necessary for the Communists to retrench their power in
the Tar Past during the conduct of a general war, southeast Asia would
probably be surrendered ahead of other areas, not only because of its
remote location from the center of Communist military and economic
strength, but also because of the fact that not only southeast Asia
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but also the southern part of China In of comparatively little
military and economic importance. to the Soviet blood It 1s probable
that in the event of a world war, Commmiat strength in the Far East
would be concentrated in Korea, Manchuria, and north China and that the
main Far Eastern offensive effdrt would probably be directed against Japan,
Furthermore, there are Indications that in the event of an invasion of
the Chinese mainland, the Peiping regime would withdraw its strength to
north and northeast China and would not attempt to make a stand in the
south, thus further reducing the importance of Indochina,
H. What would be the influence on Chinese Communie; courses of
actions with respect to Indochina oft
1, World Communist Strategy in Asia. Communist policy toward
Indoonina is determined not only by considerations of Communist Interests
in Indochina, but also by considerations of world Communist strategy. It
remains the primary Communist objective in Asia to extend Communist con-
trol to the areas now under non-Communist governments, In the pursuit of
this objective the Communist leaders have at their disposal a wide variety
of strategic devices, including both military pressure (by native
Ccrmunistacontrolled armies or by foreign "volunteers") and campaigns
of "peace". Communist policy toward Indochina will depend upon the
extent to which the world Communist leadership regards present policies
as successful, the extent to which it will hope to exploit "neutralist"
sentiment in Asia and elsewhere, and the extent to which it will attempt
to exacerbate existing differences in Far Santora policy among the US9
UK, and France, The DRV forces may Continue their present tactics while
steadily achieving
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a greater military potential through Chinese materiel
the Kremlin may try for a dramatic victory in Indochina
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through Chinese intervention. Howes, in view of the estimated
probability that the Kremlin desires to launch neither a general Asian
nor a world war during the time period of this estimate, it is unlikely
that the Kramlin would in the near f4ture shift to a policy of full-
scale Chinese Communist intervention In Indochina if it believed such a
policy to entail a severe danger of world war,
2. Possible Western Counter-aeasureso A O, nunist decision to
commit Chinese troops to the war in Indochina would necessarily be based
largely on the Communist estimate of possible western countermeasures
to such an sttack. Recent western developments, including the Singapore
conference, the 1nhington tripartite talks on Southeast Amiss and the
Truman-Churchill conference, and atatrssats by Eden, Juin, Churchill,
Truman, Davey, and others, have probably created an awarenese among the
Communist leadership of the danger that the west may react with vigour
and determination to Chines aggression in Indochina. However other
developments, particularly the domestic political situation in Iranoe, the
US, and Great Britain, my have tampered this realisation somewhat. The
Communists probably realise that once'OS and other western troops are
committed to a full-scale war, It may be difficult to localise that war
and to keep it from affecting the Chinese mainland. It is probable that
in any decision on possible invasion of Indochina, the danger of
retaliatory action against China itself will be a paramount factor.
3. Developments in Korea. Developments in Korea will effect
policy toward Indochina, not only insofar as Indochina and Korea compete
for materiel and troops, but particularly since the two theaters are
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important aspects of Asian Communist policy. itile it doss not seem
likely that the potential importance of Indochina to the Communist bloc
is great enough to lead the Communists Into a general Par !'astern or
world war in order to conquer Indoohina, it is possible that developments
in Korea may make it impossible for the Communists to confine hostilities
to a limited area. In that cass,-the Communists may desire to create t
diversionary attack in Indochina. Conversely, if the Korean war ends in
a cease-fire and the Communists desire continued hostilities, they my
shift their effort at military expansion in Asia to Southeast Asia.
However, it should be noted that the Communists have thus far demonstrated
a seeming desire to avoid a widening of the Korean hostilities. In.
creased Chinese Communist intervention in Indochina would increase the
risk of regional, if not global, war and would therefore appear to under.
out the apparent Communist policy in Korea.
4. Developments in Southeast Asiab Among the possible developp
meets in Southeast Asia that might have a bearing on Chinese intentions
would bet
(a) A substantial improvement of Communist military prospects in
Indochina. A substantial improvement in the DRY military position,
whether paused by Chinese materiel aid and technical assistance, or by a
reduction in French and Vietnamese capabilities and determination, would
probably be interpreted by the Communist leaders as proof of the probable
success of their present strategy. It would be unlikely, under such
circumstances, that the Communists should shift to the more dangerous and
costly policy of direct intervention by Chinese Communist troops.
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(b) A. substantial improvement of French and Vietnamese military
prospects in Indochina. An Improvement of the French and Vietnamese
military prospects in Indochina sufficient to threaten the DRY with
axtinotSon would probably lead to a reappraisal of present 0onsuaist
policies, and to a greatly increased danger of 'Chinas intsrt,rsntion on
the Korean model. However, an improvement in French and Vietnamese
prospects sufficient to seriously threaten the survival of the DRY S.
unlikely within the time-context of this estimate,
(a) Other Developments in Southeast Asia, It is unlikely that
other developnente in Southeast Asia, such as a decisive shift in the
prospects of the Communist movement in Burma or political chomp in
Thailand, would have a serious'effect on Communist intentions toward
Indochina within the time context of this estimate,
5. Domestic Developments in China.. Domestic Chinese considerations
are probably not a major factor in Communist intentions toward Indochina,
except insofar as domestic considerations may influence the Chinese
Connunists toward wishing to avoid another military commitment of the
scope of the Korean was, The Peiping regime-has demonstrated that it is
capable of supporting a sissable war effort without suffering such
consequences as a breakdown in rail transportation, a shortage of man-
power on the war front, an increase in guerrilla activity at home,. or
anti-Communist riots in cities. However, the Korean war has resulted
in strains in Communist China, and has probably led the government to
exhaust its political, economic, and social capital at a faster rats than
previously planned. While the existing strains are not sufficient to
preclude a new military commitment, particularly if the Korean at should
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end in a cease-firs, they are sufficient to give the Peiping regime
pause before embarking on military adventures that might lead to more
than local, limited hostilities, In particular, it is probable that
the Peiping regime, having esfiausted much of the popular support it had
on its accession to power, would be very reluctant to face the danger of
an actual attack on or invasion of the maibland in reprisal for an attack
on Indochina,
II, INDICATIONS OF CURREfl CHINESE CO.f"UNIST INTENTIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INDOCHINA
B, that indications may be derived from nonasilitary events in
the Far East such as Communist (Soviet, Chinese Communist,
Viet Minh) propaganda, the movement and change of status of
Communist leaders, and the formation of joint Viet Minh-
Chinese Communist cultural and/or military organisations?
No firm conclusions regarding Communist Intentions in Indochina
may be drawn from analysis of communist propaganda or other non-military
evidence,
A propaganda base, streaming the themes of the "struggle against
Western imperialism", the "unity of the camp of peace and democracy" the
reliance that may be placed in Soviet and Chinese Communist leadership
and military strength, etc., has been laid for some time. A number of
rather ominous and specific references to US plans to create another
"Korea" in Indochina in recent Chinese Communist and USSR propaganda may
have been intended to discredit or influence Western proposals in the UN,
US Mutual Security arrangements, the Korean negotiations, *to.,, and do
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not, by themselves, warrant a conclusion that a!"ressive action is
envisioned for the immediate future, In this-connection, it might be
significant that there has not recently been any notable step up in
Viet Minh propaganda regarding Communist China and the USSR, Qn the
other hand, there is little reason to hope that indications of more
overt.Chinese Communist intervention will be found before the act, since
the preliminary propaganda base for such Intervention has been firmly
laid.
Visits of Viet Minh delegations to Communist China, Worth Korea
and the USSto celebration with much fanfare of Chinese Communist and USSR
national holidays, the actions of Sino-Vietnam and Vietnam-Soviet
friendship Associations, continue to point to the special relation that
each of these countries oontiaues to occupy in relation to the Viet Minh,
The USSR is regarded as the "fatherland of the revolution" and the
"leader of the world oemp of peace and democracy"I Communist China, by
virtue of its.geographio position, is respected as pointing the way to
the successful achievement of colonial revolution, which example is to
be emulated by the Viet Minh, However, none of these activities serve
to elucidate Communist intentions, other than to clearly define ultimate
Communist objectives.
Although there are numerous low-grade reports concerning joint
Sino-Vietnamese or Sino-Soviet-Vistosmsss aid organisations in South
China, it is not possible to came to any firm conclusions regarding
their nature or activities. It would appear logical, in view of the
scope of Chinese assistance to the Viet Minh, that such organizations
exist, but there is no firm evidence to suggest Inset participation,
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Cctmmuuications facilities on both sides of the border are con-
tinuously being repaired and improved, The Chinese Communists recently
opened the LaipinCChennaskusn railway to the Indochina border, although
several months behind schedule, An old railway bridge near Lackey and
parts of the old railway roadbed fran ttmgtsu to Lacey apparently have
been made operable, at least for truck traftio. These activities,
however, provide no conclusive evidence of Chines? intentions, and may be
normal in view of the accepted scope of Chinese Communist material aid
to the He forces.
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