NIE-35/1: PROBABLE DEVELOPMENTS IN INDOCHINA THROUGH MID- 1952

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R01012A001000030022-2
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 15
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 18, 1999
• Sequence Number: 22
• Publication Date: February 26, 1952
• Content Type: REPORT

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Ste)W INFOW4ATION
SUBJECT: NIE 35/1: PROBABLE DVNELOPMAIIITS IN INAOCIiIN&
TERW OR MID-1952
To estimate probable developments in Indochina through mid-1952
with particular emphasis on probable Chinese Communist courses of
action in that area.
1. We believe that the French will continue their war effort
in Indochina, but at the same time,, while insisting upon the prom
ments there by demanding additional US financial assistance and by
seeking commitments for US-UK military support in the defense of
 2. The present critical financial situation of France is
causing the French Government increasing concern over France's
ability to maintain its, position in Indochina and to support
simultaneously its presently projected military effort in Europe.
We believe that the reflections of this concern in Vietnam will
give rise to misgivings regarding France's intentions toward Indo-
china and will accordingly have an adverse effect upon Vietnamese
morale. We believe that this concern will not affect the French
effort in Indochina during the period of this estimate, but may at
a later date adversely influence France's will to continue resis-
tance in Indochina.
3. Independent of operations in Korea, the Chinese Communists
have the capability to commit and logistically support approximately
150,000 troops in Indochina. This force could probably cause the
Franca-Vietnamese forces to evacuate Tonkin before effective resis-
tance could be brought to bear.
4. We believe, however, that the Chinese Communists will not
intervene in force in Indochina during the period of this estimate.
5. We believe that the Chinese Communists will gradually
expand the scale and nature of their present assistance to the Viet
 Minh and may in addition introduce Chinese Communist "volunteer"
troops in small numbers, We believe that in pursuit of this policy
they will stop short of any degree of assistance ithich they estimate
might provoke major western retaliatory action against the mainland
of China.
6n The probable outlook through mid-1952 in Indochina is one
of continued military stalemate. We foresee some small territorial
gains by the Viet Minh, but no major victory on either side during
the period of this estimate?
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 THE CURRENT SITUATION
6. Since the publication of 141B-35t "Probable Developments
in Indochina During the Remainder of 1951" dated 7 August 1951,
the French extended their Red River delta perimeter amund Hanoi
and Haiphong westward to boa Dinh, but heavy Viet Minh attacks
over a period of two months coupled with harassing action by
Viet Liinh units which had infiltrated the Delta, have resulted
in French withdrawal from the Boa Binh sector., (Sec 'Map 171.) In
the Haanni-Haiphong delta area, 115,000 Franco-Victnamese regular
troops currently contrcnt an estimated 90,000 Viet 11inh regular
troops. Elsewhere in Indochina, guerrilla-type warfare continues
and the Viet Uinh still control northern Tonkin, major portions
of the Annam coast and parts of Cochinchina, Cambodia, and Laos.
(see Map //2. )
7. There has been a great Improvement in the vigor, co-
ordination, and effectiveness of recent Viet Ltinh attacks along
the French perimeter in Tonkin. The Viet Minh have mounted a
sustained frontal attack in the-western delta area, and elsewhere
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in the delta have infiltrated one division and major elements of
another behind the Franco Vietnamese positions in the central
and southern parts of the delta where they are now conducting
harassing operations and pose a threat to, the Hanoi-Haiphong
line of communications, There has been a noticeable increase
in Viet Minh antiaircraft capability in recent months. Although
the Viet Minh have suffered heavy casualties, they continue to
attack and have forced the French to commit almost all of theft'
Tonkin reserves to the operations along the western edge of the
delta and against Viet Dinh units which have infiltrated elsewhere.
8. This increased capability reflects a considerable in-
crease in Chinese Communist advisory, training, and logistic
assistance to the Viet Minh. While there is no conclusive
evidence that Chinese personnel, either in units or as individuals,
are serving with Viet Minh combat units, there are an estimated
15,000 Communist Chinese with the Viet Minh serving in technical,
advisory and garrison capacities. There has been a continuing
improvement of transportation routes and facilities from South
China into Indochina, Chinese Communist logistic assistance to
the Viet Minh via these routes is at an all time high, while
stockpiles on both sides of the border are believed to be in
excess of Viet Dinh requirements for present operations.
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9. Although French losses have been heavy, the combat
effectiveness of the French forces remains high. The combat
effectiveness of the Associated States' forces is for the most
part not yet adequate to fit them for Independent combat oper-
ations. These forces are primarily performing static defense
roles, but some units have conducted themselves creditably with
the French in offensive operations. US IDAP aid has been of
critical importance to the regular French forces during recent
operations. Although the attrition rate in French equipment is
high, LSDAP logistic assistance is compensating for these losses.
10. There has been little significant change in the political
situation within Vietnam, the most important of the Associated
States, since the publication of NIE..35, and the factors discussed
in NM 35 which limit the development of a strong Vietnamese
government still apply. The death of General de Lattre has had
an adverse effect upon Vietnamese morale as have the suspicions
of the Vietnamese that the French may be weakening in their
determination and ability to defend Indochina.
11. tie believe that the spirits of the Viet Minh leaders
have been raised by the recent death of General de Iattre, the
expanded scale of Chinese Communist assistance, the debilitating
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effect which the sustained Viet Minh offensive has had upon
the French, the reoccupation of Hoa Binh by the Viet Minh and
their discernment of a weakening Franco-Vietnamese will to resist.
The consolidation of Commutiat control within the Viet Hintz area
continues and has effectively counttwed internal opposition. The
food shortage is being alleviated by rice gained from within the
French perimeter. There is no evidence of, serious friction be-
tween the Viet 11?.nh ar?l the Chinese Connuniots.
V73T 1111M AND FTh\NCO.=VITFTN,= F CAPABILTTI AW O flOBP.DLE' ODIWly
12. Vie believe that the Viet Minh will probably be able to
continue to Infiltrate the French lines in Tonlcin, but will be
unable to achieve a decisive victcz7 during the period of this
estimate. However, the overall combat effectiveness of the Viet
Minh will almost certainly continue to improve and the Viet Minh
will probably be able to launch a series of haramaing attacks on
French positions in Tonkin, Elsewhere in Indochina, the Viet Minh
will increase their terrorist and guerrilla tactics.
13. The French government is increasingly concerned over
Francells ability to maintain its position in Indochina, There
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is a going, Official fooling in France that it cannot sismita-
feoas3y support presently projected military efforts in both
Brope and Asia without greater IE aid. The 1 'ench D W estimate
that, With pa eslenl: said, the maxtmlrar 1952 military budget that
16 politicaZly and economically possible win fail several
hundred million dollars short of their projected requirements
for NATO and Indochina together, The French, if forced to choose
between Europe and. Indochina, would view their Indochina coamd,tment
as of lesser importance, but the necessity for such a decision is
unlikely to arise during the period under review. Moreover, there
has been a growing feeling that the distant and costly Indochinese
War otters few rewards even if won. This feeling is increasing
political pressure for some alleviation of the French burden In
Indochina. The various approaches by which Vance is seelclzg
to achieve ouch alleviation of the burden aces (a) by insisting
that much of the financial, burden for the defense of Indoohins, be
shitted to the US, (b) by seeking a W -M comnitment to pttioipate
in the defense of Taxiochina in the event of more active Chinese
9oomnmist intcnentianj or possibly (c) by including the issue at
Indochina within the context of air general Far East settlement
which might arise out of Korean negotiations, Should these ap-
proaches prove unsuccessful, the French would seriously consider
withdrawai from IndochlM.
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ila. Within the period under review, however, we believe
that a French military withdrawal from Indochina is unlikely
despite the increasingly difficult financial situation which has
caused isolated demands in Parliament for a withdrawal. Strong
factors still hold the French to their present commitments.
These include: (a) the intangible but powerful factor of prestige;
(b) the knot:ledge thatr;ithdrawal from Indochina would have reper-
cuosiono eiaevrhere in the French 'union; (c) the concern over the
fate of French nationals and investments in Indochina; and (d) the
official feeling that no settlement vdth the Viet titnh or with
Communist China could be achieved that would preserve any french
interests in Indochina.
15. Within Indochina, we believe that there will be no im.
provement during the period of this estimate in the morale or the
political strength of the Vietnanese.. The efforts of the French
and the Bao Dai regime to resist Communist pressure will continue
to be viewed apathetically by a people who do not recognize much
of a personal stake in the war effort and apparently mistrust French
motives more than they recognize any danger from the Communists.
This mistrust of French motivon would be furthcr heightened in the
event that the French shall be impelled to take measures to subdue
the growing "third force" mover;lents, which are opposed to both the
Viet ttinh and the F.rench..
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211M MB CCtBf I )T CAPABILflt) AND PROBABLE CDURSES Or ACTION
16, The Communist Bloc continues to view Indochina as a key
to its desired goal, that of eventual Communist control over all
Southeast Asia, The immediate importance of Indochina to Lioccorr
and Peiping lies in the fact that the existence of a Communist-
sponsored Viet Minh compells France to divert much of its
financial and military resources to Indochina, prevents the
Associated States from gaining generally recognized international
status, and hinders the establishment of a stable non-Communist
state on China's border. The potential importance of Indochina
to Mosccv and Peiping iC greats the fall of Indochina would be a
psychological victory for the Cctimtmist Bloc of the first magnitude,
would undermine the determination of the governments and peoples
of Burma and Thailand to resist Communist aggression, would
facilitate further communist conquests in Southeast Asia, t:ould
hinder the "encirclement" of Communist China by non-Communist states,
would provide the Communist Bloc with control of additional sources
of food and strategic materials, and mould derv to the West the
strategic position and the resources of Indochina.
17. Transportation facilities from South China into Indochina
continue to be improved, and there have been numerous indications of
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Chinese Communist troop buildup and stockpiling along the Indochina
border, These developments increase the capabilities of the Chinese
CcmmuAsto either to invade Indochina in force or to give military
assistance to the Viet Liinh,
18. If the Chinese Communists should decide to intervene
directly in Indochina, they have an estimated 300,000 troops
available in South China for such an invasion. We believe that of
this number they could actually commit and support logistically
150,000 troops isuiependent of operations in Korea. Logistic and
transportation difficulties would restrict the operations of these
troops to a series of limited offensives, between which time would
be needed for replenishment of supplies and repair of transportation
facilities. An intensification of the Korean hostilities would
probably substantially' reduce the flocs of supplies for Iruiochina
unless the Soviets undertook to replenish the Chinese Cemmunint
stocks. Such Soviet aid suuld be probable in the event of Chinese
Ccwman3.ot ccaanitment of forces in Indochina. It may be assumed that
the infantry components of the Chinese Communist troops south of the
Yangtze are adequately equipped with normal infantry light weapons
and that their training is sufficient to attempt an invasion, An
armistice in Korea would increase the number of Chinese Communist
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troops and the logistic support that could be made available for
operations in Indochina; transportation deficiencies would still be
a limiting factor, however, although the level of logistic support
could be raised somewhat by use of the facilities of the Chinese
Communist Air Force.
19. These Chinese Communist troops, added to those of the
Viet Minh, would probably be able to force the French and the
Vietnamese troops to evacuate Tonkin before any effective assistance
would be brought to bears Although the Chinese Communists Could
probably not commit arC* jet aircraft so long as hostilities in
Korea continue, the CCAF, employing only piston-type aircraft, would
probably, with surprise, have the capability to neutralize the French
Air Forces in Tonkin,. An armistice in Korea would of course vastly
increase this capability.
20. The Chinese Communists might risk an invasion of Indochina
in arty one of a number of circumstances; in order to counter an
anticipated blow by the Vest and/or the Chinese Nationalists; as a
diversionary attack in the event of a general Far Eastcxn or global
war; if the Columnists believed that the West intended to attack
Communist China regardless of the latter?s policies in Southeast
Asia; or in the event that Commrnist leadership should decide that
swim
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a potential shift in inestorn policies might create a serious threat
to Communist China that could not be countered through present
Communist strategy.
21. We believe, honever,, that the Chinese Communists will
not invade Indochina during the period of this estimate. Although
the increased Chinese Communist capabilities in South China suggest
preparations for an invasion of Indochina, present evidence does
not necessarily indicate that such an invasion is imminent. Other
considerations, furthermore, militate against a direct Intervention
by the Chinese Ce mmun3.sts:
a. Present Cammmist strategy is bringing considerable
success in Tudochina, may weaken the determination
:.nd. ability of both the Vietnamese and the French
to continue resistance, and may provide the Camttuu..-
nistc vriith a potential tool for aggravating dif-
ferences among the 'Western Powers,
bo Recent western moves have probably made world
Communist leadership are that the 'Nest, and in
particular the TE, may expand the war in Asia to
the Chinese mainland should. Cawunist China invade
Indochina. Any such awareness is probably somewhat
offset by Communist recognition of divided opinions
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in the West as to the merits and timing of such
retaliation. On balance, however, concern that
the war in Asia might be expanded and that drastic
retaliatory action might be taken against the
mainland of China is probably sufficient to be a
major factor dissuading the Chinese Communists from
openly intervening in force in Indochina.
c. Despite the importance of Indochina discussed above,
it is unlikely that its present economic and
strategic importance to Peiping and Moscow is great
enough to dictate a large-scale Chinese Ccommist
invasion with a possible risk of initiating general
22. We believe that the Chinese Communists will, short of
open intervention, gradually expand the scale and nature of their
present assistance to the Viet Minh. Even assuming continuing
heavy commitments in Korea, the Chinese Ccmaunists will face no
forbidding difficulty in increasing the present level of technical
and logistic assistance to the Viet Minh. Logistical, support will
probably consist primarily of such items as light arms and ammunition,
vehicles, some field and antiaircraft artillery, and communication,
and medical equipment.
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23. The Chinese Communists wil1 also continue to commit
technical and advisory personnel to the Viet Liinh and may intro-
duce Chinese "volunteer" troops. 17e do not believe, however,
that significant numbers of such "volunteers" will be introduced
into the Viet Minh during the period of this estimate.
24. Consequently, the probable outlook through mid-1952
in Indochina is one of continued military stalemated We foresee
some small territorial gains by the Viet Minh, but no major
victory on either side during the period of this estimate,
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